本實驗提供全面的指導，幫助您在 MCP 伺服器上實現企業級安全性與多租戶架構。您將學習如何設計安全且符合規範的系統，保護敏感的零售數據，同時支持多租戶的靈活訪問模式。
安全性在處理客戶數據、支付信息以及商業智能的零售應用中至關重要。本實驗涵蓋完整的安全架構，從身份驗證與授權到數據隔離與合規監控。
我們採用深度防禦策略，結合 Azure 身份服務、PostgreSQL 行級安全性（Row Level Security）、應用層控制以及全面的審計日誌，打造一個穩健且符合規範的平台。
完成本實驗後，您將能夠：
- 實現 企業級行級安全性以隔離多租戶數據
- 設計 使用 Azure 的安全身份驗證與授權模式
- 配置 符合合規要求的全面審計日誌
- 應用 深度防禦安全策略於所有應用層
- 驗證 通過系統化測試檢查安全性實施
- 監控 安全事件並應對潛在威脅
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Azure Front Door │ ← WAF, DDoS Protection
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Application Gateway │ ← SSL Termination, Rate Limiting
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ MCP Server │ ← Authentication, Authorization
│ ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ │ Connection Layer │ ← Connection Pooling, Circuit Breakers
│ ├─────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ │ Business Logic Layer │ ← Input Validation, Business Rules
│ ├─────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ │ Data Access Layer │ ← Query Sanitization, RLS Context
│ └─────────────────────────────────────────────┤
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ PostgreSQL RLS │ ← Row Level Security, Audit Triggers
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
我們的實現採用了 共享數據庫，共享架構 模型，並結合行級安全性：
優勢：
- 成本效益高的資源利用
- 簡化維護與更新
- 通過 RLS 實現強大的數據隔離
- 符合合規要求的審計記錄
權衡：
- 需要仔細設計 RLS 策略
- 架構更改會影響所有租戶
- 需要穩健的備份/恢復程序
-- Enable RLS on all multi-tenant tables
ALTER TABLE retail.customers ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
ALTER TABLE retail.products ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
ALTER TABLE retail.sales_transactions ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
ALTER TABLE retail.sales_transaction_items ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
ALTER TABLE retail.product_embeddings ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
-- Create application role for MCP server
CREATE ROLE mcp_user LOGIN;
GRANT USAGE ON SCHEMA retail TO mcp_user;
GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON ALL TABLES IN SCHEMA retail TO mcp_user;-- Function to securely set store context
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION retail.set_store_context(store_id_param VARCHAR(50))
RETURNS void
LANGUAGE plpgsql
SECURITY DEFINER
SET search_path = retail, pg_temp
AS $$
DECLARE
user_info RECORD;
BEGIN
-- Validate store exists and is active
SELECT store_id, store_name, is_active
INTO user_info
FROM retail.stores
WHERE store_id = store_id_param;
IF NOT FOUND THEN
RAISE EXCEPTION 'Store not found: %', store_id_param
USING ERRCODE = 'invalid_parameter_value',
HINT = 'Verify store ID and ensure it exists in the system';
END IF;
IF NOT user_info.is_active THEN
RAISE EXCEPTION 'Store is inactive: %', store_id_param
USING ERRCODE = 'insufficient_privilege',
HINT = 'Contact administrator to activate store';
END IF;
-- Set the secure context
PERFORM set_config('app.current_store_id', store_id_param, false);
PERFORM set_config('app.store_name', user_info.store_name, false);
PERFORM set_config('app.context_set_at', extract(epoch from current_timestamp)::text, false);
-- Log context change for audit
INSERT INTO retail.security_audit_log (
event_type,
user_name,
store_id,
ip_address,
user_agent,
details,
severity
) VALUES (
'store_context_set',
current_user,
store_id_param,
inet_client_addr()::text,
current_setting('application_name', true),
jsonb_build_object(
'store_name', user_info.store_name,
'timestamp', current_timestamp,
'session_id', pg_backend_pid()
),
'INFO'
);
END;
$$;
-- Grant execute to MCP user
GRANT EXECUTE ON FUNCTION retail.set_store_context TO mcp_user;-- Customers RLS Policy
CREATE POLICY customers_store_isolation ON retail.customers
FOR ALL
TO mcp_user
USING (
store_id = current_setting('app.current_store_id', true)
AND current_setting('app.current_store_id', true) IS NOT NULL
AND current_setting('app.current_store_id', true) != ''
)
WITH CHECK (
store_id = current_setting('app.current_store_id', true)
AND current_setting('app.current_store_id', true) IS NOT NULL
AND current_setting('app.current_store_id', true) != ''
);
-- Products RLS Policy with additional business rules
CREATE POLICY products_store_isolation ON retail.products
FOR ALL
TO mcp_user
USING (
store_id = current_setting('app.current_store_id', true)
AND current_setting('app.current_store_id', true) IS NOT NULL
AND current_setting('app.current_store_id', true) != ''
AND is_active = TRUE -- Additional business rule
)
WITH CHECK (
store_id = current_setting('app.current_store_id', true)
AND current_setting('app.current_store_id', true) IS NOT NULL
AND current_setting('app.current_store_id', true) != ''
);
-- Sales Transactions RLS Policy
CREATE POLICY sales_transactions_store_isolation ON retail.sales_transactions
FOR ALL
TO mcp_user
USING (
store_id = current_setting('app.current_store_id', true)
AND current_setting('app.current_store_id', true) IS NOT NULL
AND current_setting('app.current_store_id', true) != ''
)
WITH CHECK (
store_id = current_setting('app.current_store_id', true)
AND current_setting('app.current_store_id', true) IS NOT NULL
AND current_setting('app.current_store_id', true) != ''
);
-- Transaction Items RLS Policy (via join)
CREATE POLICY sales_transaction_items_store_isolation ON retail.sales_transaction_items
FOR ALL
TO mcp_user
USING (
transaction_id IN (
SELECT transaction_id
FROM retail.sales_transactions
WHERE store_id = current_setting('app.current_store_id', true)
)
)
WITH CHECK (
transaction_id IN (
SELECT transaction_id
FROM retail.sales_transactions
WHERE store_id = current_setting('app.current_store_id', true)
)
);
-- Product Embeddings RLS Policy
CREATE POLICY product_embeddings_store_isolation ON retail.product_embeddings
FOR ALL
TO mcp_user
USING (
store_id = current_setting('app.current_store_id', true)
AND current_setting('app.current_store_id', true) IS NOT NULL
AND current_setting('app.current_store_id', true) != ''
)
WITH CHECK (
store_id = current_setting('app.current_store_id', true)
AND current_setting('app.current_store_id', true) IS NOT NULL
AND current_setting('app.current_store_id', true) != ''
);-- Test RLS policies with different store contexts
DO $$
DECLARE
test_result RECORD;
customer_count INTEGER;
product_count INTEGER;
BEGIN
-- Test Seattle store context
PERFORM retail.set_store_context('seattle');
SELECT COUNT(*) INTO customer_count FROM retail.customers;
SELECT COUNT(*) INTO product_count FROM retail.products;
RAISE NOTICE 'Seattle store - Customers: %, Products: %', customer_count, product_count;
-- Test Redmond store context
PERFORM retail.set_store_context('redmond');
SELECT COUNT(*) INTO customer_count FROM retail.customers;
SELECT COUNT(*) INTO product_count FROM retail.products;
RAISE NOTICE 'Redmond store - Customers: %, Products: %', customer_count, product_count;
-- Verify data isolation
IF customer_count > 0 AND product_count > 0 THEN
RAISE NOTICE 'RLS policies are working correctly';
ELSE
RAISE WARNING 'RLS policies may not be configured correctly';
END IF;
END;
$$;# mcp_server/security/authentication.py
"""
Azure Entra ID authentication for MCP server.
"""
import os
import jwt
import aiohttp
import asyncio
from typing import Dict, Optional, List
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from azure.identity.aio import DefaultAzureCredential
from azure.keyvault.secrets.aio import SecretClient
import logging
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
class AzureAuthenticator:
"""Handle Azure Entra ID authentication and token validation."""
def __init__(self):
self.tenant_id = os.getenv('AZURE_TENANT_ID')
self.client_id = os.getenv('AZURE_CLIENT_ID')
self.audience = os.getenv('AZURE_AUDIENCE', self.client_id)
self.issuer = f"https://login.microsoftonline.com/{self.tenant_id}/v2.0"
# Cache for JWKS (JSON Web Key Set)
self._jwks_cache = None
self._jwks_cache_expiry = None
# Key Vault for secrets
self.key_vault_url = os.getenv('AZURE_KEY_VAULT_URL')
self.credential = DefaultAzureCredential()
if self.key_vault_url:
self.secret_client = SecretClient(
vault_url=self.key_vault_url,
credential=self.credential
)
async def validate_token(self, token: str) -> Dict:
"""Validate JWT token from Azure Entra ID."""
try:
# Get signing keys
signing_keys = await self._get_signing_keys()
# Decode token header to get key ID
unverified_header = jwt.get_unverified_header(token)
key_id = unverified_header.get('kid')
if not key_id:
raise ValueError("Token missing key ID")
# Find the corresponding key
signing_key = None
for key in signing_keys:
if key['kid'] == key_id:
signing_key = jwt.algorithms.RSAAlgorithm.from_jwk(key)
break
if not signing_key:
raise ValueError(f"Unable to find signing key for kid: {key_id}")
# Validate and decode token
payload = jwt.decode(
token,
signing_key,
algorithms=['RS256'],
audience=self.audience,
issuer=self.issuer,
options={
'verify_exp': True,
'verify_aud': True,
'verify_iss': True
}
)
# Extract user information
user_info = self._extract_user_info(payload)
# Log successful authentication
logger.info(
"User authenticated successfully",
extra={
'user_id': user_info['user_id'],
'email': user_info.get('email'),
'tenant_id': payload.get('tid')
}
)
return user_info
except jwt.ExpiredSignatureError:
logger.warning("Token has expired")
raise ValueError("Token has expired")
except jwt.InvalidAudienceError:
logger.warning(f"Invalid audience in token. Expected: {self.audience}")
raise ValueError("Invalid token audience")
except jwt.InvalidIssuerError:
logger.warning(f"Invalid issuer in token. Expected: {self.issuer}")
raise ValueError("Invalid token issuer")
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Token validation failed: {str(e)}")
raise ValueError(f"Token validation failed: {str(e)}")
async def _get_signing_keys(self) -> List[Dict]:
"""Get JWKS from Azure Entra ID with caching."""
current_time = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
# Check if cache is valid
if (self._jwks_cache and self._jwks_cache_expiry and
current_time < self._jwks_cache_expiry):
return self._jwks_cache
# Fetch new JWKS
jwks_url = f"{self.issuer}/keys"
async with aiohttp.ClientSession() as session:
async with session.get(jwks_url) as response:
if response.status != 200:
raise Exception(f"Failed to fetch JWKS: {response.status}")
jwks_data = await response.json()
# Cache for 1 hour
self._jwks_cache = jwks_data['keys']
self._jwks_cache_expiry = current_time.replace(
hour=current_time.hour + 1
)
return self._jwks_cache
def _extract_user_info(self, payload: Dict) -> Dict:
"""Extract user information from JWT payload."""
return {
'user_id': payload.get('oid') or payload.get('sub'),
'email': payload.get('email') or payload.get('preferred_username'),
'name': payload.get('name'),
'tenant_id': payload.get('tid'),
'roles': payload.get('roles', []),
'groups': payload.get('groups', []),
'app_roles': payload.get('app_roles', []),
'scope': payload.get('scp', '').split() if payload.get('scp') else [],
'expires_at': datetime.fromtimestamp(payload['exp'], timezone.utc),
'issued_at': datetime.fromtimestamp(payload['iat'], timezone.utc)
}
async def get_user_store_access(self, user_id: str) -> List[str]:
"""Get list of stores the user has access to."""
try:
# This would typically query your user/store mapping
# For demo, we'll use a simple Key Vault secret
secret_name = f"user-{user_id}-stores"
if self.secret_client:
secret = await self.secret_client.get_secret(secret_name)
store_list = secret.value.split(',')
return [store.strip() for store in store_list if store.strip()]
# Fallback: return default store access
logger.warning(f"No store mapping found for user {user_id}, using default")
return ['seattle'] # Default store access
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Failed to get store access for user {user_id}: {e}")
return [] # No access if we can't determine stores
# Global authenticator instance
azure_authenticator = AzureAuthenticator()# mcp_server/security/authorization.py
"""
Authorization middleware and decorators for MCP server.
"""
import functools
from typing import Dict, List, Optional, Callable, Any
from fastapi import HTTPException, status, Request
from fastapi.security import HTTPBearer, HTTPAuthorizationCredentials
import logging
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
security = HTTPBearer()
class AuthorizationError(Exception):
"""Custom authorization error."""
pass
class RoleBasedAuth:
"""Role-based access control implementation."""
# Define role hierarchy
ROLE_HIERARCHY = {
'store_admin': ['store_manager', 'store_user', 'store_readonly'],
'store_manager': ['store_user', 'store_readonly'],
'store_user': ['store_readonly'],
'store_readonly': []
}
# Define permissions for each role
ROLE_PERMISSIONS = {
'store_admin': [
'read_all', 'write_all', 'delete_all', 'manage_users'
],
'store_manager': [
'read_all', 'write_transactions', 'write_inventory', 'read_reports'
],
'store_user': [
'read_products', 'read_customers', 'write_transactions'
],
'store_readonly': [
'read_products', 'read_basic_reports'
]
}
@classmethod
def has_permission(cls, user_roles: List[str], required_permission: str) -> bool:
"""Check if user has required permission."""
user_permissions = set()
for role in user_roles:
# Add direct permissions
user_permissions.update(cls.ROLE_PERMISSIONS.get(role, []))
# Add inherited permissions
inherited_roles = cls.ROLE_HIERARCHY.get(role, [])
for inherited_role in inherited_roles:
user_permissions.update(cls.ROLE_PERMISSIONS.get(inherited_role, []))
return required_permission in user_permissions
@classmethod
def get_user_stores(cls, user_info: Dict) -> List[str]:
"""Extract stores user has access to from user info."""
# This would typically come from your user management system
# For demo, we'll extract from custom claims or groups
stores = []
# Check for direct store assignments in groups
for group in user_info.get('groups', []):
if group.startswith('store_'):
store_id = group.replace('store_', '')
stores.append(store_id)
# Check for app-specific roles
for role in user_info.get('app_roles', []):
if 'store:' in role:
_, store_id = role.split('store:', 1)
stores.append(store_id)
return list(set(stores)) # Remove duplicates
def require_auth(required_permission: str = None, require_store_access: bool = True):
"""Decorator to require authentication and authorization."""
def decorator(func: Callable) -> Callable:
@functools.wraps(func)
async def wrapper(*args, **kwargs):
# Extract request from args (FastAPI dependency injection)
request = None
for arg in args:
if isinstance(arg, Request):
request = arg
break
if not request:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_500_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
detail="Request object not found"
)
# Get authorization header
auth_header = request.headers.get('Authorization')
if not auth_header or not auth_header.startswith('Bearer '):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
detail="Missing or invalid authorization header",
headers={"WWW-Authenticate": "Bearer"}
)
token = auth_header.split(' ')[1]
try:
# Validate token
user_info = await azure_authenticator.validate_token(token)
# Check required permission
if required_permission:
user_roles = user_info.get('roles', [])
if not RoleBasedAuth.has_permission(user_roles, required_permission):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
detail=f"Insufficient permissions. Required: {required_permission}"
)
# Check store access
if require_store_access:
user_stores = RoleBasedAuth.get_user_stores(user_info)
if not user_stores:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
detail="No store access configured for user"
)
# Set default store context (first accessible store)
request.state.current_store = user_stores[0]
request.state.accessible_stores = user_stores
# Add user info to request state
request.state.user_info = user_info
request.state.user_id = user_info['user_id']
# Call the original function
return await func(*args, **kwargs)
except ValueError as e:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
detail=str(e),
headers={"WWW-Authenticate": "Bearer"}
)
except AuthorizationError as e:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
detail=str(e)
)
return wrapper
return decorator
def require_store_context(store_param: str = 'store_id'):
"""Decorator to validate and set store context."""
def decorator(func: Callable) -> Callable:
@functools.wraps(func)
async def wrapper(*args, **kwargs):
# Get store_id from kwargs
store_id = kwargs.get(store_param)
if not store_id:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
detail=f"Missing required parameter: {store_param}"
)
# Extract request from args
request = None
for arg in args:
if isinstance(arg, Request):
request = arg
break
if not request or not hasattr(request.state, 'accessible_stores'):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_500_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
detail="Authentication required before store context validation"
)
# Validate user has access to requested store
if store_id not in request.state.accessible_stores:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
detail=f"Access denied to store: {store_id}"
)
# Set store context in request state
request.state.current_store = store_id
return await func(*args, **kwargs)
return wrapper
return decorator-- Security audit log table
CREATE TABLE retail.security_audit_log (
log_id UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT uuid_generate_v4(),
event_type VARCHAR(100) NOT NULL,
user_name VARCHAR(100) NOT NULL,
user_id VARCHAR(100),
store_id VARCHAR(50),
ip_address INET,
user_agent TEXT,
request_id VARCHAR(100),
session_id VARCHAR(100),
resource_type VARCHAR(100),
resource_id VARCHAR(100),
action VARCHAR(50) NOT NULL,
success BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT TRUE,
failure_reason TEXT,
details JSONB,
severity VARCHAR(20) DEFAULT 'INFO',
created_at TIMESTAMP WITH TIME ZONE DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
-- Ensure proper indexing for security queries
CONSTRAINT valid_severity CHECK (severity IN ('DEBUG', 'INFO', 'WARN', 'ERROR', 'CRITICAL'))
);
-- Indexes for security audit queries
CREATE INDEX idx_security_audit_event_type ON retail.security_audit_log(event_type);
CREATE INDEX idx_security_audit_user_name ON retail.security_audit_log(user_name);
CREATE INDEX idx_security_audit_store_id ON retail.security_audit_log(store_id);
CREATE INDEX idx_security_audit_created_at ON retail.security_audit_log(created_at);
CREATE INDEX idx_security_audit_success ON retail.security_audit_log(success);
CREATE INDEX idx_security_audit_severity ON retail.security_audit_log(severity);
CREATE INDEX idx_security_audit_details ON retail.security_audit_log USING GIN(details);
-- Function to log security events
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION retail.log_security_event(
p_event_type VARCHAR(100),
p_user_name VARCHAR(100),
p_user_id VARCHAR(100) DEFAULT NULL,
p_store_id VARCHAR(50) DEFAULT NULL,
p_ip_address TEXT DEFAULT NULL,
p_action VARCHAR(50) DEFAULT 'unknown',
p_success BOOLEAN DEFAULT TRUE,
p_failure_reason TEXT DEFAULT NULL,
p_details JSONB DEFAULT NULL,
p_severity VARCHAR(20) DEFAULT 'INFO'
)
RETURNS UUID
LANGUAGE plpgsql
SECURITY DEFINER
AS $$
DECLARE
log_id UUID;
BEGIN
INSERT INTO retail.security_audit_log (
event_type,
user_name,
user_id,
store_id,
ip_address,
action,
success,
failure_reason,
details,
severity
) VALUES (
p_event_type,
p_user_name,
p_user_id,
p_store_id,
p_ip_address::INET,
p_action,
p_success,
p_failure_reason,
p_details,
p_severity
) RETURNING log_id INTO log_id;
RETURN log_id;
END;
$$;
-- Grant execute to MCP user
GRANT EXECUTE ON FUNCTION retail.log_security_event TO mcp_user;-- Failed authentication attempts
CREATE VIEW retail.security_failed_auth AS
SELECT
event_type,
user_name,
ip_address,
COUNT(*) as attempt_count,
MIN(created_at) as first_attempt,
MAX(created_at) as last_attempt,
ARRAY_AGG(DISTINCT failure_reason) as failure_reasons
FROM retail.security_audit_log
WHERE success = FALSE
AND event_type IN ('authentication_failed', 'token_validation_failed')
AND created_at >= CURRENT_TIMESTAMP - INTERVAL '24 hours'
GROUP BY event_type, user_name, ip_address
HAVING COUNT(*) >= 3 -- 3 or more failures
ORDER BY attempt_count DESC, last_attempt DESC;
-- Suspicious access patterns
CREATE VIEW retail.security_suspicious_access AS
SELECT
user_name,
user_id,
COUNT(DISTINCT ip_address) as ip_count,
COUNT(DISTINCT store_id) as store_count,
ARRAY_AGG(DISTINCT ip_address::TEXT) as ip_addresses,
ARRAY_AGG(DISTINCT store_id) as stores_accessed,
MIN(created_at) as first_access,
MAX(created_at) as last_access
FROM retail.security_audit_log
WHERE created_at >= CURRENT_TIMESTAMP - INTERVAL '1 hour'
AND success = TRUE
GROUP BY user_name, user_id
HAVING COUNT(DISTINCT ip_address) > 3 -- Access from multiple IPs
OR COUNT(DISTINCT store_id) > 2 -- Access to multiple stores
ORDER BY ip_count DESC, store_count DESC;
-- Data access patterns
CREATE VIEW retail.security_data_access_summary AS
SELECT
DATE_TRUNC('hour', created_at) as access_hour,
store_id,
resource_type,
action,
COUNT(*) as access_count,
COUNT(DISTINCT user_id) as unique_users
FROM retail.security_audit_log
WHERE resource_type IS NOT NULL
AND created_at >= CURRENT_TIMESTAMP - INTERVAL '24 hours'
GROUP BY DATE_TRUNC('hour', created_at), store_id, resource_type, action
ORDER BY access_hour DESC, access_count DESC;# mcp_server/security/monitoring.py
"""
Security monitoring and alerting for MCP server.
"""
import asyncio
import asyncpg
from typing import Dict, List, Any
from datetime import datetime, timedelta
from dataclasses import dataclass
import logging
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@dataclass
class SecurityAlert:
"""Security alert data structure."""
alert_type: str
severity: str
message: str
details: Dict[str, Any]
timestamp: datetime
class SecurityMonitor:
"""Monitor security events and generate alerts."""
def __init__(self, db_connection_string: str):
self.db_connection_string = db_connection_string
self.alert_handlers = []
# Alert thresholds
self.thresholds = {
'failed_auth_attempts': 5, # per user per hour
'multiple_ip_access': 3, # different IPs per user per hour
'excessive_data_access': 1000, # queries per user per hour
'privilege_escalation': 1, # any attempt
'unauthorized_store_access': 1 # any attempt
}
async def start_monitoring(self):
"""Start security monitoring loop."""
logger.info("Starting security monitoring")
while True:
try:
await self._check_security_events()
await asyncio.sleep(300) # Check every 5 minutes
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Security monitoring error: {e}")
await asyncio.sleep(60) # Short retry on error
async def _check_security_events(self):
"""Check for security events and generate alerts."""
conn = await asyncpg.connect(self.db_connection_string)
try:
# Check failed authentication attempts
await self._check_failed_auth(conn)
# Check suspicious access patterns
await self._check_suspicious_access(conn)
# Check data access anomalies
await self._check_data_access_anomalies(conn)
# Check unauthorized access attempts
await self._check_unauthorized_access(conn)
finally:
await conn.close()
async def _check_failed_auth(self, conn):
"""Check for excessive failed authentication attempts."""
query = """
SELECT
user_name,
ip_address,
COUNT(*) as attempt_count,
MAX(created_at) as last_attempt
FROM retail.security_audit_log
WHERE success = FALSE
AND event_type IN ('authentication_failed', 'token_validation_failed')
AND created_at >= CURRENT_TIMESTAMP - INTERVAL '1 hour'
GROUP BY user_name, ip_address
HAVING COUNT(*) >= $1
"""
results = await conn.fetch(query, self.thresholds['failed_auth_attempts'])
for record in results:
alert = SecurityAlert(
alert_type='failed_authentication',
severity='HIGH',
message=f"Excessive failed login attempts for user {record['user_name']}",
details={
'user_name': record['user_name'],
'ip_address': str(record['ip_address']),
'attempt_count': record['attempt_count'],
'last_attempt': record['last_attempt'].isoformat()
},
timestamp=datetime.now()
)
await self._send_alert(alert)
async def _check_suspicious_access(self, conn):
"""Check for suspicious access patterns."""
query = """
SELECT
user_name,
user_id,
COUNT(DISTINCT ip_address) as ip_count,
ARRAY_AGG(DISTINCT ip_address::TEXT) as ip_addresses
FROM retail.security_audit_log
WHERE created_at >= CURRENT_TIMESTAMP - INTERVAL '1 hour'
AND success = TRUE
GROUP BY user_name, user_id
HAVING COUNT(DISTINCT ip_address) >= $1
"""
results = await conn.fetch(query, self.thresholds['multiple_ip_access'])
for record in results:
alert = SecurityAlert(
alert_type='suspicious_access',
severity='MEDIUM',
message=f"User {record['user_name']} accessed from multiple IP addresses",
details={
'user_name': record['user_name'],
'user_id': record['user_id'],
'ip_count': record['ip_count'],
'ip_addresses': record['ip_addresses']
},
timestamp=datetime.now()
)
await self._send_alert(alert)
async def _check_unauthorized_access(self, conn):
"""Check for unauthorized store access attempts."""
query = """
SELECT
user_name,
user_id,
store_id,
failure_reason,
created_at
FROM retail.security_audit_log
WHERE success = FALSE
AND event_type = 'unauthorized_store_access'
AND created_at >= CURRENT_TIMESTAMP - INTERVAL '1 hour'
"""
results = await conn.fetch(query)
for record in results:
alert = SecurityAlert(
alert_type='unauthorized_access',
severity='HIGH',
message=f"Unauthorized store access attempt by {record['user_name']}",
details={
'user_name': record['user_name'],
'user_id': record['user_id'],
'store_id': record['store_id'],
'failure_reason': record['failure_reason'],
'timestamp': record['created_at'].isoformat()
},
timestamp=datetime.now()
)
await self._send_alert(alert)
async def _send_alert(self, alert: SecurityAlert):
"""Send security alert to all configured handlers."""
logger.warning(
f"Security Alert: {alert.alert_type} - {alert.message}",
extra={'alert_details': alert.details}
)
# Send to configured alert handlers
for handler in self.alert_handlers:
try:
await handler.send_alert(alert)
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Failed to send alert via {handler.__class__.__name__}: {e}")
def add_alert_handler(self, handler):
"""Add alert handler."""
self.alert_handlers.append(handler)# tests/security/test_security.py
"""
Comprehensive security tests for MCP server.
"""
import pytest
import asyncio
import asyncpg
from datetime import datetime, timezone
import jwt
from unittest.mock import Mock, patch
class TestRowLevelSecurity:
"""Test Row Level Security implementation."""
@pytest.fixture
async def db_connection(self):
"""Database connection for testing."""
conn = await asyncpg.connect(
"postgresql://mcp_user:password@localhost:5432/retail_test"
)
yield conn
await conn.close()
async def test_store_context_isolation(self, db_connection):
"""Test that RLS properly isolates data by store."""
# Set Seattle store context
await db_connection.execute("SELECT retail.set_store_context('seattle')")
# Get customer count
seattle_customers = await db_connection.fetchval(
"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM retail.customers"
)
# Set Redmond store context
await db_connection.execute("SELECT retail.set_store_context('redmond')")
# Get customer count
redmond_customers = await db_connection.fetchval(
"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM retail.customers"
)
# Verify isolation (counts should be different)
assert seattle_customers != redmond_customers or (
seattle_customers == 0 and redmond_customers == 0
)
async def test_unauthorized_store_access(self, db_connection):
"""Test that invalid store access is blocked."""
with pytest.raises(Exception) as exc_info:
await db_connection.execute("SELECT retail.set_store_context('invalid_store')")
assert "Store not found" in str(exc_info.value)
async def test_cross_store_data_leakage(self, db_connection):
"""Test that users cannot access data from other stores."""
# Set context to one store
await db_connection.execute("SELECT retail.set_store_context('seattle')")
# Try to insert data with different store_id
with pytest.raises(Exception):
await db_connection.execute("""
INSERT INTO retail.customers (store_id, first_name, last_name, email)
VALUES ('redmond', 'Test', 'User', 'test@example.com')
""")
class TestAuthentication:
"""Test authentication and authorization."""
def test_valid_jwt_token(self):
"""Test valid JWT token validation."""
# Mock valid token
token_payload = {
'oid': 'user-123',
'email': 'test@example.com',
'name': 'Test User',
'tid': 'tenant-123',
'aud': 'app-client-id',
'iss': 'https://login.microsoftonline.com/tenant-123/v2.0',
'exp': int((datetime.now(timezone.utc)).timestamp()) + 3600,
'iat': int((datetime.now(timezone.utc)).timestamp()),
'roles': ['store_user']
}
# This would require mocking the JWKS endpoint
# In real implementation, use proper test JWT tokens
def test_expired_token_rejection(self):
"""Test that expired tokens are rejected."""
token_payload = {
'oid': 'user-123',
'exp': int((datetime.now(timezone.utc)).timestamp()) - 3600, # Expired
'iat': int((datetime.now(timezone.utc)).timestamp()) - 7200
}
# Test would verify that expired tokens are rejected
def test_invalid_audience_rejection(self):
"""Test that tokens with wrong audience are rejected."""
token_payload = {
'oid': 'user-123',
'aud': 'wrong-audience', # Invalid audience
'exp': int((datetime.now(timezone.utc)).timestamp()) + 3600,
'iat': int((datetime.now(timezone.utc)).timestamp())
}
# Test would verify that wrong audience tokens are rejected
class TestAuthorization:
"""Test role-based authorization."""
def test_role_hierarchy(self):
"""Test that role hierarchy works correctly."""
from mcp_server.security.authorization import RoleBasedAuth
# Store admin should have all permissions
assert RoleBasedAuth.has_permission(['store_admin'], 'read_all')
assert RoleBasedAuth.has_permission(['store_admin'], 'write_all')
assert RoleBasedAuth.has_permission(['store_admin'], 'delete_all')
# Store user should have limited permissions
assert RoleBasedAuth.has_permission(['store_user'], 'read_products')
assert not RoleBasedAuth.has_permission(['store_user'], 'delete_all')
# Store readonly should have minimal permissions
assert RoleBasedAuth.has_permission(['store_readonly'], 'read_products')
assert not RoleBasedAuth.has_permission(['store_readonly'], 'write_transactions')
def test_permission_inheritance(self):
"""Test that permissions are properly inherited."""
from mcp_server.security.authorization import RoleBasedAuth
# Manager should inherit user permissions
assert RoleBasedAuth.has_permission(['store_manager'], 'read_products')
assert RoleBasedAuth.has_permission(['store_manager'], 'write_transactions')
# Security test runner
if __name__ == "__main__":
pytest.main([__file__, "-v"])# security-test-checklist.yml
penetration_testing:
authentication_bypass:
- name: "Test authentication bypass attempts"
tests:
- "Missing Authorization header"
- "Malformed JWT tokens"
- "Replay attack with expired tokens"
- "Token signature manipulation"
- "Audience/issuer manipulation"
authorization_escalation:
- name: "Test privilege escalation attempts"
tests:
- "Role manipulation in token"
- "Store access boundary testing"
- "Cross-tenant data access attempts"
- "Administrative function access"
sql_injection:
- name: "Test SQL injection vulnerabilities"
tests:
- "Parameter injection in search queries"
- "Store ID manipulation"
- "JSON parameter injection"
- "Union-based injection attempts"
data_exposure:
- name: "Test for data exposure vulnerabilities"
tests:
- "Error message information disclosure"
- "Timing attack possibilities"
- "Cross-store data leakage"
- "Audit log exposure"
rate_limiting:
- name: "Test rate limiting and DoS protection"
tests:
- "Authentication endpoint flooding"
- "API endpoint rate limits"
- "Resource exhaustion attempts"
- "Connection pool exhaustion"完成本實驗後，您應該已經：
✅ 多租戶安全性：實現行級安全性以完全隔離數據
✅ Azure 身份驗證：整合 Azure Entra ID 並進行 JWT 驗證
✅ 基於角色的授權：配置分層角色與權限系統
✅ 全面審計日誌：建立安全事件追蹤與監控
✅ 安全測試：實施自動化安全驗證測試
✅ 威脅監控：創建實時安全事件檢測與警報
繼續進行 實驗 03：環境設置：
- 配置符合安全最佳實踐的開發環境
- 設置 Azure 服務以進行身份驗證與監控
- 實現安全的數據庫連接與密鑰管理
- 驗證開發環境中的安全配置
- Azure Entra ID 文件 - 完整的身份平台指南
- Azure Key Vault - 密鑰管理服務
- Azure 安全最佳實踐 - 安全指導
- PostgreSQL 行級安全性 - 官方 RLS 文件
- 數據庫安全清單 - PostgreSQL 安全指南
- 多租戶數據庫模式 - 架構模式
- OWASP 測試指南 - 全面的安全測試
- JWT 安全最佳實踐 - JWT 安全考量
- API 安全測試 - API 特定的安全測試
上一章: 實驗 01：核心架構概念
下一章: 實驗 03：環境設置
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