fix(share): scrub credentials that carry no upper-case character - #5588
fix(share): scrub credentials that carry no upper-case character#5588ntdatt812 wants to merge 2 commits into
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The last-resort secret pattern requires an upper-case letter so it does not fire on prose: (?=[A-Za-z0-9+/_-]*[A-Z])(?=...[a-z])(?=...[0-9]) That makes it blind to credentials whose body is lower-case and digits only, and those reached the share card intact. Measured against buildFallbackHeadline on main: xoxb-123456789012-987654321098-abcdefghijklmnop verbatim xoxp-987654321098-123456789012-zyxwvutsrqponmlk verbatim glpat-abcdefghij1234567890 verbatim hf_abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz1234 verbatim https://discord.com/api/webhooks/<id>/<token> verbatim The module states its own bar -- "nothing private must leak into a shared card" -- and this is the card text that gets posted publicly. Adds explicit patterns for those shapes rather than relaxing the last-resort rule, which would trade this for over-redacting prose; that trade is yours to make, not mine to assume. One detail worth keeping: `_` is optional in the huggingface pattern because stripMarkdown strips emphasis characters before redaction runs, so `hf_abc…` arrives as `hfabc…`. A pattern insisting on the underscore would never match. Pinned by a test. Eight tests. Six are red without the src change. The Slack webhook case and the prose guard pass either way -- the first because that URL's path happens to contain upper-case, the second by design. 62 tests green across src/features/share. prettier, eslint and tsc all exit 0.
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Included review availability: Your plan provides up to 10 included reviews per hour; 9 remain after this review. 📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe share feature now redacts additional vendor credentials, Hugging Face tokens, and Slack or Discord webhook URLs. Tests cover direct redaction, fallback headlines after Markdown stripping, and lowercase prose preservation. ChangesCredential redaction
Estimated code review effort: 2 (Simple) | ~10 minutes Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to This localized change broadens credential scrubbing for public share cards while preserving ordinary prose and existing behavior. Tests and static checks pass, and no actionable merge-blocking risk remains. Suggested reviewers: Poem
🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 5✅ Passed checks (5 passed)
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How this change flows0 changed behaviours across 11 relationships. 6 surrounding behaviours are shown (60 graph nodes walked). 33 further behaviours left out to keep the diagram readable. flowchart LR
n0["out"]:::impacted
n1["buildShareCaption"]:::impacted
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n3["redactSensitive"]:::impacted
n4["truncateAtWord"]:::impacted
n5["cleaned"]:::impacted
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classDef changed fill:#0d4429,stroke:#238636,color:#e6edf3
classDef impacted fill:#161b22,stroke:#6e7681,color:#c9d1d9
classDef flagged fill:#5a1e02,stroke:#d93f0b,color:#ffffff
classDef blocking fill:#67060c,stroke:#f85149,color:#ffffff
Green: changed behaviour. Grey: surrounding behaviour. Arrows name the call, use, implementation, or test relationship. Orange: has findings. Red: has a finding that blocks the merge. |
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Inline comments:
In `@app/src/features/share/shareContent.test.ts`:
- Line 63: Update the GitLab personal access token fixture in the share-content
tests to assemble the value from separate string parts, matching the existing
Slack fixture approach, so scanners do not recognize it as a PAT literal. Revoke
the token before merging if it is not synthetic.
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app/src/features/share/shareContent.test.tsapp/src/features/share/shareContent.ts
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…t whole Review point from CodeRabbit on the glpat fixture, and it holds for the huggingface one too: a shape-exact literal is what a secret scanner keys on, so writing one into a test file risks blocking the push for whoever touches it next. GitHub push protection already rejected the Slack form on the first attempt at this branch, which is why those two were assembled and the other two were not -- an inconsistency, not a judgement. Generalises the existing helper to take the separator, so `hf_` is covered by the same mechanism as the dashed prefixes rather than a second one: const assembled = (separator: string, ...parts: string[]) => parts.join(separator); All four values are unchanged, so the evidence table in the PR description still describes exactly what these tests feed in. Every fixture here is a synthetic dummy; none is or ever was a live credential. The webhook URLs are left as literals on purpose. Their secret components are `T00000000` / `B00000000` / a straight alphabet run -- visibly placeholder, and no scanner has flagged them. 62 tests green across src/features/share. prettier, eslint and tsc exit 0.
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@coderabbitai the finding is correct and is now fixed in The inconsistency you spotted was real and had a boring cause: GitHub push protection rejected my first push because of the Generalised the existing helper to take the separator, so the underscore prefix goes through the same mechanism instead of a second one: const assembled = (separator: string, ...parts: string[]) => parts.join(separator);All four fixture values are byte-for-byte unchanged, so the evidence table in the PR description still describes exactly what the tests feed in. On revocation: nothing to revoke. Every value here is synthetic — I did not de-literalise the two webhook URLs, and want to be explicit about that rather than leave it looking like an oversight. Their secret-bearing components are Verified after the change, exit codes checked rather than output skimmed: 62 tests green across |
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The generalized Keeping the synthetic webhook URLs as readable literals is appropriate. These tests verify full URL matching, and the placeholder components do not represent credentials. 🐇 ✅ ✏️ Learnings added
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Summary
shareContent.tsopens with its own bar:The last-resort secret pattern requires an upper-case character so it does not fire on prose:
That makes it blind to any credential whose body is lower-case and digits only. Those reached the card text intact — the text that gets posted publicly.
Measured on
mainEach value below passed through
buildFallbackHeadlineverbatim (shape-accurate dummies, not real keys):mainxoxb-…xoxp-…glpat-…hf_…For contrast, these were already handled and still are:
sk-…,AKIA…,npm_…(mixed case), long hex, and a JWT's payload/signature segments.The fix, and what I deliberately did not do
Added explicit patterns for those shapes, in the same style as the existing specific rules that precede the last-resort one.
I did not relax the last-resort rule to drop its upper-case requirement. That would catch this whole class in one line, but it trades it for over-redacting ordinary lower-case identifiers, and the file already states it is "intentionally last-resort and biased toward over-redaction". Where that line sits is your call, not mine to assume — say the word and I'll switch the approach.
One detail worth keeping in view: the
_is optional in the HuggingFace pattern becausestripMarkdownremoves emphasis characters before redaction runs, sohf_abc…arrives here ashfabc…. A pattern insisting on the underscore would silently never match. There is a test pinning that.I also checked whether swapping the order (
stripMarkdown(redactSensitive(x))) would be the better fix — it makes no difference to any of these cases, so I left the order alone rather than churn it.Verification
Eight tests added to
shareContent.test.ts. Reverting onlyshareContent.ts:The six failures are the bug proofs. The other two pass either way, and I would rather name them than let them pad the count:
T00000000/B00000000, so the upper-case requirement happened to be satisfied already;With the fix:
31 passed, and62 passedacross all ofsrc/features/share.prettier --check .,eslint srcandtsc --noEmiteach exit 0.One note on the test fixtures
The two Slack tokens are assembled from parts rather than written as literals. As single literals they match GitHub's Slack-token detector closely enough that push protection rejects the commit — I hit exactly that pushing this branch. Assembling them keeps the regex under test identical while letting the file be pushed. I did not use the "allow this secret" bypass; that seemed like the wrong habit to bake into a repo.
Summary by CodeRabbit