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chore(deps): update dependency @angular/compiler to v20.3.16 [security]#2430

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chore(deps): update dependency @angular/compiler to v20.3.16 [security]#2430
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@renovate renovate bot commented Apr 8, 2026

This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Adoption Passing Confidence
@angular/compiler (source) 20.3.220.3.16 age adoption passing confidence

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2025-66412

A Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability has been identified in the Angular Template Compiler. It occurs because the compiler's internal security schema is incomplete, allowing attackers to bypass Angular's built-in security sanitization. Specifically, the schema fails to classify certain URL-holding attributes (e.g., those that could contain javascript: URLs) as requiring strict URL security, enabling the injection of malicious scripts.

Additionally, a related vulnerability exists involving SVG animation elements (<animate>, <set>, <animateMotion>, <animateTransform>). The attributeName attribute on these elements was not properly validated, allowing attackers to dynamically target security-sensitive attributes like href or xlink:href on other elements. By binding attributeName to "href" and providing a javascript: URL in the values or to attribute, an attacker could bypass sanitization and execute arbitrary code.

Attributes confirmed to be vulnerable include:

  • SVG-related attributes: (e.g., xlink:href), and various MathML attributes (e.g., math|href, annotation|href).
  • SVG animation attributeName attribute when bound to "href" or "xlink:href".

When template binding is used to assign untrusted, user-controlled data to these attributes (e.g., [attr.xlink:href]="maliciousURL" or <animate [attributeName]="'href'" [values]="maliciousURL">), the compiler incorrectly falls back to a non-sanitizing context or fails to block the dangerous attribute assignment. This allows an attacker to inject a javascript:URL payload. Upon user interaction (like a click) on the element, or automatically in the case of animations, the malicious JavaScript executes in the context of the application's origin.

Impact

When exploited, this vulnerability allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code within the context of the vulnerable application's domain. This enables:

  • Session Hijacking: Stealing session cookies and authentication tokens.
  • Data Exfiltration: Capturing and transmitting sensitive user data.
  • Unauthorized Actions: Performing actions on behalf of the user.

Patches

  • 19.2.17
  • 20.3.15
  • 21.0.2

Attack Preconditions

  • The victim's Angular application must render data derived from untrusted input (e.g., from a database or API) and bind it to one of the unsanitized URL attributes or the attributeName of an SVG animation element.
  • The victim must perform a user interaction (e.g., clicking) on the compromised element for the stored script to execute, or the animation must trigger the execution.

Workarounds

If you cannot upgrade, you can workaround the issue by ensuring that any data bound to the vulnerable attributes is never sourced from untrusted user input (e.g., database, API response, URL parameters).

  • Avoid Affected Template Bindings: Specifically avoid using template bindings (e.g., [attr.xlink:href]="maliciousURL") to assign untrusted data to the vulnerable SVG/MathML attributes.
  • Avoid Dynamic attributeName on SVG Animations: Do not bind untrusted data to the attributeName attribute of SVG animation elements (<animate>, <set>, etc.).
  • Enable Content Security Policy (CSP): Configure a robust CSP header that disallows javascript: URLs.

CVE-2026-22610

A Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability has been identified in the Angular Template Compiler. The vulnerability exists because Angular’s internal sanitization schema fails to recognize the href and xlink:href attributes of SVG <script> elements as a Resource URL context.

In a standard security model, attributes that can load and execute code (like a script's source) should be strictly validated. However, because the compiler does not classify these specific SVG attributes correctly, it allows attackers to bypass Angular's built-in security protections.

When template binding is used to assign user-controlled data to these attributes for example, <script [attr.href]="userInput"> the compiler treats the value as a standard string or a non-sensitive URL rather than a resource link. This enables an attacker to provide a malicious payload, such as a data:text/javascript URI or a link to an external malicious script.

Impact

When successfully exploited, this vulnerability allows for arbitrary JavaScript execution within the context of the victim's browser session. This can lead to:

  • Session Hijacking: Stealing session cookies, localStorage data, or authentication tokens.
  • Data Exfiltration: Accessing and transmitting sensitive information displayed within the application.
  • Unauthorized Actions: Performing state-changing actions (like clicking buttons or submitting forms) on behalf of the authenticated user.

Attack Preconditions

  1. The victim application must explicitly use SVG <script> elements within its templates.
  2. The application must use property or attribute binding (interpolation) for the href or xlink:href attributes of those SVG scripts.
  3. The data bound to these attributes must be derived from an untrusted source (e.g., URL parameters, user-submitted database entries, or unsanitized API responses).

Patches

  • 19.2.18
  • 20.3.16
  • 21.0.7
  • 21.1.0-rc.0

Workarounds

Until the patch is applied, developers should:

  • Avoid Dynamic Bindings: Do not use Angular template binding (e.g., [attr.href]) for SVG <script> elements.
  • Input Validation: If dynamic values must be used, strictly validate the input against a strict allowlist of trusted URLs on the server side or before it reaches the template.

Resources


Release Notes

angular/angular (@​angular/compiler)

v20.3.16

Compare Source

core
Commit Type Description
c2c2b4aaa8 fix sanitize sensitive attributes on SVG script elements

v20.3.15

Compare Source

compiler
Commit Type Description
d1ca8ae043 fix prevent XSS via SVG animation attributeName and MathML/SVG URLs

v20.3.14

Compare Source

http
Commit Type Description
0276479e7d fix prevent XSRF token leakage to protocol-relative URLs

v20.3.13

Compare Source

v20.3.12

Compare Source

v20.3.11

Compare Source

common
Commit Type Description
5047849a4a fix remove placeholder image listeners once view is removed
compiler
Commit Type Description
f9d0818087 fix support arbitrary nesting in :host-context()
106b9040df fix support commas in :host() argument
9419ea348a fix support complex selectors in :nth-child()
036c5d2a07 fix support one additional level of nesting in :host()
core
Commit Type Description
dcdd1bcdbb fix skip leave animations on view swaps

v20.3.10

Compare Source

compiler-cli
Commit Description
fix - 840db59dc1 make required inputs diagnostic less noisy
migrations
Commit Description
fix - a45e6b2b66 Prevent removal of templates referenced with preceding whitespace characters

v20.3.9

Compare Source

v20.3.7

Compare Source

animations
Commit Type Description
bd38cd45a5 fix account for Element.animate exceptions (#​64506)
compiler
Commit Type Description
891f180262 fix correctly compile long numeric HTML entities (#​64297)
compiler-cli
Commit Type Description
371274bfc6 fix missingStructuralDirective diagnostic produces false negatives (#​64470)
core
Commit Type Description
4c89a267c3 fix pass element removal property through in all locations (#​64565)
2fad4d4ab6 fix prevent duplicate nodes from being retained with fast `animate.leave`` calls (#​64592)
router
Commit Type Description
cfd8ed3fff fix Fix outlet serialization and parsing with no primary children (#​64505)
182fe78f91 fix Surface parse errors in Router.parseUrl (#​64503)

v20.3.6

Compare Source

core
Commit Type Description
911d6822cb fix update animation scheduling (#​64441)
platform-browser
Commit Type Description
2ece42866d fix DomEventsPlugin should always be the last plugin to be called for supports(). (#​50394)

v20.3.5

Compare Source

compiler-cli
Commit Type Description
8dec92ff9f fix capture metadata for undecorated fields (#​63957) (#​64317)
c2e817b0ef perf fix performance of "interpolated signal not invoked" check (#​64410)
core
Commit Type Description
f15cfa4cc4 fix fixes regression in animate.leave function bindings (#​64413)
d54dd674ca fix Prevents early style pruning with leave animations (#​64335)
migrations
Commit Type Description
554573e524 fix migrating input with more than 1 usage in a method (#​64367)
2c79ca0b57 fix remove error for no matching files in control flow migration (#​64253) (#​64314)
router
Commit Type Description
6e4bcc7d22 fix Scroll restoration should use instant scroll behavior for traversals (#​64299)

v20.3.4

Compare Source

core
Commit Type Description
853ed169a8 fix ensure missing leave animations don't queue leave animations (#​64226)
6fed986b7a fix Fixes animations in conjunction with content projection (#​63776)
76fe5599fe fix handle undefined CSS time values in parseCssTimeUnitsToMs function (#​64181)
3b959105be fix prevent early exit from leave animations when multiple transitions are present (#​64225)
migrations
Commit Type Description
65884895ff fix preserve component imports when pruning NgModules in standalone migration (#​64186)

v20.3.3

Compare Source

compiler
Commit Type Description
f51ab32fb3 fix recover template literals with broken expressions (#​64150)
core
Commit Type Description
542cd0019a fix do not rename ARIA property bindings to attributes (#​64089)
0e928fbc4a fix Fixes animations in conjunction with content projection (#​63776)
e5157bd933 fix prevents unintended early termination of leave animations and hoisting (#​64088)
migrations
Commit Type Description
1710cbd7d4 fix handle shorthand property declarations in NgModule (#​64160)
77b6305a4b fix skip migration for inputs with 'this' references (#​64142)

Configuration

📅 Schedule: (in timezone UTC)

  • Branch creation
    • ""
  • Automerge
    • At any time (no schedule defined)

🚦 Automerge: Enabled.

Rebasing: Whenever PR is behind base branch, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.

🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.


  • If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box

This PR was generated by Mend Renovate. View the repository job log.

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nx-cloud bot commented Apr 8, 2026

View your CI Pipeline Execution ↗ for commit 1ce29b8

Command Status Duration Result
nx run-many --target=test --all --configuration... ✅ Succeeded 2s View ↗
nx run-many --target=lint --all --exclude=creat... ✅ Succeeded 2s View ↗
nx lint-types store ✅ Succeeded <1s View ↗
nx run-many --target=build --all ✅ Succeeded 1m 6s View ↗

☁️ Nx Cloud last updated this comment at 2026-04-08 20:25:40 UTC

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@ngxs/devtools-plugin

npm i https://pkg.pr.new/@ngxs/devtools-plugin@2430

@ngxs/form-plugin

npm i https://pkg.pr.new/@ngxs/form-plugin@2430

@ngxs/hmr-plugin

npm i https://pkg.pr.new/@ngxs/hmr-plugin@2430

@ngxs/router-plugin

npm i https://pkg.pr.new/@ngxs/router-plugin@2430

@ngxs/storage-plugin

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@ngxs/store

npm i https://pkg.pr.new/@ngxs/store@2430

@ngxs/websocket-plugin

npm i https://pkg.pr.new/@ngxs/websocket-plugin@2430

commit: 1ce29b8

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bundlemon bot commented Apr 8, 2026

BundleMon

Files updated (1)
Status Path Size Limits
fesm2022/ngxs-store.mjs
112.8KB (+70B +0.06%) 114KB / +0.5%
Unchanged files (5)
Status Path Size Limits
fesm2022/ngxs-store-operators.mjs
15.7KB 16KB / +0.5%
fesm2022/ngxs-store-internals.mjs
13.74KB 15KB / +0.5%
fesm2022/ngxs-store-internals-testing.mjs
10.33KB 13KB / +0.5%
fesm2022/ngxs-store-plugins.mjs
2.37KB 3KB / +0.5%
fesm2022/ngxs-store-experimental.mjs
574B 2KB / +0.5%

Total files change +89B +0.06%

Unchanged groups (1)
Status Path Size Limits
@ngxs/store(fesm2022)[gzip]
./fesm2022/*.mjs
38.57KB +1%

Final result: ✅

View report in BundleMon website ➡️


Current branch size history | Target branch size history

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bundlemon bot commented Apr 8, 2026

BundleMon (NGXS Plugins)

Unchanged files (9)
Status Path Size Limits
Plugins(fesm2022)[gzip]
storage-plugin/fesm2022/ngxs-storage-plugin.m
js
4.12KB +0.5%
Plugins(fesm2022)[gzip]
router-plugin/fesm2022/ngxs-router-plugin.mjs
3.4KB +0.5%
Plugins(fesm2022)[gzip]
hmr-plugin/fesm2022/ngxs-hmr-plugin.mjs
2.72KB +0.5%
Plugins(fesm2022)[gzip]
websocket-plugin/fesm2022/ngxs-websocket-plug
in.mjs
2.58KB +0.5%
Plugins(fesm2022)[gzip]
form-plugin/fesm2022/ngxs-form-plugin.mjs
2.47KB +0.5%
Plugins(fesm2022)[gzip]
devtools-plugin/fesm2022/ngxs-devtools-plugin
.mjs
2.23KB +0.5%
Plugins(fesm2022)[gzip]
logger-plugin/fesm2022/ngxs-logger-plugin.mjs
2.03KB +0.5%
Plugins(fesm2022)[gzip]
storage-plugin/fesm2022/ngxs-storage-plugin-i
nternals.mjs
947B +0.5%
Plugins(fesm2022)[gzip]
router-plugin/fesm2022/ngxs-router-plugin-int
ernals.mjs
453B +0.5%

Total files change +14B +0.07%

Groups updated (1)
Status Path Size Limits
All Plugins(fesm2022)[gzip]
./-plugin/fesm2022/.mjs
20.92KB (+14B +0.07%) +0.5%

Final result: ✅

View report in BundleMon website ➡️


Current branch size history | Target branch size history

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bundlemon bot commented Apr 8, 2026

BundleMon (Integration Projects)

Unchanged files (1)
Status Path Size Limits
Main bundles(Gzip)
hello-world-ng21/dist-integration/browser/mai
n-(hash).js
67.33KB +1%

No change in files bundle size

Final result: ✅

View report in BundleMon website ➡️


Current branch size history | Target branch size history

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