Gate legacy element attestations behind the operator role

PROGRESS.md

@@ -36,6 +36,9 @@ source of truth로 사용한다.
   `RFQMakerNotApproved`), maker-initiated nonce-scoped idempotent cancellation
   (`cancelQuoteNonce`/`cancelQuoteNonces`, `RFQQuoteCancelled`), venueType binding
   fix, `docs/rfq-threat-model.md` 위협 모델과 D008 결정 기록
+- legacy mock element(Sanctions A-01, AccreditedInvestor A-03, QualifiedPurchaser
+  A-13)의 attestation setter를 `Governed`/`onlyOperator` + 이벤트로 정렬해 CMP-001
+  이후 hardening divergence를 닫았다(Lockup C-01은 settable mutator가 없어 변경 없음).
 
 ## Blocked
 
@@ -45,28 +48,25 @@ source of truth로 사용한다.
 
 1. MVP RFQ demo backend milestone/user flow를 별도 문서·feature로 구체화한다.
    PR #29/#30이 머지되면 기존 live-Anvil E2E/CLI 경로를 재사용한다.
-2. pending RFQ/E2E/CLI/BUIDL PR stack(#26/#27/#28/#29/#30/#35)이 머지된 뒤
+2. pending RFQ/E2E/CLI/BUIDL PR stack(#28/#29/#30/#35)이 머지된 뒤
    roadmap과 feature 상태를 재조정한다.
-3. ungated legacy mock element(A-01 sanctions, A-03 accredited, QP)를 새 element와
-   동일하게 operator-gate로 정렬한다 — CMP-001 deferred follow-up.
-4. 남은 RFQ production policy를 별도 feature로 분리한다: custody, partial fill,
+3. 남은 RFQ production policy를 별도 feature로 분리한다: custody, partial fill,
    production dealer/operator 책임.
-5. acquisition/lot data source와 holding-period Recipe 활성화 조건을 결정한다
+4. acquisition/lot data source와 holding-period Recipe 활성화 조건을 결정한다
    (C-01 Lockup은 현재 fixture-only mock acquisition source).
-6. Order Book은 matching/custody/surveillance 모델 결정 후 구현한다.
+5. Order Book은 matching/custody/surveillance 모델 결정 후 구현한다.
 
 ## Last Session Summary
 
-- #26 merge preparation includes CMP-002 (Manifest Lifecycle & Operator Approval Flow) on top of current main.
-- CMP-002 closes the manifest lifecycle state machine and engine default-deny path after CMP-001.
-- RFQ-002, CMP-001, and RFQ-SDK records are preserved during this stacked merge reconciliation.
+- #27 merge preparation includes legacy element gating on top of current main.
+- Legacy mock element setters for A-01/A-03/A-13 are now operator-gated, closing the CMP-001 hardening divergence.
+- RFQ-002, CMP-001, CMP-002, and RFQ-SDK records are preserved during this stacked merge reconciliation.
 - 실행한 검증:
   - original PR CI/checks passed before retarget
   - conflict reconciliation checked with `git diff --check`
 - 남은 리스크:
   - MVP HTTP/CLI backend는 아직 구현하지 않았다.
   - production signer custody, persistent nonce store, pricing, inventory/risk는 integrator/operator 책임이다.
-  - ungated legacy mock element(A-01/A-03/QP)와 새 operator-gated element 사이 hardening divergence는 follow-up으로 정렬한다.
   - C-01 Lockup은 fixture-only mock acquisition source에 의존한다.
 
 ## RFQ-002 Merge Note

src/compliance/elements/AccreditedInvestor.sol

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 pragma solidity 0.8.17;
 
 import {BaseElement} from "./BaseElement.sol";
+import {Governed} from "../../auth/Governed.sol";
 import {
     ElementMetadata,
     ElementCategory,
@@ -14,11 +15,13 @@ import {ReasonCodes} from "../../libraries/ReasonCodes.sol";
 
 /// @dev A-03-v1 Accredited investor attestation (mock). Settable per-user flag
 ///      stands in for a real claim (existence + issuer + expiry, Pattern B).
-contract AccreditedInvestor is BaseElement {
+contract AccreditedInvestor is BaseElement, Governed {
     bytes32 internal constant ELEMENT_ID = "A-03-v1";
 
     mapping(address => bool) public accredited;
 
+    event AccreditedInvestorSet(address indexed investor, bool isAccredited);
+
     constructor()
         BaseElement(ElementMetadata({
                 elementId: ELEMENT_ID,
@@ -31,8 +34,9 @@ contract AccreditedInvestor is BaseElement {
             }))
     {}
 
-    function setAccredited(address user, bool isAccredited) external {
+    function setAccredited(address user, bool isAccredited) external onlyOperator {
         accredited[user] = isAccredited;
+        emit AccreditedInvestorSet(user, isAccredited);
     }
 
     function check(address user, address, address, uint256, bytes calldata)

src/compliance/elements/QualifiedPurchaser.sol

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 pragma solidity 0.8.17;
 
 import {BaseElement} from "./BaseElement.sol";
+import {Governed} from "../../auth/Governed.sol";
 import {
     ElementMetadata,
     ElementCategory,
@@ -14,11 +15,13 @@ import {ReasonCodes} from "../../libraries/ReasonCodes.sol";
 
 /// @dev A-13-v1 Qualified purchaser attestation (mock). Activated conditionally
 ///      by the 3(c)(7) fund recipe; settable per-user flag stands in for a claim.
-contract QualifiedPurchaser is BaseElement {
+contract QualifiedPurchaser is BaseElement, Governed {
     bytes32 internal constant ELEMENT_ID = "A-13-v1";
 
     mapping(address => bool) public qp;
 
+    event QualifiedPurchaserSet(address indexed investor, bool isQp);
+
     constructor()
         BaseElement(ElementMetadata({
                 elementId: ELEMENT_ID,
@@ -31,8 +34,9 @@ contract QualifiedPurchaser is BaseElement {
             }))
     {}
 
-    function setQp(address user, bool isQp) external {
+    function setQp(address user, bool isQp) external onlyOperator {
         qp[user] = isQp;
+        emit QualifiedPurchaserSet(user, isQp);
     }
 
     function check(address user, address, address, uint256, bytes calldata)

src/compliance/elements/Sanctions.sol

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 pragma solidity 0.8.17;
 
 import {BaseElement} from "./BaseElement.sol";
+import {Governed} from "../../auth/Governed.sol";
 import {
     ElementMetadata,
     ElementCategory,
@@ -14,11 +15,13 @@ import {ReasonCodes} from "../../libraries/ReasonCodes.sol";
 
 /// @dev A-01-v1 Sanctions screen (mock). Blocks listed users at the trade gate.
 ///      Real list management is out of scope — a settable mapping stands in.
-contract Sanctions is BaseElement {
+contract Sanctions is BaseElement, Governed {
     bytes32 internal constant ELEMENT_ID = "A-01-v1";
 
     mapping(address => bool) public blocked;
 
+    event SanctionsBlockedSet(address indexed account, bool blocked);
+
     constructor()
         BaseElement(ElementMetadata({
                 elementId: ELEMENT_ID,
@@ -31,8 +34,9 @@ contract Sanctions is BaseElement {
             }))
     {}
 
-    function setBlocked(address user, bool isBlocked) external {
+    function setBlocked(address user, bool isBlocked) external onlyOperator {
         blocked[user] = isBlocked;
+        emit SanctionsBlockedSet(user, isBlocked);
     }
 
     function check(address user, address, address, uint256, bytes calldata)

test/unit/compliance/Elements.t.sol

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ import {
     Statefulness
 } from "../../../src/types/ComplianceTypes.sol";
 import {Events} from "../../../src/libraries/Events.sol";
+import {Errors} from "../../../src/libraries/Errors.sol";
 
 contract MockAcquisitionSource is IAcquisitionSource {
     mapping(bytes32 => uint64) internal _at;
@@ -31,8 +32,15 @@ contract MockAcquisitionSource is IAcquisitionSource {
 }
 
 contract ElementsTest is Test {
+    // Mirrors each legacy element's *Set event signature for vm.expectEmit matching
+    // (solc 0.8.17 does not support qualified `ContractName.EventName` emit syntax).
+    event SanctionsBlockedSet(address indexed account, bool blocked);
+    event AccreditedInvestorSet(address indexed investor, bool isAccredited);
+    event QualifiedPurchaserSet(address indexed investor, bool isQp);
+
     address internal user = address(0xA11CE);
     address internal asset = address(0xBEEF);
+    address internal stranger = address(0xDEAD);
 
     function test_sanctions_pass_and_fail_and_metadata() public {
         Sanctions s = new Sanctions();
@@ -54,6 +62,21 @@ contract ElementsTest is Test {
         assertEq(uint256(m.statefulness), uint256(Statefulness.STATELESS));
     }
 
+    function test_sanctions_setBlocked_reverts_for_non_operator() public {
+        Sanctions s = new Sanctions();
+        vm.prank(stranger);
+        vm.expectRevert(Errors.NotAuthorized.selector);
+        s.setBlocked(user, true);
+    }
+
+    function test_sanctions_setBlocked_updates_state_and_emits() public {
+        Sanctions s = new Sanctions();
+        vm.expectEmit(true, false, false, true);
+        emit SanctionsBlockedSet(user, true);
+        s.setBlocked(user, true);
+        assertTrue(s.blocked(user));
+    }
+
     function test_accredited_pass_fail_metadata() public {
         AccreditedInvestor a = new AccreditedInvestor();
         (bool passed,) = a.check(user, address(0), asset, 0, "");
@@ -70,6 +93,21 @@ contract ElementsTest is Test {
         assertEq(uint256(m.temporal), uint256(TemporalNature.ONE_TIME));
     }
 
+    function test_accredited_setAccredited_reverts_for_non_operator() public {
+        AccreditedInvestor a = new AccreditedInvestor();
+        vm.prank(stranger);
+        vm.expectRevert(Errors.NotAuthorized.selector);
+        a.setAccredited(user, true);
+    }
+
+    function test_accredited_setAccredited_updates_state_and_emits() public {
+        AccreditedInvestor a = new AccreditedInvestor();
+        vm.expectEmit(true, false, false, true);
+        emit AccreditedInvestorSet(user, true);
+        a.setAccredited(user, true);
+        assertTrue(a.accredited(user));
+    }
+
     function test_qp_pass_fail_metadata() public {
         QualifiedPurchaser q = new QualifiedPurchaser();
         (bool passed,) = q.check(user, address(0), asset, 0, "");
@@ -84,6 +122,21 @@ contract ElementsTest is Test {
         assertEq(uint256(m.decidability), uint256(Decidability.ATTESTATION_BASED));
     }
 
+    function test_qp_setQp_reverts_for_non_operator() public {
+        QualifiedPurchaser q = new QualifiedPurchaser();
+        vm.prank(stranger);
+        vm.expectRevert(Errors.NotAuthorized.selector);
+        q.setQp(user, true);
+    }
+
+    function test_qp_setQp_updates_state_and_emits() public {
+        QualifiedPurchaser q = new QualifiedPurchaser();
+        vm.expectEmit(true, false, false, true);
+        emit QualifiedPurchaserSet(user, true);
+        q.setQp(user, true);
+        assertTrue(q.qp(user));
+    }
+
     function test_lockup_blocks_until_elapsed() public {
         MockAcquisitionSource src = new MockAcquisitionSource();
         uint64 lockupSeconds = 100;