fix(security): prevent command and path injection in instance handling#122
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Remediate CodeQL critical command-line-injection (cs/command-line-injection) and high path-injection (cs/path-injection) findings. - Add PokManager.Domain.Common.SafePath with identifier/file-token validation, shell-text sanitization, and ResolveWithin (canonicalize + base-dir containment). - Validate instanceId/backupId and resolve all user-derived paths within their base directory in LogEndpoints, InstanceEndpoints, UploadBackupHandler and DockerPokManagerClient (rejects path traversal). - Pass process arguments via ProcessStartInfo.ArgumentList instead of a single concatenated string in LocalDockerService, LocalDockerComposeService and DockerPokManagerClient (prevents argument injection). - Validate identifiers and sanitize free-form text (chat messages, config values/keys, custom command tokens) before building shell commands in PokManagerClient; validate container names in SshDockerService. - Switch the CodeQL workflow to the security-focused query suite (security-extended) to stop emitting code-quality noise. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Dependency Review✅ No vulnerabilities or license issues or OpenSSF Scorecard issues found.Scanned FilesNone |
…reated from user input' Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <62310815+github-advanced-security[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Add SafePath.SanitizeLogValue and apply it when logging user-derived values (cache keys/patterns, instance ids, docker-compose paths, executed commands) so attacker-controlled CR/LF cannot forge log entries (cs/log-forging). Instance-id sourced log entries are additionally covered by the identifier validation added earlier. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Remediate CodeQL critical command-line-injection (cs/command-line-injection)
and high path-injection (cs/path-injection) findings.
shell-text sanitization, and ResolveWithin (canonicalize + base-dir containment).
base directory in LogEndpoints, InstanceEndpoints, UploadBackupHandler and
DockerPokManagerClient (rejects path traversal).
concatenated string in LocalDockerService, LocalDockerComposeService and
DockerPokManagerClient (prevents argument injection).
values/keys, custom command tokens) before building shell commands in
PokManagerClient; validate container names in SshDockerService.
(security-extended) to stop emitting code-quality noise.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 noreply@anthropic.com