ci: attach provenance and SBOM attestations to the published container

[kobihikri]

Hi, and thanks for InvokeAI.

.github/workflows/build-container.yml publishes the container, but the pushed manifest carries no provenance or SBOM attestation. Someone pulling it cannot check that it was built by this workflow, from this repository, at that tag.

The SBOM half is the one I would argue for first here. An InvokeAI image is a large, opinionated stack — a specific torch build, CUDA or ROCm bits, and a long tail of Python packages pinned to work together. That combination is the whole value of using the image rather than installing locally, and right now the only way to see exactly what a given tag contains is to run it and inspect. sbom: true publishes that inventory next to the image.

The change is two lines on the build step:

          push: ...
          provenance: mode=max
          sbom: true

BuildKit attaches both to the image manifest, so they travel with the image. No permissions change is needed — nothing has to gain id-token, and your existing conditional push and cache configuration are untouched.

docker buildx imagetools inspect <image>:<tag> --format '{{ json .SBOM }}'

Two caveats: mode=max records build arguments (provenance: true gives a smaller record if any have ever been sensitive), and attestations add an extra manifest to the index, which the registry supports.

No SLSA level claimed — the attestation is what BuildKit produces.

Disclosure: I used AI assistance to help spot this and prepare the change, and I read the workflow myself.

[lstein]

Thank you for your contribution.