Skip to content

chore(deps): bump actions/checkout from 6 to 7 #1238

New issue

Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.

Sign up for GitHub

By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.

Already on GitHub? Sign in to your account

Merged
github-actions merged 2 commits into from
Jul 9, 2026
Merged

chore(deps): bump actions/checkout from 6 to 7 #1238

Changes from 1 commit
Commits
Show all changes
2 commits
Select commit Hold shift + click to select a range
a413ea4
chore(deps): bump actions/checkout from 6 to 7
dependabot[bot] Jul 1, 2026
cd345ef
fix: actions/checkout version hash
sc-david-voisin Jul 9, 2026
File filter

Filter by extension

Filter by extension
Conversations
Failed to load comments.
Loading
Jump to
Jump to file
Failed to load files.
Loading
Diff view
Diff view
4 changes: 2 additions & 2 deletions .github/workflows/publish.yml
View file
Open in desktop
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ jobs:
if: ${{ github.ref_type == 'tag' }}
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
- uses: actions/checkout@v7

@semgrep-code-scalingo semgrep-code-scalingo Bot Jul 1, 2026

Copy link
Copy Markdown

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

Semgrep identified an issue in your code:

actions/checkout@v7 is a mutable tag, so a repointed tag could run attacker-controlled code in your release jobs with repository write access.

More details about this

actions/checkout@v7 pulls whatever code the v7 tag points to at runtime instead of a specific commit. In this releases job, that action runs before GoReleaser and has access to the checked-out repository plus the job’s contents: write permission, so if the v7 tag were ever repointed to attacker-controlled code, that code would execute during your release pipeline.

A plausible attack looks like this:

  1. An attacker compromises the actions/checkout action or gains the ability to move its v7 tag to a different commit.
  2. Your workflow starts on a tag push (if: ${{ github.ref_type == 'tag' }}) and runs - uses: actions/checkout@v7 in the releases job.
  3. GitHub resolves @v7 to the attacker’s commit, and the malicious action code runs on ubuntu-24.04 inside your release job.
  4. That code can read the repository contents fetched by actions/checkout, use the job’s contents: write permission to alter release artifacts or create/update a GitHub release, and access GITHUB_TOKEN later exposed to the GoReleaser step.
  5. The result is a supply-chain compromise where users download a release produced or modified by attacker-controlled code, even though your workflow file still says actions/checkout@v7.

The same risk also appears in the releases-windows job, which uses the same mutable actions/checkout@v7 reference before building Windows releases.

To resolve this comment:

✨ Commit fix suggestion

Suggested change
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608
with:
fetch-depth: 0 # required by GoReleaser (https://goreleaser.com/ci/actions/#fetch-all-history)
View step-by-step instructions
  1. Replace the mutable action reference actions/checkout@v7 with a full 40-character commit SHA for the exact release you want to trust, for example actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608.
  2. Apply the same change to the other actions/checkout@v7 step shown in this workflow so both checkout steps use the same pinned commit.
  3. Keep the existing with: block unchanged, so the step still uses fetch-depth: 0 after pinning. Pinning to a commit SHA prevents the action owner from silently changing what code runs under the same tag name.
  4. Alternatively, if you need a newer actions/checkout release than the example SHA, look up the commit behind that release on the action's GitHub releases page and pin uses: to that 40-character SHA instead of the version tag.
💬 Ignore this finding

Reply with Semgrep commands to ignore this finding.

  • /fp <comment> for false positive
  • /ar <comment> for acceptable risk
  • /other <comment> for all other reasons

Alternatively, triage in Semgrep AppSec Platform to ignore the finding created by github-actions-mutable-action-tag.

You can view more details about this finding in the Semgrep AppSec Platform.

with:
fetch-depth: 0 # required by GoReleaser (https://goreleaser.com/ci/actions/#fetch-all-history)
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6
Expand All @@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ jobs:
if: ${{ github.ref_type == 'tag' }}
runs-on: windows-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
- uses: actions/checkout@v7

@semgrep-code-scalingo semgrep-code-scalingo Bot Jul 1, 2026 •
edited
Loading

Copy link
Copy Markdown

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608.

🥳 Fixed in commit cd345ef 🥳

with:
fetch-depth: 0 # required by GoReleaser (https://goreleaser.com/ci/actions/#fetch-all-history)
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6
Expand Down
Loading