Status: Executed for the first source publication. Use this file to verify or repair controls. Do not repeat repository creation.
The owner approved the wip-commit name,
github.com/nstranquist/wip-commit module path, and capture-only boundary on
2026-08-16. This approval does not permit an agent to push. The repository
instructions assign the first push to a human.
Do not create a release tag until every public-beta gate passes.
The first-publication procedure is now a historical record in PUBLICATION-HANDOFF.md. Current control evidence is in HOSTED-STATUS-2026-08-18.md. This runbook does not authorize a release tag.
Use the current GitHub documentation when this runbook executes:
- Managing repository rulesets
- Configuring private vulnerability reporting
- Configuring Dependabot alerts
- Enabling secret scanning
- Artifact attestations
Review those pages again before the first push. GitHub settings and plan availability can change.
- Validate and retain the private pre-first-push receipt.
- Follow the human-only first-push and pull-request sequence in the publication handoff.
- Verify that remote
mainequals the receipt's candidate commit and tree. - Set
mainas the default branch before you activate its ruleset.
Do not force-push or replace imported history.
Create one active branch ruleset for main. Do not grant a routine bypass.
Require:
- pull requests before updates.
- at least one approval.
- dismissal of stale approvals after new commits.
- resolution of review conversations.
- required status checks.
- linear history.
- blocked force pushes.
- blocked branch deletion.
Run the first pull request before you select status-check names. Use the exact check names that GitHub reports for:
- Linux, macOS, and Windows tests.
- the race job.
- golangci-lint.
- dependency review.
Set the ruleset to active only after its target and required checks are exact.
Enable and verify:
- the dependency graph.
- Dependabot alerts.
- Dependabot security updates.
- secret scanning for the public repository.
- push protection when the repository plan provides it.
- private vulnerability reporting.
- security-alert notifications for the maintainer.
The repository already contains SECURITY.md. Verify that GitHub displays it
on the repository security page.
Use read-only workflow permissions by default. Grant write permissions only in the release job that needs them.
Keep every third-party action pinned to a complete commit ID. Verify that the workflow does not persist checkout credentials.
Require approval before an untrusted fork workflow receives protected access.
After the approved prerelease workflow runs:
- Download every archive, checksum file, and release receipt.
- Verify
checksums.txtin a clean directory. - Run
gh attestation verifyfor each release archive. - Verify that the attestation names the approved repository and tag commit.
- Install the tagged module in a clean environment.
- Run
wip version. - Record the workflow URL and redacted verification receipt.
An attestation has value only after a consumer verifies it.
Keep these public or redacted records:
- owner approval for the name and module path.
- candidate commit and tree IDs.
- ruleset URL or exported settings.
- hosted job URLs for all required platforms.
- enabled security-setting receipt.
- private reporting test receipt.
- release checksums and attestations.
- clean installation receipt.
- unresolved gaps and their owners.
Do not store access tokens, notification addresses, private reports, or raw security logs in the repository.