diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 001f011..62e4f6a 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,22 @@
+2026-04-28  Egor Ignatov  <egori at altlinux.org>
+
+	libtcb: skip privilege drop in unprivileged user namespaces.
+	When /proc/self/setgroups is "deny" we cannot call setgroups(2),
+	and euid 0 inside such a namespace does not carry real privileges
+	anyway.  Treat this case the same as running non-root: mark the
+	privs structure with PRIV_MAGIC_NONROOT and return success.
+	Fixes failures of pam_tcb, libnss_tcb, tcb_unconvert and shadow's
+	shadowtcb_drop_priv() when running under rootless container.
+	* libs/libtcb.c (tcb_drop_priv_r): Behave as non-root when
+	setgroups_allowed() returns 0.
+
+	libtcb: add setgroups_allowed() helper.
+	Detect /proc/self/setgroups == "deny" to recognize an unprivileged
+	user namespace where setgroups(2) is permanently denied by the
+	kernel.  No-op on non-Linux.
+	* libs/libtcb.c (setgroups_allowed) [__linux__]: New function.
+	(setgroups_allowed) [!__linux__]: New stub returning 1.
+
 2024-12-22  Björn Esser  <besser82 at fedoraproject.org>
 
 	tcb_(un)convert: Check for UID and EUID to be 0 before proceeding.
diff --git a/libs/libtcb.c b/libs/libtcb.c
index 872e435..25b9c46 100644
--- a/libs/libtcb.c
+++ b/libs/libtcb.c
@@ -167,6 +167,33 @@ static int sys_setgroups(size_t size, const gid_t *list)
 	return syscall(SYS_setgroups, size, list);
 }
 
+#ifdef __linux__
+/*
+ * In an unprivileged user namespace the kernel writes "deny" to
+ * /proc/self/setgroups, after which setgroups(2) is permanently
+ * denied for this process.  Detect that situation so callers of
+ * tcb_drop_priv_r() can short-circuit instead of failing on
+ * setgroups(0, NULL).
+ */
+static int setgroups_allowed(void)
+{
+	int fd;
+	char buf[5];
+	ssize_t n;
+
+	fd = open("/proc/self/setgroups", O_RDONLY | O_NOCTTY);
+	if (fd == -1)
+		return 1;
+	n = read(fd, buf, 5);
+	close(fd);
+	if (n != 5)
+		return 1;
+	return memcmp(buf, "deny\n", 5) != 0;
+}
+#else
+static int setgroups_allowed(void) { return 1; }
+#endif
+
 #define PRIV_MAGIC			0x1004000a
 #define PRIV_MAGIC_NONROOT		0xdead000a
 
@@ -188,6 +215,17 @@ int tcb_drop_priv_r(const char *name, struct tcb_privs *p)
 		return 0;
 	}
 
+/*
+ * In an unprivileged user namespace setgroups(2) is denied by the
+ * kernel.  Without it we cannot drop supplementary groups, and being
+ * euid 0 inside such a namespace does not carry real privileges
+ * anyway, so behave as if we were non-root.
+ */
+	if (!setgroups_allowed()) {
+		p->is_dropped = PRIV_MAGIC_NONROOT;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	if (stat(TCB_DIR, &st))
 		return -1;