diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore
index daffad5cd9..8d9730d527 100644
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@@ -91,6 +91,19 @@ coverage.txt
 harmony_db_*
 explorer_storage_*
 
+# committed recovery-preflight fixtures are deliberately tracked
+# (see testdata/recovery/preflight/README.md)
+!testdata/recovery/preflight/*/harmony_db_0/
+
+# committed metadata fixture kit is deliberately tracked
+# (see testdata/recovery/metadata/README.md). Re-include the LevelDB
+# directories first, then the file types the global rules would otherwise
+# swallow (*.log LevelDB write-ahead logs, *.hex fixture BLS secrets).
+!testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/harmony_db_0/
+!testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/clean/harmony_db_0/
+!testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/**/*.log
+!testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/**/*.hex
+
 # local blskeys for testing
 .hmy/blskeys
 
diff --git a/cmd/harmony-recovery/deps_guard_test.go b/cmd/harmony-recovery/deps_guard_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ae5aceeae7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cmd/harmony-recovery/deps_guard_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"os/exec"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// forbiddenDeps is the static dependency guard: a compile-time code-hygiene
+// boundary (distinct from any approved-build allowlist). The preflight
+// binary must never link networking, RPC, consensus-service wiring or BLS
+// keystore loading - it reads a database and verifies signatures, nothing
+// else. Exact package or prefix matches against `go list -deps`.
+var forbiddenDeps = []string{
+	// harmony p2p service / host wiring (the libp2p transport stack hangs
+	// off this package; note the type-only go-libp2p/core/{crypto,peer}
+	// packages leak in via internal/utils logging helpers and open no
+	// sockets - the boundary is harmony's own p2p package)
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/p2p",
+	// RPC and API services (incl. sync services)
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/rpc",
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/api/service",
+	// node service wiring
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/node",
+	// consensus service (the engine's verification-only subpackages
+	// consensus/engine, consensus/quorum, consensus/signature,
+	// consensus/votepower are allowed; the service package itself is not)
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/consensus\x00exact",
+	// BLS keystore loading (validators' signing keys must never be touched;
+	// multibls is a pure key-slice type and is allowed)
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/blsgen",
+	// libp2p host construction (transport/muxer/swarm - the actual network
+	// stack, as opposed to the type-only core packages)
+	"github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p\x00exact",
+	"github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/p2p",
+}
+
+// exemptDeps are exact-match exemptions consulted before recording a
+// violation. The metadata audit-branch engine links package core (the
+// masked-overlay re-execution needs the production BlockChain), and core's
+// blockchain_pruner_metric.go imports api/service/prometheus purely for
+// metric REGISTRATION - nothing in this binary constructs or starts the
+// prometheus service (no listener; the process-isolation test enforces
+// that). The api/service prefix ban and every other rule stay intact.
+var exemptDeps = map[string]bool{
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/api/service/prometheus": true,
+}
+
+// TestDependencyGuard runs `go list -deps ./cmd/harmony-recovery` and fails
+// on forbidden imports.
+func TestDependencyGuard(t *testing.T) {
+	out, err := exec.Command("go", "list", "-deps", ".").CombinedOutput()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("go list -deps failed: %v\n%s", err, out)
+	}
+	deps := strings.Split(strings.TrimSpace(string(out)), "\n")
+	depSet := make(map[string]bool, len(deps))
+	for _, d := range deps {
+		depSet[strings.TrimSpace(d)] = true
+	}
+	var violations []string
+	for _, rule := range forbiddenDeps {
+		if exact, ok := strings.CutSuffix(rule, "\x00exact"); ok {
+			if depSet[exact] && !exemptDeps[exact] {
+				violations = append(violations, exact)
+			}
+			continue
+		}
+		for dep := range depSet {
+			if (dep == rule || strings.HasPrefix(dep, rule+"/")) && !exemptDeps[dep] {
+				violations = append(violations, dep)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if len(violations) > 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("forbidden dependencies linked into harmony-recovery:\n  %s",
+			strings.Join(violations, "\n  "))
+	}
+	// Sanity: the audited verification packages ARE expected.
+	for _, want := range []string{
+		"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/chain",
+		"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/consensus/quorum",
+	} {
+		if !depSet[want] {
+			t.Fatalf("expected dependency %s missing; the dependency guard may be checking the wrong package", want)
+		}
+	}
+}
diff --git a/cmd/harmony-recovery/golden_test.go b/cmd/harmony-recovery/golden_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..94f43b6a32
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cmd/harmony-recovery/golden_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"regexp"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/spf13/pflag"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/inplace/fixture"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/inplace/report"
+)
+
+const goldenDir = "../../testdata/recovery/preflight/golden"
+
+// normalizeReceipt zeroes the volatile fields (host identity, timing, build
+// stamp, machine paths); everything else in the fixture receipts is
+// deterministic, including the state digest.
+func normalizeReceipt(rec report.Receipt) report.Receipt {
+	rec.Hostname = "<host>"
+	rec.DBPath = "<db>"
+	rec.StartedAt = "<time>"
+	rec.DurationS = 0
+	rec.Build = report.Build{}
+	if rec.ExitCode == report.ExitReadError {
+		// Table numbering/offsets in goleveldb error text can vary with
+		// compaction scheduling.
+		rec.FailReason = "<read-error>"
+	}
+	return rec
+}
+
+func checkGolden(t *testing.T, name string, rec *report.Receipt) {
+	t.Helper()
+	if rec == nil {
+		t.Fatal("no receipt")
+	}
+	got, err := json.MarshalIndent(normalizeReceipt(*rec), "", "  ")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	got = append(got, '\n')
+	path := filepath.Join(goldenDir, name)
+	if os.Getenv("UPDATE_GOLDEN") == "1" {
+		if err := os.MkdirAll(goldenDir, 0o755); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if err := os.WriteFile(path, got, 0o644); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		t.Logf("golden %s updated", name)
+		return
+	}
+	want, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("golden %s missing (run with UPDATE_GOLDEN=1): %v", name, err)
+	}
+	if !bytes.Equal(got, want) {
+		t.Fatalf("receipt drifted from golden %s:\n--- got ---\n%s\n--- want ---\n%s", name, got, want)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestGoldenReceipts pins the full receipt shape for PASS, a FAIL class and
+// a read error against committed goldens.
+func TestGoldenReceipts(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("pass", func(t *testing.T) {
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+		res := runCLI(t, m, db, "--name", "golden-validator")
+		wantExit(t, res, report.ExitPass)
+		checkGolden(t, "receipt-pass.json", res.receipt)
+	})
+	t.Run("fail-state-walk", func(t *testing.T) {
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+		mustMutate(t, fixture.DeleteKey(db, m.StateRoot.Bytes()))
+		res := runCLI(t, m, db, "--name", "golden-validator")
+		wantExit(t, res, report.ExitFail)
+		checkGolden(t, "receipt-fail-state-walk.json", res.receipt)
+	})
+	t.Run("read-error", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Corrupt every table so the very first read fails: the receipt is
+		// then independent of the (scheduling-dependent) physical table
+		// layout - all checks stay "skipped".
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+		corruptAllSSTs(t, db)
+		res := runCLI(t, m, db, "--name", "golden-validator")
+		wantExit(t, res, report.ExitReadError)
+		if res.receipt.Retries.ReopenCount != 0 {
+			t.Fatalf("corrupt table must not retry: %+v", res.receipt.Retries)
+		}
+		checkGolden(t, "receipt-read-error.json", res.receipt)
+	})
+}
+
+// TestCommittedFixtureAgreement runs the CLI against the committed
+// materialized base fixture (testdata/recovery/preflight/base) and pins the
+// result to the golden PASS receipt digest - tying the committed fixtures,
+// the in-test generator and the goldens together.
+func TestCommittedFixtureAgreement(t *testing.T) {
+	committed := "../../testdata/recovery/preflight/base/harmony_db_0"
+	if _, err := os.Stat(committed); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("materialized fixtures missing (%v); regenerate with scripts/recovery/gen-preflight-fixtures.sh", err)
+	}
+	var goldenRec report.Receipt
+	goldenRaw, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(goldenDir, "receipt-pass.json"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("golden receipt missing: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(goldenRaw, &goldenRec); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	// Complete-tree reproducibility: the committed fixture must be
+	// byte-identical to a fresh hermetic generation (the canonical rewrite
+	// in fixture.Build guarantees this; a mismatch means the committed
+	// copies are stale - regenerate them).
+	m := getFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+	fresh, comm := snapshotDir(t, m.Dir), snapshotDir(t, committed)
+	for name := range comm {
+		if _, ok := fresh[name]; !ok {
+			t.Fatalf("committed fixture has extra file %s; regenerate with scripts/recovery/gen-preflight-fixtures.sh", name)
+		}
+	}
+	for name, data := range fresh {
+		got, ok := comm[name]
+		if !ok {
+			t.Fatalf("committed fixture missing %s; regenerate with scripts/recovery/gen-preflight-fixtures.sh", name)
+		}
+		if !bytes.Equal(data, got) {
+			t.Fatalf("committed fixture file %s differs from a fresh generation (%d vs %d bytes); regenerate with scripts/recovery/gen-preflight-fixtures.sh",
+				name, len(got), len(data))
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Copy so the run cannot disturb the committed fixture.
+	dst := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "harmony_db_0")
+	if err := fixture.CopyDB(committed, dst); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	res := runCLI(t, m, dst, "--name", "golden-validator")
+	wantExit(t, res, report.ExitPass)
+	if res.receipt.State.Digest != goldenRec.State.Digest {
+		t.Fatalf("committed fixture digest %s != golden %s", res.receipt.State.Digest, goldenRec.State.Digest)
+	}
+	if res.receipt.Target.Hash != goldenRec.Target.Hash {
+		t.Fatalf("committed fixture target %s != golden %s", res.receipt.Target.Hash, goldenRec.Target.Hash)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestDocMatchesFlags asserts the one-page doc lists every visible
+// preflight flag and mentions no flag that does not exist (hidden test-only
+// flags may appear in the test-only note).
+func TestDocMatchesFlags(t *testing.T) {
+	docPath := "../../docs/recovery/preflight.md"
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(docPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("doc missing: %v", err)
+	}
+	doc := string(raw)
+
+	known := map[string]bool{}
+	cmd := newPreflightCommand()
+	cmd.Flags().VisitAll(func(f *pflag.Flag) {
+		known[f.Name] = true
+		if !f.Hidden && !strings.Contains(doc, "--"+f.Name) {
+			t.Errorf("visible flag --%s is not documented in %s", f.Name, docPath)
+		}
+	})
+
+	for _, match := range flagTokenRe.FindAllStringSubmatch(doc, -1) {
+		name := match[1]
+		if !known[name] {
+			t.Errorf("doc mentions unknown flag --%s", name)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+var flagTokenRe = regexp.MustCompile(`--([a-z][a-z0-9-]+)`)
diff --git a/cmd/harmony-recovery/main.go b/cmd/harmony-recovery/main.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8b4b821f72
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cmd/harmony-recovery/main.go
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+// harmony-recovery is the emergency shard-0 recovery toolbox. Its
+// preflight subcommand is a validator-friendly eligibility sampler: run it
+// against the node's shard-0 LevelDB - WITHOUT stopping the node - and it
+// verifies the pinned target block header/certificate/ancestry plus the
+// complete target state, prints PASS or FAIL, and writes one small JSON
+// receipt to paste into Telegram. The metadata command group hosts the
+// offline validator-metadata maintenance commands (scan, export-reference,
+// audit-branch) run internally on a stopped node.
+package main
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"os"
+	"runtime/debug"
+
+	"github.com/spf13/cobra"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/inplace/report"
+)
+
+// Stamped by scripts/go_executable_build.sh ldflags (same pattern as
+// cmd/harmony). Informational only; no gating or refusal paths.
+var (
+	version string
+	commit  string
+	builtAt string
+	builtBy string
+)
+
+func buildInfo() report.Build {
+	b := report.Build{GitDescribe: commit}
+	if version != "" {
+		b.GitDescribe = fmt.Sprintf("%s (build %s)", commit, version)
+	}
+	if info, ok := debug.ReadBuildInfo(); ok {
+		b.GoVersion = info.GoVersion
+		for _, s := range info.Settings {
+			switch s.Key {
+			case "vcs.revision":
+				b.VCSRevision = s.Value
+			case "vcs.modified":
+				b.VCSModified = s.Value == "true"
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return b
+}
+
+func versionString() string {
+	b := buildInfo()
+	return fmt.Sprintf("harmony-recovery version %s commit %s vcs %s (modified=%v) built %s by %s go %s",
+		orUnknown(version), orUnknown(commit), orUnknown(b.VCSRevision), b.VCSModified,
+		orUnknown(builtAt), orUnknown(builtBy), orUnknown(b.GoVersion))
+}
+
+func orUnknown(s string) string {
+	if s == "" {
+		return "unknown"
+	}
+	return s
+}
+
+func newRootCommand() *cobra.Command {
+	root := &cobra.Command{
+		Use:   "harmony-recovery",
+		Short: "Emergency shard-0 recovery tools (preflight eligibility sampler; metadata maintenance commands)",
+		Long: "harmony-recovery hosts the emergency shard-0 in-place recovery tooling.\n" +
+			"The preflight subcommand samples a validator database for recovery\n" +
+			"eligibility without stopping the node and never writes to the database.\n" +
+			"The metadata command group (scan, export-reference, audit-branch) derives\n" +
+			"and audits the recovery target's validator metadata on a stopped node.",
+		SilenceUsage:  true,
+		SilenceErrors: true,
+		RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
+			return cmd.Help()
+		},
+	}
+	root.SetVersionTemplate("{{.Version}}\n")
+	root.Version = versionString()
+	root.AddCommand(newPreflightCommand())
+	root.AddCommand(newMetadataCommand())
+	return root
+}
+
+// exitCodeError carries a pipeline exit code through cobra.
+type exitCodeError int
+
+func (e exitCodeError) Error() string { return fmt.Sprintf("exit code %d", int(e)) }
+
+// run executes the CLI and returns the process exit code (testable without
+// process boundaries).
+func run(args []string, stdout, stderr io.Writer) int {
+	root := newRootCommand()
+	root.SetArgs(args)
+	root.SetOut(stdout)
+	root.SetErr(stderr)
+	if err := root.Execute(); err != nil {
+		var code exitCodeError
+		if errors.As(err, &code) {
+			return int(code)
+		}
+		fmt.Fprintln(stderr, "error:", err)
+		return report.ExitUnusable
+	}
+	return report.ExitPass
+}
+
+func main() {
+	os.Exit(run(os.Args[1:], os.Stdout, os.Stderr))
+}
diff --git a/cmd/harmony-recovery/metadata.go b/cmd/harmony-recovery/metadata.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0203e17265
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cmd/harmony-recovery/metadata.go
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"os"
+	"os/signal"
+
+	"github.com/spf13/cobra"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/report"
+)
+
+// newMetadataCommand builds the `metadata` command group (plan §4.1): the
+// offline validator-metadata maintenance commands extending the
+// preflight-owned harmony-recovery root. No root-global flags; every flag
+// is group-local. There is no --network flag: network, shard and the
+// frozen constants come from the JSON anchor config (--anchor), which each
+// subcommand resolves via the preflight-owned inplace/anchor.Resolve
+// (installing the process-global schedule) and cross-checks against the
+// compiled constants and the source DB.
+func newMetadataCommand() *cobra.Command {
+	cmd := &cobra.Command{
+		Use:   "metadata",
+		Short: "Offline validator-metadata maintenance (scan, export-reference, audit-branch; stopped node required)",
+		Long: "The metadata command family derives the recovery target's validator\n" +
+			"metadata from a STOPPED node's shard-0 LevelDB: scan (diagnosis/dry-run),\n" +
+			"export-reference (the run-once canonical .hmr + reference JSON producer)\n" +
+			"and audit-branch (masked re-execution of the abandoned branch).\n\n" +
+			"Exit codes: 0 OK; 13 unsafe open/concurrent writer; 14 I/O or corruption;\n" +
+			"15 invalid config/paths; 16 interrupted; 20 MISSING_REQUIRED_METADATA;\n" +
+			"21 INVALID_RETAINED_METADATA; 22 TARGET_STATE_UNAVAILABLE;\n" +
+			"23 DETERMINISM_MISMATCH; 24 AUDIT_ANOMALY; 130 SIGINT.",
+		SilenceUsage:  true,
+		SilenceErrors: true,
+		RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
+			return cmd.Help()
+		},
+	}
+	cmd.AddCommand(newMetadataScanCommand())
+	cmd.AddCommand(newMetadataExportCommand())
+	cmd.AddCommand(newMetadataAuditCommand())
+	return cmd
+}
+
+// signalContext returns a context canceled with cause report.ErrSIGINT on
+// SIGINT delivery; the deferred stop restores default signal behavior.
+// report.InterruptExit distinguishes SIGINT (130) from any other
+// cancellation (16) via the recorded cause (§4.5 table).
+func signalContext() (context.Context, context.CancelFunc) {
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancelCause(context.Background())
+	ch := make(chan os.Signal, 1)
+	signal.Notify(ch, os.Interrupt)
+	go func() {
+		select {
+		case <-ch:
+			cancel(report.ErrSIGINT)
+		case <-ctx.Done():
+		}
+	}()
+	return ctx, func() {
+		signal.Stop(ch)
+		cancel(context.Canceled)
+	}
+}
+
+// metadataExit converts a §4.5 code into the root's exit delivery
+// (exitCodeError for nonzero, nil for success — main.go:83-103).
+func metadataExit(code int) error {
+	if code == report.ExitOK {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return exitCodeError(code)
+}
diff --git a/cmd/harmony-recovery/metadata_audit.go b/cmd/harmony-recovery/metadata_audit.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c032f0e59d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cmd/harmony-recovery/metadata_audit.go
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"github.com/spf13/cobra"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/audit"
+)
+
+func newMetadataAuditCommand() *cobra.Command {
+	opts := audit.Options{}
+	cmd := &cobra.Command{
+		Use:   "audit-branch --db /path/to/harmony_db_0 --anchor recovery-anchor.json --out-dir DIR --scratch DIR",
+		Short: "Re-execute the abandoned branch over a masked overlay and reconcile every planned deletion",
+		Long: "audit-branch executes the abandoned blocks from the target state over a\n" +
+			"masked overlay (reads: scratch, then source minus the mask; writes: scratch\n" +
+			"only — the source stays strictly read-only), captures native and precompile\n" +
+			"staking operations, requires every computed state root to match its header,\n" +
+			"byte-verifies the reproduced next-epoch election records against the\n" +
+			"to-be-deleted originals, reconciles the deletion plan bidirectionally, and\n" +
+			"derives the shard-1 subsets and last-crosslink pointer for B4. Mandatory\n" +
+			"two-pass structure: pass 1 discovers the branch-written crosslink/spent\n" +
+			"masks; pass 2 is authoritative.",
+		SilenceUsage:  true,
+		SilenceErrors: true,
+		RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
+			ctx, stop := signalContext()
+			defer stop()
+			return metadataExit(audit.Run(ctx, opts, cmd.ErrOrStderr()))
+		},
+	}
+	f := cmd.Flags()
+	f.StringVar(&opts.DBPath, "db", "", "absolute path to the source harmony_db_0 (required; node must be stopped)")
+	f.StringVar(&opts.AnchorPath, "anchor", "", "path to recovery-anchor.json (required)")
+	f.StringVar(&opts.OutDir, "out-dir", "", "output directory for abandoned-branch-audit.json (required; never inside --db)")
+	f.StringVar(&opts.Scratch, "scratch", "", "disposable scratch directory for overlay writes (required; never inside --db)")
+	f.Uint64Var(&opts.EndHeight, "end-height", 0, "last branch height to execute (0 = anchor audit_end_height)")
+	f.BoolVar(&opts.KeepScratch, "keep-scratch", false, "retain the scratch directory for forensics")
+	f.BoolVar(&opts.SinglePass, "single-pass", false, "DEBUG ONLY: skip pass 2; output marked non-authoritative")
+	f.StringVar(&opts.TrustedShard1Pointer, "trusted-shard1-pointer", "", "pre-incident pointer escape hatch as <shardID>:<blockNum> (validated against the §4.4 invariants)")
+	f.StringVar(&opts.TrustedProvenance, "trusted-shard1-pointer-provenance", "", "provenance note recorded with a trusted pointer")
+	f.StringVar(&opts.ReferencePath, "reference", "", "optional exported reference manifest (metadata-<target>.reference.json) to cross-check and bind into the report hash chain")
+	f.IntVar(&opts.ScratchReserveGB, "scratch-reserve-gb", 200, "minimum free space on the scratch filesystem (must be >= 0; the gate cannot be bypassed)")
+	f.IntVar(&opts.Handles, "handles", 0, "open-file cache capacity for the LevelDB reader (0 = default)")
+	f.IntVar(&opts.CacheMB, "db-cache-mb", 0, "LevelDB block cache size in MiB (0 = default)")
+	_ = cmd.MarkFlagRequired("db")
+	_ = cmd.MarkFlagRequired("anchor")
+	_ = cmd.MarkFlagRequired("out-dir")
+	_ = cmd.MarkFlagRequired("scratch")
+	return cmd
+}
diff --git a/cmd/harmony-recovery/metadata_cli_test.go b/cmd/harmony-recovery/metadata_cli_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e987a02634
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cmd/harmony-recovery/metadata_cli_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"sort"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/spf13/pflag"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/inplace/anchor"
+)
+
+// runRecovery drives the CLI through run() capturing stdout/stderr.
+func runRecovery(args ...string) (int, string, string) {
+	var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
+	code := run(args, &stdout, &stderr)
+	return code, stdout.String(), stderr.String()
+}
+
+// TestRootHelpListsBothFamilies pins that the root help lists preflight and
+// the metadata group, and that the root Short/Long no longer read
+// preflight-only.
+func TestRootHelpListsBothFamilies(t *testing.T) {
+	_, out, _ := runRecovery("--help")
+	if !strings.Contains(out, "preflight") {
+		t.Fatal("root help must still list preflight")
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(out, "metadata") {
+		t.Fatal("root help must list the metadata group")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestMetadataHelpListsThreeSubcommands pins that `metadata --help` lists
+// exactly scan, export-reference, audit-branch.
+func TestMetadataHelpListsThreeSubcommands(t *testing.T) {
+	_, out, _ := runRecovery("metadata", "--help")
+	for _, sub := range []string{"scan", "export-reference", "audit-branch"} {
+		if !strings.Contains(out, sub) {
+			t.Fatalf("metadata help missing subcommand %q\n%s", sub, out)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// TestPreflightPreservationPin is the WS1 preflight-preservation pin: the
+// preflight command's registered flag set and its exit-code contract are
+// byte-identical after the metadata registration edit. No new root-global
+// flags exist (metadata flags are all group-local).
+func TestPreflightPreservationPin(t *testing.T) {
+	// Preflight flag set (name + shorthand + default), sorted.
+	var preflightFlags []string
+	newPreflightCommand().Flags().VisitAll(func(f *pflag.Flag) {
+		preflightFlags = append(preflightFlags, f.Name+"="+f.DefValue)
+	})
+	sort.Strings(preflightFlags)
+	want := []string{
+		"db-cache-mb=256", "db=", "handles=512", "name=",
+		"network=mainnet", "report=preflight-result.json", "shard=0",
+		"storage-workers=0", "target-hash=", "target-height=0", "trie-cache-mb=256",
+	}
+	if strings.Join(preflightFlags, ",") != strings.Join(want, ",") {
+		t.Fatalf("preflight flag set drifted:\n got %v\nwant %v", preflightFlags, want)
+	}
+
+	// No root-global (persistent) flags were introduced.
+	root := newRootCommand()
+	var persistent []string
+	root.PersistentFlags().VisitAll(func(f *pflag.Flag) { persistent = append(persistent, f.Name) })
+	if len(persistent) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("root must have no persistent flags, got %v", persistent)
+	}
+	// The root's local flags are only cobra's built-in help; no domain flags.
+	root.LocalFlags().VisitAll(func(f *pflag.Flag) {
+		if f.Name != "help" && f.Name != "version" {
+			t.Fatalf("unexpected root-local flag %q", f.Name)
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+// TestPreflightExitContractPreserved re-checks the preflight 0/1/2/3 exit
+// contract is untouched: an unusable invocation (missing --db) exits 2.
+func TestPreflightExitContractPreserved(t *testing.T) {
+	// Preflight's unusable exit is 2 (report.ExitUnusable in the
+	// inplace/report package); a missing --db is a cobra required-flag
+	// parse error, which the root maps to 2.
+	code, _, _ := runRecovery("preflight")
+	if code != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("preflight without --db exits %d, want 2 (unusable)", code)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestMetadataExitDelivery checks a metadata invocation error maps to the
+// metadata table (not preflight's 0/1/2/3): a missing --anchor is exit 2
+// from cobra's required-flag parse (root contract), while a validation
+// failure inside RunE is exit 15.
+func TestMetadataFlagParseExit(t *testing.T) {
+	// Missing required flags: cobra returns a plain error -> ExitUnusable
+	// (2) at the landed root contract (§4.1).
+	code, _, _ := runRecovery("metadata", "scan")
+	if code != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("metadata scan without required flags exits %d, want 2 (cobra parse error)", code)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestAnchorDriftPin pins the shipped mainnet recovery-anchor.json against
+// the compiled importable symbols (§4.1 WS1 drift test).
+func TestAnchorDriftPin(t *testing.T) {
+	path := "../../docs/recovery/recovery-anchor.mainnet.json"
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("shipped mainnet anchor config missing at %s: %v", path, err)
+	}
+	var cfg struct {
+		Network      string `json:"network"`
+		TargetHeight uint64 `json:"target_height"`
+		TargetHash   string `json:"target_hash"`
+	}
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &cfg); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if cfg.Network != "mainnet" {
+		t.Fatalf("shipped config network %q, want mainnet", cfg.Network)
+	}
+	if cfg.TargetHeight != anchor.MainnetTargetHeight {
+		t.Fatalf("shipped target_height %d != compiled %d", cfg.TargetHeight, anchor.MainnetTargetHeight)
+	}
+	if cfg.TargetHash != anchor.MainnetTargetHashHex {
+		t.Fatalf("shipped target_hash %s != compiled %s", cfg.TargetHash, anchor.MainnetTargetHashHex)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestGoldenHelpFiles pins root and metadata help output against committed
+// goldens (byte-stable CLI contract; regenerate with UPDATE_GOLDEN=1).
+func TestGoldenHelpFiles(t *testing.T) {
+	cases := []struct {
+		name string
+		args []string
+	}{
+		{"root-help.txt", []string{"--help"}},
+		{"metadata-help.txt", []string{"metadata", "--help"}},
+		{"preflight-help.txt", []string{"preflight", "--help"}},
+	}
+	dir := "../../testdata/recovery/metadata/golden"
+	for _, c := range cases {
+		_, out, _ := runRecovery(c.args...)
+		// Strip the version line (build-stamp dependent) from root help.
+		out = stripVersionLine(out)
+		path := filepath.Join(dir, c.name)
+		if os.Getenv("UPDATE_GOLDEN") == "1" {
+			_ = os.MkdirAll(dir, 0o755)
+			if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(out), 0o644); err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			continue
+		}
+		want, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("golden %s missing (run UPDATE_GOLDEN=1): %v", c.name, err)
+		}
+		if out != string(want) {
+			t.Fatalf("%s drifted from golden:\n--- got ---\n%s\n--- want ---\n%s", c.name, out, want)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// TestMetadataDocMatchesFlags asserts docs/recovery/metadata.md documents
+// every visible flag of every metadata subcommand (WS8 automated check).
+func TestMetadataDocMatchesFlags(t *testing.T) {
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile("../../docs/recovery/metadata.md")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("metadata doc missing: %v", err)
+	}
+	doc := string(raw)
+	root := newMetadataCommand()
+	for _, sub := range root.Commands() {
+		sub.Flags().VisitAll(func(f *pflag.Flag) {
+			if f.Hidden {
+				return
+			}
+			if !strings.Contains(doc, "--"+f.Name) {
+				t.Errorf("metadata %s flag --%s is not documented in metadata.md", sub.Name(), f.Name)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func stripVersionLine(s string) string {
+	lines := strings.Split(s, "\n")
+	var kept []string
+	for _, l := range lines {
+		if strings.HasPrefix(l, "harmony-recovery version ") {
+			continue
+		}
+		kept = append(kept, l)
+	}
+	return strings.Join(kept, "\n")
+}
diff --git a/cmd/harmony-recovery/metadata_export.go b/cmd/harmony-recovery/metadata_export.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8fc0ddeb0f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cmd/harmony-recovery/metadata_export.go
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"github.com/spf13/cobra"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/refexport"
+)
+
+func newMetadataExportCommand() *cobra.Command {
+	opts := refexport.Options{}
+	cmd := &cobra.Command{
+		Use:   "export-reference --db /path/to/harmony_db_0 --anchor recovery-anchor.json --out-dir DIR",
+		Short: "Produce the canonical .hmr reference package and reference manifest (run-once producer)",
+		Long: "export-reference derives the target-height validator metadata and, only on\n" +
+			"a fully clean run, atomically publishes <out-dir>/release/ holding\n" +
+			"metadata-<target>.hmr, the canonical metadata-<target>.reference.json\n" +
+			"(whose SHA-256 is the published reference digest), the internal run\n" +
+			"checksums and the success export report — one atomic unit that appears\n" +
+			"complete or not at all. On a failed or refused attempt a failure report\n" +
+			"is written to <out-dir> instead. Any fatal or missing-required finding\n" +
+			"refuses export. The built-in double-run determinism self-check derives\n" +
+			"everything twice and byte-compares both serializations before writing\n" +
+			"anything; on mismatch it exits 23 and emits only determinism-diff dumps.",
+		SilenceUsage:  true,
+		SilenceErrors: true,
+		RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
+			ctx, stop := signalContext()
+			defer stop()
+			return metadataExit(refexport.Run(ctx, opts, cmd.ErrOrStderr()))
+		},
+	}
+	f := cmd.Flags()
+	f.StringVar(&opts.DBPath, "db", "", "absolute path to the node's harmony_db_0 directory (required; node must be stopped)")
+	f.StringVar(&opts.AnchorPath, "anchor", "", "path to recovery-anchor.json (required)")
+	f.StringVar(&opts.OutDir, "out-dir", "", "output directory for artifacts and reports (required; never inside --db)")
+	f.IntVar(&opts.Handles, "handles", 0, "open-file cache capacity for the LevelDB reader (0 = default)")
+	f.IntVar(&opts.CacheMB, "db-cache-mb", 0, "LevelDB block cache size in MiB (0 = default)")
+	_ = cmd.MarkFlagRequired("db")
+	_ = cmd.MarkFlagRequired("anchor")
+	_ = cmd.MarkFlagRequired("out-dir")
+	return cmd
+}
diff --git a/cmd/harmony-recovery/metadata_isolation_test.go b/cmd/harmony-recovery/metadata_isolation_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..64f340474f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cmd/harmony-recovery/metadata_isolation_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"net"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	metafixture "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/fixture"
+)
+
+// harmonyServicePorts are the default harmony service ports: 9000 p2p,
+// 9500 rpc, 9800 ws, 9900 prometheus.
+var harmonyServicePorts = []int{9000, 9500, 9800, 9900}
+
+// bindableServicePorts returns the harmony service ports that are free at
+// baseline (ports occupied by unrelated processes are excluded from the
+// isolation probes rather than failing the test).
+func bindableServicePorts(t *testing.T) []int {
+	t.Helper()
+	var free []int
+	for _, port := range harmonyServicePorts {
+		ln, err := net.Listen("tcp", fmt.Sprintf("127.0.0.1:%d", port))
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Logf("port %d busy at baseline (external process?); excluded from isolation probes", port)
+			continue
+		}
+		_ = ln.Close()
+		free = append(free, port)
+	}
+	return free
+}
+
+// TestMetadataProcessIsolation asserts the metadata subcommands never
+// initialize networking or a serve loop (in-place handoff §4 safety
+// contract; complements the static dependency guard). Two layers:
+//
+//  1. Fast-error runs of every subcommand return promptly (no blocking
+//     Serve loop and no listener held afterward).
+//  2. A REAL, successful scan over a genuine fixture chain — the code path
+//     that links core/chain/EVM — is sampled WHILE it runs: every free
+//     harmony service port must remain bindable at every sample point
+//     during the working run, not just before/after a fast failure.
+func TestMetadataProcessIsolation(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("fixture generation is not short")
+	}
+	freePorts := bindableServicePorts(t)
+
+	// Layer 1: fast-error prompt return.
+	subs := [][]string{
+		{"metadata", "scan", "--db", "/nonexistent/harmony_db_0", "--anchor", "/nonexistent/anchor.json", "--report", t.TempDir() + "/r.json"},
+		{"metadata", "export-reference", "--db", "/nonexistent/harmony_db_0", "--anchor", "/nonexistent/anchor.json", "--out-dir", t.TempDir()},
+		{"metadata", "audit-branch", "--db", "/nonexistent/harmony_db_0", "--anchor", "/nonexistent/anchor.json", "--out-dir", t.TempDir(), "--scratch", t.TempDir()},
+	}
+	for _, args := range subs {
+		done := make(chan int, 1)
+		go func(a []string) {
+			code, _, _ := runRecovery(a...)
+			done <- code
+		}(args)
+		select {
+		case <-done:
+			// Returned promptly: no serve loop, no blocking listener.
+		case <-time.After(15 * time.Second):
+			t.Fatalf("%v did not return promptly (a serve loop / listener would block)", args)
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Layer 2: a real successful scan, sampled while it works.
+	dir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "harmony_db_0")
+	c, err := metafixture.Open(dir, metafixture.RepoKeysDir())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("open fixture: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := c.Generate(metafixture.Spec{
+		Blocks: 44, CreateValidatorAt: 22, DelegateAt: 26,
+		PostCreateValidatorAt: 40, PostDelegateAt: 42,
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("generate fixture: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := c.Finalize(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("finalize fixture: %v", err)
+	}
+	anchorPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "recovery-anchor.json")
+	if err := metafixture.WriteAnchorConfig(dir, 30, 44, nil, anchorPath); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	// Tight bind/close sampler loop (no ticker: the localnet scan can
+	// finish in tens of milliseconds and must still be sampled mid-run).
+	stop := make(chan struct{})
+	sampled := make(chan error, 1)
+	go func() {
+		var firstErr error
+		samples := 0
+		for {
+			select {
+			case <-stop:
+				if firstErr == nil && samples == 0 && len(freePorts) > 0 {
+					firstErr = fmt.Errorf("port sampler took no samples (scan too fast?)")
+				}
+				sampled <- firstErr
+				return
+			default:
+				for _, port := range freePorts {
+					ln, err := net.Listen("tcp", fmt.Sprintf("127.0.0.1:%d", port))
+					if err != nil {
+						if firstErr == nil {
+							firstErr = fmt.Errorf("port %d became occupied during a working scan: %v", port, err)
+						}
+						continue
+					}
+					_ = ln.Close()
+					samples++
+				}
+				time.Sleep(time.Millisecond)
+			}
+		}
+	}()
+
+	code, _, _ := runRecovery("metadata", "scan",
+		"--db", dir, "--anchor", anchorPath,
+		"--report", filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "scan-report.json"))
+	close(stop)
+	if err := <-sampled; err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if code != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("real scan over the fixture must succeed for the isolation probe, got exit %d", code)
+	}
+
+	// And still no listener afterward.
+	for _, port := range freePorts {
+		ln, err := net.Listen("tcp", fmt.Sprintf("127.0.0.1:%d", port))
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("port %d is held after the runs: %v", port, err)
+		}
+		_ = ln.Close()
+	}
+}
diff --git a/cmd/harmony-recovery/metadata_scan.go b/cmd/harmony-recovery/metadata_scan.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..df4d6ad6f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cmd/harmony-recovery/metadata_scan.go
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"github.com/spf13/cobra"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/scan"
+)
+
+func newMetadataScanCommand() *cobra.Command {
+	opts := scan.Options{}
+	cmd := &cobra.Command{
+		Use:   "scan --db /path/to/harmony_db_0 --anchor recovery-anchor.json --report scan-report.json",
+		Short: "Diagnose and dry-run the metadata normalization (read-only; run before export and audit)",
+		Long: "scan strict-opens the STOPPED node's database read-only, cross-verifies the\n" +
+			"anchor config against the schedule and the DB, resolves the target state, runs\n" +
+			"the shared normalization once and writes the full report: per-section counts,\n" +
+			"deletion plan, digests, absence assertions, coverage, stats/sync-era/shard-1\n" +
+			"inventories, and zero-write proof. The normalized validator-list length is\n" +
+			"printed prominently for the manual preflight comparison.",
+		SilenceUsage:  true,
+		SilenceErrors: true,
+		RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
+			ctx, stop := signalContext()
+			defer stop()
+			return metadataExit(scan.Run(ctx, opts, cmd.ErrOrStderr()))
+		},
+	}
+	f := cmd.Flags()
+	f.StringVar(&opts.DBPath, "db", "", "absolute path to the node's harmony_db_0 directory (required; node must be stopped)")
+	f.StringVar(&opts.AnchorPath, "anchor", "", "path to recovery-anchor.json (required)")
+	f.StringVar(&opts.ReportPath, "report", "metadata-scan-report.json", "report output path (never inside --db)")
+	f.IntVar(&opts.Handles, "handles", 0, "open-file cache capacity for the LevelDB reader (0 = default)")
+	f.IntVar(&opts.CacheMB, "db-cache-mb", 0, "LevelDB block cache size in MiB (0 = default)")
+	_ = cmd.MarkFlagRequired("db")
+	_ = cmd.MarkFlagRequired("anchor")
+	return cmd
+}
diff --git a/cmd/harmony-recovery/preflight.go b/cmd/harmony-recovery/preflight.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0ef9b9365d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cmd/harmony-recovery/preflight.go
@@ -0,0 +1,303 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"os"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/spf13/cobra"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/inplace/anchor"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/inplace/certverify"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/inplace/chainread"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/inplace/report"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/inplace/rodb"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/inplace/statecheck"
+)
+
+type preflightOptions struct {
+	dbPath     string
+	name       string
+	reportPath string
+	network    string
+	shard      uint32
+
+	storageWorkers int
+	handles        int
+	dbCacheMB      int
+	trieCacheMB    int
+
+	// Hidden test-only overrides (refused on mainnet).
+	targetHeight uint64
+	targetHash   string
+}
+
+func newPreflightCommand() *cobra.Command {
+	opts := &preflightOptions{}
+	cmd := &cobra.Command{
+		Use:   "preflight --db /path/to/harmony_db_0 [--name \"my-validator\"]",
+		Short: "Sample a shard-0 database for recovery target availability (never writes; node may keep running)",
+		Long: "preflight verifies - against a live or stopped shard-0 LevelDB - that the\n" +
+			"compiled-in recovery target block's header, certificate, ancestry and\n" +
+			"complete state are present and cryptographically consistent. It never\n" +
+			"writes to the database. The final stdout line is exactly \"PASS\" or\n" +
+			"\"FAIL: <reason>\"; a small JSON receipt is written for reporting.\n\n" +
+			"Exit codes: 0 PASS, 1 FAIL, 2 unusable (flags/layout), 3 persistent read error.",
+		SilenceUsage:  true,
+		SilenceErrors: true,
+		RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
+			code := runPreflight(opts, cmd.OutOrStdout(), cmd.ErrOrStderr())
+			if code != report.ExitPass {
+				return exitCodeError(code)
+			}
+			return nil
+		},
+	}
+	f := cmd.Flags()
+	f.StringVar(&opts.dbPath, "db", "", "path to the node's harmony_db_0 directory (required)")
+	f.StringVar(&opts.name, "name", "", "optional validator name for the receipt (coordinators use it to attribute results)")
+	f.StringVar(&opts.reportPath, "report", "preflight-result.json", "receipt output path (never inside --db)")
+	f.StringVar(&opts.network, "network", "mainnet", "network schedule to verify against")
+	f.Uint32Var(&opts.shard, "shard", 0, "shard id (the compiled anchor is shard 0)")
+	f.IntVar(&opts.storageWorkers, "storage-workers", 0, "storage/code verification workers (0 = min(8, NumCPU))")
+	f.IntVar(&opts.handles, "handles", rodb.DefaultHandles, "open-file cache capacity for the LevelDB reader")
+	f.IntVar(&opts.dbCacheMB, "db-cache-mb", rodb.DefaultBlockCacheMB, "LevelDB block cache size in MiB")
+	f.IntVar(&opts.trieCacheMB, "trie-cache-mb", 256, "trie clean-cache size in MiB")
+	f.Uint64Var(&opts.targetHeight, "target-height", 0, "TEST ONLY: override the target height (refused on mainnet)")
+	f.StringVar(&opts.targetHash, "target-hash", "", "TEST ONLY: override the target hash (refused on mainnet)")
+	_ = f.MarkHidden("target-height")
+	_ = f.MarkHidden("target-hash")
+	_ = cmd.MarkFlagRequired("db")
+	return cmd
+}
+
+// runPreflight is the pipeline: anchor resolution, layout gate, live probe,
+// chain checks + certificate, state walk, receipt, exit code.
+func runPreflight(opts *preflightOptions, stdout, stderr io.Writer) int {
+	started := time.Now()
+
+	usage := func(format string, args ...interface{}) int {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "unusable: "+format+"\n", args...)
+		return report.ExitUnusable
+	}
+
+	// Anchor + schedule (also validates the flag combination).
+	anc, err := anchor.Resolve(opts.network, opts.shard, anchor.Overrides{
+		TargetHeight: opts.targetHeight,
+		TargetHash:   opts.targetHash,
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		return usage("%v", err)
+	}
+
+	// The report must never land inside the DB directory.
+	if opts.reportPath == "" {
+		opts.reportPath = "preflight-result.json"
+	}
+	if err := report.ValidateReportPath(opts.reportPath, opts.dbPath); err != nil {
+		return usage("%v", err)
+	}
+
+	// File-descriptor budget: fail cleanly up front rather than mid-walk.
+	if err := checkFDLimit(opts.handles); err != nil {
+		return usage("%v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Layout gate: only the default single-LevelDB harmony_db_<shard>
+	// layout, and the directory basename must match.
+	if err := rodb.CheckLayout(opts.dbPath, opts.shard); err != nil {
+		return usage("%v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Best-effort, side-effect-free live-writer probe (informational).
+	running, known := rodb.ProbeLiveWriter(opts.dbPath)
+	var nodeProbablyRunning *bool
+	if known {
+		nodeProbablyRunning = &running
+		if running {
+			fmt.Fprintln(stderr, "note: another process holds the database lock (node probably running); results are a point-in-time sample")
+		}
+	}
+
+	hostname, _ := os.Hostname()
+	rec := &report.Receipt{
+		Tool:                report.Tool,
+		Schema:              report.Schema,
+		Build:               buildInfo(),
+		Name:                opts.name,
+		Hostname:            hostname,
+		Network:             opts.network,
+		Shard:               opts.shard,
+		DBPath:              opts.dbPath,
+		NodeProbablyRunning: nodeProbablyRunning,
+		SampleNote:          report.SampleNote,
+		StartedAt:           started.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
+		Target: report.Target{
+			Height: anc.TargetHeight,
+			Hash:   anc.TargetHash.Hex(),
+		},
+		Checks: report.NewChecks(),
+	}
+
+	runner := rodb.NewRunner(opts.dbPath, rodb.Options{
+		Handles:      opts.handles,
+		BlockCacheMB: opts.dbCacheMB,
+	})
+	runner.Progress = stderr
+	defer runner.Close()
+
+	finish := func(code int, failReason string) int {
+		rec.DurationS = time.Since(started).Seconds()
+		rec.Retries.ReopenCount = runner.ReopenCount()
+		rec.ExitCode = code
+		// The receipt result enum is exactly "PASS" | "FAIL" (schema v2); a
+		// persistent read error is a FAIL with exit_code 3 distinguishing
+		// it from a verification failure (exit_code 1).
+		if code == report.ExitPass {
+			rec.Result = "PASS"
+		} else {
+			rec.Result = "FAIL"
+			rec.FailReason = failReason
+		}
+		if err := rec.Write(opts.reportPath); err != nil {
+			fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "warning: could not write receipt %s: %v\n", opts.reportPath, err)
+		} else {
+			fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "receipt written to %s\n", opts.reportPath)
+		}
+		// The stdout contract holds for every completed run: exactly one
+		// "PASS" or "FAIL: <reason>" line. Exit code 3 distinguishes the
+		// read-error FAIL class; the remedy goes to stderr.
+		switch code {
+		case report.ExitPass:
+			report.FinalLine(stdout, true, "")
+		case report.ExitFail:
+			report.FinalLine(stdout, false, failReason)
+		case report.ExitReadError:
+			report.FinalLine(stdout, false, failReason)
+			fmt.Fprintln(stderr, report.RemedyLine)
+		}
+		return code
+	}
+
+	// Stage 1: chain checks (target tuple, body, ancestry, shard state,
+	// head sample) + certificate verification.
+	var (
+		chainOut *chainread.Outcome
+		certRes  *certverify.Result
+	)
+	stageErr := runner.Stage("chain", func(kv *rodb.KV) (err error) {
+		defer convertUnexpectedCall(&err)
+		out, err := chainread.RunChecks(kv, anc, stderr)
+		chainOut = out
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		res, err := certverify.Verify(kv, anc, out)
+		certRes = res
+		if err != nil {
+			if f, ok := err.(*report.Failure); ok {
+				out.Checks["certificate"] = "fail: " + f.Reason
+			}
+			return err
+		}
+		out.Checks["certificate"] = "ok"
+		return nil
+	})
+	if chainOut != nil {
+		copyChecks(rec.Checks, chainOut.Checks)
+		rec.HeadSample = chainOut.Head
+		if chainOut.TargetHeader != nil {
+			rec.Target.StateRoot = chainOut.StateRoot.Hex()
+			rec.Target.Epoch = chainOut.TargetHeader.Epoch().Uint64()
+			rec.Target.ViewID = chainOut.ViewID
+		}
+	}
+	if certRes != nil {
+		rec.CertificateSources = certRes.Sources
+	}
+	if stageErr != nil {
+		return finishStageError(stageErr, finish, usage)
+	}
+
+	// Stage 2: full target-state completeness walk.
+	var stateRes *statecheck.Result
+	stageErr = runner.Stage("state", func(kv *rodb.KV) (err error) {
+		defer convertUnexpectedCall(&err)
+		res, err := statecheck.Walk(statecheck.Config{
+			KV:          kv,
+			StateRoot:   chainOut.StateRoot,
+			TrieCacheMB: opts.trieCacheMB,
+			Workers:     opts.storageWorkers,
+			Progress:    stderr,
+		})
+		stateRes = res
+		return err
+	})
+	if stateRes != nil {
+		rec.State = report.State{
+			Digest:          fmt.Sprintf("%x", stateRes.Digest),
+			DigestAlgorithm: statecheck.DigestAlgorithm,
+			Counts:          stateRes.Counts,
+			Anomalies:       stateRes.Anomalies.Report(),
+		}
+	}
+	if stageErr != nil {
+		if f, ok := failureOf(stageErr); ok {
+			rec.Checks["state_walk"] = "fail: " + f.Reason
+		}
+		return finishStageError(stageErr, finish, usage)
+	}
+	rec.Checks["state_walk"] = "ok"
+
+	if n := runner.Latch().WriteAttempts(); n > 0 {
+		// Every attempt was refused; a non-zero count means some code path
+		// tried to write. Surface it loudly (fail closed).
+		return finish(report.ExitReadError, fmt.Sprintf("internal invariant violated: %d write attempts were made (and refused)", n))
+	}
+	return finish(report.ExitPass, "")
+}
+
+func copyChecks(dst, src map[string]string) {
+	for k, v := range src {
+		dst[k] = v
+	}
+}
+
+func failureOf(err error) (*report.Failure, bool) {
+	var f *report.Failure
+	if errors.As(err, &f) {
+		return f, true
+	}
+	return nil, false
+}
+
+// finishStageError maps a stage error to FAIL (exit 1), read error (exit 3)
+// or unusable (exit 2).
+func finishStageError(err error, finish func(int, string) int, usage func(string, ...interface{}) int) int {
+	var unexpected *chainread.UnexpectedCallError
+	if errors.As(err, &unexpected) {
+		return usage("%v", unexpected)
+	}
+	if f, ok := failureOf(err); ok {
+		return finish(report.ExitFail, f.Error())
+	}
+	var re *rodb.ReadError
+	if errors.As(err, &re) {
+		return finish(report.ExitReadError, re.Error())
+	}
+	return finish(report.ExitReadError, err.Error())
+}
+
+// convertUnexpectedCall converts the minimal ChainReader's fail-closed
+// panic into an error (mapped to exit 2 by finishStageError).
+func convertUnexpectedCall(err *error) {
+	if r := recover(); r != nil {
+		if uce, ok := r.(*chainread.UnexpectedCallError); ok {
+			*err = uce
+			return
+		}
+		panic(r)
+	}
+}
diff --git a/cmd/harmony-recovery/preflight_fail_test.go b/cmd/harmony-recovery/preflight_fail_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..742cab8541
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cmd/harmony-recovery/preflight_fail_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,851 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"fmt"
+	"math/big"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/rlp"
+
+	bls_core "github.com/harmony-one/bls/ffi/go/bls"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/block"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/consensus/signature"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/types"
+	bls_cosi "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/crypto/bls"
+	shardingconfig "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/configs/sharding"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/params"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/inplace/chainread"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/inplace/fixture"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/inplace/report"
+)
+
+// readFixtureHeader decodes a stored header from a fixture directory.
+func readFixtureHeader(t *testing.T, dir string, num uint64, m *fixture.Manifest) *block.Header {
+	t.Helper()
+	raw, err := fixture.GetKey(dir, chainread.HeaderKey(num, m.Hashes[num]))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("read header %d: %v", num, err)
+	}
+	h := new(block.Header)
+	if err := rlp.Decode(bytes.NewReader(raw), h); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("decode header %d: %v", num, err)
+	}
+	return h
+}
+
+// --- Row 4: wrong target hash / broken ancestry / ss mismatch ---
+
+func TestFailTargetHeaderRows(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("canonical-mapping-missing", func(t *testing.T) {
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+		mustMutate(t, fixture.DeleteKey(db, chainread.HeaderHashKey(fixture.TargetHeight)))
+		wantFailLine(t, runCLI(t, m, db), "no canonical hash at target height")
+	})
+	t.Run("canonical-mapping-wrong", func(t *testing.T) {
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+		mustMutate(t, fixture.PutKey(db, chainread.HeaderHashKey(fixture.TargetHeight), m.ChildHash.Bytes()))
+		wantFailLine(t, runCLI(t, m, db), "want anchored")
+	})
+	t.Run("reverse-mapping-missing", func(t *testing.T) {
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+		mustMutate(t, fixture.DeleteKey(db, chainread.HeaderNumberKey(m.TargetHash)))
+		wantFailLine(t, runCLI(t, m, db), "no reverse number mapping")
+	})
+	t.Run("reverse-mapping-wrong", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// The reverse hash->number mapping exists but names the wrong
+		// height.
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+		enc := make([]byte, 8)
+		binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(enc, fixture.TargetHeight-1)
+		mustMutate(t, fixture.PutKey(db, chainread.HeaderNumberKey(m.TargetHash), enc))
+		wantFailLine(t, runCLI(t, m, db), "reverse mapping")
+	})
+	t.Run("target-header-missing", func(t *testing.T) {
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+		mustMutate(t, fixture.DeleteKey(db, chainread.HeaderKey(fixture.TargetHeight, m.TargetHash)))
+		wantFailLine(t, runCLI(t, m, db), "not present")
+	})
+	t.Run("target-header-wrong-content", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Valid header RLP under the right key, but recomputing its hash
+		// betrays it (the anchored hash pins the entire header content).
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+		otherRaw, err := fixture.GetKey(db, chainread.HeaderKey(fixture.TargetHeight-1, m.Hashes[fixture.TargetHeight-1]))
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		mustMutate(t, fixture.PutKey(db, chainread.HeaderKey(fixture.TargetHeight, m.TargetHash), otherRaw))
+		wantFailLine(t, runCLI(t, m, db), "recomputes to")
+	})
+	t.Run("anchor-hash-not-in-db", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Override the anchor with a hash the DB does not have.
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+		res := runCLI(t, m, db, "--target-hash", "0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111")
+		wantFailLine(t, res, "canonical hash")
+	})
+}
+
+func TestFailBodyRows(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("body-missing", func(t *testing.T) {
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+		mustMutate(t, fixture.DeleteKey(db, chainread.BlockBodyKey(fixture.TargetHeight, m.TargetHash)))
+		wantFailLine(t, runCLI(t, m, db), "body not present")
+	})
+	t.Run("tx-root-mismatch", func(t *testing.T) {
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+		header := readFixtureHeader(t, db, fixture.TargetHeight, m)
+		body, err := types.NewBodyForMatchingHeader(header)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		tx := types.NewTransaction(7, m.ContractAddr, 0, big.NewInt(1), 21000, big.NewInt(1), nil)
+		body.SetTransactions([]*types.Transaction{tx})
+		raw, err := rlp.EncodeToBytes(body)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		mustMutate(t, fixture.PutKey(db, chainread.BlockBodyKey(fixture.TargetHeight, m.TargetHash), raw))
+		wantFailLine(t, runCLI(t, m, db), "transaction root mismatch")
+	})
+	t.Run("incoming-receipt-root-mismatch", func(t *testing.T) {
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+		header := readFixtureHeader(t, db, fixture.TargetHeight, m)
+		body, err := types.NewBodyForMatchingHeader(header)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		body.SetIncomingReceipts(types.CXReceiptsProofs{{
+			Receipts: types.CXReceipts{},
+			MerkleProof: &types.CXMerkleProof{
+				BlockNum:      big.NewInt(1),
+				CXReceiptHash: m.TargetHash,
+			},
+			Header:       header,
+			CommitSig:    []byte{0x01},
+			CommitBitmap: []byte{0x01},
+		}})
+		raw, err := rlp.EncodeToBytes(body)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		mustMutate(t, fixture.PutKey(db, chainread.BlockBodyKey(fixture.TargetHeight, m.TargetHash), raw))
+		wantFailLine(t, runCLI(t, m, db), "incoming-receipt root mismatch")
+	})
+	t.Run("nonempty-uncles", func(t *testing.T) {
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+		header := readFixtureHeader(t, db, fixture.TargetHeight, m)
+		body, err := types.NewBodyForMatchingHeader(header)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		uncle := readFixtureHeader(t, db, fixture.BoundaryHeight, m)
+		body.SetUncles([]*block.Header{uncle})
+		raw, err := rlp.EncodeToBytes(body)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		mustMutate(t, fixture.PutKey(db, chainread.BlockBodyKey(fixture.TargetHeight, m.TargetHash), raw))
+		wantFailLine(t, runCLI(t, m, db), "uncles")
+	})
+}
+
+func TestFailAncestryRows(t *testing.T) {
+	mid := uint64(fixture.TargetHeight - 3)
+	t.Run("parent-header-missing", func(t *testing.T) {
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+		mustMutate(t, fixture.DeleteKey(db, chainread.HeaderKey(mid, m.Hashes[mid])))
+		wantFailLine(t, runCLI(t, m, db), "broken parent link")
+	})
+	t.Run("canonical-disagrees-mid-walk", func(t *testing.T) {
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+		mustMutate(t, fixture.PutKey(db, chainread.HeaderHashKey(mid), m.Hashes[mid+1].Bytes()))
+		wantFailLine(t, runCLI(t, m, db), "canonical mapping at")
+	})
+	t.Run("boundary-header-missing", func(t *testing.T) {
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+		mustMutate(t, fixture.DeleteKey(db, chainread.HeaderKey(fixture.BoundaryHeight, m.Hashes[fixture.BoundaryHeight])))
+		wantFailLine(t, runCLI(t, m, db), "broken parent link")
+	})
+}
+
+func TestFailShardStateRows(t *testing.T) {
+	ssKey := chainread.ShardStateKey(big.NewInt(fixture.Epoch))
+	t.Run("ss-missing", func(t *testing.T) {
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+		mustMutate(t, fixture.DeleteKey(db, ssKey))
+		wantFailLine(t, runCLI(t, m, db), "not present")
+	})
+	t.Run("ss-byte-different", func(t *testing.T) {
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+		raw, err := fixture.GetKey(db, ssKey)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		raw[len(raw)/2] ^= 0xff
+		mustMutate(t, fixture.PutKey(db, ssKey, raw))
+		wantFailLine(t, runCLI(t, m, db), "differs from boundary header")
+	})
+}
+
+// --- Certificate matrix ---
+
+func targetPayload(m *fixture.Manifest, viewID uint64) []byte {
+	return signature.ConstructCommitPayload(
+		params.LocalnetChainConfig,
+		shardingconfig.LocalnetSchedule.CalcEpochNumber(fixture.TargetHeight),
+		m.TargetHash,
+		fixture.TargetHeight, viewID)
+}
+
+func TestFailCertificateRows(t *testing.T) {
+	sigKey := chainread.BlockCommitSigKey(fixture.TargetHeight)
+	dropChild := func(t *testing.T, db string) {
+		mustMutate(t, fixture.DeleteKey(db, chainread.HeaderHashKey(fixture.ChildHeight)))
+		// Also detach the head pointers so the informational sample stays
+		// quiet about the missing canonical entry.
+	}
+	t.Run("no-source-present", func(t *testing.T) {
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+		mustMutate(t, fixture.DeleteKey(db, sigKey))
+		dropChild(t, db)
+		wantFailLine(t, runCLI(t, m, db), "no certificate source present")
+	})
+	t.Run("exact-key-bad-signature", func(t *testing.T) {
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+		payload := append([]byte(nil), m.CertPayload...)
+		payload[10] ^= 0x01 // corrupt the aggregate signature
+		mustMutate(t, fixture.PutKey(db, sigKey, payload))
+		wantFailLine(t, runCLI(t, m, db), "exact-key")
+	})
+	t.Run("bitmap-below-quorum", func(t *testing.T) {
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+		under, err := m.SignRaw(targetPayload(m, fixture.TargetHeight), []int{0})
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		mustMutate(t, fixture.PutKey(db, sigKey, under))
+		dropChild(t, db)
+		wantFailLine(t, runCLI(t, m, db), "not enough signature collected")
+	})
+	t.Run("payload-viewid-mismatch", func(t *testing.T) {
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+		wrongView, err := m.SignRaw(targetPayload(m, fixture.TargetHeight+1), nil)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		mustMutate(t, fixture.PutKey(db, sigKey, wrongView))
+		dropChild(t, db)
+		wantFailLine(t, runCLI(t, m, db), "Unable to verify aggregated signature")
+	})
+	t.Run("outside-committee-signer", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Aggregate signed by a key that is not in the committee while the
+		// bitmap claims the full committee: quorum-by-bitmap looks fine,
+		// only the cryptographic verification catches it.
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+		outside := &bls_core.SecretKey{}
+		var scalar [32]byte
+		scalar[0], scalar[1] = 0x99, 0x99 // deterministic, differs from all slot secrets
+		if err := outside.SetLittleEndian(scalar[:]); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		sig := outside.SignHash(targetPayload(m, fixture.TargetHeight))
+		mask := bls_cosi.NewMask(m.PubKeys)
+		for i := range m.PubKeys {
+			if err := mask.SetBit(i, true); err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+		}
+		payload := append(sig.Serialize(), mask.Bitmap...)
+		mustMutate(t, fixture.PutKey(db, sigKey, payload))
+		dropChild(t, db)
+		wantFailLine(t, runCLI(t, m, db), "Unable to verify aggregated signature")
+	})
+	t.Run("payload-wrong-hash", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Correct committee, correct height/viewID, but the payload binds a
+		// different block hash.
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+		wrongHash := signature.ConstructCommitPayload(
+			params.LocalnetChainConfig,
+			shardingconfig.LocalnetSchedule.CalcEpochNumber(fixture.TargetHeight),
+			m.ChildHash, fixture.TargetHeight, fixture.TargetHeight)
+		payload, err := m.SignRaw(wrongHash, nil)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		mustMutate(t, fixture.PutKey(db, sigKey, payload))
+		dropChild(t, db)
+		wantFailLine(t, runCLI(t, m, db), "Unable to verify aggregated signature")
+	})
+	t.Run("child-header-undecodable", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// The canonical child slot holds garbage bytes: a present source
+		// must verify, so this FAILs even though the exact key is valid.
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+		mustMutate(t, fixture.PutKey(db, chainread.HeaderKey(fixture.ChildHeight, m.ChildHash), []byte{0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef}))
+		res := runCLI(t, m, db)
+		wantFailLine(t, res, "present but malformed")
+		if !res.receipt.CertificateSources.ChildHeaderPresent {
+			t.Fatalf("malformed child source not reported present: %+v", res.receipt.CertificateSources)
+		}
+	})
+	t.Run("child-header-hash-invalid", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Valid header RLP of a DIFFERENT block stored under the child key:
+		// only hash authentication betrays it.
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+		otherRaw, err := fixture.GetKey(db, chainread.HeaderKey(fixture.BoundaryHeight, m.Hashes[fixture.BoundaryHeight]))
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		mustMutate(t, fixture.PutKey(db, chainread.HeaderKey(fixture.ChildHeight, m.ChildHash), otherRaw))
+		wantFailLine(t, runCLI(t, m, db), "present but malformed")
+	})
+	t.Run("sources-differ-bytewise", func(t *testing.T) {
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+		// A second valid aggregate (8 of 9 signers still clears quorum) that
+		// differs from the child header's full-committee bytes.
+		signers := []int{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}
+		alt, err := m.SignRaw(targetPayload(m, fixture.TargetHeight), signers)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		mustMutate(t, fixture.PutKey(db, sigKey, alt))
+		wantFailLine(t, runCLI(t, m, db), "differ byte-wise")
+	})
+	t.Run("child-only-satisfies", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Not a FAIL: exact key missing, child present and valid = PASS with
+		// satisfied_by=child-header (apply time can materialize the key).
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+		mustMutate(t, fixture.DeleteKey(db, sigKey))
+		res := runCLI(t, m, db)
+		wantExit(t, res, report.ExitPass)
+		if res.receipt.CertificateSources.SatisfiedBy != "child-header" ||
+			res.receipt.CertificateSources.ExactKeyPresent {
+			t.Fatalf("certificate sources %+v", res.receipt.CertificateSources)
+		}
+	})
+	t.Run("exact-key-only-satisfies", func(t *testing.T) {
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+		dropChild(t, db)
+		res := runCLI(t, m, db)
+		wantExit(t, res, report.ExitPass)
+		if res.receipt.CertificateSources.SatisfiedBy != "exact-key" ||
+			res.receipt.CertificateSources.ChildHeaderPresent {
+			t.Fatalf("certificate sources %+v", res.receipt.CertificateSources)
+		}
+		if res.receipt.HeadSample.ChildAtTargetPlus != "absent" {
+			t.Fatalf("child sample %q", res.receipt.HeadSample.ChildAtTargetPlus)
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+// --- State deletion/corruption rows (row 1) ---
+
+func TestFailStateRows(t *testing.T) {
+	nodesOf := func(t *testing.T, m *fixture.Manifest, db string) *fixture.TrieNodes {
+		nodes, err := fixture.EnumerateTrieNodes(db, m.StateRoot, m.ContractAddr)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("enumerate: %v", err)
+		}
+		return nodes
+	}
+	t.Run("state-root-node-deleted", func(t *testing.T) {
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+		mustMutate(t, fixture.DeleteKey(db, m.StateRoot.Bytes()))
+		res := runCLI(t, m, db)
+		wantFailLine(t, res, "missing trie node")
+		if !strings.Contains(res.stdout, m.StateRoot.Hex()[2:10]) {
+			t.Fatalf("FAIL line does not name the root: %s", res.stdout)
+		}
+	})
+	t.Run("account-internal-node-deleted", func(t *testing.T) {
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+		nodes := nodesOf(t, m, db)
+		if len(nodes.AccountInternal) == 0 {
+			t.Fatal("fixture has no internal account nodes")
+		}
+		mustMutate(t, fixture.DeleteKey(db, nodes.AccountInternal[0].Bytes()))
+		wantFailLine(t, runCLI(t, m, db), "missing trie node")
+	})
+	t.Run("storage-root-node-deleted", func(t *testing.T) {
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+		nodes := nodesOf(t, m, db)
+		mustMutate(t, fixture.DeleteKey(db, nodes.StorageRoot.Bytes()))
+		wantFailLine(t, runCLI(t, m, db), "missing trie node")
+	})
+	t.Run("storage-internal-node-deleted", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Defect-2-class geometry: the root opens fine; the failure appears
+		// on a child read during iteration and must never be silent-empty.
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+		nodes := nodesOf(t, m, db)
+		if len(nodes.StorageInternal) == 0 {
+			t.Fatal("fixture storage trie has no internal nodes")
+		}
+		mustMutate(t, fixture.DeleteKey(db, nodes.StorageInternal[0].Bytes()))
+		wantFailLine(t, runCLI(t, m, db), "missing trie node")
+	})
+	t.Run("node-content-substitution", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Valid RLP of a DIFFERENT node stored under the key: only content
+		// authentication (keccak(blob)==key) catches it.
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+		nodes := nodesOf(t, m, db)
+		if len(nodes.AccountInternal) < 2 {
+			t.Fatal("need two internal nodes")
+		}
+		other, err := fixture.GetKey(db, nodes.AccountInternal[1].Bytes())
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		mustMutate(t, fixture.PutKey(db, nodes.AccountInternal[0].Bytes(), other))
+		wantFailLine(t, runCLI(t, m, db), "content authentication")
+	})
+	t.Run("contract-code-deleted", func(t *testing.T) {
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+		mustMutate(t, fixture.DeleteKey(db, append([]byte("c"), m.ContractCodeHash.Bytes()...)))
+		wantFailLine(t, runCLI(t, m, db), "missing from all namespaces")
+	})
+	t.Run("validator-code-deleted", func(t *testing.T) {
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+		mustMutate(t, fixture.DeleteKey(db, append([]byte("vc"), m.ValidatorCodeHashes[0].Bytes()...)))
+		wantFailLine(t, runCLI(t, m, db), "missing from all namespaces")
+	})
+	t.Run("legacy-code-deleted", func(t *testing.T) {
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+		mustMutate(t, fixture.DeleteKey(db, m.LegacyCodeHash.Bytes()))
+		wantFailLine(t, runCLI(t, m, db), "missing from all namespaces")
+	})
+	t.Run("code-bytes-flipped", func(t *testing.T) {
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+		key := append([]byte("c"), m.ContractCodeHash.Bytes()...)
+		code, err := fixture.GetKey(db, key)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		code[len(code)/2] ^= 0x80
+		mustMutate(t, fixture.PutKey(db, key, code))
+		wantFailLine(t, runCLI(t, m, db), "hashes to")
+	})
+	t.Run("code-differs-across-locations", func(t *testing.T) {
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+		// Same hash key in the vc namespace with different bytes.
+		bogus := []byte("not the same bytes")
+		mustMutate(t, fixture.PutKey(db, append([]byte("vc"), m.ContractCodeHash.Bytes()...), bogus))
+		wantFailLine(t, runCLI(t, m, db), "DIFFERENT bytes")
+	})
+	t.Run("code-duplicate-identical-anomaly", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Identical bytes at c and legacy: anomaly, still PASS.
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+		code, err := fixture.GetKey(db, append([]byte("c"), m.ContractCodeHash.Bytes()...))
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		mustMutate(t, fixture.PutKey(db, m.ContractCodeHash.Bytes(), code))
+		res := runCLI(t, m, db)
+		wantExit(t, res, report.ExitPass)
+		if res.receipt.State.Anomalies.ByKind["code-multiple-locations"] == 0 {
+			t.Fatalf("expected code-multiple-locations anomaly: %+v", res.receipt.State.Anomalies)
+		}
+	})
+	t.Run("bad-account-leaf", func(t *testing.T) {
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBadAccountLeaf)
+		wantFailLine(t, runCLI(t, m, db), "does not decode")
+	})
+	t.Run("bad-storage-leaf", func(t *testing.T) {
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBadStorageLeaf)
+		wantFailLine(t, runCLI(t, m, db), "not an RLP byte string")
+	})
+	t.Run("flagged-empty-code", func(t *testing.T) {
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantFlaggedEmptyCode)
+		wantFailLine(t, runCLI(t, m, db), "empty code hash")
+	})
+	t.Run("validator-codes-swapped", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Swapping the two validators' wrapper blobs breaks the
+		// keccak(code)==CodeHash authentication (content moved under the
+		// wrong hash key).
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+		vc0 := append([]byte("vc"), m.ValidatorCodeHashes[0].Bytes()...)
+		vc1 := append([]byte("vc"), m.ValidatorCodeHashes[1].Bytes()...)
+		c0, err := fixture.GetKey(db, vc0)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		c1, err := fixture.GetKey(db, vc1)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		mustMutate(t, fixture.PutKey(db, vc0, c1))
+		mustMutate(t, fixture.PutKey(db, vc1, c0))
+		wantFailLine(t, runCLI(t, m, db), "hashes to")
+	})
+	t.Run("flagged-legacy-wrapper-code", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// PASS row: a flag-set account whose wrapper blob lives ONLY at the
+		// legacy bare-hash key still classifies as a validator, and the
+		// wrapper decode + address-binding checks still run (physical
+		// location does not determine class).
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+		vcKey := append([]byte("vc"), m.ValidatorCodeHashes[0].Bytes()...)
+		blob, err := fixture.GetKey(db, vcKey)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		mustMutate(t, fixture.PutKey(db, m.ValidatorCodeHashes[0].Bytes(), blob))
+		mustMutate(t, fixture.DeleteKey(db, vcKey))
+		res := runCLI(t, m, db)
+		wantExit(t, res, report.ExitPass)
+	})
+	t.Run("flagged-wrapper-address-unbound", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Build-time variant: hash-consistent wrapper bound to a foreign
+		// address on a flagged account - only the address binding catches
+		// it.
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantWrapperUnbound)
+		wantFailLine(t, runCLI(t, m, db), "does not bind")
+	})
+}
+
+// --- Anomaly truncation (row 10) ---
+
+func TestAnomalyTruncation(t *testing.T) {
+	m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantManyAnomalies)
+	res := runCLI(t, m, db)
+	wantExit(t, res, report.ExitPass)
+	an := res.receipt.State.Anomalies
+	total := fixture.ManyAnomaliesCount + 1 + 3 // planted + base flag-zero + (odd, wrapper-shaped, dual-class)
+	if an.Total != total {
+		t.Fatalf("anomaly total = %d, want %d (%+v)", an.Total, total, an)
+	}
+	if len(an.Example) != 20 {
+		t.Fatalf("examples = %d, want exactly 20", len(an.Example))
+	}
+	if an.Omitted != total-20 {
+		t.Fatalf("omitted = %d, want %d", an.Omitted, total-20)
+	}
+	if an.ByKind["flag-decoded-zero"] != fixture.ManyAnomaliesCount+1 {
+		t.Fatalf("by_kind = %+v", an.ByKind)
+	}
+	if st, err := os.Stat(res.report); err != nil || st.Size() > 64*1024 {
+		t.Fatalf("receipt size %v bytes exceeds 64KiB bound (err %v)", st.Size(), err)
+	}
+}
+
+// --- Exit 2 rows: layout, flags, report path, fd budget ---
+
+func TestUnusableRows(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("mainnet-override-refused", func(t *testing.T) {
+		var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
+		code := run([]string{"preflight", "--db", t.TempDir(), "--network", "mainnet",
+			"--target-height", "44", "--target-hash", "0xabc"}, &stdout, &stderr)
+		if code != report.ExitUnusable {
+			t.Fatalf("exit = %d, want 2 (stderr %s)", code, stderr.String())
+		}
+		if !strings.Contains(stderr.String(), "refused on --network mainnet") {
+			t.Fatalf("stderr %q", stderr.String())
+		}
+	})
+	t.Run("missing-db", func(t *testing.T) {
+		var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
+		code := run([]string{"preflight", "--db", filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "nope"),
+			"--network", "localnet", "--target-height", "44",
+			"--target-hash", "0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111"},
+			&stdout, &stderr)
+		if code != report.ExitUnusable {
+			t.Fatalf("exit = %d, want 2", code)
+		}
+	})
+	t.Run("sharded-layout", func(t *testing.T) {
+		m, _ := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+		dir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "harmony_sharddb_0")
+		if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0o755); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		res := runCLI(t, m, dir)
+		wantExit(t, res, report.ExitUnusable)
+		if !strings.Contains(res.stderr, "sharded") {
+			t.Fatalf("stderr %q", res.stderr)
+		}
+	})
+	t.Run("wrong-basename", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// A perfectly valid DB under a renamed directory is refused: --db
+		// must point at harmony_db_<shard> itself.
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+		renamed := filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(db), "db-backup")
+		if err := os.Rename(db, renamed); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		res := runCLI(t, m, renamed)
+		wantExit(t, res, report.ExitUnusable)
+		if !strings.Contains(res.stderr, "harmony_db_0") {
+			t.Fatalf("stderr %q", res.stderr)
+		}
+	})
+	t.Run("pebble-layout", func(t *testing.T) {
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+		if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(db, "OPTIONS-000005"), []byte("pebble"), 0o644); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		res := runCLI(t, m, db)
+		wantExit(t, res, report.ExitUnusable)
+		if !strings.Contains(res.stderr, "pebble") {
+			t.Fatalf("stderr %q", res.stderr)
+		}
+	})
+	t.Run("report-inside-db-refused", func(t *testing.T) {
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+		var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
+		code := run([]string{"preflight", "--db", db, "--network", "localnet",
+			"--target-height", fmt.Sprint(fixture.TargetHeight),
+			"--target-hash", m.TargetHash.Hex(),
+			"--report", filepath.Join(db, "r.json")}, &stdout, &stderr)
+		if code != report.ExitUnusable {
+			t.Fatalf("exit = %d, want 2 (stderr %s)", code, stderr.String())
+		}
+		if !strings.Contains(stderr.String(), "inside the DB directory") {
+			t.Fatalf("stderr %q", stderr.String())
+		}
+	})
+	t.Run("fd-budget-too-low", func(t *testing.T) {
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+		res := runCLI(t, m, db, "--handles", "2000000000")
+		wantExit(t, res, report.ExitUnusable)
+		if !strings.Contains(res.stderr, "RLIMIT_NOFILE") {
+			t.Fatalf("stderr %q", res.stderr)
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+// --- Exit 3 rows: persistent read errors ---
+
+func TestReadErrorRows(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("referenced-sst-deleted", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Deleting a referenced table file is a (normally transient) race
+		// class; with the file permanently gone, bounded retries exhaust
+		// into exit 3 with the remedy line.
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+		removeOneSST(t, db)
+		res := runCLI(t, m, db)
+		wantExit(t, res, report.ExitReadError)
+		if !strings.Contains(res.stderr, "remedy: re-run") {
+			t.Fatalf("stderr lacks remedy line:\n%s", res.stderr)
+		}
+		// Schema v2 result enum is exactly PASS|FAIL; exit_code 3 marks the
+		// read-error class.
+		if res.receipt == nil || res.receipt.Result != "FAIL" || res.receipt.ExitCode != 3 {
+			t.Fatalf("receipt %+v", res.receipt)
+		}
+		if res.receipt.Retries.ReopenCount == 0 {
+			t.Fatalf("expected reopen retries before giving up, got %+v", res.receipt.Retries)
+		}
+		// The one-line stdout contract holds for read errors too (exit
+		// code 3 distinguishes the class).
+		lines := strings.Split(strings.TrimRight(res.stdout, "\n"), "\n")
+		if len(lines) != 1 || !strings.HasPrefix(lines[0], "FAIL: ") {
+			t.Fatalf("stdout must be exactly one FAIL line on read error, got %q", res.stdout)
+		}
+		if !strings.Contains(lines[0], "read error") {
+			t.Fatalf("FAIL line %q does not name the read error", lines[0])
+		}
+	})
+	t.Run("sst-block-corruption-zero-retries", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Immutable-SST corruption: direct exit 3 with zero reopen attempts,
+		// console naming the corrupt table.
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+		name := corruptLargestSST(t, db)
+		res := runCLI(t, m, db)
+		wantExit(t, res, report.ExitReadError)
+		if res.receipt.Retries.ReopenCount != 0 {
+			t.Fatalf("reopen count = %d, want 0 (non-retryable class)", res.receipt.Retries.ReopenCount)
+		}
+		if !strings.Contains(res.stderr, "corrupt") {
+			t.Fatalf("stderr does not mention corruption:\n%s", res.stderr)
+		}
+		_ = name
+	})
+	t.Run("corrupt-manifest-stopped-db", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// The geth-wrapper hazard regression: open fails, nothing recovers
+		// or rewrites the manifest, directory contents byte-identical.
+		m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+		manifest := findFile(t, db, "MANIFEST-")
+		raw, err := os.ReadFile(manifest)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		raw[len(raw)/2] ^= 0xff
+		if err := os.WriteFile(manifest, raw, 0o644); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		before := snapshotDir(t, db)
+		res := runCLI(t, m, db)
+		wantExit(t, res, report.ExitReadError)
+		after := snapshotDir(t, db)
+		diffSnapshots(t, before, after)
+	})
+}
+
+// TestNoWritesToLiveDirectory asserts the tool leaves the database directory
+// byte-identical after a full PASS run (no LOCK, no LOG, no anything).
+func TestNoWritesToLiveDirectory(t *testing.T) {
+	m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+	before := snapshotDir(t, db)
+	res := runCLI(t, m, db)
+	wantExit(t, res, report.ExitPass)
+	after := snapshotDir(t, db)
+	diffSnapshots(t, before, after)
+}
+
+// --- helpers ---
+
+func mustMutate(t *testing.T, err error) {
+	t.Helper()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("fixture mutation: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func removeOneSST(t *testing.T, dir string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	entries, err := os.ReadDir(dir)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	for _, ent := range entries {
+		if strings.HasSuffix(ent.Name(), ".ldb") || strings.HasSuffix(ent.Name(), ".sst") {
+			if err := os.Remove(filepath.Join(dir, ent.Name())); err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			return
+		}
+	}
+	t.Fatal("fixture has no table files (all data still in the journal?)")
+}
+
+func corruptLargestSST(t *testing.T, dir string) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	entries, err := os.ReadDir(dir)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	var best string
+	var bestSize int64
+	for _, ent := range entries {
+		if !strings.HasSuffix(ent.Name(), ".ldb") && !strings.HasSuffix(ent.Name(), ".sst") {
+			continue
+		}
+		info, err := ent.Info()
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if info.Size() > bestSize {
+			best, bestSize = ent.Name(), info.Size()
+		}
+	}
+	if best == "" {
+		t.Fatal("fixture has no table files")
+	}
+	path := filepath.Join(dir, best)
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	// Flip a byte in (nearly) every 4KiB block so any read path hits a
+	// checksum failure deterministically, sparing the footer.
+	for off := 4096; off < len(raw)-128; off += 4096 {
+		raw[off] ^= 0xa5
+	}
+	if len(raw) > 256 {
+		raw[len(raw)/2] ^= 0xa5
+	}
+	if err := os.WriteFile(path, raw, 0o644); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return best
+}
+
+// corruptAllSSTs flips bytes in every data block of every table file.
+func corruptAllSSTs(t *testing.T, dir string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	entries, err := os.ReadDir(dir)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	corrupted := 0
+	for _, ent := range entries {
+		if !strings.HasSuffix(ent.Name(), ".ldb") && !strings.HasSuffix(ent.Name(), ".sst") {
+			continue
+		}
+		path := filepath.Join(dir, ent.Name())
+		raw, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if len(raw) < 256 {
+			continue
+		}
+		raw[16] ^= 0xa5
+		for off := 4096; off < len(raw)-128; off += 4096 {
+			raw[off] ^= 0xa5
+		}
+		if err := os.WriteFile(path, raw, 0o644); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		corrupted++
+	}
+	if corrupted == 0 {
+		t.Fatal("no table files to corrupt")
+	}
+}
+
+func findFile(t *testing.T, dir, prefix string) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	entries, err := os.ReadDir(dir)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	for _, ent := range entries {
+		if strings.HasPrefix(ent.Name(), prefix) {
+			return filepath.Join(dir, ent.Name())
+		}
+	}
+	t.Fatalf("no %s* file in %s", prefix, dir)
+	return ""
+}
+
+type dirSnapshot map[string][]byte
+
+func snapshotDir(t *testing.T, dir string) dirSnapshot {
+	t.Helper()
+	snap := dirSnapshot{}
+	entries, err := os.ReadDir(dir)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	for _, ent := range entries {
+		if ent.IsDir() {
+			continue
+		}
+		data, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(dir, ent.Name()))
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		snap[ent.Name()] = data
+	}
+	return snap
+}
+
+func diffSnapshots(t *testing.T, before, after dirSnapshot) {
+	t.Helper()
+	for name := range after {
+		if _, ok := before[name]; !ok {
+			t.Fatalf("tool created file %s in the database directory", name)
+		}
+	}
+	for name, data := range before {
+		got, ok := after[name]
+		if !ok {
+			t.Fatalf("file %s disappeared from the database directory", name)
+		}
+		if !bytes.Equal(data, got) {
+			t.Fatalf("file %s changed (%d -> %d bytes)", name, len(data), len(got))
+		}
+	}
+}
diff --git a/cmd/harmony-recovery/preflight_test.go b/cmd/harmony-recovery/preflight_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..45e9a836ba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cmd/harmony-recovery/preflight_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/inplace/fixture"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/inplace/report"
+)
+
+// Shared pristine fixtures (built once per variant, copied per test).
+var (
+	fixturesMu   sync.Mutex
+	fixturesRoot string
+	fixtures     = map[fixture.Variant]*fixture.Manifest{}
+)
+
+func TestMain(m *testing.M) {
+	dir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", "preflight-fixtures-*")
+	if err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "fixture tmp:", err)
+		os.Exit(1)
+	}
+	fixturesRoot = dir
+	code := m.Run()
+	os.RemoveAll(dir)
+	os.Exit(code)
+}
+
+// getFixture builds (once) and returns the pristine manifest for a variant.
+func getFixture(t *testing.T, v fixture.Variant) *fixture.Manifest {
+	t.Helper()
+	fixturesMu.Lock()
+	defer fixturesMu.Unlock()
+	if m, ok := fixtures[v]; ok {
+		return m
+	}
+	dir := filepath.Join(fixturesRoot, fmt.Sprintf("variant-%d", v))
+	m, err := fixture.Build(dir, v)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("build fixture variant %d: %v", v, err)
+	}
+	fixtures[v] = m
+	return m
+}
+
+// cloneFixture copies the pristine variant DB into a fresh directory the
+// test may mutate.
+func cloneFixture(t *testing.T, v fixture.Variant) (*fixture.Manifest, string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	m := getFixture(t, v)
+	dst := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "harmony_db_0")
+	if err := fixture.CopyDB(m.Dir, dst); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("copy fixture: %v", err)
+	}
+	return m, dst
+}
+
+type cliResult struct {
+	code    int
+	stdout  string
+	stderr  string
+	receipt *report.Receipt
+	report  string
+}
+
+// runCLI executes the preflight through the full CLI (cobra flags included).
+func runCLI(t *testing.T, m *fixture.Manifest, db string, extra ...string) cliResult {
+	t.Helper()
+	reportPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "preflight-result.json")
+	args := []string{
+		"preflight",
+		"--db", db,
+		"--network", "localnet",
+		"--target-height", fmt.Sprint(fixture.TargetHeight),
+		"--target-hash", m.TargetHash.Hex(),
+		"--report", reportPath,
+	}
+	args = append(args, extra...)
+	var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
+	code := run(args, &stdout, &stderr)
+	res := cliResult{code: code, stdout: stdout.String(), stderr: stderr.String(), report: reportPath}
+	if data, err := os.ReadFile(reportPath); err == nil {
+		var rec report.Receipt
+		if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &rec); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("receipt does not parse: %v\n%s", err, data)
+		}
+		res.receipt = &rec
+	}
+	return res
+}
+
+func wantExit(t *testing.T, res cliResult, code int) {
+	t.Helper()
+	if res.code != code {
+		t.Fatalf("exit code = %d, want %d\nstdout:\n%s\nstderr:\n%s", res.code, code, res.stdout, res.stderr)
+	}
+}
+
+func wantFailLine(t *testing.T, res cliResult, substr string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	wantExit(t, res, report.ExitFail)
+	lines := strings.Split(strings.TrimRight(res.stdout, "\n"), "\n")
+	if len(lines) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("stdout must be exactly one line, got %d:\n%s", len(lines), res.stdout)
+	}
+	if !strings.HasPrefix(lines[0], "FAIL: ") {
+		t.Fatalf("stdout line %q does not start with FAIL:", lines[0])
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(lines[0], substr) {
+		t.Fatalf("FAIL line %q does not mention %q", lines[0], substr)
+	}
+	if res.receipt == nil {
+		t.Fatalf("no receipt written on FAIL")
+	}
+	if res.receipt.Result != "FAIL" || res.receipt.ExitCode != report.ExitFail {
+		t.Fatalf("receipt result/exit = %s/%d, want FAIL/1", res.receipt.Result, res.receipt.ExitCode)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestPreflightPass is the end-to-end PASS row: full CLI, pristine fixture.
+func TestPreflightPass(t *testing.T) {
+	m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+	res := runCLI(t, m, db, "--name", "test-validator")
+	wantExit(t, res, report.ExitPass)
+
+	if res.stdout != "PASS\n" {
+		t.Fatalf("stdout = %q, want exactly \"PASS\\n\"", res.stdout)
+	}
+	rec := res.receipt
+	if rec == nil {
+		t.Fatal("no receipt written")
+	}
+	if rec.Result != "PASS" || rec.ExitCode != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("receipt result=%s exit=%d", rec.Result, rec.ExitCode)
+	}
+	if rec.Tool != report.Tool || rec.Schema != report.Schema {
+		t.Fatalf("receipt tool/schema = %q/%q", rec.Tool, rec.Schema)
+	}
+	if rec.Name != "test-validator" || rec.Hostname == "" {
+		t.Fatalf("receipt name/hostname = %q/%q", rec.Name, rec.Hostname)
+	}
+	for _, id := range report.CheckIDs {
+		if rec.Checks[id] != "ok" {
+			t.Fatalf("check %s = %q, want ok (all checks: %v)", id, rec.Checks[id], rec.Checks)
+		}
+	}
+	if rec.Target.Hash != m.TargetHash.Hex() || rec.Target.Height != fixture.TargetHeight {
+		t.Fatalf("receipt target %+v", rec.Target)
+	}
+	if rec.Target.StateRoot != m.StateRoot.Hex() {
+		t.Fatalf("receipt state root %s, want %s", rec.Target.StateRoot, m.StateRoot.Hex())
+	}
+	if rec.Target.Epoch != fixture.Epoch || rec.Target.ViewID != fixture.TargetHeight {
+		t.Fatalf("receipt epoch/viewid %d/%d", rec.Target.Epoch, rec.Target.ViewID)
+	}
+	if rec.CertificateSources.SatisfiedBy != "exact-key+child-header" ||
+		!rec.CertificateSources.ExactKeyPresent || !rec.CertificateSources.ChildHeaderPresent {
+		t.Fatalf("certificate sources %+v", rec.CertificateSources)
+	}
+	if rec.HeadSample.WalkToTarget != "reached-target" {
+		t.Fatalf("head sample %+v", rec.HeadSample)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(rec.HeadSample.ChildAtTargetPlus, m.ChildHash.Hex()) {
+		t.Fatalf("child sample %q", rec.HeadSample.ChildAtTargetPlus)
+	}
+	c := rec.State.Counts
+	if c.Accounts < fixture.NumEOA || c.StorageTries == 0 || c.StorageLeaves == 0 ||
+		c.UniqueCodeContract == 0 || c.UniqueCodeValidator == 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("state counts %+v", c)
+	}
+	if rec.State.Digest == "" || rec.State.DigestAlgorithm == "" {
+		t.Fatalf("digest missing: %+v", rec.State)
+	}
+	// The base fixture carries the informational flag-edge and dual-class
+	// anomalies; they never gate.
+	wantKinds := []string{"flag-decoded-zero", "flag-noncanonical-value", "wrapper-shaped-contract-code", "code-dual-class"}
+	for _, k := range wantKinds {
+		if rec.State.Anomalies.ByKind[k] == 0 {
+			t.Fatalf("expected anomaly kind %s in passing receipt, got %+v", k, rec.State.Anomalies)
+		}
+	}
+	if rec.State.Anomalies.Omitted != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected omitted anomalies: %+v", rec.State.Anomalies)
+	}
+	if rec.SampleNote == "" {
+		t.Fatal("sample note missing")
+	}
+	if rec.Retries.ReopenCount != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected reopens on a stopped fixture: %d", rec.Retries.ReopenCount)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestPreflightDigestDeterminism: worker-count variation must be
+// byte-identical (scheduling-independent fold).
+func TestPreflightDigestDeterminism(t *testing.T) {
+	m, db := cloneFixture(t, fixture.VariantBase)
+	res1 := runCLI(t, m, db, "--storage-workers", "1")
+	wantExit(t, res1, report.ExitPass)
+	res8 := runCLI(t, m, db, "--storage-workers", "8")
+	wantExit(t, res8, report.ExitPass)
+	if res1.receipt.State.Digest != res8.receipt.State.Digest {
+		t.Fatalf("digest differs across worker counts: %s vs %s",
+			res1.receipt.State.Digest, res8.receipt.State.Digest)
+	}
+	if res1.receipt.State.Counts != res8.receipt.State.Counts {
+		t.Fatalf("counts differ across worker counts: %+v vs %+v",
+			res1.receipt.State.Counts, res8.receipt.State.Counts)
+	}
+}
diff --git a/cmd/harmony-recovery/rlimit_other.go b/cmd/harmony-recovery/rlimit_other.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ce1886e0fa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cmd/harmony-recovery/rlimit_other.go
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+//go:build !unix
+
+package main
+
+// checkFDLimit is a no-op on platforms without RLIMIT_NOFILE.
+func checkFDLimit(handles int) error { return nil }
diff --git a/cmd/harmony-recovery/rlimit_unix.go b/cmd/harmony-recovery/rlimit_unix.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6ab729de70
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cmd/harmony-recovery/rlimit_unix.go
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+//go:build unix
+
+package main
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+
+	"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
+)
+
+// fdHeadroom is the file-descriptor budget beyond the LevelDB handle cache
+// (manifest, journal, caches, report file, stdio).
+const fdHeadroom = 256
+
+// checkFDLimit refuses to start when RLIMIT_NOFILE cannot cover the handle
+// cache plus headroom (a mid-walk fd exhaustion would surface as a confusing
+// read error).
+func checkFDLimit(handles int) error {
+	var lim unix.Rlimit
+	if err := unix.Getrlimit(unix.RLIMIT_NOFILE, &lim); err != nil {
+		return nil // best-effort; do not block on probe failure
+	}
+	need := uint64(handles) + fdHeadroom
+	if uint64(lim.Cur) < need {
+		return fmt.Errorf("RLIMIT_NOFILE is %d but --handles %d needs at least %d; raise it (ulimit -n %d) or lower --handles",
+			lim.Cur, handles, need, need)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
diff --git a/docs/recovery/metadata.md b/docs/recovery/metadata.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0208fbcade
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/recovery/metadata.md
@@ -0,0 +1,387 @@
+# `harmony-recovery metadata` — validator-metadata derivation, reference export, branch audit
+
+Normative reference for the `metadata` command family (plan Workstream B).
+These are **internal, run-once** tools operated on the single source machine
+`mhe-snaps0-01` (synced to the abandoned head `92,751,016`). Validators
+never run them: they run B4 `prepare --apply` / the patched binary, which
+re-derive the same normalization locally and refuse on reference mismatch.
+
+The commands extend the preflight-owned `harmony-recovery` binary. They
+require a **stopped** node (the strict opener takes a shared `flock`; a live
+node holding the exclusive lock fails the open).
+
+- [Commands](#commands)
+- [HMR1 container format](#hmr1-container-format)
+- [Reference manifest schema](#reference-manifest-schema)
+- [Report schemas](#report-schemas)
+- [Digest definitions](#digest-definitions)
+- [Exit codes](#exit-codes)
+- [Consumer interface contract (B4 / C / D / E)](#consumer-interface-contract)
+- [Run-once runbook (mhe-snaps0-01)](#run-once-runbook)
+- [Release artifacts](#release-artifacts)
+- [Performance pilot gate](#performance-pilot-gate)
+- [Operator decision log](#operator-decision-log)
+- [Handoff-vs-code discrepancy register](#handoff-vs-code-discrepancy-register)
+- [Fixture regeneration](#fixture-regeneration)
+
+## Commands
+
+All three read `recovery-anchor.json` (`--anchor`) for the frozen incident
+constants; there is **no `--network` flag** (network, shard and the
+constants come from the anchor, cross-checked against the schedule and the
+DB at run time). Every output path (`--report`, `--out-dir`, `--scratch`)
+is refused if it resolves inside the source DB directory.
+
+Common LevelDB tuning flags on every subcommand: `--handles` (open-file
+cache capacity, 0 = default 512) and `--db-cache-mb` (block cache size in
+MiB, 0 = default 256).
+
+### `metadata scan --db PATH --anchor FILE --report FILE`
+
+Read-only diagnosis / dry-run — run first, and as the cheap re-check tool.
+Strict read-only open, anchor cross-verification, target resolution,
+one normalization pass, and a full JSON report: per-section
+retained/removed/invalid/missing/duplicate counts, the deletion plan (counts
++ digest; apply re-derives, the report authenticates), the full digest set,
+absence assertions, snapshot-reconstruction coverage, the kept-untouched
+`validator-stats` inventory, sync-era/legacy key presence, the shard-1
+freeze inputs, DB identity fingerprints before/after, and a zero-write
+proof. The normalized validator-list length is printed prominently for a
+**manual, informational** comparison against the separately-run preflight
+(there is no receipt input and no gating — §8 Q2).
+
+### `metadata export-reference --db PATH --anchor FILE --out-dir DIR`
+
+The run-once reference producer. Any `Fatal`/`MissingRequired` finding
+refuses export (`ReviewItem`s are allowed and recorded in the diagnostics
+digest). A built-in **double-run determinism self-check** derives everything
+twice over independent handles and byte-compares both `.hmr` serializations
+and both reference manifests before writing anything; on mismatch it exits
+`23` with only `determinism-diff/pass-a.*` / `pass-b.*` dumps and the export
+report (no release artifacts).
+
+Publication is **failure-atomic, one visible unit**: artifacts and the
+finalized success `export-report.json` are staged privately together, the
+staged set is verified (exactly the expected files, none empty), and only
+then published as `<out-dir>/release/` through ONE atomic directory rename.
+The `release/` directory therefore either holds the complete verified set —
+`metadata-<target>.hmr`, `metadata-<target>.reference.json`,
+`run-checksums.sha256`, `export-report.json` — or does not exist at all; an
+incomplete set can never appear under a consumer-facing release name, on
+any failure path (export refuses an out-dir that already has `release/`),
+and there is no window in which `release/` exists without its success
+report or an exit-0 report is visible without `release/`. On a failed or
+refused attempt a separate FAILURE report is written to `<out-dir>` itself;
+a success-shaped report only ever exists inside `release/`. The self-check
+cannot be skipped in a release build.
+
+### `metadata audit-branch --db PATH --anchor FILE --out-dir DIR --scratch DIR`
+
+Masked-overlay re-execution of the abandoned branch
+`target+1 .. --end-height` (default anchor `audit_end_height`). Reads consult
+scratch first, then the source minus a mask; writes go to scratch only — the
+source stays strictly read-only. Before any block executes, scratch is
+seeded with the full mechanical application of the normalization output
+(deletion tombstones + materialized rewrites), the post-target chain
+tombstones, and the heads rewound to the target — i.e. a dry run of B4's
+end state. Mandatory **two-pass** structure: pass 1 discovers the
+branch-written crosslink/spent records (classifying affected findings
+`pollution-suspect`); pass 2 masks them and is authoritative. Emits
+`abandoned-branch-audit.json`.
+
+Flags: `--end-height` (default anchor value), `--scratch`, `--keep-scratch`,
+`--single-pass` (debug only; output marked non-authoritative),
+`--trusted-shard1-pointer <shardID>:<blockNum>` (pre-incident escape hatch,
+accepted only if it satisfies the §4.4 invariants),
+`--trusted-shard1-pointer-provenance`, `--scratch-reserve-gb` (default 200;
+must be non-negative — there is no bypass), `--reference` (path to the
+`export-reference` manifest: the audit cross-checks the manifest's target
+tuple and digests against its own view of the source and binds the manifest
+digest into the report's hash chain).
+
+## HMR1 container format
+
+Byte-exact, deterministic, byte-reproducible from a `NormalizedSet`:
+
+```text
+magic 4B ASCII "HMR1"
+format-version u32BE = 1
+anchor-digest  32B = SHA-256 of the exact recovery-anchor.json bytes
+record-count   u64BE
+records, in strictly increasing raw-key order (bytewise), each:
+    key-length   u32BE
+    raw-key      (exact LevelDB key)
+    value-length u64BE
+    raw-value
+```
+
+The decoder rejects, each with a distinct error class: bad magic, bad
+version, truncation, trailing bytes, non-monotone order, duplicate keys, and
+count/header disagreement. Sections are assigned by key shape (the container
+stays a flat ordered set): `validator-list` (1 record, RLP of the normalized
+ordered list), `dvl` (every corrected non-empty record), `validator-snapshot-<epoch>`
+(retained target-epoch snapshots, original validated bytes), `shard-state-<epoch>`
+(1 record, exact bytes), `reward-accumulator` (1 record — `blk-rwd-<target>`,
+§8 Q5). Stats are never included; target wrapper/state blobs are never
+included.
+
+## Reference manifest schema
+
+`metadata-<target>.reference.json` — strictly canonical JSON (sorted keys,
+no insignificant whitespace, no HTML escaping), **only chain-invariant,
+timestamp-free** material. Its SHA-256 is THE reference digest the release
+notes publish and B4/D bind. Schema `hmr-reference-v1`:
+
+```json
+{
+  "schema": "hmr-reference-v1",
+  "network": "mainnet",
+  "shard": 0,
+  "anchor": { "target_height", "target_hash", "target_root", "epoch",
+              "epoch_first_block", "epoch_last_block",
+              "snapshot_base_height", "abandoned_child_hash" },
+  "anchor_config_sha256": "<sha256 of recovery-anchor.json>",
+  "ruleset_version": "hmr-norm-v1",
+  "package_sha256": "<sha256 of the .hmr file bytes>",
+  "record_count": <u64>,
+  "sections": [ { "name", "record_count", "sha256" }, ... ],
+  "wrapper_set_sha256": "<hex>",
+  "diagnostics_sha256": "<hex>",
+  "absence_assertions": [ { "namespace", "predicate", "expected_remaining": 0 }, ... ]
+}
+```
+
+`planned_deletions` counts are **excluded** (source-specific run evidence);
+the manifest carries only the predicate and the required end-state.
+Timestamps are forbidden. Varying only per-run deletion counts must not
+change the reference digest; flipping any bound input (payload byte, ruleset
+version, a section digest) must change it.
+
+## Report schemas
+
+- **scan report** (`metadata-scan-report-v1`) and **export report**
+  (`metadata-export-report-v1`) carry run evidence: DB fingerprints, counts,
+  coverage, the per-phase deletion plan with `planned_deletions` counts,
+  timings, `created_at`. These are never digested into the reference. The
+  scan report stays internal; the export SUCCESS report is published
+  atomically inside `release/` with the artifacts (failure reports go to
+  the out-dir root), but it is run evidence, not part of the sealed
+  four-file release set.
+- **audit report** (`abandoned-branch-audit-v1`,
+  `abandoned-branch-audit.json`) is a release artifact: per-block execution
+  + validity results, first validity failure cross-checked against the
+  anchor known-bad list, the staking-op inventory (native by directive +
+  precompile by kind), the epoch-transition byte-equality record, the
+  bidirectional reconciliation with a fixed-shape write census and bounded
+  anomalies, the per-shard subsets B4 consumes, and the per-shard pointer
+  solver results.
+
+## Digest definitions
+
+All SHA-256.
+
+- **record frame**: `u32be(len(key)) ‖ key ‖ u64be(len(value)) ‖ value`.
+- **section digest**: `SHA-256("hmr1/section/" ‖ name ‖ 0x00 ‖ concat(record frames in key order))`.
+- **package digest**: SHA-256 of the `.hmr` file bytes.
+- **reference digest**: SHA-256 of the exact `metadata-<target>.reference.json`
+  bytes (embeds the package digest + ruleset version). This is what release
+  notes publish and B4's pre-mutation check, the `COMPLETE` marker, and the
+  D1 startup gate bind.
+- **wrapper-set digest**: `SHA-256("hmr1/wrappers" ‖ 0x00 ‖ concat(addr(20) ‖ u64be(len(code)) ‖ code))`
+  in normalized list order; `code` = raw stored wrapper bytes at the target
+  root (decode-validated, hashed unre-encoded).
+- **diagnostics digest**: SHA-256 of the canonical JSON of the
+  chain-deterministic findings, sorted by `(code, key)`.
+
+## Exit codes
+
+`0` OK · `13` unsafe DB open / concurrent writer / missing `LOCK` · `14` I/O
+or corruption · `15` invalid config / path overlap (validation inside
+`RunE`; cobra flag-parse / unknown-command errors exit `2` at the landed
+root) · `16` interrupted · `20` `MISSING_REQUIRED_METADATA` (clean-DB
+fallback signal) · `21` `INVALID_RETAINED_METADATA` (fatal corruption, incl.
+`NoncanonicalKey`) · `22` `TARGET_STATE_UNAVAILABLE` · `23`
+`DETERMINISM_MISMATCH` · `24` `AUDIT_ANOMALY` (incl. `POINTER_AMBIGUOUS`) ·
+`130` SIGINT.
+
+**Precedence** for mixed outcomes (highest wins):
+`130 > 16 > 15 > 13 > 14 > 22 > 21 > 20 > 24 > 23 > 0`. Corruption (`21`)
+deliberately outranks the fallback signal (`20`): a corrupt DB must be
+investigated, not routed to the clean-DB path. Reports always carry every
+finding regardless of the winning code.
+
+## Consumer interface contract
+
+The shared normalization library `internal/recovery/metadata/norm` is THE
+single implementation for scan, export, apply (B4) and verify. Its behavior
+is fixed by the anchor plus the `ruleset_version` constant (`hmr-norm-v1`) —
+no policy knobs (stats kept untouched, target reward accumulator included).
+
+- **`norm.Normalize(a Anchor, s Sources) (*Result, error)`** reads raw keys
+  with strict error-checked iterators (never the fail-open `rawdb` readers),
+  the target `*state.DB` opened at the anchor root (`snaps=nil`), a
+  best-effort historical opener, and a header reader for the boundary block.
+  It performs zero writes.
+- **`DeletionPlan`** phases map to B4's journal exactly:
+  `DVL_SANITIZING`, `SNAPSHOT_SANITIZING`, `EPOCH_SANITIZING`,
+  `LOOKUP_AND_CANONICAL_CLEANUP` — **no stats phase** (§8 Q4). The last phase
+  carries only `audit-input-required` placeholders (shard-1 subsets, the
+  derived pointer) plus B4-owned canonical cleanup, never computed here.
+- **B4 reference-comparison rule** (handoff §2.4): re-derive locally under
+  the same `ruleset_version`; match the reference digest
+  (= SHA-256 of `metadata-<target>.reference.json`); recompute the package
+  digest from the payload; **refuse before any mutation on mismatch**. B4
+  never installs `.hmr` records — it re-derives; the `.hmr` exact records
+  exist because B4 needs byte-exact values, and the audit reconciliation
+  validates the source-specific deletion plan.
+- **Audit shard-1 subset / pointer contract for B4**: `abandoned-branch-audit.json`
+  carries, per non-beacon shard, the branch-written crosslink and
+  `cxReceiptSpent` key sets and the derived last-crosslink pointer (invariant
+  solver, §4.4), or `POINTER_AMBIGUOUS` with no value (operator investigates,
+  supplies `--trusted-shard1-pointer`). B4 consumes the scan + audit reports
+  together.
+- **`COMPLETE` marker (B4 writes, D1 verifies)**: anchor-config digest,
+  reference digest, tool digest, normalized-output digest.
+- **Preflight (C)**: assumed passed; **no receipt coupling** and nothing may
+  depend on the preflight receipt (§8 Q2). Scan prints the normalized
+  list length for a manual, informational comparison only.
+- **Orchestration (E)**: quarantine `transactions.rlp` and the staged-sync
+  progress cache (a separate `kv.RwDB`, not `harmony_db_0`) before apply
+  (handoff §9 / §2.3).
+
+## Run-once runbook
+
+On `mhe-snaps0-01`, with the BLS build environment sourced:
+
+1. **Stop the node** and confirm no process holds `harmony_db_0` (the strict
+   opener's shared `flock` fails otherwise).
+2. `metadata scan --db harmony_db_0 --anchor recovery-anchor.json --report scan.json`.
+   Review: verdict OK, zero-write proof true, the fallback signals absent,
+   the normalized list length matches the preflight expectation (manual).
+3. `metadata export-reference --db harmony_db_0 --anchor recovery-anchor.json --out-dir out/`.
+   The double-run self-check runs automatically. Confirm exit 0 and that
+   `out/release/` exists holding `metadata-92730034.hmr` +
+   `metadata-92730034.reference.json` + `run-checksums.sha256` + the
+   success `export-report.json` (the directory appears only on a fully
+   clean run, complete or not at all); note the reference digest.
+4. `metadata audit-branch --db harmony_db_0 --anchor recovery-anchor.json --out-dir out/ --scratch scratch/`.
+   Two passes run. Confirm exit 0 (no `AUDIT_ANOMALY`), all roots matched,
+   the epoch-3003 next-epoch records byte-equal the source's, and the
+   reconciliation closed. On `POINTER_AMBIGUOUS`, investigate and re-run with
+   `--trusted-shard1-pointer`.
+5. **Final sealing step** (§4.7 tier b): stage exactly the four release
+   files in a directory and regenerate `SHA256SUMS` over them:
+
+   ```bash
+   mkdir -p sealed && cp recovery-anchor.json out/release/metadata-92730034.hmr \
+     out/release/metadata-92730034.reference.json out/abandoned-branch-audit.json sealed/
+   ( cd sealed && sha256sum recovery-anchor.json metadata-92730034.hmr \
+       metadata-92730034.reference.json abandoned-branch-audit.json > SHA256SUMS \
+     && sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS )
+   ```
+
+   Anything else in `sealed/` fails the seal. Sealing exists as a separate
+   step because export runs before the audit artifact exists.
+6. Attach the four files + `SHA256SUMS` to the `v2026.1.2-recovery` release
+   and publish the reference digest in the release notes.
+
+## Release artifacts
+
+Exactly four files, sealed by one `SHA256SUMS`:
+
+1. `recovery-anchor.json` (its SHA-256 is embedded in the `.hmr` header and
+   the reference manifest, so the exact file ships).
+2. `metadata-92730034.hmr`.
+3. `metadata-92730034.reference.json` (its SHA-256 is the reference digest).
+4. `abandoned-branch-audit.json`.
+
+Per-run scan/export reports and the scratch directory stay internal.
+
+## Performance pilot gate
+
+Owner: **operator devops** (§8 Q10). Before the real run, on
+`mhe-snaps0-01`-class hardware, run a full `metadata scan` plus a bounded
+`audit-branch` slice **at least through block `92,733,440`** (both passes) —
+covering the epoch-3003 snapshot batch (`92,733,438`) and the 3002→3003
+transition/election, the most expensive work in the range. Record and
+confirm/revise in writing:
+
+| Metric | Budget (estimate until the pilot) | Measured |
+|--------|-----------------------------------|----------|
+| Full scan wall-clock | ≤ 2 h | |
+| Scan peak RSS | < 16 GB | |
+| Audit wall-clock per pass | ≤ 24 h | |
+| Audit peak RSS | < 64 GB | |
+| Scratch high-water mark | (≥ 200 GB reserve enforced) | |
+| Audit throughput | (steady-state blocks/s) | |
+| Host spec | — | |
+
+The real run and the release artifacts wait for the pilot report.
+
+## Operator decision log
+
+Binding; supersedes the handoff where they conflict (plan §8, answered
+2026-08-13). Reviewers: treat the removals as decided trade-offs, not gaps.
+
+1. **Two donors → single machine.** Run once on `mhe-snaps0-01`
+   (non-reverted). `metadata compare` / two-donor convergence removed;
+   assurance = double-run self-check + junk-insensitivity. Residual: no
+   independent-hardware corroboration; corruption that passes structural
+   validation would not be caught by a second machine. Accepted.
+2. **Preflight receipt gating → dropped**, optional hook removed. Assume
+   preflight passed. Scan prints the list length for a manual comparison.
+   Residual: list completeness rests on preflight. Accepted.
+3. **Anchor ceremony → dropped; hash supplied.** Plain-JSON config
+   cross-verified at run time; integrity = SHA-256 checksums + report hash
+   chaining. Residual: authenticity rests on the release process. Accepted.
+4. **validator-stats → keep, untouched.** Not in the `.hmr`, the deletion
+   plan, or the absence assertions; scan reports a count + informational
+   digest; audit inventories (never reconciles) branch stats writes.
+5. **Reward accumulator → include.** `blk-rwd-<target>` is a mandatory
+   `.hmr` section.
+6. **LastCommits → delete, approved.** Dead legacy key; B4 writes the exact
+   `block-sig-<target>` so nothing ever falls back.
+7. **Producer/preflight ownership resolved.** Two former coordination asks
+   became exactly two edits to preflight-owned files: the `main.go`
+   registration + root help-text edit (pinned by the WS1 golden test) and
+   the code-verified `api/service/prometheus` guard exemption in
+   `deps_guard_test.go` (WS6).
+8. **Trusted shard-1 pointer → keep solver + escape hatch.** Operator
+   investigates only on `POINTER_AMBIGUOUS`.
+9. **Audience → internal, run once; outputs attached to the release.**
+   Compare removed; one best-effort snapshot behavior with coverage
+   reporting; deliverables sealed by one `SHA256SUMS`.
+10. **Performance pilot → keep; owner operator devops.**
+11. **Two-binary naming → intentional.** `harmony-recovery` (this plan) vs
+    the producer's `harmony-recovery-db`.
+
+## Handoff-vs-code discrepancy register
+
+1. The `ss` schema comment claims `num+hash`; the actual key is
+   `ss`+`epoch.Bytes()`. Cosmetic.
+2. VRF/VDF and epoch-block-number deletion rules target dead-writer
+   namespaces; retained defensively, scan reports observed counts (expected
+   zero for epochs > target).
+3. The handoff's audit prose implies stock validation can execute the
+   branch; it cannot — hence the masked overlay + `InsertChain` + separate
+   record-mode checks (which include `Engine.VerifyHeader`, because
+   `InsertChain(..., false)` skips general header verification).
+4. "Last/continuous pointers" maps to the `cl`+shard(4) crosslink pointer;
+   the leader-rotation `continuous` key is unused legacy (reported by scan,
+   deletion at B4's discretion).
+5. Stats: handoff offers delete-or-reset; operator decided **keep** (§8 Q4).
+6. Two-donor convergence and signing ceremonies dropped (§8 Q1/Q3);
+   replaced by the double-run self-check and junk-insensitivity fixtures.
+
+## Fixture regeneration
+
+The acceptance suite generates fixtures in-process (deterministic block
+times + fixture-only BLS secrets from the public `.hmy` dev keys). To write a
+kit for inspection or the pilot:
+
+```bash
+scripts/recovery/gen-metadata-fixtures.sh [out-dir]
+```
+
+The chain is byte-reproducible; two generations export a byte-identical
+`.hmr` and reference manifest (`acceptance.TestGeneratorDeterministic`).
diff --git a/docs/recovery/preflight.md b/docs/recovery/preflight.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a7dccba0b9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/recovery/preflight.md
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+# `harmony-recovery preflight` — shard-0 recovery eligibility check
+
+One page for validators. The tool answers a single question: **does your
+shard-0 database still hold everything needed to recover to block
+92,730,034?** It checks the target block's header, commit certificate,
+ancestry back to the epoch-3002 boundary, and walks the complete target
+state (every account, every storage slot, every contract and validator code
+blob, every trie node cryptographically authenticated).
+
+## You do NOT need to stop your node
+
+Run it against the live database. The tool opens the LevelDB strictly
+read-only, takes no lock, and **never writes to the database** — the node
+does not notice it. A PASS on a live node is a *point-in-time sample*: it
+tells the coordinators your DB is a viable recovery source right now. The
+authoritative verification is repeated at apply time on a stopped node; the
+preflight is the fleet-wide eligibility survey, not the final gate.
+
+## How to run
+
+```bash
+./harmony-recovery preflight --db /path/to/harmony_db_0 --name "my-validator"
+```
+
+- `--db` must point at the node's `harmony_db_0` directory itself (the
+  basename is checked — a renamed copy or a wrong-shard `harmony_db_1` is
+  refused). Only the default single-LevelDB layout is supported; sharded
+  (`harmony_sharddb_*`), pebble and TiKV layouts are refused.
+- `--name` is optional but appreciated: coordinators use it to attribute
+  your result.
+- The target height and hash are compiled into the binary — there is nothing
+  to configure and nothing to download.
+- Defaults: `--network mainnet --shard 0`,
+  receipt written to `preflight-result.json` in the current directory
+  (`--report` to change it; a path inside the database directory is
+  refused).
+- Tuning (rarely needed): `--storage-workers`, `--handles`, `--db-cache-mb`,
+  `--trie-cache-mb`. If the tool complains about `RLIMIT_NOFILE`, raise
+  `ulimit -n` or lower `--handles`.
+- Test-only (hidden, refused on mainnet): `--target-height`,
+  `--target-hash`, non-mainnet `--network` values for fixtures.
+
+## What to report
+
+The last line on stdout is exactly one of:
+
+```
+PASS
+FAIL: <one-line reason>
+```
+
+Post that line in the Telegram channel and **attach the JSON receipt**
+(`preflight-result.json`). The receipt contains the check-by-check results,
+state counts, a deterministic state digest (identical digests across
+validators are a free cross-check for the coordinators), and a bounded list
+of informational anomalies. It contains no keys and no personal data beyond
+the hostname and the `--name` you chose.
+
+## Exit codes and the retry remedy
+
+| code | meaning |
+|------|---------|
+| 0 | PASS — all checks passed (point-in-time sample if the node was running) |
+| 1 | FAIL — a verification check failed; the one-line reason says which |
+| 2 | unusable — bad flags, missing/unsupported database layout |
+| 3 | persistent read error after retries (the receipt carries `result: FAIL` with `exit_code: 3`) |
+
+On exit 3 the remedy is: **re-run the tool; if it keeps failing, stop the
+node briefly and re-run.** A live database can relocate files while the tool
+reads (the tool retries these races automatically); persistent failures
+usually mean actual disk-level corruption — the receipt names the corrupt
+file.
+
+## Runtime expectation
+
+On the pilot host (fill in after the single-DB pilot: wall-clock, peak RSS,
+`--handles` used, whether the node was running), a full run takes
+**PILOT-PENDING**. Machines with slower disks scale roughly with the size of
+`harmony_db_0`. Progress is printed to stderr while it runs.
diff --git a/docs/recovery/recovery-anchor.mainnet.json b/docs/recovery/recovery-anchor.mainnet.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3448c0f46a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/recovery/recovery-anchor.mainnet.json
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+{
+  "schema": "recovery-anchor-v1",
+  "network": "mainnet",
+  "shard": 0,
+  "target_height": 92730034,
+  "target_hash": "0x30c35d2f2291e4b27debe7862956cf7a0cc7abefc044273d6823567335086d8d",
+  "abandoned_child_hash": "0x5de06979a333f20afb8b245a8cf44472dc5bfc7383a57ddee48e1809bcee7c5d",
+  "epoch": 3002,
+  "epoch_first_block": 92700672,
+  "epoch_last_block": 92733439,
+  "snapshot_base_height": 92700670,
+  "audit_end_height": 92751016,
+  "known_bad_blocks": [
+    92730036
+  ]
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/anchor/anchor.go b/internal/recovery/anchor/anchor.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d313a96c9a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/anchor/anchor.go
@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
+// Package anchor loads and cross-verifies the plain-JSON anchor config
+// (recovery-anchor.json, plan §4.7) that drives every metadata subcommand.
+// There is no --network flag on the metadata commands: network, shard and
+// the frozen incident constants come from this file, are cross-checked
+// against the network schedule (via the preflight-owned
+// internal/recovery/inplace/anchor.Resolve, which also installs the
+// process-global shard.Schedule) and against the source DB at run time.
+// A typo'd config cannot survive first contact with the DB.
+package anchor
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common"
+	nodeconfig "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/configs/node"
+	inplaceanchor "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/inplace/anchor"
+)
+
+// Schema is the anchor config schema identifier.
+const Schema = "recovery-anchor-v1"
+
+// Config is the strict-parsed anchor file (unknown fields rejected).
+// All §1 frozen numbers live here; everything is re-verified at run time
+// against the schedule and the DB.
+type Config struct {
+	Schema             string   `json:"schema"`
+	Network            string   `json:"network"`
+	Shard              uint32   `json:"shard"`
+	TargetHeight       uint64   `json:"target_height"`
+	TargetHash         string   `json:"target_hash"`
+	AbandonedChildHash string   `json:"abandoned_child_hash"`
+	Epoch              uint64   `json:"epoch"`
+	EpochFirstBlock    uint64   `json:"epoch_first_block"`
+	EpochLastBlock     uint64   `json:"epoch_last_block"`
+	SnapshotBaseHeight uint64   `json:"snapshot_base_height"`
+	AuditEndHeight     uint64   `json:"audit_end_height"`
+	KnownBadBlocks     []uint64 `json:"known_bad_blocks"`
+}
+
+// Resolved is the run-time anchor: the parsed config, its exact file hash
+// (bound into the .hmr header and the reference manifest), and the
+// schedule-derived inplace anchor (whose Resolve installed the
+// process-global shard.Schedule).
+type Resolved struct {
+	Config     Config
+	ConfigSHA  [32]byte
+	FileBytes  []byte
+	Inplace    *inplaceanchor.Anchor
+	TargetHash common.Hash
+	ChildHash  common.Hash
+}
+
+// ConfigSHAHex returns the anchor file hash in hex.
+func (r *Resolved) ConfigSHAHex() string { return fmt.Sprintf("%x", r.ConfigSHA[:]) }
+
+// Load strictly parses the anchor config file and records its SHA-256.
+func Load(path string) (*Config, []byte, [32]byte, error) {
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, [32]byte{}, fmt.Errorf("anchor: read config: %w", err)
+	}
+	dec := json.NewDecoder(bytes.NewReader(raw))
+	dec.DisallowUnknownFields()
+	var cfg Config
+	if err := dec.Decode(&cfg); err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, [32]byte{}, fmt.Errorf("anchor: strict parse %s: %w", path, err)
+	}
+	// Exactly one JSON document.
+	if dec.More() {
+		return nil, nil, [32]byte{}, fmt.Errorf("anchor: trailing data after config document in %s", path)
+	}
+	return &cfg, raw, sha256.Sum256(raw), nil
+}
+
+// Resolve validates the config, installs the schedule via the
+// preflight-owned inplace anchor (read-only import; its files are never
+// edited) and cross-checks every derivable identity (plan §4.1/§4.7):
+//
+//   - mainnet: Resolve refuses overrides, then the JSON constants must
+//     equal the compiled anchor.MainnetTargetHeight/MainnetTargetHash
+//     (runtime drift check);
+//   - non-mainnet fixture networks: the JSON target height/hash are passed
+//     as the test-only overrides Resolve requires;
+//   - schedule identities: epoch, epoch first/last blocks, snapshot base
+//     height (= EpochLastBlock(epoch-1) - 1);
+//   - audit range sanity: audit_end_height > target_height.
+func Resolve(path string) (*Resolved, error) {
+	cfg, raw, sum, err := Load(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if cfg.Schema != Schema {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("anchor: schema %q, want %q", cfg.Schema, Schema)
+	}
+	if len(common.FromHex(cfg.TargetHash)) != common.HashLength {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("anchor: target_hash %q is not a 32-byte hex hash", cfg.TargetHash)
+	}
+	if len(common.FromHex(cfg.AbandonedChildHash)) != common.HashLength {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("anchor: abandoned_child_hash %q is not a 32-byte hex hash", cfg.AbandonedChildHash)
+	}
+
+	var ov inplaceanchor.Overrides
+	if nodeconfig.NetworkType(cfg.Network) != nodeconfig.Mainnet {
+		ov = inplaceanchor.Overrides{TargetHeight: cfg.TargetHeight, TargetHash: cfg.TargetHash}
+	}
+	ip, err := inplaceanchor.Resolve(cfg.Network, cfg.Shard, ov)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("anchor: schedule resolve: %w", err)
+	}
+	if nodeconfig.NetworkType(cfg.Network) == nodeconfig.Mainnet {
+		// Compiled-constant drift check: the shipped JSON must match the
+		// binary's compiled anchor exactly.
+		if cfg.TargetHeight != inplaceanchor.MainnetTargetHeight {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("anchor: config target_height %d differs from the compiled mainnet anchor %d",
+				cfg.TargetHeight, inplaceanchor.MainnetTargetHeight)
+		}
+		if common.HexToHash(cfg.TargetHash) != inplaceanchor.MainnetTargetHash {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("anchor: config target_hash %s differs from the compiled mainnet anchor %s",
+				cfg.TargetHash, inplaceanchor.MainnetTargetHashHex)
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Schedule cross-checks (a wrong epoch geometry cannot pass).
+	if ip.Epoch.Uint64() != cfg.Epoch {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("anchor: config epoch %d, schedule says CalcEpochNumber(%d) = %s",
+			cfg.Epoch, cfg.TargetHeight, ip.Epoch)
+	}
+	if first := ip.BoundaryHeight + 1; first != cfg.EpochFirstBlock {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("anchor: config epoch_first_block %d, schedule says %d", cfg.EpochFirstBlock, first)
+	}
+	if last := ip.Schedule.EpochLastBlock(cfg.Epoch); last != cfg.EpochLastBlock {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("anchor: config epoch_last_block %d, schedule says %d", cfg.EpochLastBlock, last)
+	}
+	if base := ip.BoundaryHeight - 1; base != cfg.SnapshotBaseHeight {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("anchor: config snapshot_base_height %d, schedule says EpochLastBlock(%d)-1 = %d",
+			cfg.SnapshotBaseHeight, cfg.Epoch-1, base)
+	}
+	if cfg.AuditEndHeight <= cfg.TargetHeight {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("anchor: audit_end_height %d must exceed target_height %d",
+			cfg.AuditEndHeight, cfg.TargetHeight)
+	}
+
+	return &Resolved{
+		Config:     *cfg,
+		ConfigSHA:  sum,
+		FileBytes:  raw,
+		Inplace:    ip,
+		TargetHash: common.HexToHash(cfg.TargetHash),
+		ChildHash:  common.HexToHash(cfg.AbandonedChildHash),
+	}, nil
+}
+
+// Getter is the minimal raw read surface the DB cross-check needs.
+type Getter interface {
+	Get(key []byte) ([]byte, error)
+	Has(key []byte) (bool, error)
+}
+
+// VerifyDB cross-checks the anchor against the opened source DB: the
+// canonical hash at the target height must equal the anchored hash and the
+// target header must exist (plan §4.7). It returns the raw target header
+// bytes for the caller to decode.
+func VerifyDB(kv Getter, r *Resolved) ([]byte, error) {
+	canonical, err := kv.Get(canonicalHashKey(r.Config.TargetHeight))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("anchor: canonical mapping for target height %d unreadable: %w", r.Config.TargetHeight, err)
+	}
+	if common.BytesToHash(canonical) != r.TargetHash {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("anchor: canonical hash at height %d is %x, config says %s — refusing (wrong DB or wrong config)",
+			r.Config.TargetHeight, canonical, r.Config.TargetHash)
+	}
+	hdr, err := kv.Get(headerKey(r.Config.TargetHeight, r.TargetHash))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("anchor: target header %d %s unreadable: %w", r.Config.TargetHeight, r.Config.TargetHash, err)
+	}
+	return hdr, nil
+}
+
+func encodeBlockNumber(number uint64) []byte {
+	enc := make([]byte, 8)
+	for i := 7; i >= 0; i-- {
+		enc[i] = byte(number)
+		number >>= 8
+	}
+	return enc
+}
+
+func canonicalHashKey(number uint64) []byte {
+	return append(append([]byte("h"), encodeBlockNumber(number)...), 'n')
+}
+
+func headerKey(number uint64, hash common.Hash) []byte {
+	return append(append([]byte("h"), encodeBlockNumber(number)...), hash.Bytes()...)
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/anchor/anchor_test.go b/internal/recovery/anchor/anchor_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1a65d9af60
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/anchor/anchor_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+package anchor
+
+import (
+	"encoding/json"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+
+	shardingconfig "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/configs/sharding"
+	inplaceanchor "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/inplace/anchor"
+)
+
+// localnetConfig builds a schedule-consistent localnet anchor config for a
+// staking-era target, computing the geometry from the real schedule so the
+// cross-checks pass.
+func localnetConfig(t *testing.T) Config {
+	t.Helper()
+	shardingconfig.InitLocalnetConfig(16, 16)
+	sched := shardingconfig.LocalnetSchedule
+	// Pick a target in epoch 3 (localnet staking epoch is 2), mid-epoch.
+	epoch := uint64(3)
+	first := sched.EpochLastBlock(epoch-1) + 1
+	last := sched.EpochLastBlock(epoch)
+	target := first + 2
+	if sched.CalcEpochNumber(target).Uint64() != epoch {
+		t.Fatalf("target %d resolves to epoch %s, want %d", target, sched.CalcEpochNumber(target), epoch)
+	}
+	return Config{
+		Schema:             Schema,
+		Network:            "localnet",
+		Shard:              0,
+		TargetHeight:       target,
+		TargetHash:         "0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111",
+		AbandonedChildHash: "0x2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222",
+		Epoch:              epoch,
+		EpochFirstBlock:    first,
+		EpochLastBlock:     last,
+		SnapshotBaseHeight: sched.EpochLastBlock(epoch-1) - 1,
+		AuditEndHeight:     last + 100,
+		KnownBadBlocks:     []uint64{target + 2},
+	}
+}
+
+func writeConfig(t *testing.T, c Config) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	raw, err := json.Marshal(c)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	p := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "recovery-anchor.json")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(p, raw, 0o644); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return p
+}
+
+func TestResolveLocalnetRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
+	c := localnetConfig(t)
+	p := writeConfig(t, c)
+	r, err := Resolve(p)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("resolve valid localnet config: %v", err)
+	}
+	if r.Config.TargetHeight != c.TargetHeight {
+		t.Fatalf("target height %d, want %d", r.Config.TargetHeight, c.TargetHeight)
+	}
+	if r.ConfigSHAHex() == "" {
+		t.Fatal("config sha not recorded")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestResolveRejectsUnknownField(t *testing.T) {
+	c := localnetConfig(t)
+	raw, _ := json.Marshal(c)
+	var m map[string]interface{}
+	_ = json.Unmarshal(raw, &m)
+	m["surprise"] = 1
+	raw2, _ := json.Marshal(m)
+	p := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "a.json")
+	_ = os.WriteFile(p, raw2, 0o644)
+	if _, err := Resolve(p); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("unknown field must be rejected (strict parse)")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestResolveRejectsScheduleMismatch(t *testing.T) {
+	c := localnetConfig(t)
+	c.EpochLastBlock += 1 // wrong
+	p := writeConfig(t, c)
+	if _, err := Resolve(p); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("schedule mismatch must be rejected")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestResolveRejectsWrongSnapshotBase(t *testing.T) {
+	c := localnetConfig(t)
+	c.SnapshotBaseHeight += 3
+	p := writeConfig(t, c)
+	if _, err := Resolve(p); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("wrong snapshot base must be rejected")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestResolveRejectsAuditEndBelowTarget(t *testing.T) {
+	c := localnetConfig(t)
+	c.AuditEndHeight = c.TargetHeight
+	p := writeConfig(t, c)
+	if _, err := Resolve(p); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("audit_end_height <= target must be rejected")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestResolveRejectsBadSchema(t *testing.T) {
+	c := localnetConfig(t)
+	c.Schema = "wrong"
+	p := writeConfig(t, c)
+	if _, err := Resolve(p); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("wrong schema must be rejected")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestMainnetDriftPin pins the shipped anchor config against the compiled
+// importable symbols (plan WS1 drift test). The shipped file lives next to
+// the release docs; the pin re-verifies its exact constants.
+func TestMainnetDriftPin(t *testing.T) {
+	// The compiled anchor is authoritative; the shipped mainnet config must
+	// echo it exactly. We assert the compiled symbols themselves here so a
+	// change to either side trips the pin.
+	if inplaceanchor.MainnetTargetHeight != 92730034 {
+		t.Fatalf("compiled MainnetTargetHeight drifted: %d", inplaceanchor.MainnetTargetHeight)
+	}
+	if inplaceanchor.MainnetTargetHashHex != "0x30c35d2f2291e4b27debe7862956cf7a0cc7abefc044273d6823567335086d8d" {
+		t.Fatalf("compiled MainnetTargetHashHex drifted: %s", inplaceanchor.MainnetTargetHashHex)
+	}
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/dbopen/dbopen_test.go b/internal/recovery/dbopen/dbopen_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8904e79d0c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/dbopen/dbopen_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,256 @@
+package dbopen
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"runtime"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/syndtr/goleveldb/leveldb"
+	"github.com/syndtr/goleveldb/leveldb/storage"
+	"github.com/syndtr/goleveldb/leveldb/util"
+)
+
+// makeColdDB writes a small cold localnet-shaped DB directory and returns
+// its path (basename harmony_db_0).
+func makeColdDB(t *testing.T) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	dir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "harmony_db_0")
+	db, err := leveldb.OpenFile(dir, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	for i := 0; i < 100; i++ {
+		if err := db.Put([]byte{byte(i)}, []byte{byte(i), byte(i)}, nil); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	if err := db.CompactRange(util.Range{}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := db.Close(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return dir
+}
+
+func TestOpenColdReadOnly(t *testing.T) {
+	if runtime.GOOS != "linux" && runtime.GOOS != "darwin" {
+		t.Skip("strict opener is unix-only")
+	}
+	dir := makeColdDB(t)
+	db, err := OpenStrictReadOnly(dir, Options{})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("open cold DB: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+	kv := db.KV()
+	v, err := kv.Get([]byte{5})
+	if err != nil || len(v) != 2 || v[0] != 5 {
+		t.Fatalf("read back = %x err %v", v, err)
+	}
+	// Every mutating method refuses and is counted.
+	if err := kv.Put([]byte("x"), []byte("y")); !errors.Is(err, ErrWriteRefused) {
+		t.Fatalf("Put must refuse, got %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := kv.Delete([]byte("x")); !errors.Is(err, ErrWriteRefused) {
+		t.Fatalf("Delete must refuse, got %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := kv.Compact(nil, nil); !errors.Is(err, ErrWriteRefused) {
+		t.Fatalf("Compact must refuse, got %v", err)
+	}
+	b := kv.NewBatch()
+	_ = b.Put([]byte("a"), []byte("b"))
+	if err := b.Write(); !errors.Is(err, ErrWriteRefused) {
+		t.Fatalf("batch Write must refuse, got %v", err)
+	}
+	if db.WriteAttempts() == 0 {
+		t.Fatal("refused writes must be counted")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestErrorIfMissing(t *testing.T) {
+	missing := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "harmony_db_0")
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(missing, 0o755); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	// An empty directory has no CURRENT; open must error, not create a DB.
+	if _, err := OpenStrictReadOnly(missing, Options{}); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("open of an empty directory must error (ErrorIfMissing)")
+	}
+	// And it must not have created anything.
+	entries, _ := os.ReadDir(missing)
+	if len(entries) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("open created files in an empty dir: %v", names(entries))
+	}
+}
+
+func TestMissingLockCreatesNothing(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := makeColdDB(t)
+	before := snapshotDir(t, dir)
+	if err := os.Remove(filepath.Join(dir, "LOCK")); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	_, err := OpenStrictReadOnly(dir, Options{})
+	if !errors.Is(err, ErrMissingLock) {
+		t.Fatalf("missing LOCK must yield ErrMissingLock, got %v", err)
+	}
+	// The O_CREATE regression: nothing may have been created, in
+	// particular no LOCK.
+	after := snapshotDir(t, dir)
+	if _, ok := after["LOCK"]; ok {
+		t.Fatal("strict opener created a LOCK file (the O_CREATE regression)")
+	}
+	delete(before, "LOCK")
+	assertSameFiles(t, before, after)
+}
+
+func TestConcurrentWriterRefused(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := makeColdDB(t)
+	// Hold the DB open with a normal writable handle (exclusive flock on
+	// LOCK), simulating a running node.
+	live, err := leveldb.OpenFile(dir, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer live.Close()
+	_, err = OpenStrictReadOnly(dir, Options{})
+	if !errors.Is(err, ErrConcurrentWriter) {
+		t.Fatalf("a live writer must make the strict open fail with ErrConcurrentWriter, got %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCorruptManifestNoRecovery(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := makeColdDB(t)
+	// Corrupt the manifest named by CURRENT.
+	current, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(dir, "CURRENT"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	manifest := filepath.Join(dir, trim(string(current)))
+	before := snapshotDir(t, dir)
+	if err := os.WriteFile(manifest, []byte("garbage-not-a-manifest"), 0o644); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	beforeCorrupt := snapshotDir(t, dir)
+	if _, err := OpenStrictReadOnly(dir, Options{}); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("corrupt manifest must error without recovery")
+	}
+	after := snapshotDir(t, dir)
+	// The RecoverFile regression: open must not rewrite/create any file.
+	// (We compare against the already-corrupted snapshot: the opener must
+	// not touch anything.)
+	assertSameFiles(t, beforeCorrupt, after)
+	_ = before
+}
+
+func TestStrictStorageMethodsRefuse(t *testing.T) {
+	s := newStrictStorage(t.TempDir())
+	if err := s.SetMeta(storage.FileDesc{}); !errors.Is(err, ErrWriteRefused) {
+		t.Fatalf("SetMeta must refuse, got %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := s.Create(storage.FileDesc{Type: storage.TypeTable, Num: 1}); !errors.Is(err, ErrWriteRefused) {
+		t.Fatalf("Create must refuse, got %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := s.Remove(storage.FileDesc{Type: storage.TypeTable, Num: 1}); !errors.Is(err, ErrWriteRefused) {
+		t.Fatalf("Remove must refuse, got %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := s.Rename(storage.FileDesc{}, storage.FileDesc{}); !errors.Is(err, ErrWriteRefused) {
+		t.Fatalf("Rename must refuse, got %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLockNeverCreates(t *testing.T) {
+	// Lock() unit-tested directly: on a directory without a LOCK file it
+	// only errors, never creates (the raced-replacement invariant).
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	s := newStrictStorage(dir)
+	if _, err := s.Lock(); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("Lock on a dir without LOCK must error")
+	}
+	if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(dir, "LOCK")); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		t.Fatal("Lock created a LOCK file")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestValidateOutputPathRejectsInsideDB(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := makeColdDB(t)
+	inside := filepath.Join(dir, "report.json")
+	if err := ValidateOutputPath(inside, dir); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("an output path inside the DB dir must be rejected")
+	}
+	if err := ValidateOutputPath(dir, dir); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("the DB dir itself must be rejected as an output path")
+	}
+	outside := filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(dir), "report.json")
+	if err := ValidateOutputPath(outside, dir); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("a sibling output path must be accepted: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCheckLayout(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := makeColdDB(t)
+	if err := CheckLayout(dir, 0); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("cold harmony_db_0 must pass layout: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := CheckLayout(dir, 1); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("basename harmony_db_0 must not match shard 1")
+	}
+	if err := CheckLayout("relative/path", 0); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("relative path must be refused")
+	}
+	sharded := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "harmony_sharddb_0")
+	_ = os.MkdirAll(sharded, 0o755)
+	if err := CheckLayout(sharded, 0); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("sharded layout must be refused")
+	}
+}
+
+// --- helpers ---
+
+func names(entries []os.DirEntry) []string {
+	var out []string
+	for _, e := range entries {
+		out = append(out, e.Name())
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
+func snapshotDir(t *testing.T, dir string) map[string]int64 {
+	t.Helper()
+	m := map[string]int64{}
+	entries, err := os.ReadDir(dir)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	for _, e := range entries {
+		info, err := e.Info()
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		m[e.Name()] = info.Size()
+	}
+	return m
+}
+
+func assertSameFiles(t *testing.T, before, after map[string]int64) {
+	t.Helper()
+	for name := range after {
+		if _, ok := before[name]; !ok {
+			t.Fatalf("strict open created file %q", name)
+		}
+	}
+	for name := range before {
+		if _, ok := after[name]; !ok {
+			t.Fatalf("strict open removed file %q", name)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func trim(s string) string {
+	for len(s) > 0 && (s[len(s)-1] == '\n' || s[len(s)-1] == '\r' || s[len(s)-1] == ' ') {
+		s = s[:len(s)-1]
+	}
+	return s
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/dbopen/lock_other.go b/internal/recovery/dbopen/lock_other.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6c3ad310ba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/dbopen/lock_other.go
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+//go:build !unix
+
+package dbopen
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"os"
+)
+
+var errWouldBlock = errors.New("dbopen: lock held")
+
+// The strict opener's writer-exclusion guard requires flock semantics;
+// the recovery run targets Linux (and tests run on macOS), both unix.
+func openNoFollowReadOnly(path string) (*os.File, error) {
+	return nil, errors.New("dbopen: strict read-only open is only supported on unix platforms")
+}
+
+func flockShared(f *os.File) error {
+	return errors.New("dbopen: flock unsupported on this platform")
+}
+
+func funlock(f *os.File) error { return nil }
diff --git a/internal/recovery/dbopen/lock_unix.go b/internal/recovery/dbopen/lock_unix.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..57d7e4192c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/dbopen/lock_unix.go
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+//go:build unix
+
+package dbopen
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"os"
+
+	"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
+)
+
+var errWouldBlock = errors.New("dbopen: lock held")
+
+// openNoFollowReadOnly opens path with O_RDONLY|O_NOFOLLOW in a single
+// atomic open(2): a missing file errors, a symlinked LOCK is refused, and
+// nothing is ever created.
+func openNoFollowReadOnly(path string) (*os.File, error) {
+	fd, err := unix.Open(path, unix.O_RDONLY|unix.O_NOFOLLOW|unix.O_CLOEXEC, 0)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, &os.PathError{Op: "open", Path: path, Err: err}
+	}
+	return os.NewFile(uintptr(fd), path), nil
+}
+
+// flockShared takes a non-blocking shared flock: it excludes concurrent
+// writers (a running node holds LOCK_EX) while allowing other readers.
+func flockShared(f *os.File) error {
+	err := unix.Flock(int(f.Fd()), unix.LOCK_SH|unix.LOCK_NB)
+	if err == unix.EWOULDBLOCK || err == unix.EAGAIN {
+		return errWouldBlock
+	}
+	return err
+}
+
+func funlock(f *os.File) error {
+	return unix.Flock(int(f.Fd()), unix.LOCK_UN)
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/dbopen/open.go b/internal/recovery/dbopen/open.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d33a1886d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/dbopen/open.go
@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
+package dbopen
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/ethdb"
+	"github.com/syndtr/goleveldb/leveldb"
+	ldberrors "github.com/syndtr/goleveldb/leveldb/errors"
+	"github.com/syndtr/goleveldb/leveldb/iterator"
+	"github.com/syndtr/goleveldb/leveldb/opt"
+	"github.com/syndtr/goleveldb/leveldb/util"
+)
+
+// Options tunes the strict read-only open.
+type Options struct {
+	Handles      int // open-file cache capacity (default 512)
+	BlockCacheMB int // table block cache MiB (default 256)
+}
+
+func (o Options) withDefaults() Options {
+	if o.Handles <= 0 {
+		o.Handles = 512
+	}
+	if o.BlockCacheMB <= 0 {
+		o.BlockCacheMB = 256
+	}
+	return o
+}
+
+// DB is an open strict read-only database handle.
+type DB struct {
+	ldb  *leveldb.DB
+	stor *strictStorage
+	path string // resolved absolute path
+
+	mu            sync.Mutex
+	writeAttempts int
+}
+
+// CheckLayout gates the directory shape (plan WS1): absolute path, no
+// symlinked final component, the default single-LevelDB harmony_db_<shard>
+// layout only. The sharded harmony_sharddb_* layout is refused — no
+// read-only open path exists for it (internal/shardchain/leveldb_shard).
+func CheckLayout(path string, shard uint32) error {
+	if !filepath.IsAbs(path) {
+		return fmt.Errorf("dbopen: --db must be an absolute path (got %q)", path)
+	}
+	fi, err := os.Lstat(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("dbopen: %w", err)
+	}
+	if fi.Mode()&os.ModeSymlink != 0 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("dbopen: %s is a symlink; pass the resolved directory itself", path)
+	}
+	if !fi.IsDir() {
+		return fmt.Errorf("dbopen: %s is not a directory", path)
+	}
+	base := filepath.Base(path)
+	if strings.HasPrefix(base, "harmony_sharddb_") {
+		return fmt.Errorf("dbopen: %s is a sharded (harmony_sharddb_*) layout; no strict read-only path exists for it", path)
+	}
+	if want := fmt.Sprintf("harmony_db_%d", shard); base != want {
+		return fmt.Errorf("dbopen: directory basename %q does not match the expected %q layout", base, want)
+	}
+	if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(path, "CURRENT")); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("dbopen: %s does not look like a LevelDB (no CURRENT): %w", path, err)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// OpenStrictReadOnly opens the database directory via the no-create
+// flock-guarded storage, ReadOnly+ErrorIfMissing, strict manifest/journal
+// handling, and no recovery path of any kind.
+func OpenStrictReadOnly(path string, opts Options) (*DB, error) {
+	opts = opts.withDefaults()
+	resolved, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("dbopen: resolve %s: %w", path, err)
+	}
+	stor := newStrictStorage(resolved)
+	ldb, err := leveldb.Open(stor, &opt.Options{
+		ReadOnly:               true,
+		ErrorIfMissing:         true,
+		OpenFilesCacheCapacity: opts.Handles,
+		BlockCacheCapacity:     opts.BlockCacheMB * opt.MiB,
+		// Fail closed on manifest/journal corruption instead of the default
+		// record-dropping.
+		Strict: opt.DefaultStrict | opt.StrictManifest | opt.StrictJournal,
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		_ = stor.Close()
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return &DB{ldb: ldb, stor: stor, path: resolved}, nil
+}
+
+// Path returns the resolved database directory.
+func (d *DB) Path() string { return d.path }
+
+// Close closes the goleveldb session and releases the shared lock.
+func (d *DB) Close() error {
+	err := d.ldb.Close()
+	if cerr := d.stor.Close(); err == nil {
+		err = cerr
+	}
+	return err
+}
+
+// WriteAttempts reports how many times a mutating KV method was invoked
+// (each was refused; non-zero means a bug in a caller's read pipeline).
+func (d *DB) WriteAttempts() int {
+	d.mu.Lock()
+	defer d.mu.Unlock()
+	return d.writeAttempts
+}
+
+func (d *DB) recordWriteAttempt() {
+	d.mu.Lock()
+	defer d.mu.Unlock()
+	d.writeAttempts++
+}
+
+// KV returns the write-refusing ethdb.KeyValueStore adapter.
+func (d *DB) KV() ethdb.KeyValueStore { return &kv{d: d} }
+
+// ClassifyExit maps an open error to the §4.5 exit code: 13 for unsafe
+// open/concurrent writer/missing LOCK, 14 for I/O or corruption.
+func ClassifyExit(err error) int {
+	switch {
+	case err == nil:
+		return 0
+	case errors.Is(err, ErrConcurrentWriter), errors.Is(err, ErrMissingLock):
+		return 13
+	default:
+		return 14
+	}
+}
+
+// IsNotFound reports goleveldb key absence.
+func IsNotFound(err error) bool { return errors.Is(err, ldberrors.ErrNotFound) }
+
+type kv struct{ d *DB }
+
+var _ ethdb.KeyValueStore = (*kv)(nil)
+
+func (k *kv) Get(key []byte) ([]byte, error)  { return k.d.ldb.Get(key, nil) }
+func (k *kv) Has(key []byte) (bool, error)    { return k.d.ldb.Has(key, nil) }
+func (k *kv) Put(key, value []byte) error     { k.d.recordWriteAttempt(); return ErrWriteRefused }
+func (k *kv) Delete(key []byte) error         { k.d.recordWriteAttempt(); return ErrWriteRefused }
+func (k *kv) Compact(start, limit []byte) error {
+	k.d.recordWriteAttempt()
+	return ErrWriteRefused
+}
+func (k *kv) Stat(property string) (string, error) { return k.d.ldb.GetProperty(property) }
+func (k *kv) NewBatch() ethdb.Batch                { return &refusingBatch{d: k.d} }
+func (k *kv) NewBatchWithSize(int) ethdb.Batch     { return &refusingBatch{d: k.d} }
+func (k *kv) Close() error                         { return nil } // owner controls lifecycle
+
+func (k *kv) NewIterator(prefix []byte, start []byte) ethdb.Iterator {
+	r := util.BytesPrefix(prefix)
+	r.Start = append(r.Start, start...)
+	return &ldbIterator{it: k.d.ldb.NewIterator(r, nil)}
+}
+
+func (k *kv) NewSnapshot() (ethdb.Snapshot, error) {
+	snap, err := k.d.ldb.GetSnapshot()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return &roSnapshot{snap: snap}, nil
+}
+
+type ldbIterator struct{ it iterator.Iterator }
+
+func (i *ldbIterator) Next() bool    { return i.it.Next() }
+func (i *ldbIterator) Key() []byte   { return i.it.Key() }
+func (i *ldbIterator) Value() []byte { return i.it.Value() }
+func (i *ldbIterator) Release()      { i.it.Release() }
+func (i *ldbIterator) Error() error  { return i.it.Error() }
+
+type roSnapshot struct{ snap *leveldb.Snapshot }
+
+func (s *roSnapshot) Has(key []byte) (bool, error)   { return s.snap.Has(key, nil) }
+func (s *roSnapshot) Get(key []byte) ([]byte, error) { return s.snap.Get(key, nil) }
+func (s *roSnapshot) Release()                       { s.snap.Release() }
+
+type refusingBatch struct{ d *DB }
+
+var _ ethdb.Batch = (*refusingBatch)(nil)
+
+func (b *refusingBatch) Put(key, value []byte) error {
+	b.d.recordWriteAttempt()
+	return ErrWriteRefused
+}
+func (b *refusingBatch) Delete(key []byte) error {
+	b.d.recordWriteAttempt()
+	return ErrWriteRefused
+}
+func (b *refusingBatch) ValueSize() int { return 0 }
+func (b *refusingBatch) Write() error {
+	b.d.recordWriteAttempt()
+	return ErrWriteRefused
+}
+func (b *refusingBatch) Reset() {}
+func (b *refusingBatch) Replay(w ethdb.KeyValueWriter) error {
+	b.d.recordWriteAttempt()
+	return ErrWriteRefused
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/dbopen/paths.go b/internal/recovery/dbopen/paths.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2d5d049461
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/dbopen/paths.go
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+package dbopen
+
+import (
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"sort"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+// ValidateOutputPath refuses an output/report/scratch path that resolves
+// inside the source DB directory (plan §4.2). Both the raw and the
+// symlink-resolved forms are compared; the output's parent may not exist
+// yet, so the deepest existing ancestor is resolved and rejoined.
+func ValidateOutputPath(outPath, dbPath string) error {
+	absOut, err := filepath.Abs(outPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("dbopen: resolve output path: %w", err)
+	}
+	absDB, err := filepath.Abs(dbPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("dbopen: resolve db path: %w", err)
+	}
+	within := func(base, p string) bool {
+		rel, err := filepath.Rel(base, p)
+		return err == nil && rel != ".." && !strings.HasPrefix(rel, ".."+string(filepath.Separator)) && rel != "."
+	}
+	resolvedDB := absDB
+	if r, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(absDB); err == nil {
+		resolvedDB = r
+	}
+	resolvedOut := absOut
+	dir, rest := filepath.Dir(absOut), filepath.Base(absOut)
+	for {
+		if r, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(dir); err == nil {
+			resolvedOut = filepath.Join(r, rest)
+			break
+		}
+		parent := filepath.Dir(dir)
+		if parent == dir {
+			break
+		}
+		rest = filepath.Join(filepath.Base(dir), rest)
+		dir = parent
+	}
+	if absOut == absDB || resolvedOut == resolvedDB ||
+		within(absDB, absOut) || within(resolvedDB, resolvedOut) {
+		return fmt.Errorf("dbopen: output path %s resolves inside the source DB directory %s; choose a path outside the database", outPath, dbPath)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// Fingerprint is the DB identity snapshot recorded in every report and
+// compared before/after for zero-write proofs.
+type Fingerprint struct {
+	Path        string `json:"path"`
+	Device      uint64 `json:"device"`
+	Inode       uint64 `json:"inode"`
+	Current     string `json:"current"`      // CURRENT file content (trimmed)
+	ManifestSHA string `json:"manifest_sha"` // SHA-256 of the manifest named by CURRENT
+	FileListSHA string `json:"file_list_sha"`
+	FileCount   int    `json:"file_count"`
+}
+
+// FingerprintDir captures the identity of a database directory. The file
+// list hash covers name+size+mtime of every regular file, so any mutation
+// (including a created LOCK or rewritten MANIFEST) changes it.
+func FingerprintDir(path string) (*Fingerprint, error) {
+	resolved, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	fp := &Fingerprint{Path: resolved}
+	fp.Device, fp.Inode, err = statDevIno(resolved)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	current, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(resolved, "CURRENT"))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	fp.Current = strings.TrimSpace(string(current))
+	manifest, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(resolved, fp.Current))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	msum := sha256.Sum256(manifest)
+	fp.ManifestSHA = fmt.Sprintf("%x", msum[:])
+
+	entries, err := os.ReadDir(resolved)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	names := make([]string, 0, len(entries))
+	for _, e := range entries {
+		if e.IsDir() {
+			continue
+		}
+		info, err := e.Info()
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		names = append(names, fmt.Sprintf("%s|%d|%d", e.Name(), info.Size(), info.ModTime().UnixNano()))
+	}
+	sort.Strings(names)
+	lsum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(strings.Join(names, "\n")))
+	fp.FileListSHA = fmt.Sprintf("%x", lsum[:])
+	fp.FileCount = len(names)
+	return fp, nil
+}
+
+// Equal compares the mutation-relevant fields of two fingerprints,
+// including device/inode identity (a swapped-out directory with identical
+// content is still a different database).
+func (f *Fingerprint) Equal(o *Fingerprint) bool {
+	return f.Device == o.Device && f.Inode == o.Inode &&
+		f.Current == o.Current && f.ManifestSHA == o.ManifestSHA &&
+		f.FileListSHA == o.FileListSHA && f.FileCount == o.FileCount
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/dbopen/statfs_other.go b/internal/recovery/dbopen/statfs_other.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0b88045660
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/dbopen/statfs_other.go
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+//go:build !unix
+
+package dbopen
+
+import "errors"
+
+func statDevIno(path string) (uint64, uint64, error) {
+	return 0, 0, nil
+}
+
+// FreeBytes is unsupported off unix; callers treat an error as "unknown".
+func FreeBytes(path string) (uint64, error) {
+	return 0, errors.New("dbopen: statfs unsupported on this platform")
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/dbopen/statfs_unix.go b/internal/recovery/dbopen/statfs_unix.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d9a6fd5d3e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/dbopen/statfs_unix.go
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+//go:build unix
+
+package dbopen
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"syscall"
+)
+
+func statDevIno(path string) (uint64, uint64, error) {
+	var st syscall.Stat_t
+	if err := syscall.Stat(path, &st); err != nil {
+		return 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("dbopen: stat %s: %w", path, err)
+	}
+	return uint64(st.Dev), uint64(st.Ino), nil
+}
+
+// FreeBytes returns the free space of the filesystem holding path (the
+// scratch-reserve pre-run check, plan §4.6).
+func FreeBytes(path string) (uint64, error) {
+	var st syscall.Statfs_t
+	if err := syscall.Statfs(path, &st); err != nil {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf("dbopen: statfs %s: %w", path, err)
+	}
+	return uint64(st.Bavail) * uint64(st.Bsize), nil
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/dbopen/storage.go b/internal/recovery/dbopen/storage.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e460b5a916
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/dbopen/storage.go
@@ -0,0 +1,249 @@
+// Package dbopen is the metadata commands' strict, fail-closed read-only
+// LevelDB opener (plan §4.2). Both stock paths are unsafe: geth's wrapper
+// calls leveldb.RecoverFile on ErrCorrupted even in read-only mode, and
+// direct goleveldb storage.OpenFile(path, true) O_CREATEs a missing LOCK.
+//
+// Intentional contrast with preflight's landed opener
+// (internal/recovery/inplace/rodb): preflight targets a LIVE database, so
+// its storage never touches LOCK and it retries live-file races. The
+// metadata commands target a STOPPED node: this opener takes a SHARED
+// flock on the existing LOCK file as a writer guard (a running node holds
+// LOCK_EX and fails the open) and performs zero retries. Separate
+// implementations by design (plan §4.2).
+package dbopen
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+
+	"github.com/syndtr/goleveldb/leveldb/storage"
+)
+
+// ErrWriteRefused is returned by every mutating storage or KV method.
+var ErrWriteRefused = errors.New("dbopen: write refused (strict read-only handle)")
+
+// ErrConcurrentWriter reports a live process holding the database LOCK.
+var ErrConcurrentWriter = errors.New("dbopen: another process holds the database lock (node still running?)")
+
+// ErrMissingLock reports a database directory without a LOCK file — either
+// not a LevelDB or a damaged one; the strict opener never creates it.
+var ErrMissingLock = errors.New("dbopen: LOCK file missing (never created by this tool)")
+
+// strictStorage implements goleveldb's storage.Storage over an existing DB
+// directory:
+//
+//   - Lock() opens the EXISTING <dir>/LOCK with O_RDONLY|O_NOFOLLOW — never
+//     O_CREATE; a missing or concurrently-deleted LOCK errors at the single
+//     atomic open(2) (no check-then-open TOCTOU window) — then takes a
+//     shared flock (a concurrent writer holding LOCK_EX fails the open);
+//   - Open/List/GetMeta are plain file reads;
+//   - Create/Remove/Rename/SetMeta refuse; Log is a no-op.
+type strictStorage struct {
+	dir string
+
+	mu     sync.Mutex
+	locked bool
+	closed bool
+	lockF  *os.File
+}
+
+var _ storage.Storage = (*strictStorage)(nil)
+
+func newStrictStorage(dir string) *strictStorage {
+	return &strictStorage{dir: dir}
+}
+
+type strictLock struct{ s *strictStorage }
+
+func (l *strictLock) Unlock() {
+	l.s.mu.Lock()
+	defer l.s.mu.Unlock()
+	l.s.releaseLockLocked()
+}
+
+func (s *strictStorage) releaseLockLocked() {
+	if s.lockF != nil {
+		_ = funlock(s.lockF)
+		_ = s.lockF.Close()
+		s.lockF = nil
+	}
+	s.locked = false
+}
+
+// Lock opens the existing LOCK file read-only (single atomic open, no
+// create) and acquires a shared flock. Unit-testable directly: it only
+// errors, it never creates a file.
+func (s *strictStorage) Lock() (storage.Locker, error) {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+	if s.closed {
+		return nil, storage.ErrClosed
+	}
+	if s.locked {
+		return nil, storage.ErrLocked
+	}
+	f, err := openNoFollowReadOnly(filepath.Join(s.dir, "LOCK"))
+	if err != nil {
+		if os.IsNotExist(err) {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrMissingLock, filepath.Join(s.dir, "LOCK"))
+		}
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("dbopen: open LOCK: %w", err)
+	}
+	if err := flockShared(f); err != nil {
+		_ = f.Close()
+		if errors.Is(err, errWouldBlock) {
+			return nil, ErrConcurrentWriter
+		}
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("dbopen: flock LOCK: %w", err)
+	}
+	s.lockF = f
+	s.locked = true
+	return &strictLock{s: s}, nil
+}
+
+// Log is a no-op (the stock storage appends to the LOG file).
+func (s *strictStorage) Log(str string) {}
+
+// SetMeta would rewrite CURRENT; refused.
+func (s *strictStorage) SetMeta(fd storage.FileDesc) error { return ErrWriteRefused }
+
+// GetMeta returns the manifest descriptor named by CURRENT.
+func (s *strictStorage) GetMeta() (storage.FileDesc, error) {
+	if err := s.ok(); err != nil {
+		return storage.FileDesc{}, err
+	}
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(s.dir, "CURRENT"))
+	if err != nil {
+		return storage.FileDesc{}, err
+	}
+	content := strings.TrimRight(string(raw), "\r\n ")
+	var num int64
+	if _, err := fmt.Sscanf(content, "MANIFEST-%d", &num); err != nil || num < 0 {
+		return storage.FileDesc{}, fmt.Errorf("dbopen: malformed CURRENT content %q", content)
+	}
+	fd := storage.FileDesc{Type: storage.TypeManifest, Num: num}
+	if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(s.dir, fsGenName(fd))); err != nil {
+		return storage.FileDesc{}, err
+	}
+	return fd, nil
+}
+
+// List returns descriptors matching the type mask per the stock file
+// naming rules (LOCK, LOG, CURRENT* do not parse and are skipped).
+func (s *strictStorage) List(ft storage.FileType) ([]storage.FileDesc, error) {
+	if err := s.ok(); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	entries, err := os.ReadDir(s.dir)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	seen := make(map[storage.FileDesc]bool)
+	var fds []storage.FileDesc
+	for _, ent := range entries {
+		if ent.IsDir() {
+			continue
+		}
+		if fd, ok := fsParseName(ent.Name()); ok && fd.Type&ft != 0 && !seen[fd] {
+			seen[fd] = true
+			fds = append(fds, fd)
+		}
+	}
+	return fds, nil
+}
+
+// Open opens the named file read-only.
+func (s *strictStorage) Open(fd storage.FileDesc) (storage.Reader, error) {
+	if err := s.ok(); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if !storage.FileDescOk(fd) {
+		return nil, storage.ErrInvalidFile
+	}
+	f, err := os.Open(filepath.Join(s.dir, fsGenName(fd)))
+	if os.IsNotExist(err) && fd.Type == storage.TypeTable {
+		// Tables written by older goleveldb use the .sst suffix.
+		f, err = os.Open(filepath.Join(s.dir, fsGenOldName(fd)))
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return f, nil
+}
+
+func (s *strictStorage) Create(fd storage.FileDesc) (storage.Writer, error) {
+	return nil, ErrWriteRefused
+}
+
+func (s *strictStorage) Remove(fd storage.FileDesc) error { return ErrWriteRefused }
+
+func (s *strictStorage) Rename(oldfd, newfd storage.FileDesc) error { return ErrWriteRefused }
+
+func (s *strictStorage) Close() error {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+	s.releaseLockLocked()
+	s.closed = true
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (s *strictStorage) ok() error {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+	if s.closed {
+		return storage.ErrClosed
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// fsGenName/fsGenOldName/fsParseName mirror goleveldb's file storage naming
+// rules (leveldb/storage/file_storage.go).
+func fsGenName(fd storage.FileDesc) string {
+	switch fd.Type {
+	case storage.TypeManifest:
+		return fmt.Sprintf("MANIFEST-%06d", fd.Num)
+	case storage.TypeJournal:
+		return fmt.Sprintf("%06d.log", fd.Num)
+	case storage.TypeTable:
+		return fmt.Sprintf("%06d.ldb", fd.Num)
+	case storage.TypeTemp:
+		return fmt.Sprintf("%06d.tmp", fd.Num)
+	default:
+		panic("dbopen: invalid file type")
+	}
+}
+
+func fsGenOldName(fd storage.FileDesc) string {
+	if fd.Type == storage.TypeTable {
+		return fmt.Sprintf("%06d.sst", fd.Num)
+	}
+	return fsGenName(fd)
+}
+
+func fsParseName(name string) (fd storage.FileDesc, ok bool) {
+	var tail string
+	_, err := fmt.Sscanf(name, "%d.%s", &fd.Num, &tail)
+	if err == nil {
+		switch tail {
+		case "log":
+			fd.Type = storage.TypeJournal
+		case "ldb", "sst":
+			fd.Type = storage.TypeTable
+		case "tmp":
+			fd.Type = storage.TypeTemp
+		default:
+			return storage.FileDesc{}, false
+		}
+		return fd, true
+	}
+	n, _ := fmt.Sscanf(name, "MANIFEST-%d%s", &fd.Num, &tail)
+	if n == 1 {
+		fd.Type = storage.TypeManifest
+		return fd, true
+	}
+	return storage.FileDesc{}, false
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/inplace/anchor/anchor.go b/internal/recovery/inplace/anchor/anchor.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..01b18eabfc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/inplace/anchor/anchor.go
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+// Package anchor holds the compiled-in incident constants for the shard-0
+// in-place recovery preflight and derives the epoch geometry from the
+// network schedule at runtime.
+//
+// The anchor is deliberately minimal: network, shard, target height and the
+// operator-provided target block hash. Everything else (state root, epoch,
+// ViewID, parent hash) is read from the locally stored target header, which
+// must recompute (header.Hash()) to the anchored hash - the externally known
+// block hash pins the entire header content, so there is no manifest file
+// and nothing for validators to fetch or verify.
+package anchor
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"math/big"
+
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common"
+	nodeconfig "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/configs/node"
+	shardingconfig "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/configs/sharding"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/params"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/shard"
+)
+
+// Compiled-in incident constants (mainnet shard 0).
+const (
+	// MainnetTargetHeight is the recovery target block height.
+	MainnetTargetHeight uint64 = 92730034
+	// MainnetTargetHashHex is the operator-provided target block hash
+	// (authoritative, cross-checked against explorer/API at release time via
+	// `go test -tags releasecheck ./internal/recovery/inplace/anchor/...`).
+	MainnetTargetHashHex = "0x30c35d2f2291e4b27debe7862956cf7a0cc7abefc044273d6823567335086d8d"
+
+	// MainnetAbandonedChildHashHex is the memo's abandoned child block
+	// 92,730,035 hash. Informational only: the head-sample receipt rows
+	// compare against it; it never gates any check.
+	MainnetAbandonedChildHashHex = "0x5de06979a333f20afb8b245a8cf44472dc5bfc7383a57ddee48e1809bcee7c5d"
+)
+
+// MainnetTargetHash is the parsed operator-provided target hash.
+var MainnetTargetHash = common.HexToHash(MainnetTargetHashHex)
+
+// Anchor is the resolved verification anchor: compiled constants plus
+// schedule-derived epoch geometry.
+type Anchor struct {
+	Network      nodeconfig.NetworkType
+	ShardID      uint32
+	TargetHeight uint64
+	TargetHash   common.Hash
+
+	// Derived from the schedule (never compiled in):
+	Epoch          *big.Int // CalcEpochNumber(TargetHeight)
+	BoundaryHeight uint64   // EpochLastBlock(Epoch-1): carries ss<Epoch>
+
+	ChainConfig *params.ChainConfig
+	Schedule    shardingconfig.Schedule
+}
+
+// Overrides are the hidden, test-only anchor overrides. On mainnet they are
+// refused: the compiled constants are authoritative.
+type Overrides struct {
+	TargetHeight uint64 // 0 = unset
+	TargetHash   string // "" = unset
+}
+
+// Resolve builds the anchor for the given network, applying test-only
+// overrides on non-mainnet networks. It also installs the process-global
+// shard.Schedule required by the committee/quorum code.
+func Resolve(network string, shardID uint32, ov Overrides) (*Anchor, error) {
+	networkType := nodeconfig.NetworkType(network)
+	schedule, chainConfig, err := scheduleForNetwork(networkType)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	// Process-global schedule initialization, as cmd/harmony/main.go does;
+	// votepower.Compute and committee reads consult shard.Schedule.
+	shard.Schedule = schedule
+
+	a := &Anchor{
+		Network:     networkType,
+		ShardID:     shardID,
+		ChainConfig: chainConfig,
+		Schedule:    schedule,
+	}
+	if networkType == nodeconfig.Mainnet {
+		if ov.TargetHeight != 0 || ov.TargetHash != "" {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("--target-height/--target-hash are test-only overrides and are refused on --network mainnet (compiled constants are authoritative)")
+		}
+		if shardID != 0 {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("the compiled mainnet anchor is for shard 0; --shard %d is not supported", shardID)
+		}
+		a.TargetHeight = MainnetTargetHeight
+		a.TargetHash = MainnetTargetHash
+	} else {
+		if ov.TargetHeight == 0 || ov.TargetHash == "" {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("--network %s requires the test-only --target-height and --target-hash overrides", network)
+		}
+		if len(common.FromHex(ov.TargetHash)) != common.HashLength {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("--target-hash %q is not a 32-byte hex hash", ov.TargetHash)
+		}
+		a.TargetHeight = ov.TargetHeight
+		a.TargetHash = common.HexToHash(ov.TargetHash)
+	}
+
+	a.Epoch = schedule.CalcEpochNumber(a.TargetHeight)
+	if a.Epoch.Sign() <= 0 {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("target height %d resolves to epoch %s; the preflight requires a target above epoch 0", a.TargetHeight, a.Epoch)
+	}
+	if !chainConfig.IsStaking(a.Epoch) {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("target epoch %s is pre-staking on %s; the certificate check requires a staking-era committee", a.Epoch, network)
+	}
+	a.BoundaryHeight = schedule.EpochLastBlock(a.Epoch.Uint64() - 1)
+	// Cross-check the derived geometry against the schedule.
+	if a.BoundaryHeight >= a.TargetHeight {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("schedule inconsistency: boundary %d >= target %d", a.BoundaryHeight, a.TargetHeight)
+	}
+	if last := schedule.EpochLastBlock(a.Epoch.Uint64()); last < a.TargetHeight {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("schedule inconsistency: target %d beyond epoch %s last block %d", a.TargetHeight, a.Epoch, last)
+	}
+	return a, nil
+}
+
+func scheduleForNetwork(nt nodeconfig.NetworkType) (shardingconfig.Schedule, *params.ChainConfig, error) {
+	switch nt {
+	case nodeconfig.Mainnet:
+		return shardingconfig.MainnetSchedule, params.MainnetChainConfig, nil
+	case nodeconfig.Testnet:
+		return shardingconfig.TestnetSchedule, params.TestnetChainConfig, nil
+	case nodeconfig.Localnet:
+		// The localnet schedule needs its blocks-per-epoch configuration
+		// installed before use (panics otherwise). 16/16 are the harmony
+		// config defaults; fixtures are generated with the same values.
+		shardingconfig.InitLocalnetConfig(16, 16)
+		return shardingconfig.LocalnetSchedule, params.LocalnetChainConfig, nil
+	case nodeconfig.Partner:
+		return shardingconfig.PartnerSchedule, params.PartnerChainConfig, nil
+	case nodeconfig.Stressnet:
+		return shardingconfig.StressNetSchedule, params.StressnetChainConfig, nil
+	case nodeconfig.Pangaea:
+		return shardingconfig.PangaeaSchedule, params.PangaeaChainConfig, nil
+	default:
+		return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported --network %q (mainnet, testnet, localnet, partner, stressnet, pangaea)", string(nt))
+	}
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/inplace/anchor/anchor_test.go b/internal/recovery/inplace/anchor/anchor_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9e66a48588
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/inplace/anchor/anchor_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+package anchor
+
+import (
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	shardingconfig "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/configs/sharding"
+)
+
+// TestMainnetScheduleProperties pins the derived epoch geometry the plan
+// relies on: CalcEpochNumber(92,730,034) = 3002 and EpochLastBlock(3001) =
+// 92,700,671 under the compiled mainnet schedule.
+func TestMainnetScheduleProperties(t *testing.T) {
+	s := shardingconfig.MainnetSchedule
+	if got := s.CalcEpochNumber(MainnetTargetHeight); got.Uint64() != 3002 {
+		t.Fatalf("CalcEpochNumber(%d) = %s, want 3002", MainnetTargetHeight, got)
+	}
+	if got := s.EpochLastBlock(3001); got != 92700671 {
+		t.Fatalf("EpochLastBlock(3001) = %d, want 92700671", got)
+	}
+	if got := s.EpochLastBlock(3002); got != 92733439 {
+		t.Fatalf("EpochLastBlock(3002) = %d, want 92733439", got)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestMainnetResolve checks the compiled constants land in the anchor
+// (reviewed literals) and the derived fields match the schedule.
+func TestMainnetResolve(t *testing.T) {
+	a, err := Resolve("mainnet", 0, Overrides{})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if a.TargetHeight != 92730034 {
+		t.Fatalf("target height %d", a.TargetHeight)
+	}
+	if a.TargetHash.Hex() != "0x30c35d2f2291e4b27debe7862956cf7a0cc7abefc044273d6823567335086d8d" {
+		t.Fatalf("target hash %s", a.TargetHash.Hex())
+	}
+	if a.Epoch.Uint64() != 3002 {
+		t.Fatalf("epoch %s", a.Epoch)
+	}
+	if a.BoundaryHeight != 92700671 {
+		t.Fatalf("boundary %d", a.BoundaryHeight)
+	}
+	if !a.ChainConfig.IsStaking(a.Epoch) {
+		t.Fatal("target epoch must be staking-era")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestMainnetOverridesRefused: the compiled constants are authoritative on
+// mainnet.
+func TestMainnetOverridesRefused(t *testing.T) {
+	if _, err := Resolve("mainnet", 0, Overrides{TargetHeight: 42}); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "refused") {
+		t.Fatalf("height override not refused: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := Resolve("mainnet", 0, Overrides{TargetHash: "0xdead"}); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "refused") {
+		t.Fatalf("hash override not refused: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := Resolve("mainnet", 1, Overrides{}); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "shard 0") {
+		t.Fatalf("non-zero shard not refused: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestNonMainnetResolve(t *testing.T) {
+	hash := "0x30c35d2f2291e4b27debe7862956cf7a0cc7abefc044273d6823567335086d8d"
+	if _, err := Resolve("localnet", 0, Overrides{}); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("localnet without overrides must be refused")
+	}
+	if _, err := Resolve("localnet", 0, Overrides{TargetHeight: 44, TargetHash: "0x123"}); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("short hash must be refused")
+	}
+	a, err := Resolve("localnet", 0, Overrides{TargetHeight: 44, TargetHash: hash})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if a.Epoch.Uint64() != 3 || a.BoundaryHeight != 36 {
+		t.Fatalf("localnet target 44: epoch %s boundary %d, want 3/36", a.Epoch, a.BoundaryHeight)
+	}
+	if _, err := Resolve("neptune", 0, Overrides{TargetHeight: 44, TargetHash: hash}); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("unknown network must be refused")
+	}
+	// Pre-staking target refused (localnet epoch 1 < staking epoch 2).
+	if _, err := Resolve("localnet", 0, Overrides{TargetHeight: 10, TargetHash: hash}); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "staking") {
+		t.Fatalf("pre-staking target not refused: %v", err)
+	}
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/inplace/anchor/releasecheck_test.go b/internal/recovery/inplace/anchor/releasecheck_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..986fe2554a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/inplace/anchor/releasecheck_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+//go:build releasecheck
+
+package anchor
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"net/http"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// TestReleaseCrossCheckTargetHash is the pre-release cross-check build step:
+// it fetches the target block from the public explorer/API endpoints and
+// asserts the returned hash equals the compiled constant.
+//
+// It is guarded by the releasecheck build tag because it needs network
+// access; the releaser runs it manually:
+//
+//	go test -tags releasecheck -run TestReleaseCrossCheck ./internal/recovery/inplace/anchor/...
+//
+// Validators never run it; CI never needs network.
+func TestReleaseCrossCheckTargetHash(t *testing.T) {
+	endpoints := []string{
+		"https://api.harmony.one",
+		"https://api.s0.t.hmny.io",
+	}
+	reqBody := fmt.Sprintf(
+		`{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"hmyv2_getBlockByNumber","params":[%d,{}]}`,
+		MainnetTargetHeight,
+	)
+	client := &http.Client{Timeout: 30 * time.Second}
+	var lastErr error
+	for _, url := range endpoints {
+		resp, err := client.Post(url, "application/json", bytes.NewBufferString(reqBody))
+		if err != nil {
+			lastErr = err
+			continue
+		}
+		var parsed struct {
+			Result struct {
+				Hash   string `json:"hash"`
+				Number uint64 `json:"number"`
+			} `json:"result"`
+			Error *struct {
+				Message string `json:"message"`
+			} `json:"error"`
+		}
+		err = json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&parsed)
+		resp.Body.Close()
+		if err != nil {
+			lastErr = err
+			continue
+		}
+		if parsed.Error != nil {
+			lastErr = fmt.Errorf("%s: rpc error: %s", url, parsed.Error.Message)
+			continue
+		}
+		if parsed.Result.Number != MainnetTargetHeight {
+			t.Fatalf("%s returned block %d, requested %d", url, parsed.Result.Number, MainnetTargetHeight)
+		}
+		if !strings.EqualFold(parsed.Result.Hash, MainnetTargetHashHex) {
+			t.Fatalf("compiled target hash %s does NOT match %s block %d hash %s",
+				MainnetTargetHashHex, url, MainnetTargetHeight, parsed.Result.Hash)
+		}
+		t.Logf("compiled target hash confirmed by %s at height %d", url, MainnetTargetHeight)
+		return
+	}
+	t.Fatalf("no endpoint reachable: %v", lastErr)
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/inplace/certverify/certverify.go b/internal/recovery/inplace/certverify/certverify.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..414d5b8a2b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/inplace/certverify/certverify.go
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+// Package certverify verifies the target block's commit certificate from
+// its two possible local sources, using the audited
+// chain.NewEngine().VerifyHeaderSignature path against the minimal
+// fail-closed ChainReader (BlockChainImpl is never constructed).
+package certverify
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/ethdb"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/chain"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/inplace/anchor"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/inplace/chainread"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/inplace/report"
+)
+
+// Result records which certificate sources were present and which satisfied
+// the check.
+type Result struct {
+	Sources report.CertificateSources
+}
+
+// Verify runs check 6 (target certificate, two sources):
+//
+//   - source A: the exact raw key "block-sig-"+BE64(target height)
+//   - source B: the child header's LastCommitSignature+LastCommitBitmap
+//
+// Every present source is verified cryptographically: stake-weighted quorum
+// over the committee decoded from the walk-authenticated ss record, payload
+// binding blockNum+blockHash+viewID. Decision: at least one source present
+// and verifying passes; two present sources that differ byte-wise FAIL (two
+// different valid aggregates for one block must not be papered over); zero
+// present sources or any present-but-failing source FAIL.
+func Verify(kv ethdb.KeyValueReader, a *anchor.Anchor, out *chainread.Outcome) (*Result, error) {
+	res := &Result{}
+
+	exact, foundExact, err := chainread.ReadBlockCommitSig(kv, a.TargetHeight)
+	if err != nil {
+		return res, err
+	}
+	res.Sources.ExactKeyPresent = foundExact
+
+	// A present-but-malformed child header (undecodable, or failing hash
+	// authentication) is a failing source, not an absent one: every present
+	// source must verify, even when the exact key alone would pass.
+	if out.ChildSourceErr != "" {
+		res.Sources.ChildHeaderPresent = true
+		return res, report.Failf("certificate",
+			"child-header source at %d is present but malformed: %s", a.TargetHeight+1, out.ChildSourceErr)
+	}
+
+	var childPayload []byte
+	if out.ChildHeader != nil {
+		sig := out.ChildHeader.LastCommitSignature()
+		childPayload = append(sig[:], out.ChildHeader.LastCommitBitmap()...)
+		res.Sources.ChildHeaderPresent = true
+	}
+
+	if !foundExact && childPayload == nil {
+		return res, report.Failf("certificate",
+			"no certificate source present: block-sig-%d missing and no child header at %d",
+			a.TargetHeight, a.TargetHeight+1)
+	}
+
+	reader := chainread.NewMinimalChainReader(a.ChainConfig, a.ShardID, out.TargetHeader, a.Epoch, out.ShardState)
+	engine := chain.NewEngine()
+
+	verify := func(name string, payload []byte) error {
+		sig, bitmap, err := chain.ParseCommitSigAndBitmap(payload)
+		if err != nil {
+			return report.Failf("certificate", "source %s does not parse: %v", name, err)
+		}
+		if err := engine.VerifyHeaderSignature(reader, out.TargetHeader, sig, bitmap); err != nil {
+			return report.Failf("certificate", "source %s fails verification: %v", name, err)
+		}
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	var satisfied []string
+	if foundExact {
+		if err := verify("exact-key", exact); err != nil {
+			return res, err
+		}
+		satisfied = append(satisfied, "exact-key")
+	}
+	if childPayload != nil {
+		if err := verify("child-header", childPayload); err != nil {
+			return res, err
+		}
+		satisfied = append(satisfied, "child-header")
+	}
+	if foundExact && childPayload != nil && !bytes.Equal(exact, childPayload) {
+		return res, report.Failf("certificate",
+			"exact-key and child-header certificates are both valid but differ byte-wise (%d vs %d bytes)",
+			len(exact), len(childPayload))
+	}
+	if len(satisfied) == 1 {
+		res.Sources.SatisfiedBy = satisfied[0]
+	} else {
+		res.Sources.SatisfiedBy = "exact-key+child-header"
+	}
+	// Note for Workstream B (informational): if source A was missing, apply
+	// time can materialize the exact key from the verified child header.
+	return res, nil
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/inplace/certverify/certverify_test.go b/internal/recovery/inplace/certverify/certverify_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e2be260470
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/inplace/certverify/certverify_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+package certverify_test
+
+import (
+	"math/big"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	blockfactory "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/block/factory"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/rawdb"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/types"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/vm"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/chain"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/params"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/inplace/anchor"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/inplace/certverify"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/inplace/chainread"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/inplace/fixture"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/inplace/rodb"
+)
+
+func fixtureOutcome(t *testing.T) (*fixture.Manifest, *anchor.Anchor, *rodb.DB, *chainread.Outcome) {
+	t.Helper()
+	dir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "harmony_db_0")
+	m, err := fixture.Build(dir, fixture.VariantBase)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	a, err := anchor.Resolve("localnet", 0, anchor.Overrides{
+		TargetHeight: fixture.TargetHeight,
+		TargetHash:   m.TargetHash.Hex(),
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	db, err := rodb.Open(dir, rodb.Options{})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { db.Close() })
+	out, err := chainread.RunChecks(db.KV(&rodb.Latch{}), a, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("chain checks: %v", err)
+	}
+	return m, a, db, out
+}
+
+// TestVerifyBothSources: the fixture carries both certificate sources with
+// identical bytes; verification must pass via the production engine.
+func TestVerifyBothSources(t *testing.T) {
+	_, a, db, out := fixtureOutcome(t)
+	res, err := certverify.Verify(db.KV(&rodb.Latch{}), a, out)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("verify: %v", err)
+	}
+	if res.Sources.SatisfiedBy != "exact-key+child-header" {
+		t.Fatalf("satisfied by %q", res.Sources.SatisfiedBy)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestBlockChainImplDifferential: the independent certificate differential.
+// A real core.BlockChainImpl is constructed over a scratch COPY of the
+// fixture (it may write there - production preflight never constructs one),
+// and the engine's verdict through it must agree with the verdict through
+// the minimal fail-closed ChainReader, on both the accept and the reject
+// side. A shared bug in the minimal reader's committee sourcing would break
+// the agreement here.
+func TestBlockChainImplDifferential(t *testing.T) {
+	m, a, _, out := fixtureOutcome(t)
+
+	scratch := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "harmony_db_0")
+	if err := fixture.CopyDB(m.Dir, scratch); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	db, err := rawdb.NewLevelDBDatabase(scratch, 64, 128, "", false)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+
+	// BlockChainImpl refuses to construct without a genesis block; the
+	// recovery fixture deliberately starts at the epoch boundary, so plant
+	// a minimal genesis in the scratch copy.
+	factory := blockfactory.NewFactory(params.LocalnetChainConfig)
+	gh := factory.NewHeader(big.NewInt(0))
+	gh.SetNumber(big.NewInt(0))
+	gh.SetShardID(0)
+	if err := rawdb.WriteHeader(db, gh); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := rawdb.WriteCanonicalHash(db, gh.Hash(), 0); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	gbody, err := types.NewBodyForMatchingHeader(gh)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := rawdb.WriteBody(db, gh.Hash(), 0, gbody); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	// Point the head block at the target so CurrentHeader matches what the
+	// minimal reader serves (the fixture's head is the child, whose header
+	// carries no state root).
+	if err := rawdb.WriteHeadBlockHash(db, m.TargetHash); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	// The constructor's leader-rotation init walk resolves each header's
+	// coinbase to a committee BLS key - metadata the minimal recovery
+	// fixture does not carry, and irrelevant to certificate verification.
+	// Push the activation epoch out of reach for the scratch chain only;
+	// every field the signature path consults is untouched.
+	cfg := *params.LocalnetChainConfig
+	cfg.LeaderRotationInternalValidatorsEpoch = big.NewInt(1 << 30)
+	cfg.LeaderRotationExternalValidatorsEpoch = big.NewInt(1 << 30)
+
+	engine := chain.NewEngine()
+	bc, err := core.NewBlockChain(db, nil, nil, &core.CacheConfig{
+		// Disabled skips Stop()'s recent-trie commit sweep, which would
+		// dereference the zero roots the fixture's non-target headers carry.
+		Disabled:       true,
+		TrieCleanLimit: 16,
+		TrieDirtyLimit: 16,
+		TrieTimeLimit:  time.Minute,
+		TriesInMemory:  128,
+		SnapshotLimit:  0,
+	}, &cfg, engine, vm.Config{})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("scratch BlockChainImpl: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer bc.Stop()
+	if got := bc.CurrentHeader().Hash(); got != m.TargetHash {
+		t.Fatalf("scratch chain current header %s, want target %s", got.Hex(), m.TargetHash.Hex())
+	}
+
+	minimal := chainread.NewMinimalChainReader(
+		params.LocalnetChainConfig, a.ShardID, out.TargetHeader, a.Epoch, out.ShardState)
+
+	// Accept side: the genuine certificate verifies through both readers.
+	sig, bitmap, err := chain.ParseCommitSigAndBitmap(m.CertPayload)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := engine.VerifyHeaderSignature(bc, out.TargetHeader, sig, bitmap); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("BlockChainImpl path rejects the genuine certificate: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := engine.VerifyHeaderSignature(minimal, out.TargetHeader, sig, bitmap); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("minimal-reader path rejects the genuine certificate: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Reject side: a tampered aggregate fails through both readers.
+	bad := append([]byte(nil), m.CertPayload...)
+	bad[10] ^= 0x01
+	badSig, badBitmap, err := chain.ParseCommitSigAndBitmap(bad)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	errFull := engine.VerifyHeaderSignature(bc, out.TargetHeader, badSig, badBitmap)
+	errMin := engine.VerifyHeaderSignature(minimal, out.TargetHeader, badSig, badBitmap)
+	if errFull == nil || errMin == nil {
+		t.Fatalf("tampered certificate accepted: full=%v minimal=%v", errFull, errMin)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestChainReaderMethodPin: the certificate verification path exercises
+// exactly {Config, CurrentHeader, ShardID, ReadShardState} on the minimal
+// ChainReader. An upstream internal/chain change that starts calling more
+// methods fails here (and fails closed at runtime).
+func TestChainReaderMethodPin(t *testing.T) {
+	m, a, _, out := fixtureOutcome(t)
+
+	reader := chainread.NewMinimalChainReader(
+		params.LocalnetChainConfig, a.ShardID, out.TargetHeader, a.Epoch, out.ShardState)
+	engine := chain.NewEngine()
+	sig, bitmap, err := chain.ParseCommitSigAndBitmap(m.CertPayload)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := engine.VerifyHeaderSignature(reader, out.TargetHeader, sig, bitmap); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("verification failed: %v", err)
+	}
+	called := reader.CalledMethods()
+	audited := map[string]bool{
+		"Config": true, "CurrentHeader": true, "ShardID": true, "ReadShardState": true,
+	}
+	for method := range called {
+		if !audited[method] {
+			t.Fatalf("engine exercised unaudited ChainReader method %s (called set %v)", method, called)
+		}
+	}
+	for _, must := range []string{"Config", "CurrentHeader", "ReadShardState"} {
+		if called[must] == 0 {
+			t.Fatalf("expected engine to call %s (called set %v)", must, called)
+		}
+	}
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/inplace/chainread/checks.go b/internal/recovery/inplace/chainread/checks.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fa0675ec9c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/inplace/chainread/checks.go
@@ -0,0 +1,390 @@
+package chainread
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common"
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/ethdb"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/block"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/types"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/inplace/anchor"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/inplace/report"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/shard"
+	staking "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/staking/types"
+)
+
+// Outcome carries what the chain checks proved, feeding the certificate
+// check and the state walk.
+type Outcome struct {
+	TargetHeader   *block.Header
+	StateRoot      common.Hash
+	ViewID         uint64
+	BoundaryHeader *block.Header
+	ShardState     *shard.State
+
+	// ChildHeader is the header at target height+1 whose parent is the
+	// target (certificate source B), nil when absent.
+	ChildHeader *block.Header
+
+	// ChildSourceErr is set when the canonical slot at target+1 holds a
+	// present-but-malformed header: undecodable bytes, or content that does
+	// not recompute to its canonical hash. Certificate verification fails
+	// closed on it - a present source must verify, and malformed stored
+	// bytes must not be papered over as absence.
+	ChildSourceErr string
+
+	// Head sample rows (informational, never gate).
+	Head report.HeadSample
+
+	// Checks records "ok"/"fail: ..."/"skipped" per check id as the ordered
+	// checks progress.
+	Checks map[string]string
+}
+
+// maxUpwardWalk bounds the informational head-to-target walk (the incident
+// cites ~21k abandoned blocks above the target; walk a bit further, never
+// unbounded).
+const maxUpwardWalk = 1 << 18
+
+// RunChecks performs the ordered chain checks (target tuple, body,
+// downward ancestry, shard state, upward head sample). Certificate
+// verification (check 6) lives in certverify and consumes this Outcome.
+// The returned error is a *report.Failure for verification FAILs, or a read
+// error to be classified by the retry runner.
+func RunChecks(kv ethdb.KeyValueReader, a *anchor.Anchor, progress io.Writer) (*Outcome, error) {
+	out := &Outcome{Checks: report.NewChecks()}
+
+	// mark records a verification FAIL against a check id; read errors are
+	// NOT verification results and leave the check "skipped" (the stage may
+	// be retried against a fresh manifest generation).
+	mark := func(id string, err error) error {
+		if f, ok := err.(*report.Failure); ok {
+			out.Checks[id] = "fail: " + f.Reason
+		}
+		return err
+	}
+
+	// Check 1: target tuple.
+	if err := out.checkTargetHeader(kv, a); err != nil {
+		return out, mark("target_header", err)
+	}
+	out.Checks["target_header"] = "ok"
+
+	// Check 2: body integrity.
+	if err := out.checkBody(kv, a); err != nil {
+		return out, mark("body", err)
+	}
+	out.Checks["body"] = "ok"
+
+	// Check 3: downward ancestry walk to the epoch boundary.
+	if err := out.walkAncestryToBoundary(kv, a, progress); err != nil {
+		return out, mark("ancestry_to_boundary", err)
+	}
+	out.Checks["ancestry_to_boundary"] = "ok"
+
+	// Check 4: ss<epoch> byte-equality against the walk-authenticated
+	// boundary header.
+	if err := out.checkShardState(kv, a); err != nil {
+		return out, mark("shard_state", err)
+	}
+	out.Checks["shard_state"] = "ok"
+
+	// Check 5: upward sample - informational, never gates. Read errors on a
+	// moving head are recorded as strings, not returned (the head is
+	// expected to move on a live DB), and they must not dirty the shared
+	// read-error latch either - a latched head error would send an
+	// otherwise clean run into the retry machinery and exit 3. When the
+	// reader can scope its latch (the rodb adapter), sample through an
+	// unlatched view.
+	informational := kv
+	if u, ok := kv.(interface{ Unlatched() ethdb.KeyValueReader }); ok {
+		informational = u.Unlatched()
+	}
+	out.sampleHeads(informational, a, progress)
+
+	// Locate the child header for certificate source B.
+	if err := out.locateChild(kv, a); err != nil {
+		return out, err
+	}
+	return out, nil
+}
+
+func (o *Outcome) checkTargetHeader(kv ethdb.KeyValueReader, a *anchor.Anchor) error {
+	canonical, found, err := ReadCanonicalHash(kv, a.TargetHeight)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if !found {
+		return report.Failf("target_header", "no canonical hash at target height %d", a.TargetHeight)
+	}
+	if canonical != a.TargetHash {
+		return report.Failf("target_header", "canonical hash at %d is %s, want anchored %s", a.TargetHeight, canonical.Hex(), a.TargetHash.Hex())
+	}
+	num, found, err := ReadHeaderNumber(kv, a.TargetHash)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if !found {
+		return report.Failf("target_header", "no reverse number mapping for target hash %s", a.TargetHash.Hex())
+	}
+	if num != a.TargetHeight {
+		return report.Failf("target_header", "reverse mapping of %s is height %d, want %d", a.TargetHash.Hex(), num, a.TargetHeight)
+	}
+	header, found, err := ReadHeader(kv, a.TargetHeight, a.TargetHash)
+	if err != nil {
+		if de, ok := err.(*DecodeErr); ok {
+			return report.Failf("target_header", "%v", de)
+		}
+		return err
+	}
+	if !found {
+		return report.Failf("target_header", "target header %d %s not present", a.TargetHeight, a.TargetHash.Hex())
+	}
+	// The recomputed hash pins the entire header content to the anchor.
+	if got := header.Hash(); got != a.TargetHash {
+		return report.Failf("target_header", "stored target header recomputes to %s, want anchored %s", got.Hex(), a.TargetHash.Hex())
+	}
+	if header.Number() == nil || header.Number().Uint64() != a.TargetHeight {
+		return report.Failf("target_header", "target header embeds number %v, want %d", header.Number(), a.TargetHeight)
+	}
+	if header.ShardID() != a.ShardID {
+		return report.Failf("target_header", "target header shard %d, want %d", header.ShardID(), a.ShardID)
+	}
+	if header.Epoch() == nil || header.Epoch().Cmp(a.Epoch) != 0 {
+		return report.Failf("target_header", "target header epoch %v, want %s (schedule cross-check)", header.Epoch(), a.Epoch)
+	}
+	o.TargetHeader = header
+	o.StateRoot = header.Root()
+	o.ViewID = header.ViewID().Uint64()
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (o *Outcome) checkBody(kv ethdb.KeyValueReader, a *anchor.Anchor) error {
+	body, found, err := ReadBody(kv, a.TargetHeight, a.TargetHash)
+	if err != nil {
+		if de, ok := err.(*DecodeErr); ok {
+			return report.Failf("body", "%v", de)
+		}
+		return err
+	}
+	if !found {
+		return report.Failf("body", "target block body not present")
+	}
+	txs := types.Transactions(body.Transactions())
+	stks := staking.StakingTransactions(body.StakingTransactions())
+	if got := types.DeriveSha(txs, stks); got != o.TargetHeader.TxHash() {
+		return report.Failf("body", "transaction root mismatch: derived %s, header %s", got.Hex(), o.TargetHeader.TxHash().Hex())
+	}
+	incoming := types.CXReceiptsProofs(body.IncomingReceipts())
+	if got := types.DeriveSha(incoming); got != o.TargetHeader.IncomingReceiptHash() {
+		return report.Failf("body", "incoming-receipt root mismatch: derived %s, header %s", got.Hex(), o.TargetHeader.IncomingReceiptHash().Hex())
+	}
+	// The v3 header has no UncleHash field, so stored uncles are
+	// unauthenticated bytes; the check gates on emptiness.
+	if n := len(body.Uncles()); n != 0 {
+		return report.Failf("body", "target block body carries %d uncles, want 0 (uncles are unauthenticated)", n)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (o *Outcome) walkAncestryToBoundary(kv ethdb.KeyValueReader, a *anchor.Anchor, progress io.Writer) error {
+	steps := a.TargetHeight - a.BoundaryHeight
+	current := o.TargetHeader
+	for n := a.TargetHeight; n > a.BoundaryHeight; n-- {
+		parentHash := current.ParentHash()
+		parentNum := n - 1
+		parent, found, err := ReadHeader(kv, parentNum, parentHash)
+		if err != nil {
+			if de, ok := err.(*DecodeErr); ok {
+				return report.Failf("ancestry_to_boundary", "%v", de)
+			}
+			return err
+		}
+		if !found {
+			return report.Failf("ancestry_to_boundary", "broken parent link: header %d %s (parent of %d) not present", parentNum, parentHash.Hex(), n)
+		}
+		// Recompute the parent hash: a valid-RLP-wrong-content header under
+		// the right key must not pass.
+		if got := parent.Hash(); got != parentHash {
+			return report.Failf("ancestry_to_boundary", "header stored at %d %s recomputes to %s", parentNum, parentHash.Hex(), got.Hex())
+		}
+		if parent.Number() == nil || parent.Number().Uint64() != parentNum {
+			return report.Failf("ancestry_to_boundary", "header %s embeds number %v, want %d", parentHash.Hex(), parent.Number(), parentNum)
+		}
+		// Canonical-mapping agreement: long-final heights must agree even on
+		// a live DB.
+		canonical, found, err := ReadCanonicalHash(kv, parentNum)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if !found {
+			return report.Failf("ancestry_to_boundary", "no canonical mapping at height %d", parentNum)
+		}
+		if canonical != parentHash {
+			return report.Failf("ancestry_to_boundary", "canonical mapping at %d is %s, ancestry expects %s", parentNum, canonical.Hex(), parentHash.Hex())
+		}
+		current = parent
+		if progress != nil && (a.TargetHeight-parentNum)%8192 == 0 {
+			fmt.Fprintf(progress, "ancestry walk: %d/%d parent steps\n", a.TargetHeight-parentNum, steps)
+		}
+	}
+	o.BoundaryHeader = current
+	if progress != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(progress, "ancestry walk: authenticated boundary header %d %s (%d steps)\n",
+			a.BoundaryHeight, current.Hash().Hex(), steps)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (o *Outcome) checkShardState(kv ethdb.KeyValueReader, a *anchor.Anchor) error {
+	raw, found, err := ReadShardStateBytes(kv, a.Epoch)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if !found {
+		return report.Failf("shard_state", "ss<%s> record not present", a.Epoch)
+	}
+	boundaryBytes := o.BoundaryHeader.ShardState()
+	if len(boundaryBytes) == 0 {
+		return report.Failf("shard_state", "boundary header %d carries no shard state", a.BoundaryHeight)
+	}
+	if !bytes.Equal(raw, boundaryBytes) {
+		return report.Failf("shard_state", "ss<%s> record (%d bytes) differs from boundary header %d ShardState (%d bytes)",
+			a.Epoch, len(raw), a.BoundaryHeight, len(boundaryBytes))
+	}
+	decoded, err := shard.DecodeWrapper(raw)
+	if err != nil {
+		return report.Failf("shard_state", "ss<%s> does not decode: %v", a.Epoch, err)
+	}
+	if decoded.Epoch == nil || decoded.Epoch.Cmp(a.Epoch) != 0 {
+		return report.Failf("shard_state", "ss<%s> decodes with epoch %v, want %s", a.Epoch, decoded.Epoch, a.Epoch)
+	}
+	committee, err := decoded.FindCommitteeByID(a.ShardID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return report.Failf("shard_state", "ss<%s> has no committee for shard %d: %v", a.Epoch, a.ShardID, err)
+	}
+	if len(committee.Slots) == 0 {
+		return report.Failf("shard_state", "ss<%s> committee for shard %d is empty", a.Epoch, a.ShardID)
+	}
+	o.ShardState = decoded
+	return nil
+}
+
+// sampleHeads reads the head pointers and walks head-to-target parent links.
+// Informational only: on a live DB heads move and abandoned-branch shapes
+// vary - gating here would produce false FAILs, and target-block eligibility
+// does not depend on what sits above the target. All errors are recorded as
+// strings, never returned.
+func (o *Outcome) sampleHeads(kv ethdb.KeyValueReader, a *anchor.Anchor, progress io.Writer) {
+	headHeader, foundHH, errHH := ReadHeadPointer(kv, HeadHeaderKey)
+	switch {
+	case errHH != nil:
+		o.Head.LastHeader = "read-error: " + errHH.Error()
+	case !foundHH:
+		o.Head.LastHeader = "absent"
+	default:
+		o.Head.LastHeader = headHeader.Hex()
+	}
+	headBlock, foundHB, errHB := ReadHeadPointer(kv, HeadBlockKey)
+	switch {
+	case errHB != nil:
+		o.Head.LastBlock = "read-error: " + errHB.Error()
+	case !foundHB:
+		o.Head.LastBlock = "absent"
+	default:
+		o.Head.LastBlock = headBlock.Hex()
+	}
+
+	start := common.Hash{}
+	if foundHH && errHH == nil {
+		start = headHeader
+	} else if foundHB && errHB == nil {
+		start = headBlock
+	}
+	if start == (common.Hash{}) {
+		o.Head.WalkToTarget = "not-walked: no resolvable head pointer"
+		return
+	}
+	num, found, err := ReadHeaderNumber(kv, start)
+	if err != nil || !found {
+		o.Head.WalkToTarget = "not-walked: head has no number mapping"
+		return
+	}
+	if num < a.TargetHeight {
+		o.Head.WalkToTarget = fmt.Sprintf("head-below-target: head height %d < target %d", num, a.TargetHeight)
+		return
+	}
+	if num-a.TargetHeight > maxUpwardWalk {
+		o.Head.WalkToTarget = fmt.Sprintf("not-walked: head %d is %d blocks above target (bound %d)", num, num-a.TargetHeight, maxUpwardWalk)
+		return
+	}
+	if progress != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(progress, "head sample: walking %d parent steps from head %d to target height\n", num-a.TargetHeight, num)
+	}
+	cursor, cursorNum := start, num
+	for cursorNum > a.TargetHeight {
+		h, found, err := ReadHeader(kv, cursorNum, cursor)
+		if err != nil || !found {
+			o.Head.WalkToTarget = fmt.Sprintf("walk-broken at height %d (%s)", cursorNum, cursor.Hex())
+			return
+		}
+		cursor = h.ParentHash()
+		cursorNum--
+	}
+	if cursor == a.TargetHash {
+		o.Head.WalkToTarget = "reached-target"
+	} else {
+		o.Head.WalkToTarget = fmt.Sprintf("diverged: head ancestry at target height is %s, target is %s", cursor.Hex(), a.TargetHash.Hex())
+	}
+}
+
+// locateChild finds the header at target+1 whose parent is the target, for
+// certificate source B. Absence is not an error; read errors propagate.
+func (o *Outcome) locateChild(kv ethdb.KeyValueReader, a *anchor.Anchor) error {
+	childNum := a.TargetHeight + 1
+	childHash, found, err := ReadCanonicalHash(kv, childNum)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if !found {
+		o.Head.ChildAtTargetPlus = "absent"
+		return nil
+	}
+	child, found, err := ReadHeader(kv, childNum, childHash)
+	if err != nil {
+		if de, ok := err.(*DecodeErr); ok {
+			o.Head.ChildAtTargetPlus = fmt.Sprintf("undecodable header at %d (%s)", childNum, childHash.Hex())
+			o.ChildSourceErr = fmt.Sprintf("header at %d (%s) does not decode: %v", childNum, childHash.Hex(), de)
+			return nil
+		}
+		return err
+	}
+	if !found {
+		// The canonical mapping outliving the header is a transient shape
+		// during above-target cleanup on a live DB: the source payload is
+		// genuinely absent, not malformed.
+		o.Head.ChildAtTargetPlus = fmt.Sprintf("canonical %s at %d without stored header", childHash.Hex(), childNum)
+		return nil
+	}
+	if got := child.Hash(); got != childHash {
+		o.Head.ChildAtTargetPlus = fmt.Sprintf("stored header at %d recomputes to %s, canonical says %s", childNum, got.Hex(), childHash.Hex())
+		o.ChildSourceErr = fmt.Sprintf("header stored at %d recomputes to %s, canonical says %s", childNum, got.Hex(), childHash.Hex())
+		return nil
+	}
+	if child.ParentHash() != a.TargetHash {
+		// A well-formed foreign block at target+1: its commit signature
+		// certifies a different parent, so it is not a certificate source
+		// for the target (informational only).
+		o.Head.ChildAtTargetPlus = fmt.Sprintf("present-not-child: %s (parent %s != target)", childHash.Hex(), child.ParentHash().Hex())
+		return nil
+	}
+	o.Head.ChildAtTargetPlus = childHash.Hex()
+	if a.Network == "mainnet" && childHash == common.HexToHash(anchor.MainnetAbandonedChildHashHex) {
+		o.Head.ChildAtTargetPlus += " (matches memo abandoned-child hash)"
+	}
+	o.ChildHeader = child
+	return nil
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/inplace/chainread/checks_unit_test.go b/internal/recovery/inplace/chainread/checks_unit_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..52e0c9c920
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/inplace/chainread/checks_unit_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+package chainread
+
+import (
+	"math/big"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/block/factory"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/rawdb"
+	bls "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/crypto/bls"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/params"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/inplace/anchor"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/inplace/report"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/numeric"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/shard"
+)
+
+func testCommittee(epoch int64) *shard.State {
+	stake := numeric.NewDec(1)
+	return &shard.State{
+		Epoch: big.NewInt(epoch),
+		Shards: []shard.Committee{{
+			ShardID: 0,
+			Slots: shard.SlotList{{
+				BLSPublicKey:   bls.SerializedPublicKey{0x01},
+				EffectiveStake: &stake,
+			}},
+		}},
+	}
+}
+
+// TestShardStateWrongEpoch: byte-equality passes (boundary header carries
+// the same bytes) but the decoded epoch does not match the anchor - FAIL.
+func TestShardStateWrongEpoch(t *testing.T) {
+	db := rawdb.NewMemoryDatabase()
+	a := &anchor.Anchor{Epoch: big.NewInt(3), ShardID: 0}
+
+	wrongEpochState := testCommittee(4) // decodes fine, epoch mismatch
+	raw, err := shard.EncodeWrapper(*wrongEpochState, true)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := rawdb.WriteShardStateBytes(db, big.NewInt(3), raw); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	boundary := blockfactory.NewFactory(params.LocalnetChainConfig).NewHeader(big.NewInt(2))
+	boundary.SetShardState(raw)
+
+	o := &Outcome{BoundaryHeader: boundary, Checks: report.NewChecks()}
+	err = o.checkShardState(db, a)
+	f, ok := err.(*report.Failure)
+	if !ok || !strings.Contains(f.Reason, "epoch") {
+		t.Fatalf("want epoch-mismatch failure, got %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestShardStateUndecodable: present, byte-equal, but not valid RLP.
+func TestShardStateUndecodable(t *testing.T) {
+	db := rawdb.NewMemoryDatabase()
+	a := &anchor.Anchor{Epoch: big.NewInt(3), ShardID: 0}
+	raw := []byte{0xde, 0xad}
+	if err := rawdb.WriteShardStateBytes(db, big.NewInt(3), raw); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	boundary := blockfactory.NewFactory(params.LocalnetChainConfig).NewHeader(big.NewInt(2))
+	boundary.SetShardState(raw)
+	o := &Outcome{BoundaryHeader: boundary, Checks: report.NewChecks()}
+	err := o.checkShardState(db, a)
+	f, ok := err.(*report.Failure)
+	if !ok || !strings.Contains(f.Reason, "decode") {
+		t.Fatalf("want decode failure, got %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestMinimalChainReaderFailsClosed: every method outside the audited set
+// panics with UnexpectedCallError.
+func TestMinimalChainReaderFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
+	r := NewMinimalChainReader(params.LocalnetChainConfig, 0, nil, big.NewInt(3), testCommittee(3))
+
+	mustPanic := func(name string, fn func()) {
+		t.Helper()
+		defer func() {
+			rec := recover()
+			uce, ok := rec.(*UnexpectedCallError)
+			if !ok {
+				t.Fatalf("%s: want UnexpectedCallError panic, got %v", name, rec)
+			}
+			if uce.Method != name {
+				t.Fatalf("panic names %s, want %s", uce.Method, name)
+			}
+		}()
+		fn()
+	}
+	mustPanic("GetHeaderByNumber", func() { r.GetHeaderByNumber(1) })
+	mustPanic("TrieDB", func() { r.TrieDB() })
+	mustPanic("CurrentBlock", func() { r.CurrentBlock() })
+	mustPanic("ReadCommitSig", func() { _, _ = r.ReadCommitSig(1) })
+	mustPanic("Snapshots", func() { r.Snapshots() })
+
+	// Audited set answers.
+	if r.Config() != params.LocalnetChainConfig || r.ShardID() != 0 {
+		t.Fatal("audited methods broken")
+	}
+	if _, err := r.ReadShardState(big.NewInt(3)); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := r.ReadShardState(big.NewInt(4)); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("foreign epoch must be refused")
+	}
+	called := r.CalledMethods()
+	for m := range called {
+		switch m {
+		case "Config", "CurrentHeader", "ShardID", "ReadShardState":
+		default:
+			t.Fatalf("unexpected recorded method %s", m)
+		}
+	}
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/inplace/chainread/headsample_test.go b/internal/recovery/inplace/chainread/headsample_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cecdea6a82
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/inplace/chainread/headsample_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+package chainread
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"errors"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/ethdb"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/inplace/anchor"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/inplace/fixture"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/inplace/rodb"
+)
+
+// headFaultCounters tracks which adapter view served the failing head-key
+// reads.
+type headFaultCounters struct {
+	latchedHeadReads   int
+	unlatchedHeadReads int
+}
+
+func isHeadKey(key []byte) bool {
+	return bytes.Equal(key, HeadHeaderKey) || bytes.Equal(key, HeadBlockKey)
+}
+
+// headFaultReader wraps the latched rodb adapter and injects a read error
+// on the head-pointer keys; its Unlatched view injects the same error but
+// counts separately, so the test can pin which view sampleHeads used.
+type headFaultReader struct {
+	kv       *rodb.KV
+	counters *headFaultCounters
+}
+
+func (r *headFaultReader) Get(key []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	if isHeadKey(key) {
+		r.counters.latchedHeadReads++
+		return nil, errors.New("injected head read error")
+	}
+	return r.kv.Get(key)
+}
+
+func (r *headFaultReader) Has(key []byte) (bool, error) {
+	if isHeadKey(key) {
+		r.counters.latchedHeadReads++
+		return false, errors.New("injected head read error")
+	}
+	return r.kv.Has(key)
+}
+
+func (r *headFaultReader) Unlatched() ethdb.KeyValueReader {
+	return &headFaultUnlatched{inner: r.kv.Unlatched(), counters: r.counters}
+}
+
+type headFaultUnlatched struct {
+	inner    ethdb.KeyValueReader
+	counters *headFaultCounters
+}
+
+func (r *headFaultUnlatched) Get(key []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	if isHeadKey(key) {
+		r.counters.unlatchedHeadReads++
+		return nil, errors.New("injected head read error")
+	}
+	return r.inner.Get(key)
+}
+
+func (r *headFaultUnlatched) Has(key []byte) (bool, error) {
+	if isHeadKey(key) {
+		r.counters.unlatchedHeadReads++
+		return false, errors.New("injected head read error")
+	}
+	return r.inner.Has(key)
+}
+
+// TestHeadSampleReadErrorsDoNotGate: head-pointer read errors are strictly
+// informational - the run completes, nothing reaches the shared read-error
+// latch, and the sampling happened through the unlatched view.
+func TestHeadSampleReadErrorsDoNotGate(t *testing.T) {
+	m, err := fixture.Build(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "harmony_db_0"), fixture.VariantBase)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("build fixture: %v", err)
+	}
+	db, err := rodb.Open(m.Dir, rodb.Options{})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+	latch := &rodb.Latch{}
+	kv := db.KV(latch)
+
+	a, err := anchor.Resolve("localnet", 0, anchor.Overrides{
+		TargetHeight: fixture.TargetHeight,
+		TargetHash:   m.TargetHash.Hex(),
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	counters := &headFaultCounters{}
+	out, err := RunChecks(&headFaultReader{kv: kv, counters: counters}, a, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("head read errors gated the run: %v", err)
+	}
+	if latch.First() != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("head read errors dirtied the shared latch: %v", latch.First())
+	}
+	if counters.latchedHeadReads != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("%d head reads went through the latched view, want 0", counters.latchedHeadReads)
+	}
+	if counters.unlatchedHeadReads == 0 {
+		t.Fatal("head sampling never touched the unlatched view")
+	}
+	if !bytes.Contains([]byte(out.Head.LastHeader), []byte("read-error")) ||
+		!bytes.Contains([]byte(out.Head.LastBlock), []byte("read-error")) {
+		t.Fatalf("head sample did not record the errors: %+v", out.Head)
+	}
+	if out.Head.WalkToTarget != "not-walked: no resolvable head pointer" {
+		t.Fatalf("walk = %q", out.Head.WalkToTarget)
+	}
+	// The gating checks all completed against the intact fixture.
+	for _, id := range []string{"target_header", "body", "ancestry_to_boundary", "shard_state"} {
+		if out.Checks[id] != "ok" {
+			t.Fatalf("check %s = %q", id, out.Checks[id])
+		}
+	}
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/inplace/chainread/keys.go b/internal/recovery/inplace/chainread/keys.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c40db59211
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/inplace/chainread/keys.go
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+// Package chainread provides strict raw readers over the exact rawdb key
+// schema plus the minimal fail-closed engine.ChainReader used for
+// certificate verification. Stock rawdb readers swallow read errors into
+// "absence"; on a live DB transient errors are expected, so every reader
+// here propagates errors and distinguishes them from genuine absence.
+package chainread
+
+import (
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"math/big"
+
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common"
+)
+
+// Exact raw keys, re-derived from core/rawdb/schema.go (the builders there
+// are unexported). TestKeySchemaAgainstRawdb pins byte-equality with what
+// the production rawdb writers put on disk.
+
+func encodeBlockNumber(number uint64) []byte {
+	enc := make([]byte, 8)
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(enc, number)
+	return enc
+}
+
+// HeaderHashKey is the canonical mapping: "h" + BE64(number) + "n" -> hash.
+func HeaderHashKey(number uint64) []byte {
+	return append(append([]byte("h"), encodeBlockNumber(number)...), 'n')
+}
+
+// HeaderNumberKey is the reverse mapping: "H" + hash -> BE64(number).
+func HeaderNumberKey(hash common.Hash) []byte {
+	return append([]byte("H"), hash.Bytes()...)
+}
+
+// HeaderKey: "h" + BE64(number) + hash -> header RLP.
+func HeaderKey(number uint64, hash common.Hash) []byte {
+	return append(append([]byte("h"), encodeBlockNumber(number)...), hash.Bytes()...)
+}
+
+// BlockBodyKey: "b" + BE64(number) + hash -> body RLP.
+func BlockBodyKey(number uint64, hash common.Hash) []byte {
+	return append(append([]byte("b"), encodeBlockNumber(number)...), hash.Bytes()...)
+}
+
+// BlockCommitSigKey: "block-sig-" + BE64(number) -> 96-byte BLS aggregate
+// signature followed by the bitmap. The legacy "LastCommits" fallback inside
+// rawdb.ReadBlockCommitSig is deliberately not consulted: the preflight
+// reads exact keys only.
+func BlockCommitSigKey(number uint64) []byte {
+	return append([]byte("block-sig-"), encodeBlockNumber(number)...)
+}
+
+// ShardStateKey: "ss" + epoch.Bytes() -> shard state RLP (the boundary
+// header's raw ShardState() bytes, stored unmodified by all three
+// production write sites).
+func ShardStateKey(epoch *big.Int) []byte {
+	return append([]byte("ss"), epoch.Bytes()...)
+}
+
+// HeadHeaderKey is the "LastHeader" head pointer (informational only).
+var HeadHeaderKey = []byte("LastHeader")
+
+// HeadBlockKey is the "LastBlock" head pointer (informational only).
+var HeadBlockKey = []byte("LastBlock")
diff --git a/internal/recovery/inplace/chainread/keys_test.go b/internal/recovery/inplace/chainread/keys_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6dcd4dc306
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/inplace/chainread/keys_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+package chainread
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"math/big"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/rawdb"
+)
+
+// TestKeySchemaAgainstRawdb pins the re-derived exact keys byte-for-byte
+// against what the production rawdb writers put on disk.
+func TestKeySchemaAgainstRawdb(t *testing.T) {
+	db := rawdb.NewMemoryDatabase()
+	hash := common.HexToHash("0x30c35d2f2291e4b27debe7862956cf7a0cc7abefc044273d6823567335086d8d")
+	const height = uint64(92730034)
+
+	if err := rawdb.WriteCanonicalHash(db, hash, height); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	got, err := db.Get(HeaderHashKey(height))
+	if err != nil || !bytes.Equal(got, hash.Bytes()) {
+		t.Fatalf("canonical key mismatch: %x %v", got, err)
+	}
+
+	if err := rawdb.WriteHeaderNumber(db, hash, height); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := db.Get(HeaderNumberKey(hash)); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("reverse-number key mismatch: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	sig := []byte("aggregate-signature-and-bitmap")
+	if err := rawdb.WriteBlockCommitSig(db, height, sig); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	got, err = db.Get(BlockCommitSigKey(height))
+	if err != nil || !bytes.Equal(got, sig) {
+		t.Fatalf("block-sig key mismatch: %x %v", got, err)
+	}
+
+	epoch := big.NewInt(3002)
+	ss := []byte("shard-state-bytes")
+	if err := rawdb.WriteShardStateBytes(db, epoch, ss); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	got, err = db.Get(ShardStateKey(epoch))
+	if err != nil || !bytes.Equal(got, ss) {
+		t.Fatalf("ss key mismatch: %x %v", got, err)
+	}
+
+	if err := rawdb.WriteHeadHeaderHash(db, hash); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := db.Get(HeadHeaderKey); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("LastHeader key mismatch: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := rawdb.WriteHeadBlockHash(db, hash); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := db.Get(HeadBlockKey); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("LastBlock key mismatch: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Literal shapes.
+	if !bytes.Equal(BlockCommitSigKey(height)[:10], []byte("block-sig-")) {
+		t.Fatal("block-sig prefix")
+	}
+	if !bytes.Equal(ShardStateKey(epoch), append([]byte("ss"), 0x0b, 0xba)) {
+		t.Fatalf("ss<3002> literal: %x", ShardStateKey(epoch))
+	}
+	wantCanonical := append(append([]byte("h"), 0, 0, 0, 0, 0x05, 0x86, 0xf2, 0xb2), 'n') // 92730034 = 0x0586F2B2
+	if !bytes.Equal(HeaderHashKey(height), wantCanonical) {
+		t.Fatalf("canonical literal: %x want %x", HeaderHashKey(height), wantCanonical)
+	}
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/inplace/chainread/reader.go b/internal/recovery/inplace/chainread/reader.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e23960286b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/inplace/chainread/reader.go
@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
+package chainread
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"math/big"
+	"sync"
+
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common"
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/trie"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/block"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/consensus/engine"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/state"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/state/snapshot"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/types"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/params"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/shard"
+	staking "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/staking/types"
+)
+
+// UnexpectedCallError is panicked by every MinimalChainReader method outside
+// the audited set. The pipeline converts it to exit code 2: an upstream
+// internal/chain change that starts calling more ChainReader methods must
+// fail closed, never silently return junk.
+type UnexpectedCallError struct {
+	Method string
+}
+
+func (e *UnexpectedCallError) Error() string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("minimal ChainReader: unexpected method call %s (fail-closed; the certificate verification path changed upstream)", e.Method)
+}
+
+// MinimalChainReader implements engine.ChainReader with exactly the state
+// the certificate check needs: the chain config, the pinned target header
+// (as CurrentHeader), the shard ID, and the walk-authenticated shard state
+// for the target epoch. BlockChainImpl is never constructed (its open path
+// calls loadLastState, which can reset or repair the chain on disk).
+type MinimalChainReader struct {
+	config     *params.ChainConfig
+	shardID    uint32
+	current    *block.Header
+	epoch      *big.Int
+	shardState *shard.State
+
+	mu     sync.Mutex
+	called map[string]int
+}
+
+// NewMinimalChainReader builds the reader from the outcome of the chain
+// checks: header is the hash-verified target header and ss the
+// byte-equality-authenticated shard state for the target epoch.
+func NewMinimalChainReader(config *params.ChainConfig, shardID uint32, header *block.Header, epoch *big.Int, ss *shard.State) *MinimalChainReader {
+	return &MinimalChainReader{
+		config:     config,
+		shardID:    shardID,
+		current:    header,
+		epoch:      epoch,
+		shardState: ss,
+		called:     make(map[string]int),
+	}
+}
+
+var _ engine.ChainReader = (*MinimalChainReader)(nil)
+
+func (r *MinimalChainReader) record(method string) {
+	r.mu.Lock()
+	defer r.mu.Unlock()
+	r.called[method]++
+}
+
+// CalledMethods returns the set of methods exercised so far (pin test).
+func (r *MinimalChainReader) CalledMethods() map[string]int {
+	r.mu.Lock()
+	defer r.mu.Unlock()
+	out := make(map[string]int, len(r.called))
+	for k, v := range r.called {
+		out[k] = v
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
+// Config is in the audited set.
+func (r *MinimalChainReader) Config() *params.ChainConfig {
+	r.record("Config")
+	return r.config
+}
+
+// CurrentHeader is in the audited set (the engine's Number()<=1 guard).
+func (r *MinimalChainReader) CurrentHeader() *block.Header {
+	r.record("CurrentHeader")
+	return r.current
+}
+
+// ShardID is in the audited set.
+func (r *MinimalChainReader) ShardID() uint32 {
+	r.record("ShardID")
+	return r.shardID
+}
+
+// ReadShardState is in the audited set; only the target epoch is served.
+func (r *MinimalChainReader) ReadShardState(epoch *big.Int) (*shard.State, error) {
+	r.record("ReadShardState")
+	if epoch == nil || r.epoch.Cmp(epoch) != 0 {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("minimal ChainReader: shard state requested for epoch %s, only epoch %s is available", epoch, r.epoch)
+	}
+	return r.shardState, nil
+}
+
+// --- everything below is outside the audited set and fails closed ---
+
+func (r *MinimalChainReader) unexpected(method string) {
+	panic(&UnexpectedCallError{Method: method})
+}
+
+func (r *MinimalChainReader) TrieDB() *trie.Database {
+	r.unexpected("TrieDB")
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (r *MinimalChainReader) TrieNode(hash common.Hash) ([]byte, error) {
+	r.unexpected("TrieNode")
+	return nil, nil
+}
+
+func (r *MinimalChainReader) ContractCode(hash common.Hash) ([]byte, error) {
+	r.unexpected("ContractCode")
+	return nil, nil
+}
+
+func (r *MinimalChainReader) ValidatorCode(hash common.Hash) ([]byte, error) {
+	r.unexpected("ValidatorCode")
+	return nil, nil
+}
+
+func (r *MinimalChainReader) GetReceiptsByHash(hash common.Hash) types.Receipts {
+	r.unexpected("GetReceiptsByHash")
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (r *MinimalChainReader) GetHeader(hash common.Hash, number uint64) *block.Header {
+	r.unexpected("GetHeader")
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (r *MinimalChainReader) GetHeaderByNumber(number uint64) *block.Header {
+	r.unexpected("GetHeaderByNumber")
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (r *MinimalChainReader) GetHeaderByHash(hash common.Hash) *block.Header {
+	r.unexpected("GetHeaderByHash")
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (r *MinimalChainReader) GetBlock(hash common.Hash, number uint64) *types.Block {
+	r.unexpected("GetBlock")
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (r *MinimalChainReader) Snapshots() *snapshot.Tree {
+	r.unexpected("Snapshots")
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (r *MinimalChainReader) ReadValidatorList() ([]common.Address, error) {
+	r.unexpected("ReadValidatorList")
+	return nil, nil
+}
+
+func (r *MinimalChainReader) CurrentBlock() *types.Block {
+	r.unexpected("CurrentBlock")
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (r *MinimalChainReader) StateAt(root common.Hash) (*state.DB, error) {
+	r.unexpected("StateAt")
+	return nil, nil
+}
+
+func (r *MinimalChainReader) ReadValidatorInformation(addr common.Address) (*staking.ValidatorWrapper, error) {
+	r.unexpected("ReadValidatorInformation")
+	return nil, nil
+}
+
+func (r *MinimalChainReader) ReadValidatorInformationAtState(addr common.Address, state *state.DB) (*staking.ValidatorWrapper, error) {
+	r.unexpected("ReadValidatorInformationAtState")
+	return nil, nil
+}
+
+func (r *MinimalChainReader) ReadValidatorSnapshot(addr common.Address) (*staking.ValidatorSnapshot, error) {
+	r.unexpected("ReadValidatorSnapshot")
+	return nil, nil
+}
+
+func (r *MinimalChainReader) ValidatorCandidates() []common.Address {
+	r.unexpected("ValidatorCandidates")
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (r *MinimalChainReader) ReadValidatorSnapshotAtEpoch(epoch *big.Int, addr common.Address) (*staking.ValidatorSnapshot, error) {
+	r.unexpected("ReadValidatorSnapshotAtEpoch")
+	return nil, nil
+}
+
+func (r *MinimalChainReader) ReadBlockRewardAccumulator(number uint64) (*big.Int, error) {
+	r.unexpected("ReadBlockRewardAccumulator")
+	return nil, nil
+}
+
+func (r *MinimalChainReader) ReadValidatorStats(addr common.Address) (*staking.ValidatorStats, error) {
+	r.unexpected("ReadValidatorStats")
+	return nil, nil
+}
+
+func (r *MinimalChainReader) SuperCommitteeForNextEpoch(beacon engine.ChainReader, header *block.Header, isVerify bool) (*shard.State, error) {
+	r.unexpected("SuperCommitteeForNextEpoch")
+	return nil, nil
+}
+
+func (r *MinimalChainReader) ReadCommitSig(blockNum uint64) ([]byte, error) {
+	r.unexpected("ReadCommitSig")
+	return nil, nil
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/inplace/chainread/readers.go b/internal/recovery/inplace/chainread/readers.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9f05680e12
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/inplace/chainread/readers.go
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+package chainread
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"fmt"
+	"math/big"
+
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common"
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/ethdb"
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/rlp"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/block"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/types"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/inplace/rodb"
+)
+
+// Get is the strict read primitive: (value, found, error). A missing key is
+// (nil, false, nil); any other error propagates and is never treated as
+// absence.
+func Get(db ethdb.KeyValueReader, key []byte) ([]byte, bool, error) {
+	val, err := db.Get(key)
+	if err != nil {
+		if rodb.IsNotFound(err) {
+			return nil, false, nil
+		}
+		return nil, false, err
+	}
+	return val, true, nil
+}
+
+// ReadCanonicalHash reads the canonical hash for a height.
+func ReadCanonicalHash(db ethdb.KeyValueReader, number uint64) (common.Hash, bool, error) {
+	raw, found, err := Get(db, HeaderHashKey(number))
+	if err != nil || !found {
+		return common.Hash{}, found, err
+	}
+	if len(raw) != common.HashLength {
+		return common.Hash{}, true, fmt.Errorf("canonical mapping for height %d has %d bytes, want 32", number, len(raw))
+	}
+	return common.BytesToHash(raw), true, nil
+}
+
+// ReadHeaderNumber reads the reverse hash->number mapping.
+func ReadHeaderNumber(db ethdb.KeyValueReader, hash common.Hash) (uint64, bool, error) {
+	raw, found, err := Get(db, HeaderNumberKey(hash))
+	if err != nil || !found {
+		return 0, found, err
+	}
+	if len(raw) != 8 {
+		return 0, true, fmt.Errorf("reverse number mapping for %s has %d bytes, want 8", hash.Hex(), len(raw))
+	}
+	return binary.BigEndian.Uint64(raw), true, nil
+}
+
+// DecodeErr marks bytes that were present but failed to decode - a data
+// integrity FAIL, not a read error.
+type DecodeErr struct {
+	What string
+	Err  error
+}
+
+func (e *DecodeErr) Error() string { return fmt.Sprintf("%s: undecodable: %v", e.What, e.Err) }
+
+func (e *DecodeErr) Unwrap() error { return e.Err }
+
+// ReadHeader reads and decodes the header stored under (number, hash).
+// Returns (nil, true, *DecodeErr) when present but undecodable.
+func ReadHeader(db ethdb.KeyValueReader, number uint64, hash common.Hash) (*block.Header, bool, error) {
+	raw, found, err := Get(db, HeaderKey(number, hash))
+	if err != nil || !found {
+		return nil, found, err
+	}
+	header := new(block.Header)
+	if err := rlp.Decode(bytes.NewReader(raw), header); err != nil {
+		return nil, true, &DecodeErr{What: fmt.Sprintf("header %d %s", number, hash.Hex()), Err: err}
+	}
+	return header, true, nil
+}
+
+// ReadBody reads and decodes the block body stored under (number, hash).
+func ReadBody(db ethdb.KeyValueReader, number uint64, hash common.Hash) (*types.Body, bool, error) {
+	raw, found, err := Get(db, BlockBodyKey(number, hash))
+	if err != nil || !found {
+		return nil, found, err
+	}
+	body := new(types.Body)
+	if err := rlp.Decode(bytes.NewReader(raw), body); err != nil {
+		return nil, true, &DecodeErr{What: fmt.Sprintf("body %d %s", number, hash.Hex()), Err: err}
+	}
+	return body, true, nil
+}
+
+// ReadShardStateBytes reads the raw ss<epoch> record.
+func ReadShardStateBytes(db ethdb.KeyValueReader, epoch *big.Int) ([]byte, bool, error) {
+	return Get(db, ShardStateKey(epoch))
+}
+
+// ReadBlockCommitSig reads the exact block-sig-<n> record (no legacy
+// LastCommits fallback).
+func ReadBlockCommitSig(db ethdb.KeyValueReader, number uint64) ([]byte, bool, error) {
+	return Get(db, BlockCommitSigKey(number))
+}
+
+// ReadHeadPointer reads a 32-byte head pointer ("LastHeader"/"LastBlock").
+func ReadHeadPointer(db ethdb.KeyValueReader, key []byte) (common.Hash, bool, error) {
+	raw, found, err := Get(db, key)
+	if err != nil || !found {
+		return common.Hash{}, found, err
+	}
+	if len(raw) != common.HashLength {
+		return common.Hash{}, true, fmt.Errorf("head pointer %q has %d bytes, want 32", string(key), len(raw))
+	}
+	return common.BytesToHash(raw), true, nil
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/inplace/fixture/fixture.go b/internal/recovery/inplace/fixture/fixture.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7790f65634
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/inplace/fixture/fixture.go
@@ -0,0 +1,755 @@
+// Package fixture builds the deterministic preflight test fixtures: a small
+// shard-0 LevelDB carrying a BLS-signed header chain (with real, verifiable
+// certificates), the epoch-boundary shard state, and a state trie populated
+// with EOA / contract / validator / legacy-code / crafted flag-edge
+// accounts.
+//
+// SECURITY NOTE - fixture-only secrets: the committee BLS secret keys are
+// fixed small nonzero scalars (secret i = 32-byte little-endian of i+1),
+// exploiting that the pinned SecretKey.SetLittleEndian performs no modular
+// reduction. They exist so fixtures are byte-reproducible; they must never
+// be used outside tests.
+package fixture
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"math/big"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common"
+	ethtypes "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/core/types"
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto"
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/ethdb"
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/rlp"
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/trie"
+	bls_core "github.com/harmony-one/bls/ffi/go/bls"
+	"github.com/syndtr/goleveldb/leveldb"
+	"github.com/syndtr/goleveldb/leveldb/opt"
+	"github.com/syndtr/goleveldb/leveldb/util"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/block"
+	blockfactory "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/block/factory"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/consensus/signature"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/rawdb"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/state"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/types"
+	bls_cosi "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/crypto/bls"
+	shardingconfig "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/configs/sharding"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/params"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/numeric"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/shard"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/staking"
+	staketest "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/staking/types/test"
+)
+
+// Variant selects a build-time state mutation (cases that cannot be created
+// by post-hoc key surgery because trie hashes must remain consistent).
+type Variant int
+
+const (
+	// VariantBase is the passing fixture.
+	VariantBase Variant = iota
+	// VariantBadAccountLeaf plants an undecodable account leaf value.
+	VariantBadAccountLeaf
+	// VariantBadStorageLeaf plants a storage leaf whose value is not an RLP
+	// byte string.
+	VariantBadStorageLeaf
+	// VariantFlaggedEmptyCode plants a canonical IsValidator flag on an
+	// account with the empty code hash (walker must FAIL).
+	VariantFlaggedEmptyCode
+	// VariantManyAnomalies plants >20 decoded-zero flag accounts (anomaly
+	// truncation row: 20 examples, correct total/by_kind/omitted).
+	VariantManyAnomalies
+	// VariantWrapperUnbound plants a flagged account whose code is a valid
+	// wrapper bound to a DIFFERENT address (walker must FAIL on the
+	// address binding).
+	VariantWrapperUnbound
+)
+
+// ManyAnomaliesCount is the number of decoded-zero accounts planted by
+// VariantManyAnomalies (in addition to the base fixture's one).
+const ManyAnomaliesCount = 25
+
+// Chain geometry (localnet schedule, 16 blocks/epoch, epoch 3 is staking).
+const (
+	Epoch          = 3
+	BoundaryHeight = 36 // EpochLastBlock(2)
+	TargetHeight   = 44
+	ChildHeight    = 45
+	NumEOA         = 1000
+	shard0Slots    = 9 // 6 harmony (nil stake) + 3 external
+	shard0Harmony  = 6
+)
+
+// Manifest reports what was built, for test assertions and mutations.
+type Manifest struct {
+	Dir string
+
+	StateRoot  common.Hash
+	TargetHash common.Hash
+	ChildHash  common.Hash
+	Hashes     map[uint64]common.Hash // height -> hash, Boundary..Child
+
+	CertPayload []byte // aggregate signature || bitmap for the target block
+
+	// Committee secrets in slot order (fixture-only scalars, shard 0).
+	Secrets []*bls_core.SecretKey
+	// PubKeys are the wrappers in committee slot order.
+	PubKeys []bls_cosi.PublicKeyWrapper
+
+	ContractAddr     common.Address // multi-node storage + c-namespace code
+	Contract2Addr    common.Address // second contract (shares nothing)
+	LegacyCodeAddr   common.Address // code stored ONLY at the legacy bare-hash key
+	ValidatorAddrs   []common.Address
+	FlagZeroAddr     common.Address // crafted decoded-zero flag leaf
+	FlagOddAddr      common.Address // crafted non-canonical non-zero flag value
+	DualClassAddr    common.Address // unflagged account sharing the FlagOdd wrapper code hash
+	FlaggedEmptyAddr common.Address // only in VariantFlaggedEmptyCode
+	BadLeafAddr      common.Address // variant-dependent crafted account
+
+	LegacyCodeHash      common.Hash
+	ContractCodeHash    common.Hash
+	ValidatorCodeHashes []common.Hash // vc-namespace wrapper code hashes (slot order)
+	OddWrapperCodeHash  common.Hash   // FlagOddAddr's (and DualClassAddr's) code hash
+
+	committee *shard.State
+}
+
+// addr derives a deterministic address from a label.
+func addr(label string) common.Address {
+	return common.BytesToAddress(crypto.Keccak256([]byte("hmy-preflight-fixture/" + label))[12:])
+}
+
+// secretScalar builds the fixture-only secret for slot index i (little-endian
+// of i+1, or base+i for other shards).
+func secretScalar(n uint64) *bls_core.SecretKey {
+	var buf [32]byte
+	for i := 0; i < 8; i++ {
+		buf[i] = byte(n >> (8 * i))
+	}
+	sec := &bls_core.SecretKey{}
+	if err := sec.SetLittleEndian(buf[:]); err != nil {
+		panic(fmt.Sprintf("fixture secret scalar: %v", err))
+	}
+	return sec
+}
+
+// Build creates the fixture database in dir (which must not exist or be
+// empty) and returns the manifest. Deterministic for a given variant.
+func Build(dir string, variant Variant) (*Manifest, error) {
+	shardingconfig.InitLocalnetConfig(16, 16)
+	shard.Schedule = shardingconfig.LocalnetSchedule
+
+	db, err := rawdb.NewLevelDBDatabase(dir, 64, 128, "", false)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("open fixture db: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	m := &Manifest{Dir: dir, Hashes: make(map[uint64]common.Hash)}
+
+	build := func() error {
+		if err := m.buildCommittee(); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if err := m.buildState(db, variant); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if err := m.buildChain(db); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		// Flush the memtable/journal into table files: the corruption and
+		// relocation test rows operate on .ldb files, and real validator
+		// DBs hold their data in tables.
+		if err := db.Compact(nil, nil); err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("compact fixture: %w", err)
+		}
+		return nil
+	}
+	if err := build(); err != nil {
+		db.Close()
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if err := db.Close(); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("close fixture: %w", err)
+	}
+	if err := canonicalize(dir); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("canonicalize fixture: %w", err)
+	}
+	return m, nil
+}
+
+// canonicalize rewrites the freshly built database into a byte-reproducible
+// canonical form. LevelDB embeds per-write sequence numbers in its tables,
+// so the physical bytes depend on the write ORDER, which upstream map
+// iteration makes nondeterministic even for identical logical content.
+// Re-inserting every key-value pair in sorted key order makes the sequence
+// numbers (and hence the tables and the manifest) a pure function of the
+// content; the timestamped LOG file is dropped. Two generations of the same
+// variant are byte-identical afterwards.
+func canonicalize(dir string) error {
+	src, err := leveldb.OpenFile(dir, &opt.Options{ReadOnly: true, ErrorIfMissing: true})
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("open source: %w", err)
+	}
+	tmp := dir + ".canonical"
+	if err := os.RemoveAll(tmp); err != nil {
+		src.Close()
+		return err
+	}
+	dst, err := leveldb.OpenFile(tmp, &opt.Options{ErrorIfExist: true})
+	if err != nil {
+		src.Close()
+		return fmt.Errorf("open canonical: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	it := src.NewIterator(nil, nil)
+	batch := new(leveldb.Batch)
+	n := 0
+	for it.Next() {
+		batch.Put(append([]byte(nil), it.Key()...), append([]byte(nil), it.Value()...))
+		n++
+		if n%1024 == 0 {
+			if err := dst.Write(batch, nil); err != nil {
+				it.Release()
+				src.Close()
+				dst.Close()
+				return err
+			}
+			batch.Reset()
+		}
+	}
+	it.Release()
+	if err := it.Error(); err != nil {
+		src.Close()
+		dst.Close()
+		return fmt.Errorf("iterate source: %w", err)
+	}
+	if err := dst.Write(batch, nil); err != nil {
+		src.Close()
+		dst.Close()
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := src.Close(); err != nil {
+		dst.Close()
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := dst.CompactRange(util.Range{}); err != nil {
+		dst.Close()
+		return fmt.Errorf("compact canonical: %w", err)
+	}
+	if err := dst.Close(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := os.Remove(filepath.Join(tmp, "LOG")); err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := os.RemoveAll(dir); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return os.Rename(tmp, dir)
+}
+
+func (m *Manifest) buildCommittee() error {
+	stake := numeric.NewDec(20000)
+	var slots0 shard.SlotList
+	for i := 0; i < shard0Slots; i++ {
+		sec := secretScalar(uint64(i + 1))
+		pub := sec.GetPublicKey()
+		wrapper := bls_cosi.PublicKeyWrapper{Object: pub}
+		if err := wrapper.Bytes.FromLibBLSPublicKey(pub); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		m.Secrets = append(m.Secrets, sec)
+		m.PubKeys = append(m.PubKeys, wrapper)
+		slot := shard.Slot{
+			EcdsaAddress: addr(fmt.Sprintf("slot0-%d", i)),
+			BLSPublicKey: wrapper.Bytes,
+		}
+		if i >= shard0Harmony {
+			s := stake
+			slot.EffectiveStake = &s // external, stake-weighted
+		}
+		slots0 = append(slots0, slot)
+	}
+	var slots1 shard.SlotList
+	for i := 0; i < 3; i++ {
+		sec := secretScalar(uint64(101 + i))
+		pub := sec.GetPublicKey()
+		var ser bls_cosi.SerializedPublicKey
+		if err := ser.FromLibBLSPublicKey(pub); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		slots1 = append(slots1, shard.Slot{
+			EcdsaAddress: addr(fmt.Sprintf("slot1-%d", i)),
+			BLSPublicKey: ser,
+		})
+	}
+	m.committee = &shard.State{
+		Epoch: big.NewInt(Epoch),
+		Shards: []shard.Committee{
+			{ShardID: 0, Slots: slots0},
+			{ShardID: 1, Slots: slots1},
+		},
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (m *Manifest) buildState(db ethdb.Database, variant Variant) error {
+	sdb := state.NewDatabase(db)
+	st, err := state.New(common.Hash{}, sdb, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	// ~1k EOAs for multi-level tries.
+	for i := 0; i < NumEOA; i++ {
+		a := addr(fmt.Sprintf("eoa-%d", i))
+		st.SetBalance(a, big.NewInt(int64(i)*1_000_000_007+13))
+		st.SetNonce(a, uint64(i%7))
+	}
+
+	// Contract with a multi-node storage trie and c-namespace code.
+	m.ContractAddr = addr("contract-1")
+	contractCode := deterministicCode("contract-1-code", 2048)
+	m.ContractCodeHash = crypto.Keccak256Hash(contractCode)
+	st.SetCode(m.ContractAddr, contractCode, false)
+	for j := 0; j < 96; j++ {
+		key := crypto.Keccak256Hash([]byte(fmt.Sprintf("slot-%d", j)))
+		val := crypto.Keccak256Hash([]byte(fmt.Sprintf("value-%d", j)))
+		st.SetState(m.ContractAddr, key, val)
+	}
+	m.Contract2Addr = addr("contract-2")
+	st.SetCode(m.Contract2Addr, deterministicCode("contract-2-code", 512), false)
+	st.SetState(m.Contract2Addr, common.HexToHash("0x01"), common.HexToHash("0x02"))
+
+	// Legacy bare-hash code account: created normally, then relocated to
+	// the legacy location by key surgery after commit.
+	m.LegacyCodeAddr = addr("legacy-code")
+	legacyCode := deterministicCode("legacy-code-bytes", 300)
+	m.LegacyCodeHash = crypto.Keccak256Hash(legacyCode)
+	st.SetCode(m.LegacyCodeAddr, legacyCode, false)
+
+	// Validator accounts: canonical flag + vc-namespace wrapper code.
+	for i := 0; i < 2; i++ {
+		a := addr(fmt.Sprintf("validator-%d", i))
+		m.ValidatorAddrs = append(m.ValidatorAddrs, a)
+		w := staketest.GetDefaultValidatorWrapperWithAddr(a, []bls_cosi.SerializedPublicKey{m.PubKeys[i].Bytes})
+		wBytes, err := rlp.EncodeToBytes(&w)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		m.ValidatorCodeHashes = append(m.ValidatorCodeHashes, crypto.Keccak256Hash(wBytes))
+		if err := st.UpdateValidatorWrapper(a, &w); err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("update validator wrapper: %w", err)
+		}
+		st.SetValidatorFlag(a)
+		st.SetBalance(a, big.NewInt(1_000_000))
+	}
+
+	root, err := st.Commit(false)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := sdb.TrieDB().Commit(root, false); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	// Post-commit crafted accounts via direct trie manipulation (stock
+	// SetState cannot write these shapes).
+	root, err = m.craftAccounts(db, sdb, root, variant)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	// Legacy-code relocation surgery: move the blob from the c-namespace
+	// key to the bare-hash legacy key.
+	cKey := append([]byte("c"), m.LegacyCodeHash.Bytes()...)
+	blob, err := db.Get(cKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("read code for legacy relocation: %w", err)
+	}
+	if err := db.Put(m.LegacyCodeHash.Bytes(), blob); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := db.Delete(cKey); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	m.StateRoot = root
+	return nil
+}
+
+// craftAccounts writes the flag-edge accounts by direct trie manipulation:
+//   - FlagZeroAddr: IsValidatorKey leaf whose RLP decodes to zero (0x80) -
+//     presence-testing would call it flagged; decode-testing keeps it
+//     unflagged (anomaly, passing)
+//   - FlagOddAddr: non-canonical non-zero flag value (0x02) - flagged +
+//     anomaly, wrapper code required and provided
+//   - variant-specific FAIL shapes
+func (m *Manifest) craftAccounts(db ethdb.Database, sdb state.Database, root common.Hash, variant Variant) (common.Hash, error) {
+	triedb := sdb.TrieDB()
+
+	put := func(root common.Hash, address common.Address, tweak func(st *trie.StateTrie) (common.Hash, []byte, error)) (common.Hash, error) {
+		addrHash := crypto.Keccak256Hash(address.Bytes())
+		storageTrie, err := trie.NewStateTrie(trie.StorageTrieID(root, addrHash, common.Hash{}), triedb)
+		if err != nil {
+			return common.Hash{}, err
+		}
+		storageRoot, codeHash, err := tweak(storageTrie)
+		if err != nil {
+			return common.Hash{}, err
+		}
+		accountTrie, err := trie.NewStateTrie(trie.StateTrieID(root), triedb)
+		if err != nil {
+			return common.Hash{}, err
+		}
+		acct := &ethtypes.StateAccount{
+			Nonce:    1,
+			Balance:  big.NewInt(42),
+			Root:     storageRoot,
+			CodeHash: codeHash,
+		}
+		if err := accountTrie.TryUpdateAccount(address, acct); err != nil {
+			return common.Hash{}, err
+		}
+		// collectLeaf=false: triedb.Update decodes collected account leaves
+		// for reference tracking, which the crafted shapes would trip; the
+		// fixture flushes to disk immediately and needs no references.
+		newRoot, nodes := accountTrie.Commit(false)
+		if nodes != nil {
+			if err := triedb.Update(trie.NewWithNodeSet(nodes)); err != nil {
+				return common.Hash{}, err
+			}
+		}
+		if err := triedb.Commit(newRoot, false); err != nil {
+			return common.Hash{}, err
+		}
+		return newRoot, nil
+	}
+
+	commitStorage := func(st *trie.StateTrie) (common.Hash, error) {
+		newRoot, nodes := st.Commit(false)
+		if nodes != nil {
+			if err := triedb.Update(trie.NewWithNodeSet(nodes)); err != nil {
+				return common.Hash{}, err
+			}
+		}
+		// Flush the storage nodes to disk directly: with collectLeaf=false
+		// on the account commit there is no leaf-derived reference from the
+		// account trie to this storage root, so the account-root Commit
+		// would not reach these nodes.
+		if err := triedb.Commit(newRoot, false); err != nil {
+			return common.Hash{}, err
+		}
+		return newRoot, nil
+	}
+
+	emptyCodeHash := crypto.Keccak256(nil)
+
+	// Decoded-zero flag leaf: storage value RLP 0x80 (empty byte string).
+	m.FlagZeroAddr = addr("flag-decoded-zero")
+	var err error
+	root, err = put(root, m.FlagZeroAddr, func(st *trie.StateTrie) (common.Hash, []byte, error) {
+		zeroVal, _ := rlp.EncodeToBytes([]byte{})
+		if err := st.TryUpdate(staking.IsValidatorKey.Bytes(), zeroVal); err != nil {
+			return common.Hash{}, nil, err
+		}
+		// A second slot so the trie is not single-leaf.
+		other, _ := rlp.EncodeToBytes([]byte{0x33})
+		if err := st.TryUpdate(common.HexToHash("0x07").Bytes(), other); err != nil {
+			return common.Hash{}, nil, err
+		}
+		r, err := commitStorage(st)
+		return r, emptyCodeHash, err
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		return common.Hash{}, err
+	}
+
+	// Non-canonical non-zero flag value: flagged + anomaly; must carry a
+	// valid address-bound wrapper (vc namespace).
+	m.FlagOddAddr = addr("flag-noncanonical")
+	oddWrapper := staketest.GetDefaultValidatorWrapperWithAddr(m.FlagOddAddr, nil)
+	oddBytes, err := rlp.EncodeToBytes(&oddWrapper)
+	if err != nil {
+		return common.Hash{}, err
+	}
+	oddCodeHash := crypto.Keccak256Hash(oddBytes)
+	if err := db.Put(append([]byte("vc"), oddCodeHash.Bytes()...), oddBytes); err != nil {
+		return common.Hash{}, err
+	}
+	root, err = put(root, m.FlagOddAddr, func(st *trie.StateTrie) (common.Hash, []byte, error) {
+		odd, _ := rlp.EncodeToBytes([]byte{0x02})
+		if err := st.TryUpdate(staking.IsValidatorKey.Bytes(), odd); err != nil {
+			return common.Hash{}, nil, err
+		}
+		r, err := commitStorage(st)
+		return r, oddCodeHash.Bytes(), err
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		return common.Hash{}, err
+	}
+	m.OddWrapperCodeHash = oddCodeHash
+
+	// Dual-class code: an unflagged account referencing the same wrapper
+	// code hash (contract class + wrapper-shaped anomaly + dual-class
+	// anomaly; all passing).
+	m.DualClassAddr = addr("dual-class-contract")
+	root, err = put(root, m.DualClassAddr, func(st *trie.StateTrie) (common.Hash, []byte, error) {
+		benign, _ := rlp.EncodeToBytes([]byte{0x44})
+		if err := st.TryUpdate(common.HexToHash("0x21").Bytes(), benign); err != nil {
+			return common.Hash{}, nil, err
+		}
+		r, err := commitStorage(st)
+		return r, oddCodeHash.Bytes(), err
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		return common.Hash{}, err
+	}
+
+	switch variant {
+	case VariantBadAccountLeaf:
+		// Plant a garbage account leaf value directly in the account trie.
+		m.BadLeafAddr = addr("bad-account-leaf")
+		accountTrie, err := trie.NewStateTrie(trie.StateTrieID(root), triedb)
+		if err != nil {
+			return common.Hash{}, err
+		}
+		if err := accountTrie.TryUpdate(m.BadLeafAddr.Bytes(), []byte{0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef}); err != nil {
+			return common.Hash{}, err
+		}
+		newRoot, nodes := accountTrie.Commit(false)
+		if nodes != nil {
+			if err := triedb.Update(trie.NewWithNodeSet(nodes)); err != nil {
+				return common.Hash{}, err
+			}
+		}
+		if err := triedb.Commit(newRoot, false); err != nil {
+			return common.Hash{}, err
+		}
+		root = newRoot
+	case VariantBadStorageLeaf:
+		// Storage leaf value that is not an RLP byte string (an RLP list).
+		m.BadLeafAddr = addr("bad-storage-leaf")
+		root, err = put(root, m.BadLeafAddr, func(st *trie.StateTrie) (common.Hash, []byte, error) {
+			listVal, _ := rlp.EncodeToBytes([]interface{}{[]byte{0x01}, []byte{0x02}})
+			if err := st.TryUpdate(common.HexToHash("0x11").Bytes(), listVal); err != nil {
+				return common.Hash{}, nil, err
+			}
+			r, err := commitStorage(st)
+			return r, emptyCodeHash, err
+		})
+		if err != nil {
+			return common.Hash{}, err
+		}
+	case VariantFlaggedEmptyCode:
+		// Canonical flag, empty code hash: the walker must FAIL.
+		m.FlaggedEmptyAddr = addr("flagged-empty-code")
+		root, err = put(root, m.FlaggedEmptyAddr, func(st *trie.StateTrie) (common.Hash, []byte, error) {
+			canonical, _ := rlp.EncodeToBytes(staking.IsValidator.Bytes())
+			if err := st.TryUpdate(staking.IsValidatorKey.Bytes(), canonical); err != nil {
+				return common.Hash{}, nil, err
+			}
+			r, err := commitStorage(st)
+			return r, emptyCodeHash, err
+		})
+		if err != nil {
+			return common.Hash{}, err
+		}
+	case VariantManyAnomalies:
+		for i := 0; i < ManyAnomaliesCount; i++ {
+			a := addr(fmt.Sprintf("many-anomalies-%d", i))
+			root, err = put(root, a, func(st *trie.StateTrie) (common.Hash, []byte, error) {
+				zeroVal, _ := rlp.EncodeToBytes([]byte{})
+				if err := st.TryUpdate(staking.IsValidatorKey.Bytes(), zeroVal); err != nil {
+					return common.Hash{}, nil, err
+				}
+				r, err := commitStorage(st)
+				return r, emptyCodeHash, err
+			})
+			if err != nil {
+				return common.Hash{}, err
+			}
+		}
+	case VariantWrapperUnbound:
+		// Flagged account whose (hash-consistent) code is a wrapper bound
+		// to a different address.
+		m.BadLeafAddr = addr("wrapper-unbound")
+		foreignWrapper := staketest.GetDefaultValidatorWrapperWithAddr(addr("some-other-validator"), nil)
+		foreignBytes, err2 := rlp.EncodeToBytes(&foreignWrapper)
+		if err2 != nil {
+			return common.Hash{}, err2
+		}
+		foreignHash := crypto.Keccak256Hash(foreignBytes)
+		if err2 := db.Put(append([]byte("vc"), foreignHash.Bytes()...), foreignBytes); err2 != nil {
+			return common.Hash{}, err2
+		}
+		root, err = put(root, m.BadLeafAddr, func(st *trie.StateTrie) (common.Hash, []byte, error) {
+			canonical, _ := rlp.EncodeToBytes(staking.IsValidator.Bytes())
+			if err := st.TryUpdate(staking.IsValidatorKey.Bytes(), canonical); err != nil {
+				return common.Hash{}, nil, err
+			}
+			r, err := commitStorage(st)
+			return r, foreignHash.Bytes(), err
+		})
+		if err != nil {
+			return common.Hash{}, err
+		}
+	}
+	return root, nil
+}
+
+func deterministicCode(label string, size int) []byte {
+	out := make([]byte, 0, size)
+	seed := crypto.Keccak256([]byte(label))
+	for len(out) < size {
+		out = append(out, seed...)
+		seed = crypto.Keccak256(seed)
+	}
+	return out[:size]
+}
+
+// buildChain writes headers Boundary..Child with real BLS certificates,
+// canonical + reverse mappings, empty bodies, the boundary ss record, the
+// exact target block-sig record, and the head pointers.
+func (m *Manifest) buildChain(db ethdb.Database) error {
+	config := params.LocalnetChainConfig
+	factory := blockfactory.NewFactory(config)
+
+	ssBytes, err := shard.EncodeWrapper(*m.committee, true)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	type built struct {
+		header *block.Header
+		hash   common.Hash
+	}
+	var prev *built
+	for n := uint64(BoundaryHeight); n <= uint64(ChildHeight); n++ {
+		epoch := shardingconfig.LocalnetSchedule.CalcEpochNumber(n)
+		h := factory.NewHeader(epoch)
+		h.SetNumber(new(big.Int).SetUint64(n))
+		h.SetShardID(0)
+		h.SetViewID(new(big.Int).SetUint64(n))
+		h.SetTime(new(big.Int).SetUint64(1_700_000_000 + 2*n))
+		h.SetTxHash(types.EmptyRootHash)
+		h.SetReceiptHash(types.EmptyRootHash)
+		h.SetIncomingReceiptHash(types.EmptyRootHash)
+		h.SetCoinbase(addr("leader"))
+		if n == uint64(BoundaryHeight) {
+			h.SetShardState(ssBytes)
+		}
+		if n == uint64(TargetHeight) {
+			h.SetRoot(m.StateRoot)
+		}
+		if prev != nil {
+			h.SetParentHash(prev.hash)
+			sigAndBitmap, err := m.SignPayload(prev.header)
+			if err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+			var sig [96]byte
+			copy(sig[:], sigAndBitmap[:96])
+			h.SetLastCommitSignature(sig)
+			h.SetLastCommitBitmap(sigAndBitmap[96:])
+		}
+		hash := h.Hash()
+		m.Hashes[n] = hash
+		if err := rawdb.WriteHeader(db, h); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if err := rawdb.WriteCanonicalHash(db, hash, n); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		body, err := types.NewBodyForMatchingHeader(h)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if err := rawdb.WriteBody(db, hash, n, body); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		prev = &built{header: h, hash: hash}
+	}
+
+	m.TargetHash = m.Hashes[TargetHeight]
+	m.ChildHash = m.Hashes[ChildHeight]
+
+	// The boundary ss record: byte-identical to the boundary header's
+	// ShardState (as all production write sites store it).
+	if err := rawdb.WriteShardStateBytes(db, big.NewInt(Epoch), ssBytes); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	// Exact block-sig record for the target (certificate source A; the
+	// child header carries the same bytes as source B).
+	certPayload, err := m.SignPayloadAt(m.TargetHash, TargetHeight)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	m.CertPayload = certPayload
+	if err := rawdb.WriteBlockCommitSig(db, TargetHeight, certPayload); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	// Head pointers at the child (upward sample lands on the target).
+	if err := rawdb.WriteHeadHeaderHash(db, m.ChildHash); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return rawdb.WriteHeadBlockHash(db, m.ChildHash)
+}
+
+// SignPayload builds the aggregate commit signature || full bitmap for the
+// given header.
+func (m *Manifest) SignPayload(h *block.Header) ([]byte, error) {
+	return m.SignPayloadAt(h.Hash(), h.Number().Uint64())
+}
+
+// SignPayloadAt signs the commit payload for (hash, height) with the full
+// committee (viewID = height by fixture convention).
+func (m *Manifest) SignPayloadAt(hash common.Hash, height uint64) ([]byte, error) {
+	epoch := shardingconfig.LocalnetSchedule.CalcEpochNumber(height)
+	payload := signature.ConstructCommitPayload(params.LocalnetChainConfig, epoch, hash, height, height)
+	return m.SignRaw(payload, nil)
+}
+
+// SignRaw signs an arbitrary payload with the committee; signers selects
+// slot indices (nil = all).
+func (m *Manifest) SignRaw(payload []byte, signers []int) ([]byte, error) {
+	if signers == nil {
+		signers = make([]int, len(m.Secrets))
+		for i := range signers {
+			signers[i] = i
+		}
+	}
+	mask := bls_cosi.NewMask(m.PubKeys)
+	agg := &bls_core.Sign{}
+	for _, idx := range signers {
+		sig := m.Secrets[idx].SignHash(payload)
+		if sig == nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("bls sign failed for slot %d", idx)
+		}
+		agg.Add(sig)
+		if err := mask.SetBit(idx, true); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+	}
+	out := append([]byte(nil), agg.Serialize()...)
+	if len(out) != 96 {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("aggregate signature is %d bytes, want 96", len(out))
+	}
+	return append(out, mask.Bitmap...), nil
+}
+
+// committee is kept on the manifest for signing helpers.
+func (m *Manifest) Committee() *shard.State { return m.committee }
+
+// ValidatorWrapperBytes returns RLP of a default wrapper bound to addr
+// (helper for tests crafting code blobs).
+func ValidatorWrapperBytes(a common.Address) ([]byte, common.Hash, error) {
+	w := staketest.GetDefaultValidatorWrapperWithAddr(a, nil)
+	b, err := rlp.EncodeToBytes(&w)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, common.Hash{}, err
+	}
+	return b, crypto.Keccak256Hash(b), nil
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/inplace/fixture/fixture_test.go b/internal/recovery/inplace/fixture/fixture_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..30d37172d6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/inplace/fixture/fixture_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+package fixture_test
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/inplace/fixture"
+)
+
+// TestBuildByteReproducible: two independent generations of the same
+// variant must produce byte-identical database trees (the canonical
+// rewrite makes LevelDB sequence numbers a pure function of the content
+// and drops the timestamped LOG).
+func TestBuildByteReproducible(t *testing.T) {
+	dirA := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "harmony_db_0")
+	dirB := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "harmony_db_0")
+	ma, err := fixture.Build(dirA, fixture.VariantBase)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("build A: %v", err)
+	}
+	mb, err := fixture.Build(dirB, fixture.VariantBase)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("build B: %v", err)
+	}
+	if ma.TargetHash != mb.TargetHash || ma.StateRoot != mb.StateRoot {
+		t.Fatalf("logical content differs: %s/%s vs %s/%s",
+			ma.TargetHash.Hex(), ma.StateRoot.Hex(), mb.TargetHash.Hex(), mb.StateRoot.Hex())
+	}
+	CompareTrees(t, dirA, dirB)
+}
+
+// CompareTrees fails the test unless the two flat directories hold the same
+// file names with byte-identical contents.
+func CompareTrees(t *testing.T, a, b string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	filesA := readTree(t, a)
+	filesB := readTree(t, b)
+	for name := range filesB {
+		if _, ok := filesA[name]; !ok {
+			t.Errorf("file %s only in %s", name, b)
+		}
+	}
+	for name, data := range filesA {
+		got, ok := filesB[name]
+		if !ok {
+			t.Errorf("file %s only in %s", name, a)
+			continue
+		}
+		if !bytes.Equal(data, got) {
+			t.Errorf("file %s differs (%d vs %d bytes)", name, len(data), len(got))
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func readTree(t *testing.T, dir string) map[string][]byte {
+	t.Helper()
+	entries, err := os.ReadDir(dir)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	files := map[string][]byte{}
+	for _, ent := range entries {
+		if ent.IsDir() {
+			t.Fatalf("unexpected subdirectory %s in %s", ent.Name(), dir)
+		}
+		data, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(dir, ent.Name()))
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		files[ent.Name()] = data
+	}
+	return files
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/inplace/fixture/gen/main.go b/internal/recovery/inplace/fixture/gen/main.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..11e0f10718
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/inplace/fixture/gen/main.go
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+// Command gen materializes the deterministic preflight fixtures into
+// testdata/recovery/preflight/ (invoked via
+// scripts/recovery/gen-preflight-fixtures.sh). Tests build the same
+// fixtures hermetically in temp dirs through the fixture package; the
+// materialized copies exist for manual inspection and ad-hoc runs of the
+// preflight binary against a known-good database.
+package main
+
+import (
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/inplace/fixture"
+)
+
+func main() {
+	out := "testdata/recovery/preflight"
+	if len(os.Args) > 1 {
+		out = os.Args[1]
+	}
+	variants := map[string]fixture.Variant{
+		"base":               fixture.VariantBase,
+		"bad-account-leaf":   fixture.VariantBadAccountLeaf,
+		"bad-storage-leaf":   fixture.VariantBadStorageLeaf,
+		"flagged-empty-code": fixture.VariantFlaggedEmptyCode,
+		"many-anomalies":     fixture.VariantManyAnomalies,
+		"wrapper-unbound":    fixture.VariantWrapperUnbound,
+	}
+	type summary struct {
+		StateRoot  string `json:"state_root"`
+		TargetHash string `json:"target_hash"`
+		ChildHash  string `json:"child_hash"`
+		Height     uint64 `json:"target_height"`
+		Network    string `json:"network"`
+	}
+	all := map[string]summary{}
+	for name, v := range variants {
+		dir := filepath.Join(out, name, "harmony_db_0")
+		if err := os.RemoveAll(dir); err != nil {
+			fatal(err)
+		}
+		if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(dir), 0o755); err != nil {
+			fatal(err)
+		}
+		m, err := fixture.Build(dir, v)
+		if err != nil {
+			fatal(fmt.Errorf("build %s: %w", name, err))
+		}
+		all[name] = summary{
+			StateRoot:  m.StateRoot.Hex(),
+			TargetHash: m.TargetHash.Hex(),
+			ChildHash:  m.ChildHash.Hex(),
+			Height:     fixture.TargetHeight,
+			Network:    "localnet",
+		}
+		fmt.Printf("%-20s target %s state %s -> %s\n", name, m.TargetHash.Hex(), m.StateRoot.Hex(), dir)
+	}
+	data, err := json.MarshalIndent(all, "", "  ")
+	if err != nil {
+		fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(out, "fixtures.json"), append(data, '\n'), 0o644); err != nil {
+		fatal(err)
+	}
+}
+
+func fatal(err error) {
+	fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "gen-preflight-fixtures:", err)
+	os.Exit(1)
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/inplace/fixture/mutate.go b/internal/recovery/inplace/fixture/mutate.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cc74493eb0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/inplace/fixture/mutate.go
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+package fixture
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common"
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto"
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/rlp"
+	"github.com/syndtr/goleveldb/leveldb"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/rawdb"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/state"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/inplace/rodb"
+)
+
+// Mutate opens the fixture database read-write (the tool under test is
+// never running at this point) and applies fn. Used to derive corruption
+// variants from the pristine fixture.
+func Mutate(dir string, fn func(db *leveldb.DB) error) error {
+	db, err := leveldb.OpenFile(dir, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("open fixture for mutation: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+	return fn(db)
+}
+
+// DeleteKey removes one exact key.
+func DeleteKey(dir string, key []byte) error {
+	return Mutate(dir, func(db *leveldb.DB) error { return db.Delete(key, nil) })
+}
+
+// PutKey writes one exact key.
+func PutKey(dir string, key, value []byte) error {
+	return Mutate(dir, func(db *leveldb.DB) error { return db.Put(key, value, nil) })
+}
+
+// GetKey reads one exact key from the (stopped) fixture.
+func GetKey(dir string, key []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	var out []byte
+	err := Mutate(dir, func(db *leveldb.DB) error {
+		v, err := db.Get(key, nil)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		out = append([]byte(nil), v...)
+		return nil
+	})
+	return out, err
+}
+
+// CopyDB copies a fixture database directory (file-level copy of a stopped
+// DB) so tests can derive mutation variants without rebuilding.
+func CopyDB(src, dst string) error {
+	entries, err := os.ReadDir(src)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(dst, 0o755); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	for _, ent := range entries {
+		if ent.IsDir() {
+			continue
+		}
+		data, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(src, ent.Name()))
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dst, ent.Name()), data, 0o644); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// TrieNodes describes the physical trie-node keys of the fixture state,
+// classified for targeted deletion/corruption.
+type TrieNodes struct {
+	AccountRoot     common.Hash
+	AccountInternal []common.Hash // non-root standalone nodes that are not leaf-carrying
+	AccountAll      []common.Hash // every standalone account-trie node incl. root
+
+	StorageRoot     common.Hash   // storage root node of the probe account
+	StorageInternal []common.Hash // non-root standalone storage nodes
+	StorageAll      []common.Hash
+}
+
+// EnumerateTrieNodes walks the pristine fixture read-only and returns the
+// standalone node hashes of the account trie and of probeAddr's storage
+// trie, in deterministic iteration order.
+func EnumerateTrieNodes(dir string, stateRoot common.Hash, probeAddr common.Address) (*TrieNodes, error) {
+	db, err := rodb.Open(dir, rodb.Options{})
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+	latch := &rodb.Latch{}
+	sdb := state.NewDatabase(rawdb.NewDatabase(db.KV(latch)))
+
+	out := &TrieNodes{AccountRoot: stateRoot}
+
+	accountTrie, err := sdb.OpenTrie(stateRoot)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	var probeStorageRoot common.Hash
+	probeKey := crypto.Keccak256(probeAddr.Bytes())
+	it := accountTrie.NodeIterator(nil)
+	for it.Next(true) {
+		if it.Hash() != (common.Hash{}) {
+			out.AccountAll = append(out.AccountAll, it.Hash())
+			if it.Hash() != stateRoot && !it.Leaf() {
+				out.AccountInternal = append(out.AccountInternal, it.Hash())
+			}
+		}
+		if it.Leaf() && string(it.LeafKey()) == string(probeKey) {
+			var acct state.Account
+			if err := decodeAccount(it.LeafBlob(), &acct); err != nil {
+				return nil, err
+			}
+			probeStorageRoot = acct.Root
+		}
+	}
+	if err := it.Error(); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if probeStorageRoot == (common.Hash{}) {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("probe account %s not found or without storage", probeAddr.Hex())
+	}
+	out.StorageRoot = probeStorageRoot
+
+	storageTrie, err := sdb.OpenStorageTrie(stateRoot, common.BytesToHash(probeKey), probeStorageRoot)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	sit := storageTrie.NodeIterator(nil)
+	for sit.Next(true) {
+		if sit.Hash() != (common.Hash{}) {
+			out.StorageAll = append(out.StorageAll, sit.Hash())
+			if sit.Hash() != probeStorageRoot {
+				out.StorageInternal = append(out.StorageInternal, sit.Hash())
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if err := sit.Error(); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if latch.First() != nil {
+		return nil, latch.First()
+	}
+	return out, nil
+}
+
+func decodeAccount(blob []byte, acct *state.Account) error {
+	return rlp.DecodeBytes(blob, acct)
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/inplace/report/report.go b/internal/recovery/inplace/report/report.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..780cfdc249
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/inplace/report/report.go
@@ -0,0 +1,265 @@
+// Package report holds the validator-facing output contract: the PASS/FAIL
+// console line, the small flat JSON receipt, and the exit codes.
+package report
+
+import (
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+// Exit codes (fixed contract).
+const (
+	ExitPass      = 0 // all checks passed (point-in-time sample if the node was running)
+	ExitFail      = 1 // a verification check failed (one-line reason on the console)
+	ExitUnusable  = 2 // bad flags, missing DB, unsupported layout, not a LevelDB
+	ExitReadError = 3 // persistent read errors after retries
+)
+
+// RemedyLine is printed to stderr on exit 3.
+const RemedyLine = "remedy: re-run; if it keeps failing, stop the node briefly and re-run"
+
+// SampleNote is the point-in-time live-sample disclaimer embedded in every
+// receipt.
+const SampleNote = "result reflects the database at scan time; if the node was running, this is a point-in-time sample - authoritative verification happens at apply time on a stopped node"
+
+// Schema is the receipt schema identifier.
+const Schema = "preflight-result-v2"
+
+// Tool is the receipt tool identifier.
+const Tool = "harmony-recovery preflight"
+
+// Failure is a verification-check FAIL (as opposed to an I/O read error).
+// The first failing check wins the console line; the receipt carries the
+// rest.
+type Failure struct {
+	Check  string // stable check id, e.g. "target_header"
+	Reason string // one line
+}
+
+// Failf builds a Failure.
+func Failf(check, format string, args ...interface{}) *Failure {
+	return &Failure{Check: check, Reason: fmt.Sprintf(format, args...)}
+}
+
+func (f *Failure) Error() string { return f.Check + ": " + f.Reason }
+
+// VerificationFailure marks this error as a check FAIL for the retry runner
+// (rodb.IsVerificationFailure).
+func (f *Failure) VerificationFailure() bool { return true }
+
+// Build carries informational build-stamp fields (no gating or refusal
+// paths).
+type Build struct {
+	GitDescribe string `json:"git_describe,omitempty"`
+	VCSRevision string `json:"vcs_revision,omitempty"`
+	VCSModified bool   `json:"vcs_modified,omitempty"`
+	GoVersion   string `json:"go_version,omitempty"`
+}
+
+// Target is the verified target tuple.
+type Target struct {
+	Height    uint64 `json:"height"`
+	Hash      string `json:"hash"`
+	StateRoot string `json:"state_root,omitempty"`
+	Epoch     uint64 `json:"epoch,omitempty"`
+	ViewID    uint64 `json:"view_id,omitempty"`
+}
+
+// HeadSample is the informational upward sample (never gates).
+type HeadSample struct {
+	LastHeader        string `json:"last_header,omitempty"`
+	LastBlock         string `json:"last_block,omitempty"`
+	WalkToTarget      string `json:"walk_to_target,omitempty"`
+	ChildAtTargetPlus string `json:"child_at_target_plus_1,omitempty"`
+}
+
+// CertificateSources records which certificate sources were present and
+// which satisfied the check.
+type CertificateSources struct {
+	ExactKeyPresent    bool   `json:"exact_key_present"`
+	ChildHeaderPresent bool   `json:"child_header_present"`
+	SatisfiedBy        string `json:"satisfied_by,omitempty"`
+}
+
+// Anomaly is one bounded example entry.
+type Anomaly struct {
+	Kind   string `json:"kind"`
+	Detail string `json:"detail"`
+}
+
+// Anomalies is the bounded anomaly report: full counters, first-seen
+// examples, and the omitted count. Anomalies never gate.
+type Anomalies struct {
+	Total   int            `json:"total"`
+	ByKind  map[string]int `json:"by_kind,omitempty"`
+	Example []Anomaly      `json:"examples,omitempty"`
+	Omitted int            `json:"omitted"`
+}
+
+// StateCounts are the state-walk counters.
+type StateCounts struct {
+	Accounts            uint64 `json:"accounts"`
+	AccountTrieNodes    uint64 `json:"account_trie_nodes"`
+	StorageTries        uint64 `json:"storage_tries"`
+	StorageTrieNodes    uint64 `json:"storage_trie_nodes"`
+	StorageLeaves       uint64 `json:"storage_leaves"`
+	CodeRefsContract    uint64 `json:"code_refs_contract"`
+	CodeRefsValidator   uint64 `json:"code_refs_validator"`
+	UniqueCodeContract  uint64 `json:"unique_code_contract"`
+	UniqueCodeValidator uint64 `json:"unique_code_validator"`
+	UniqueCodeBytes     uint64 `json:"unique_code_bytes"`
+}
+
+// State is the state-walk section of the receipt.
+type State struct {
+	Digest          string      `json:"digest,omitempty"`
+	DigestAlgorithm string      `json:"digest_algorithm,omitempty"`
+	Counts          StateCounts `json:"counts"`
+	Anomalies       Anomalies   `json:"anomalies"`
+}
+
+// Retries reports live-race reopen activity.
+type Retries struct {
+	ReopenCount int `json:"reopen_count"`
+}
+
+// Receipt is the one small flat JSON file a validator attaches in Telegram.
+type Receipt struct {
+	Tool   string `json:"tool"`
+	Schema string `json:"schema"`
+	Build  Build  `json:"build"`
+
+	Name     string `json:"name,omitempty"`
+	Hostname string `json:"hostname,omitempty"`
+	Network  string `json:"network"`
+	Shard    uint32 `json:"shard"`
+	DBPath   string `json:"db_path"`
+
+	NodeProbablyRunning *bool  `json:"node_probably_running,omitempty"`
+	SampleNote          string `json:"sample_note"`
+
+	StartedAt string  `json:"started_at"`
+	DurationS float64 `json:"duration_s"`
+	Retries   Retries `json:"retries"`
+
+	Target Target `json:"target"`
+
+	// Checks maps stable check ids to "ok" | "fail: <reason>" | "skipped".
+	Checks map[string]string `json:"checks"`
+
+	HeadSample         HeadSample         `json:"head_sample"`
+	CertificateSources CertificateSources `json:"certificate_sources"`
+
+	State State `json:"state"`
+
+	Result     string `json:"result"` // "PASS" | "FAIL" (exit_code 3 marks a read-error FAIL)
+	FailReason string `json:"fail_reason,omitempty"`
+	ExitCode   int    `json:"exit_code"`
+}
+
+// CheckIDs is the stable, ordered check id list.
+var CheckIDs = []string{
+	"target_header",
+	"body",
+	"ancestry_to_boundary",
+	"shard_state",
+	"certificate",
+	"state_walk",
+}
+
+// NewChecks returns a check map with every check "skipped".
+func NewChecks() map[string]string {
+	m := make(map[string]string, len(CheckIDs))
+	for _, id := range CheckIDs {
+		m[id] = "skipped"
+	}
+	return m
+}
+
+// ValidateReportPath refuses a report path that resolves inside the DB
+// directory (writing into a live LevelDB directory could confuse the node).
+// Both the raw and the symlink-resolved forms are compared: the report's
+// parent may not exist yet, and partially-resolvable paths must not slip
+// through (e.g. /var vs /private/var on macOS).
+func ValidateReportPath(reportPath, dbPath string) error {
+	absReport, err := filepath.Abs(reportPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("resolve report path: %w", err)
+	}
+	absDB, err := filepath.Abs(dbPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("resolve db path: %w", err)
+	}
+	within := func(base, p string) bool {
+		rel, err := filepath.Rel(base, p)
+		return err == nil && rel != ".." && !strings.HasPrefix(rel, ".."+string(filepath.Separator))
+	}
+	resolvedDB := absDB
+	if r, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(absDB); err == nil {
+		resolvedDB = r
+	}
+	resolvedReport := absReport
+	// Resolve the deepest existing ancestor of the report path and rejoin
+	// the non-existing remainder.
+	dir, rest := filepath.Dir(absReport), filepath.Base(absReport)
+	for {
+		if r, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(dir); err == nil {
+			resolvedReport = filepath.Join(r, rest)
+			break
+		}
+		parent := filepath.Dir(dir)
+		if parent == dir {
+			break
+		}
+		rest = filepath.Join(filepath.Base(dir), rest)
+		dir = parent
+	}
+	if within(absDB, absReport) || within(resolvedDB, resolvedReport) {
+		return fmt.Errorf("report path %s resolves inside the DB directory %s; choose a path outside the database", reportPath, dbPath)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// Write atomically writes the receipt: temp file + rename in the target
+// directory.
+func (r *Receipt) Write(path string) error {
+	data, err := json.MarshalIndent(r, "", "  ")
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	data = append(data, '\n')
+	dir := filepath.Dir(path)
+	tmp, err := os.CreateTemp(dir, ".preflight-result-*.tmp")
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	tmpName := tmp.Name()
+	if _, err := tmp.Write(data); err != nil {
+		tmp.Close()
+		os.Remove(tmpName)
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := tmp.Close(); err != nil {
+		os.Remove(tmpName)
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := os.Rename(tmpName, path); err != nil {
+		os.Remove(tmpName)
+		return err
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// FinalLine prints the exactly-one-line stdout contract for completed
+// verification runs: "PASS" or "FAIL: <one-line reason>".
+func FinalLine(stdout io.Writer, pass bool, failReason string) {
+	if pass {
+		fmt.Fprintln(stdout, "PASS")
+		return
+	}
+	fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "FAIL: %s\n", failReason)
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/inplace/report/report_test.go b/internal/recovery/inplace/report/report_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e5f1da907e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/inplace/report/report_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+package report
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestValidateReportPath(t *testing.T) {
+	db := t.TempDir()
+	if err := ValidateReportPath(filepath.Join(db, "r.json"), db); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("path inside the DB directory must be refused")
+	}
+	if err := ValidateReportPath(filepath.Join(db, "sub", "r.json"), db); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("nested path inside the DB directory must be refused")
+	}
+	outside := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "r.json")
+	if err := ValidateReportPath(outside, db); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("outside path refused: %v", err)
+	}
+	// A symlinked parent that resolves into the DB directory is refused.
+	link := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "link")
+	if err := os.Symlink(db, link); err == nil {
+		if err := ValidateReportPath(filepath.Join(link, "r.json"), db); err == nil {
+			t.Fatal("symlinked path into the DB directory must be refused")
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestReceiptAtomicWrite(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	path := filepath.Join(dir, "receipt.json")
+	rec := &Receipt{
+		Tool:   Tool,
+		Schema: Schema,
+		Checks: NewChecks(),
+		Result: "PASS",
+	}
+	if err := rec.Write(path); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	var back Receipt
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &back); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("written receipt does not parse: %v", err)
+	}
+	if back.Schema != Schema {
+		t.Fatalf("schema %q", back.Schema)
+	}
+	// No temp files left behind.
+	entries, err := os.ReadDir(dir)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(entries) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("stray files after atomic write: %v", entries)
+	}
+	for _, id := range CheckIDs {
+		if back.Checks[id] != "skipped" {
+			t.Fatalf("check %s = %q", id, back.Checks[id])
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestFinalLine(t *testing.T) {
+	var buf bytes.Buffer
+	FinalLine(&buf, true, "")
+	if buf.String() != "PASS\n" {
+		t.Fatalf("pass line %q", buf.String())
+	}
+	buf.Reset()
+	FinalLine(&buf, false, "target_header: gone")
+	if buf.String() != "FAIL: target_header: gone\n" {
+		t.Fatalf("fail line %q", buf.String())
+	}
+	if strings.Count(buf.String(), "\n") != 1 {
+		t.Fatal("final line must be exactly one line")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestFailureError(t *testing.T) {
+	f := Failf("body", "root mismatch %d", 42)
+	if f.Error() != "body: root mismatch 42" || !f.VerificationFailure() {
+		t.Fatalf("%v", f)
+	}
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/inplace/rodb/adapter.go b/internal/recovery/inplace/rodb/adapter.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..978960daac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/inplace/rodb/adapter.go
@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
+package rodb
+
+import (
+	"sync"
+
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/ethdb"
+	"github.com/syndtr/goleveldb/leveldb"
+	"github.com/syndtr/goleveldb/leveldb/iterator"
+	"github.com/syndtr/goleveldb/leveldb/util"
+)
+
+// Latch records non-not-found read errors seen through the adapter. Stock
+// rawdb readers and the trie resolver swallow read errors into "absence";
+// the latch keeps a transient I/O error distinguishable from genuine
+// absence, so it surfaces as a read error (exit 3), never as a false FAIL.
+type Latch struct {
+	mu            sync.Mutex
+	first         error
+	count         int
+	writeAttempts int
+}
+
+// Record notes a non-nil, non-not-found error.
+func (l *Latch) Record(err error) {
+	if err == nil || IsNotFound(err) {
+		return
+	}
+	l.mu.Lock()
+	defer l.mu.Unlock()
+	if l.first == nil {
+		l.first = err
+	}
+	l.count++
+}
+
+func (l *Latch) recordWriteAttempt() {
+	l.mu.Lock()
+	defer l.mu.Unlock()
+	l.writeAttempts++
+}
+
+// First returns the first recorded error (nil if clean).
+func (l *Latch) First() error {
+	l.mu.Lock()
+	defer l.mu.Unlock()
+	return l.first
+}
+
+// Count returns the number of recorded errors.
+func (l *Latch) Count() int {
+	l.mu.Lock()
+	defer l.mu.Unlock()
+	return l.count
+}
+
+// WriteAttempts returns how many times a write method was invoked (each one
+// was refused; a non-zero value indicates a programming error somewhere in
+// the read pipeline).
+func (l *Latch) WriteAttempts() int {
+	l.mu.Lock()
+	defer l.mu.Unlock()
+	return l.writeAttempts
+}
+
+// Reset clears the latch (used when a stage is retried after reopen).
+func (l *Latch) Reset() {
+	l.mu.Lock()
+	defer l.mu.Unlock()
+	l.first = nil
+	l.count = 0
+}
+
+// KV is the write-refusing ethdb.KeyValueStore adapter over the read-only
+// goleveldb handle (never-write layer 3).
+type KV struct {
+	ldb   *leveldb.DB
+	latch *Latch
+}
+
+var _ ethdb.KeyValueStore = (*KV)(nil)
+
+// Get passes through with error propagation; a missing key returns
+// leveldb.ErrNotFound untouched, any other error is latched.
+func (kv *KV) Get(key []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	dat, err := kv.ldb.Get(key, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		kv.latch.Record(err)
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return dat, nil
+}
+
+// Has passes through with error propagation.
+func (kv *KV) Has(key []byte) (bool, error) {
+	ret, err := kv.ldb.Has(key, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		kv.latch.Record(err)
+		return false, err
+	}
+	return ret, nil
+}
+
+// Put is refused.
+func (kv *KV) Put(key []byte, value []byte) error {
+	kv.latch.recordWriteAttempt()
+	return ErrWriteRefused
+}
+
+// Delete is refused.
+func (kv *KV) Delete(key []byte) error {
+	kv.latch.recordWriteAttempt()
+	return ErrWriteRefused
+}
+
+// Compact is refused (it is a write path).
+func (kv *KV) Compact(start []byte, limit []byte) error {
+	kv.latch.recordWriteAttempt()
+	return ErrWriteRefused
+}
+
+// Stat passes through to goleveldb's property reader.
+func (kv *KV) Stat(property string) (string, error) {
+	return kv.ldb.GetProperty(property)
+}
+
+// NewBatch returns a batch whose write methods are refused (the Batcher
+// signature admits no error, so refusal happens on the batch's methods).
+func (kv *KV) NewBatch() ethdb.Batch {
+	return &refusingBatch{latch: kv.latch}
+}
+
+// NewBatchWithSize returns a write-refusing batch.
+func (kv *KV) NewBatchWithSize(size int) ethdb.Batch {
+	return &refusingBatch{latch: kv.latch}
+}
+
+// NewIterator wraps goleveldb's iterator over a binary-alphabetical prefix
+// range, mirroring geth's leveldb wrapper semantics.
+func (kv *KV) NewIterator(prefix []byte, start []byte) ethdb.Iterator {
+	r := util.BytesPrefix(prefix)
+	r.Start = append(r.Start, start...)
+	return &latchingIterator{it: kv.ldb.NewIterator(r, nil), latch: kv.latch}
+}
+
+// NewSnapshot wraps goleveldb's native read-only snapshot.
+func (kv *KV) NewSnapshot() (ethdb.Snapshot, error) {
+	snap, err := kv.ldb.GetSnapshot()
+	if err != nil {
+		kv.latch.Record(err)
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return &roSnapshot{snap: snap, latch: kv.latch}, nil
+}
+
+// Close is a no-op: the rodb.DB owner controls the database lifecycle (the
+// adapter is handed to library code that must not close it).
+func (kv *KV) Close() error { return nil }
+
+// Unlatched returns a view over the same database whose read errors are NOT
+// recorded in the shared latch (writes are still refused). It backs
+// strictly informational reads - the head sample - which must never gate
+// the run or engage the retry machinery: a latched error from a moving head
+// would send an otherwise clean run into retries and exit 3.
+func (kv *KV) Unlatched() ethdb.KeyValueReader {
+	return &KV{ldb: kv.ldb, latch: &Latch{}}
+}
+
+type latchingIterator struct {
+	it    iterator.Iterator
+	latch *Latch
+}
+
+func (i *latchingIterator) Next() bool    { return i.it.Next() }
+func (i *latchingIterator) Key() []byte   { return i.it.Key() }
+func (i *latchingIterator) Value() []byte { return i.it.Value() }
+func (i *latchingIterator) Release()      { i.err(); i.it.Release() }
+
+func (i *latchingIterator) Error() error { return i.err() }
+
+func (i *latchingIterator) err() error {
+	err := i.it.Error()
+	if err != nil {
+		i.latch.Record(err)
+	}
+	return err
+}
+
+type roSnapshot struct {
+	snap  *leveldb.Snapshot
+	latch *Latch
+}
+
+func (s *roSnapshot) Has(key []byte) (bool, error) {
+	ok, err := s.snap.Has(key, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		s.latch.Record(err)
+	}
+	return ok, err
+}
+
+func (s *roSnapshot) Get(key []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	dat, err := s.snap.Get(key, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		s.latch.Record(err)
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return dat, nil
+}
+
+func (s *roSnapshot) Release() { s.snap.Release() }
+
+type refusingBatch struct {
+	latch *Latch
+}
+
+var _ ethdb.Batch = (*refusingBatch)(nil)
+
+func (b *refusingBatch) Put(key, value []byte) error {
+	b.latch.recordWriteAttempt()
+	return ErrWriteRefused
+}
+
+func (b *refusingBatch) Delete(key []byte) error {
+	b.latch.recordWriteAttempt()
+	return ErrWriteRefused
+}
+
+func (b *refusingBatch) ValueSize() int { return 0 }
+
+func (b *refusingBatch) Write() error {
+	b.latch.recordWriteAttempt()
+	return ErrWriteRefused
+}
+
+func (b *refusingBatch) Reset() {}
+
+func (b *refusingBatch) Replay(w ethdb.KeyValueWriter) error {
+	b.latch.recordWriteAttempt()
+	return ErrWriteRefused
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/inplace/rodb/errors.go b/internal/recovery/inplace/rodb/errors.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e445b8222f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/inplace/rodb/errors.go
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+// Package rodb opens a (possibly live) harmony_db_0 LevelDB strictly
+// read-only, without taking the OS flock and without ever writing to the
+// database directory.
+//
+// Never-write property, three layers:
+//  1. goleveldb opened with opt.Options{ReadOnly: true, ErrorIfMissing: true}
+//  2. the custom storage.Storage refuses Create/Remove/Rename/SetMeta and
+//     never opens, creates or probes the LOCK and LOG files
+//  3. the ethdb adapter refuses Put/Delete/Compact and returns
+//     write-refusing batches
+//
+// leveldb.RecoverFile is never called (a RecoverFile against a live
+// validator DB rewrites the MANIFEST on disk and corrupts the node).
+package rodb
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+
+	lverrors "github.com/syndtr/goleveldb/leveldb/errors"
+	"github.com/syndtr/goleveldb/leveldb/storage"
+)
+
+// ErrWriteRefused is returned by every write path of the read-only storage
+// and the ethdb adapter.
+var ErrWriteRefused = errors.New("rodb: write refused (recovery preflight is strictly read-only)")
+
+// LayoutError marks an unusable/unsupported database layout (exit code 2).
+type LayoutError struct {
+	Reason string
+}
+
+func (e *LayoutError) Error() string { return "unsupported database layout: " + e.Reason }
+
+// ReadError marks a persistent read error (exit code 3). Remedy: re-run; if
+// it keeps failing, stop the node briefly and re-run.
+type ReadError struct {
+	Err     error
+	Detail  string // e.g. the corrupt table file name
+	Retries int    // reopen attempts consumed before giving up
+}
+
+func (e *ReadError) Error() string {
+	if e.Detail != "" {
+		return fmt.Sprintf("persistent read error (%s): %v", e.Detail, e.Err)
+	}
+	return fmt.Sprintf("persistent read error: %v", e.Err)
+}
+
+func (e *ReadError) Unwrap() error { return e.Err }
+
+// Class is the retry classification of a read error observed on a live DB.
+type Class int
+
+const (
+	// ClassNone: no error.
+	ClassNone Class = iota
+	// ClassRetryableRace: exactly the error classes a concurrent live
+	// writer can cause: (a) ENOENT on a referenced file (compaction deleted
+	// a table under our pinned manifest), and (b) ErrCorrupted attributed
+	// to journal or manifest files (torn .log tail during in-memory journal
+	// recovery, CURRENT/MANIFEST rotation mid-open).
+	ClassRetryableRace
+	// ClassCorruptTable: a checksum/content error inside an existing
+	// immutable SST. No live-writer race explains it; never retried.
+	ClassCorruptTable
+	// ClassPersistent: everything else (EACCES, EIO, ...); never retried.
+	ClassPersistent
+)
+
+// Classify sorts an error into retry classes. The string is a short detail
+// (the corrupt table name for ClassCorruptTable).
+func Classify(err error) (Class, string) {
+	if err == nil {
+		return ClassNone, ""
+	}
+	if os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		return ClassRetryableRace, ""
+	}
+	var fd storage.FileDesc
+	var isCorrupted bool
+	var lvErr *lverrors.ErrCorrupted
+	var stErr *storage.ErrCorrupted
+	if errors.As(err, &lvErr) {
+		fd, isCorrupted = lvErr.Fd, true
+	} else if errors.As(err, &stErr) {
+		fd, isCorrupted = stErr.Fd, true
+	}
+	if isCorrupted {
+		switch fd.Type {
+		case storage.TypeTable:
+			return ClassCorruptTable, fd.String()
+		case storage.TypeJournal, storage.TypeManifest:
+			return ClassRetryableRace, fd.String()
+		default:
+			// Corruption not attributable to a specific live-file class:
+			// fail closed, do not retry.
+			return ClassPersistent, ""
+		}
+	}
+	return ClassPersistent, ""
+}
+
+// IsNotFound reports whether err is a key-absence error from the underlying
+// key-value store (as opposed to an I/O or corruption error).
+func IsNotFound(err error) bool {
+	if err == nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	if errors.Is(err, lverrors.ErrNotFound) {
+		return true
+	}
+	// geth's memorydb returns a private errors.New("not found"); tolerate it
+	// so strict readers behave identically under test databases.
+	return err.Error() == "not found"
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/inplace/rodb/layout.go b/internal/recovery/inplace/rodb/layout.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..307da3e2a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/inplace/rodb/layout.go
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+package rodb
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+// CheckLayout gates on the simple default layout: a single-directory
+// goleveldb database whose basename is exactly harmony_db_<shard>. Sharded
+// multi-LevelDB (harmony_sharddb_*), pebble and TiKV layouts have no safe
+// read-only open path here, and a wrong-shard or renamed directory would
+// produce confusing FAILs instead of a clear refusal; all are rejected with
+// a *LayoutError (exit code 2).
+func CheckLayout(dir string, shardID uint32) error {
+	st, err := os.Stat(dir)
+	if err != nil {
+		return &LayoutError{Reason: fmt.Sprintf("cannot stat --db path: %v", err)}
+	}
+	if !st.IsDir() {
+		return &LayoutError{Reason: "--db path is not a directory"}
+	}
+	base := filepath.Base(filepath.Clean(dir))
+	if strings.HasPrefix(base, "harmony_sharddb") {
+		return &LayoutError{Reason: "sharded multi-LevelDB layout (harmony_sharddb*) is not supported; only the default harmony_db_0 LevelDB is supported"}
+	}
+
+	entries, err := os.ReadDir(dir)
+	if err != nil {
+		return &LayoutError{Reason: fmt.Sprintf("cannot list --db directory: %v", err)}
+	}
+	var hasCurrent, hasManifest, hasShardSubdir, hasDBSubdir bool
+	for _, ent := range entries {
+		name := ent.Name()
+		switch {
+		case strings.HasPrefix(name, "OPTIONS"):
+			return &LayoutError{Reason: "found OPTIONS file: this looks like a pebble database, which is not supported; only the default harmony_db_0 LevelDB is supported"}
+		case name == "CURRENT":
+			hasCurrent = true
+		case strings.HasPrefix(name, "MANIFEST-"):
+			hasManifest = true
+		case ent.IsDir() && strings.HasPrefix(name, "harmony_sharddb"):
+			hasShardSubdir = true
+		case ent.IsDir() && strings.HasPrefix(name, "harmony_db_"):
+			hasDBSubdir = true
+		}
+	}
+	if hasShardSubdir {
+		return &LayoutError{Reason: "directory contains a harmony_sharddb* database; the sharded layout is not supported"}
+	}
+	want := fmt.Sprintf("harmony_db_%d", shardID)
+	if base != want {
+		reason := fmt.Sprintf("--db must point at the node's %s directory itself (basename is %q)", want, base)
+		if hasDBSubdir {
+			reason += fmt.Sprintf("; did you mean the %s subdirectory?", want)
+		}
+		return &LayoutError{Reason: reason}
+	}
+	if !hasCurrent || !hasManifest {
+		reason := "not a LevelDB database directory (missing CURRENT/MANIFEST)"
+		if hasDBSubdir {
+			reason += "; did you mean to pass the harmony_db_0 subdirectory?"
+		}
+		return &LayoutError{Reason: reason}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/inplace/rodb/open.go b/internal/recovery/inplace/rodb/open.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4365d98577
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/inplace/rodb/open.go
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+package rodb
+
+import (
+	"github.com/syndtr/goleveldb/leveldb"
+	"github.com/syndtr/goleveldb/leveldb/opt"
+)
+
+// Options tunes the read-only open. Zero values pick safe defaults.
+type Options struct {
+	// Handles caps goleveldb's open-file cache (OpenFilesCacheCapacity).
+	Handles int
+	// BlockCacheMB caps the table block cache, in MiB.
+	BlockCacheMB int
+}
+
+const (
+	// DefaultHandles is the default open-file cache capacity.
+	DefaultHandles = 512
+	// DefaultBlockCacheMB is the default block cache size in MiB.
+	DefaultBlockCacheMB = 256
+)
+
+func (o Options) withDefaults() Options {
+	if o.Handles <= 0 {
+		o.Handles = DefaultHandles
+	}
+	if o.BlockCacheMB <= 0 {
+		o.BlockCacheMB = DefaultBlockCacheMB
+	}
+	return o
+}
+
+// DB is an open, strictly read-only database handle.
+type DB struct {
+	ldb  *leveldb.DB
+	stor *roStorage
+}
+
+// Open opens the database directory read-only via the no-flock storage.
+// It never calls leveldb.RecoverFile and never uses geth's leveldb wrapper
+// (whose open path calls RecoverFile on ErrCorrupted, dropping ReadOnly and
+// rewriting the MANIFEST on disk).
+//
+// With ReadOnly+ErrorIfMissing: a missing DB errors instead of being
+// created, journal recovery is performed in memory only, obsolete-file
+// cleanup and compaction are skipped, and every internal write path returns
+// an error.
+func Open(dir string, opts Options) (*DB, error) {
+	opts = opts.withDefaults()
+	stor := newROStorage(dir)
+	ldb, err := leveldb.Open(stor, &opt.Options{
+		ReadOnly:               true,
+		ErrorIfMissing:         true,
+		OpenFilesCacheCapacity: opts.Handles,
+		BlockCacheCapacity:     opts.BlockCacheMB * opt.MiB,
+		// Fail closed on manifest/journal corruption instead of goleveldb's
+		// default record-dropping (a silently truncated manifest would make
+		// missing tables look like key absence - a false FAIL). A cleanly
+		// torn live-journal tail still reads as graceful EOF; actual
+		// corruption surfaces as ErrCorrupted and is classified by Classify.
+		Strict: opt.DefaultStrict | opt.StrictManifest | opt.StrictJournal,
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		_ = stor.Close()
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return &DB{ldb: ldb, stor: stor}, nil
+}
+
+// KV returns the write-refusing ethdb adapter recording read errors into
+// latch.
+func (d *DB) KV(latch *Latch) *KV {
+	return &KV{ldb: d.ldb, latch: latch}
+}
+
+// Close closes the goleveldb session and the storage.
+func (d *DB) Close() error {
+	err := d.ldb.Close()
+	if cerr := d.stor.Close(); err == nil {
+		err = cerr
+	}
+	return err
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/inplace/rodb/probe_other.go b/internal/recovery/inplace/rodb/probe_other.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b81646ac86
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/inplace/rodb/probe_other.go
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+//go:build !unix
+
+package rodb
+
+// ProbeLiveWriter is unsupported on this platform; the result is unknown.
+func ProbeLiveWriter(dir string) (running bool, known bool) {
+	return false, false
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/inplace/rodb/probe_unix.go b/internal/recovery/inplace/rodb/probe_unix.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c60e60cebc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/inplace/rodb/probe_unix.go
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+//go:build unix
+
+package rodb
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+
+	"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
+)
+
+// ProbeLiveWriter best-effort detects a running node: it opens LOCK
+// read-only ONLY if it already exists (never O_CREATE) and tries a
+// non-blocking shared flock, which a running node's LOCK_EX blocks. The
+// shared lock is released immediately and never held across reads. The
+// result is informational only; probe failure is ignored.
+func ProbeLiveWriter(dir string) (running bool, known bool) {
+	path := filepath.Join(dir, "LOCK")
+	if _, err := os.Lstat(path); err != nil {
+		// No LOCK file: nothing to probe (and nothing must be created).
+		return false, false
+	}
+	f, err := os.OpenFile(path, os.O_RDONLY, 0)
+	if err != nil {
+		return false, false
+	}
+	defer f.Close()
+	if err := unix.Flock(int(f.Fd()), unix.LOCK_SH|unix.LOCK_NB); err != nil {
+		if err == unix.EWOULDBLOCK || err == unix.EAGAIN {
+			return true, true
+		}
+		return false, false
+	}
+	_ = unix.Flock(int(f.Fd()), unix.LOCK_UN)
+	return false, true
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/inplace/rodb/retry.go b/internal/recovery/inplace/rodb/retry.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..595e3c9b95
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/inplace/rodb/retry.go
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+package rodb
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+)
+
+// verificationFailure is the marker interface implemented by check-failure
+// errors (see report.Failure). A verification failure computed while the
+// latch is clean is a genuine FAIL; one computed while reads were erroring
+// is untrustworthy and follows the read-error path instead.
+type verificationFailure interface {
+	VerificationFailure() bool
+}
+
+// IsVerificationFailure reports whether err is a check FAIL rather than an
+// I/O problem.
+func IsVerificationFailure(err error) bool {
+	var v verificationFailure
+	return errors.As(err, &v) && v.VerificationFailure()
+}
+
+// Runner opens the database and runs pipeline stages with the bounded
+// reopen-and-retry policy for genuine live-file races.
+type Runner struct {
+	Dir  string
+	Opts Options
+	// MaxAttempts bounds open+run attempts per stage (default 3).
+	MaxAttempts int
+	// Progress, if set, receives human-readable retry notes (stderr).
+	Progress io.Writer
+
+	// open hooks the database open (tests inject fault wrappers).
+	open func() (*DB, error)
+
+	db          *DB
+	latch       *Latch
+	reopenCount int
+}
+
+// NewRunner constructs a stage runner for the database directory.
+func NewRunner(dir string, opts Options) *Runner {
+	r := &Runner{Dir: dir, Opts: opts, MaxAttempts: 3}
+	r.open = func() (*DB, error) { return Open(dir, opts) }
+	r.latch = &Latch{}
+	return r
+}
+
+// SetOpenFunc overrides the database open function (test fault injection).
+func (r *Runner) SetOpenFunc(open func() (*DB, error)) { r.open = open }
+
+// ReopenCount returns the total number of reopen attempts performed.
+func (r *Runner) ReopenCount() int { return r.reopenCount }
+
+// Latch returns the shared read-error latch.
+func (r *Runner) Latch() *Latch { return r.latch }
+
+// Close closes the underlying database if open.
+func (r *Runner) Close() {
+	if r.db != nil {
+		_ = r.db.Close()
+		r.db = nil
+	}
+}
+
+func (r *Runner) progressf(format string, args ...interface{}) {
+	if r.Progress != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(r.Progress, format+"\n", args...)
+	}
+}
+
+// Stage runs fn against the adapter, classifying failures:
+//
+//   - fn nil + clean latch: stage succeeded
+//   - verification failure + clean latch: genuine FAIL, returned as-is
+//   - retryable race (referenced-file ENOENT, journal/manifest turnover):
+//     close, reopen against the fresh manifest generation, retry the stage;
+//     bounded by MaxAttempts, exhaustion returns *ReadError
+//   - immutable-SST corruption: *ReadError immediately, zero retries,
+//     naming the corrupt table
+//   - anything else: *ReadError immediately
+func (r *Runner) Stage(name string, fn func(kv *KV) error) error {
+	for attempt := 1; ; attempt++ {
+		if r.db == nil {
+			db, err := r.open()
+			if err != nil {
+				class, detail := Classify(err)
+				if class == ClassRetryableRace && attempt < r.MaxAttempts {
+					r.reopenCount++
+					r.progressf("[%s] open hit a live-file race (%v); reopening (attempt %d/%d)", name, err, attempt+1, r.MaxAttempts)
+					continue
+				}
+				return &ReadError{Err: fmt.Errorf("open database: %w", err), Detail: detail, Retries: attempt - 1}
+			}
+			r.db = db
+		}
+		r.latch.Reset()
+		err := fn(r.db.KV(r.latch))
+
+		latched := r.latch.First()
+		if err == nil && latched == nil {
+			return nil
+		}
+		if err != nil && IsVerificationFailure(err) && latched == nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		// Read-error path. Prefer the latched root cause when present.
+		cause := err
+		if latched != nil {
+			cause = latched
+		}
+		class, detail := Classify(cause)
+		switch class {
+		case ClassRetryableRace:
+			if attempt < r.MaxAttempts {
+				r.reopenCount++
+				r.progressf("[%s] read hit a live-file race (%v); reopening and retrying stage (attempt %d/%d)", name, cause, attempt+1, r.MaxAttempts)
+				r.Close()
+				continue
+			}
+			return &ReadError{Err: cause, Detail: detail, Retries: attempt - 1}
+		case ClassCorruptTable:
+			// Immutable-SST corruption: no live-writer race explains it.
+			return &ReadError{Err: cause, Detail: detail, Retries: 0}
+		default:
+			return &ReadError{Err: cause, Detail: detail, Retries: 0}
+		}
+	}
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/inplace/rodb/rodb_test.go b/internal/recovery/inplace/rodb/rodb_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..11325874a9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/inplace/rodb/rodb_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,658 @@
+package rodb
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/syndtr/goleveldb/leveldb"
+	lverrors "github.com/syndtr/goleveldb/leveldb/errors"
+	"github.com/syndtr/goleveldb/leveldb/storage"
+	"github.com/syndtr/goleveldb/leveldb/util"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/inplace/report"
+)
+
+// newTestDB creates a small stopped LevelDB with deterministic content.
+func newTestDB(t *testing.T, n int) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	dir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "harmony_db_0")
+	db, err := leveldb.OpenFile(dir, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	for i := 0; i < n; i++ {
+		if err := db.Put(testKey(i), testVal(i), nil); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	if err := db.CompactRange(util.Range{}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := db.Close(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return dir
+}
+
+func testKey(i int) []byte { return []byte(fmt.Sprintf("key-%06d", i)) }
+func testVal(i int) []byte { return []byte(fmt.Sprintf("val-%06d", i)) }
+
+func TestLayoutGate(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("valid", func(t *testing.T) {
+		dir := newTestDB(t, 10)
+		if err := CheckLayout(dir, 0); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("valid layout refused: %v", err)
+		}
+	})
+	t.Run("missing", func(t *testing.T) {
+		err := CheckLayout(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "nope"), 0)
+		var le *LayoutError
+		if !errors.As(err, &le) {
+			t.Fatalf("want LayoutError, got %v", err)
+		}
+	})
+	t.Run("sharded-name", func(t *testing.T) {
+		dir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "harmony_sharddb_0")
+		if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0o755); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		err := CheckLayout(dir, 0)
+		if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "sharddb") {
+			t.Fatalf("sharded layout not refused: %v", err)
+		}
+	})
+	t.Run("pebble-options", func(t *testing.T) {
+		dir := newTestDB(t, 1)
+		if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "OPTIONS-000003"), []byte("x"), 0o644); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		err := CheckLayout(dir, 0)
+		if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "pebble") {
+			t.Fatalf("pebble layout not refused: %v", err)
+		}
+	})
+	t.Run("not-a-leveldb", func(t *testing.T) {
+		dir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "harmony_db_0")
+		if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0o755); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		err := CheckLayout(dir, 0)
+		if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "CURRENT") {
+			t.Fatalf("non-leveldb dir not refused: %v", err)
+		}
+	})
+	t.Run("wrong-shard-basename", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// A valid LevelDB named harmony_db_1 must be refused for shard 0
+		// (wrong-shard DBs would otherwise FAIL confusingly), and accepted
+		// when the caller asks for shard 1.
+		src := newTestDB(t, 5)
+		dir := filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(src), "harmony_db_1")
+		if err := os.Rename(src, dir); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		err := CheckLayout(dir, 0)
+		if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "harmony_db_0") {
+			t.Fatalf("wrong shard basename not refused: %v", err)
+		}
+		if err := CheckLayout(dir, 1); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("harmony_db_1 refused for shard 1: %v", err)
+		}
+	})
+	t.Run("renamed-dir-refused", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Even an otherwise valid LevelDB under an arbitrary basename is
+		// refused: --db must point at the node's harmony_db_0 itself.
+		src := newTestDB(t, 5)
+		dir := filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(src), "db-backup")
+		if err := os.Rename(src, dir); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		err := CheckLayout(dir, 0)
+		if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "harmony_db_0") {
+			t.Fatalf("renamed dir not refused: %v", err)
+		}
+	})
+	t.Run("hints-at-subdir", func(t *testing.T) {
+		dir := t.TempDir()
+		if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(dir, "harmony_db_0"), 0o755); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		err := CheckLayout(dir, 0)
+		if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "subdirectory") {
+			t.Fatalf("no subdir hint: %v", err)
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+func TestROStorageRefusesWrites(t *testing.T) {
+	stor := newROStorage(newTestDB(t, 5))
+	if _, err := stor.Create(storage.FileDesc{Type: storage.TypeTable, Num: 99}); err != ErrWriteRefused {
+		t.Fatalf("Create: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := stor.Remove(storage.FileDesc{Type: storage.TypeTable, Num: 1}); err != ErrWriteRefused {
+		t.Fatalf("Remove: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := stor.Rename(storage.FileDesc{Type: storage.TypeTable, Num: 1}, storage.FileDesc{Type: storage.TypeTable, Num: 2}); err != ErrWriteRefused {
+		t.Fatalf("Rename: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := stor.SetMeta(storage.FileDesc{Type: storage.TypeManifest, Num: 9}); err != ErrWriteRefused {
+		t.Fatalf("SetMeta: %v", err)
+	}
+	// GetMeta and List work read-only.
+	fd, err := stor.GetMeta()
+	if err != nil || fd.Type != storage.TypeManifest {
+		t.Fatalf("GetMeta: %v %v", fd, err)
+	}
+	fds, err := stor.List(storage.TypeAll)
+	if err != nil || len(fds) == 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("List: %v %v", fds, err)
+	}
+	// The LOCK file is never part of the descriptor namespace.
+	for _, fd := range fds {
+		if !storage.FileDescOk(fd) {
+			t.Fatalf("bad descriptor %v", fd)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAdapterRefusesWrites(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := newTestDB(t, 20)
+	db, err := Open(dir, Options{})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+	latch := &Latch{}
+	kv := db.KV(latch)
+
+	if err := kv.Put([]byte("k"), []byte("v")); err != ErrWriteRefused {
+		t.Fatalf("Put: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := kv.Delete([]byte("k")); err != ErrWriteRefused {
+		t.Fatalf("Delete: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := kv.Compact(nil, nil); err != ErrWriteRefused {
+		t.Fatalf("Compact: %v", err)
+	}
+	for name, b := range map[string]interface {
+		Put(k, v []byte) error
+		Delete(k []byte) error
+		Write() error
+	}{
+		"NewBatch":         kv.NewBatch(),
+		"NewBatchWithSize": kv.NewBatchWithSize(16),
+	} {
+		if err := b.Put([]byte("k"), []byte("v")); err != ErrWriteRefused {
+			t.Fatalf("%s.Put: %v", name, err)
+		}
+		if err := b.Delete([]byte("k")); err != ErrWriteRefused {
+			t.Fatalf("%s.Delete: %v", name, err)
+		}
+		if err := b.Write(); err != ErrWriteRefused {
+			t.Fatalf("%s.Write: %v", name, err)
+		}
+	}
+	if got := latch.WriteAttempts(); got == 0 {
+		t.Fatal("write attempts not recorded")
+	}
+
+	// Reads pass through; a missing key is not latched.
+	val, err := kv.Get(testKey(3))
+	if err != nil || !bytes.Equal(val, testVal(3)) {
+		t.Fatalf("Get: %q %v", val, err)
+	}
+	if _, err := kv.Get([]byte("absent")); !IsNotFound(err) {
+		t.Fatalf("absent key: %v", err)
+	}
+	if latch.First() != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("latch dirtied by not-found: %v", latch.First())
+	}
+	// Iterator and snapshot read paths work.
+	it := kv.NewIterator([]byte("key-"), nil)
+	count := 0
+	for it.Next() {
+		count++
+	}
+	it.Release()
+	if count != 20 || it.Error() != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("iterator: %d %v", count, it.Error())
+	}
+	snap, err := kv.NewSnapshot()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer snap.Release()
+	if v, err := snap.Get(testKey(1)); err != nil || !bytes.Equal(v, testVal(1)) {
+		t.Fatalf("snapshot get: %q %v", v, err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestClassify(t *testing.T) {
+	cases := []struct {
+		name string
+		err  error
+		want Class
+	}{
+		{"nil", nil, ClassNone},
+		{"enoent", &os.PathError{Op: "open", Path: "x", Err: os.ErrNotExist}, ClassRetryableRace},
+		{"corrupt-journal", lverrors.NewErrCorrupted(storage.FileDesc{Type: storage.TypeJournal, Num: 3}, errors.New("torn tail")), ClassRetryableRace},
+		{"corrupt-manifest", lverrors.NewErrCorrupted(storage.FileDesc{Type: storage.TypeManifest, Num: 2}, errors.New("bad record")), ClassRetryableRace},
+		{"corrupt-table", lverrors.NewErrCorrupted(storage.FileDesc{Type: storage.TypeTable, Num: 7}, errors.New("checksum mismatch")), ClassCorruptTable},
+		{"corrupt-unattributed", lverrors.NewErrCorrupted(storage.FileDesc{}, errors.New("mystery")), ClassPersistent},
+		{"other", errors.New("permission denied"), ClassPersistent},
+	}
+	for _, c := range cases {
+		t.Run(c.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			got, detail := Classify(c.err)
+			if got != c.want {
+				t.Fatalf("Classify(%v) = %v, want %v", c.err, got, c.want)
+			}
+			if c.want == ClassCorruptTable && !strings.Contains(detail, "000007.ldb") {
+				t.Fatalf("corrupt table detail %q does not name the table", detail)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRunnerRetryPolicy(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := newTestDB(t, 10)
+
+	t.Run("open-race-then-success", func(t *testing.T) {
+		r := NewRunner(dir, Options{})
+		defer r.Close()
+		fails := 1
+		r.SetOpenFunc(func() (*DB, error) {
+			if fails > 0 {
+				fails--
+				return nil, &os.PathError{Op: "open", Path: "000001.ldb", Err: os.ErrNotExist}
+			}
+			return Open(dir, Options{})
+		})
+		err := r.Stage("test", func(kv *KV) error {
+			_, err := kv.Get(testKey(1))
+			return err
+		})
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("stage: %v", err)
+		}
+		if r.ReopenCount() != 1 {
+			t.Fatalf("reopen count %d, want 1", r.ReopenCount())
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("latched-race-then-success", func(t *testing.T) {
+		r := NewRunner(dir, Options{})
+		defer r.Close()
+		injected := 1
+		err := r.Stage("test", func(kv *KV) error {
+			if injected > 0 {
+				injected--
+				r.Latch().Record(&os.PathError{Op: "read", Path: "000002.ldb", Err: os.ErrNotExist})
+				// A missing-key FAIL computed under a dirty latch must NOT
+				// surface as a verification failure.
+				return report.Failf("target_header", "spurious absence")
+			}
+			return nil
+		})
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("stage: %v", err)
+		}
+		if r.ReopenCount() != 1 {
+			t.Fatalf("reopen count %d, want 1", r.ReopenCount())
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("verification-failure-clean-latch", func(t *testing.T) {
+		r := NewRunner(dir, Options{})
+		defer r.Close()
+		err := r.Stage("test", func(kv *KV) error {
+			return report.Failf("target_header", "genuinely missing")
+		})
+		var f *report.Failure
+		if !errors.As(err, &f) {
+			t.Fatalf("want Failure, got %v", err)
+		}
+		if r.ReopenCount() != 0 {
+			t.Fatalf("reopens on clean FAIL: %d", r.ReopenCount())
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("corrupt-table-zero-retries", func(t *testing.T) {
+		r := NewRunner(dir, Options{})
+		defer r.Close()
+		err := r.Stage("test", func(kv *KV) error {
+			return lverrors.NewErrCorrupted(storage.FileDesc{Type: storage.TypeTable, Num: 5}, errors.New("checksum mismatch"))
+		})
+		var re *ReadError
+		if !errors.As(err, &re) {
+			t.Fatalf("want ReadError, got %v", err)
+		}
+		if re.Retries != 0 || r.ReopenCount() != 0 {
+			t.Fatalf("corrupt table must not retry: %+v reopens=%d", re, r.ReopenCount())
+		}
+		if !strings.Contains(re.Detail, "000005.ldb") {
+			t.Fatalf("detail %q does not name the table", re.Detail)
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("persistent-race-exhausts", func(t *testing.T) {
+		r := NewRunner(dir, Options{})
+		defer r.Close()
+		err := r.Stage("test", func(kv *KV) error {
+			return &os.PathError{Op: "read", Path: "000009.ldb", Err: os.ErrNotExist}
+		})
+		var re *ReadError
+		if !errors.As(err, &re) {
+			t.Fatalf("want ReadError, got %v", err)
+		}
+		if re.Retries != r.MaxAttempts-1 || r.ReopenCount() != r.MaxAttempts-1 {
+			t.Fatalf("retries %d reopens %d, want %d", re.Retries, r.ReopenCount(), r.MaxAttempts-1)
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+// TestLiveWriterCoexistence: a real goleveldb writer holds LOCK_EX and keeps
+// writing/compacting; the lock-free reader opens concurrently and reads
+// stable keys; the writer never observes an error.
+func TestLiveWriterCoexistence(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := newTestDB(t, 500)
+	wdb, err := leveldb.OpenFile(dir, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer wdb.Close()
+
+	// The writer holds the flock now; probe must see it.
+	if running, known := ProbeLiveWriter(dir); !known || !running {
+		t.Fatalf("probe = running:%v known:%v, want running under writer flock", running, known)
+	}
+
+	stop := make(chan struct{})
+	var wg sync.WaitGroup
+	var writerErr error
+	wg.Add(1)
+	go func() {
+		defer wg.Done()
+		for i := 0; ; i++ {
+			select {
+			case <-stop:
+				return
+			default:
+			}
+			if err := wdb.Put([]byte(fmt.Sprintf("live-%06d", i)), testVal(i), nil); err != nil {
+				writerErr = err
+				return
+			}
+			if i%512 == 511 {
+				if err := wdb.CompactRange(util.Range{}); err != nil {
+					writerErr = err
+					return
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}()
+
+	// Open lock-free while the writer runs and read the pre-existing keys.
+	deadline := time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)
+	var lastErr error
+	ok := false
+	for time.Now().Before(deadline) && !ok {
+		func() {
+			db, err := Open(dir, Options{})
+			if err != nil {
+				lastErr = err
+				time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond)
+				return
+			}
+			defer db.Close()
+			latch := &Latch{}
+			kv := db.KV(latch)
+			for i := 0; i < 500; i++ {
+				val, err := kv.Get(testKey(i))
+				if err != nil || !bytes.Equal(val, testVal(i)) {
+					lastErr = fmt.Errorf("key %d: %q %w", i, val, err)
+					return
+				}
+			}
+			if latch.First() != nil {
+				lastErr = latch.First()
+				return
+			}
+			ok = true
+		}()
+	}
+	close(stop)
+	wg.Wait()
+	if writerErr != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("writer observed an error: %v", writerErr)
+	}
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatalf("reader never completed cleanly against the live writer: %v", lastErr)
+	}
+	// The writer still works after our reads.
+	if err := wdb.Put([]byte("post"), []byte("ok"), nil); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("writer put after coexistence: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestIdleWriterDirectoryUntouched: with an idle writer holding the flock,
+// a full read pass leaves the directory byte-identical (no LOCK/LOG
+// creation, no manifest rewrite - the geth-wrapper RecoverFile hazard).
+func TestIdleWriterDirectoryUntouched(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := newTestDB(t, 50)
+	wdb, err := leveldb.OpenFile(dir, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer wdb.Close()
+
+	snapshot := func() map[string][]byte {
+		out := map[string][]byte{}
+		entries, err := os.ReadDir(dir)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		for _, ent := range entries {
+			data, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(dir, ent.Name()))
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			out[ent.Name()] = data
+		}
+		return out
+	}
+	before := snapshot()
+
+	db, err := Open(dir, Options{})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("lock-free open under held flock: %v", err)
+	}
+	latch := &Latch{}
+	kv := db.KV(latch)
+	it := kv.NewIterator(nil, nil)
+	for it.Next() {
+	}
+	it.Release()
+	if err := it.Error(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := kv.Get(testKey(7)); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	db.Close()
+
+	after := snapshot()
+	if len(before) != len(after) {
+		t.Fatalf("file set changed: %d -> %d", len(before), len(after))
+	}
+	for name, data := range before {
+		if !bytes.Equal(after[name], data) {
+			t.Fatalf("file %s changed", name)
+		}
+	}
+	if latch.First() != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("latch: %v", latch.First())
+	}
+}
+
+// TestMidScanRelocation: a compaction relocates tables between stages; the
+// pinned session either keeps serving (open fds) or the runner reopens -
+// stage 2 must succeed either way.
+func TestMidScanRelocation(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := newTestDB(t, 200)
+	r := NewRunner(dir, Options{})
+	defer r.Close()
+
+	if err := r.Stage("stage1", func(kv *KV) error {
+		_, err := kv.Get(testKey(0))
+		return err
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("stage1: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Relocate: write + compact through a second (writing) handle.
+	wdb, err := leveldb.OpenFile(dir, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	for i := 0; i < 2000; i++ {
+		if err := wdb.Put([]byte(fmt.Sprintf("fill-%06d", i)), bytes.Repeat([]byte{0xab}, 128), nil); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	if err := wdb.CompactRange(util.Range{}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := wdb.Close(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	if err := r.Stage("stage2", func(kv *KV) error {
+		for i := 0; i < 200; i++ {
+			if _, err := kv.Get(testKey(i)); err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+		}
+		return nil
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("stage2 after relocation: %v (reopens %d)", err, r.ReopenCount())
+	}
+}
+
+// TestRelocationReopenDeterministic pins the successful-relocation path:
+// every table file vanishes mid-stage (the extreme compaction race), the
+// runner reopens exactly once, and the retried stage reads every key
+// correctly after the files return.
+func TestRelocationReopenDeterministic(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := newTestDB(t, 300)
+	r := NewRunner(dir, Options{})
+	defer r.Close()
+
+	stash := t.TempDir()
+	moveTables := func(from, to string) []string {
+		entries, err := os.ReadDir(from)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		var moved []string
+		for _, ent := range entries {
+			if strings.HasSuffix(ent.Name(), ".ldb") || strings.HasSuffix(ent.Name(), ".sst") {
+				if err := os.Rename(filepath.Join(from, ent.Name()), filepath.Join(to, ent.Name())); err != nil {
+					t.Fatal(err)
+				}
+				moved = append(moved, ent.Name())
+			}
+		}
+		if len(moved) == 0 {
+			t.Fatal("no table files to relocate")
+		}
+		return moved
+	}
+
+	attempt := 0
+	err := r.Stage("scan", func(kv *KV) error {
+		attempt++
+		if attempt == 1 {
+			// Tables vanish before the first read of this session (the
+			// open-file cache holds nothing yet), producing a genuine
+			// ENOENT through goleveldb - the retryable race class.
+			moveTables(dir, stash)
+			if _, err := kv.Get(testKey(0)); err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+			return errors.New("read unexpectedly succeeded with tables missing")
+		}
+		// Retried attempt: the files are back; every key must read
+		// correctly through the fresh session.
+		moveTables(stash, dir)
+		for i := 0; i < 300; i++ {
+			val, err := kv.Get(testKey(i))
+			if err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+			if !bytes.Equal(val, testVal(i)) {
+				return fmt.Errorf("key %d reads %q after reopen", i, val)
+			}
+		}
+		return nil
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("stage after relocation: %v", err)
+	}
+	if attempt != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("stage ran %d times, want 2", attempt)
+	}
+	if r.ReopenCount() != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("reopen count = %d, want exactly 1", r.ReopenCount())
+	}
+}
+
+// TestUnlatchedReaderScopesLatch: read errors through the Unlatched view
+// must not dirty the shared latch (they back the informational head sample),
+// while the same error through the primary adapter must.
+func TestUnlatchedReaderScopesLatch(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := newTestDB(t, 5)
+	db, err := Open(dir, Options{})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	latch := &Latch{}
+	kv := db.KV(latch)
+	unlatched := kv.Unlatched()
+
+	// Force a real (non-not-found) read error on both views.
+	if err := db.Close(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := unlatched.Get(testKey(0)); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("read on a closed DB must fail")
+	}
+	if latch.First() != nil || latch.Count() != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("unlatched read dirtied the shared latch: %v", latch.First())
+	}
+	if _, err := kv.Get(testKey(0)); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("read on a closed DB must fail")
+	}
+	if latch.First() == nil {
+		t.Fatal("latched read did not record the error")
+	}
+	// The unlatched view still refuses writes.
+	if w, ok := unlatched.(interface{ Put(k, v []byte) error }); !ok {
+		t.Fatal("unlatched view lost its type")
+	} else if err := w.Put([]byte("k"), []byte("v")); err != ErrWriteRefused {
+		t.Fatalf("unlatched Put: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestOpenMissingDB(t *testing.T) {
+	_, err := Open(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "empty"), Options{})
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("open of a missing DB must fail (ErrorIfMissing)")
+	}
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/inplace/rodb/storage.go b/internal/recovery/inplace/rodb/storage.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..96dd8d7345
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/inplace/rodb/storage.go
@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
+package rodb
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+
+	"github.com/syndtr/goleveldb/leveldb/storage"
+)
+
+// roStorage implements goleveldb's storage.Storage over an existing DB
+// directory using plain file reads only.
+//
+// Why not storage.OpenFile(dir, readOnly=true): its constructor acquires an
+// OS flock on the LOCK file (LOCK_SH for read-only openers) and O_CREATEs
+// LOCK if missing. A running validator holds LOCK_EX, so a second process
+// cannot open the DB that way at all - and creating LOCK would be a write
+// into a live DB directory. The goleveldb session only needs the Storage
+// interface's Lock() method, which is an in-process lock; the OS flock lives
+// exclusively in storage.OpenFile's constructor. So this implementation:
+//
+//   - never opens, creates, stats or flocks the LOCK file
+//   - never writes the LOG file (Log is a no-op)
+//   - returns ErrWriteRefused from Create/Remove/Rename/SetMeta
+type roStorage struct {
+	dir string
+
+	mu     sync.Mutex
+	locked bool
+	closed bool
+}
+
+var _ storage.Storage = (*roStorage)(nil)
+
+func newROStorage(dir string) *roStorage {
+	return &roStorage{dir: dir}
+}
+
+type roLock struct{ s *roStorage }
+
+func (l *roLock) Unlock() {
+	l.s.mu.Lock()
+	defer l.s.mu.Unlock()
+	l.s.locked = false
+}
+
+// Lock takes the in-process lock the goleveldb session requires. No OS-level
+// lock is involved.
+func (s *roStorage) Lock() (storage.Locker, error) {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+	if s.closed {
+		return nil, storage.ErrClosed
+	}
+	if s.locked {
+		return nil, storage.ErrLocked
+	}
+	s.locked = true
+	return &roLock{s: s}, nil
+}
+
+// Log is a no-op; the file storage implementation would append to LOG.
+func (s *roStorage) Log(str string) {}
+
+// SetMeta would rewrite CURRENT; refused.
+func (s *roStorage) SetMeta(fd storage.FileDesc) error { return ErrWriteRefused }
+
+// GetMeta returns the manifest file descriptor named by CURRENT.
+func (s *roStorage) GetMeta() (storage.FileDesc, error) {
+	if err := s.ok(); err != nil {
+		return storage.FileDesc{}, err
+	}
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(s.dir, "CURRENT"))
+	if err != nil {
+		return storage.FileDesc{}, err
+	}
+	content := strings.TrimRight(string(raw), "\r\n ")
+	var num int64
+	if _, err := fmt.Sscanf(content, "MANIFEST-%d", &num); err != nil || num < 0 {
+		return storage.FileDesc{}, fmt.Errorf("rodb: malformed CURRENT content %q", content)
+	}
+	fd := storage.FileDesc{Type: storage.TypeManifest, Num: num}
+	if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(s.dir, fsGenName(fd))); err != nil {
+		return storage.FileDesc{}, err
+	}
+	return fd, nil
+}
+
+// List returns the file descriptors in the DB directory matching the type
+// mask, following the file storage naming rules (LOCK, LOG, CURRENT* do not
+// parse as descriptors and are naturally skipped).
+func (s *roStorage) List(ft storage.FileType) ([]storage.FileDesc, error) {
+	if err := s.ok(); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	entries, err := os.ReadDir(s.dir)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	seen := make(map[storage.FileDesc]bool)
+	var fds []storage.FileDesc
+	for _, ent := range entries {
+		if ent.IsDir() {
+			continue
+		}
+		if fd, ok := fsParseName(ent.Name()); ok && fd.Type&ft != 0 && !seen[fd] {
+			seen[fd] = true
+			fds = append(fds, fd)
+		}
+	}
+	return fds, nil
+}
+
+// Open opens the named file read-only with plain os.Open.
+func (s *roStorage) Open(fd storage.FileDesc) (storage.Reader, error) {
+	if err := s.ok(); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if !storage.FileDescOk(fd) {
+		return nil, storage.ErrInvalidFile
+	}
+	f, err := os.Open(filepath.Join(s.dir, fsGenName(fd)))
+	if os.IsNotExist(err) && fd.Type == storage.TypeTable {
+		// Tables written by older goleveldb use the .sst suffix.
+		f, err = os.Open(filepath.Join(s.dir, fsGenOldName(fd)))
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return f, nil
+}
+
+// Create/Remove/Rename are write paths; refused.
+func (s *roStorage) Create(fd storage.FileDesc) (storage.Writer, error) {
+	return nil, ErrWriteRefused
+}
+
+func (s *roStorage) Remove(fd storage.FileDesc) error { return ErrWriteRefused }
+
+func (s *roStorage) Rename(oldfd, newfd storage.FileDesc) error { return ErrWriteRefused }
+
+func (s *roStorage) Close() error {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+	s.closed = true
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (s *roStorage) ok() error {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+	if s.closed {
+		return storage.ErrClosed
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// fsGenName/fsGenOldName/fsParseName mirror goleveldb's file storage naming
+// rules (leveldb/storage/file_storage.go).
+func fsGenName(fd storage.FileDesc) string {
+	switch fd.Type {
+	case storage.TypeManifest:
+		return fmt.Sprintf("MANIFEST-%06d", fd.Num)
+	case storage.TypeJournal:
+		return fmt.Sprintf("%06d.log", fd.Num)
+	case storage.TypeTable:
+		return fmt.Sprintf("%06d.ldb", fd.Num)
+	case storage.TypeTemp:
+		return fmt.Sprintf("%06d.tmp", fd.Num)
+	default:
+		panic("rodb: invalid file type")
+	}
+}
+
+func fsGenOldName(fd storage.FileDesc) string {
+	if fd.Type == storage.TypeTable {
+		return fmt.Sprintf("%06d.sst", fd.Num)
+	}
+	return fsGenName(fd)
+}
+
+func fsParseName(name string) (fd storage.FileDesc, ok bool) {
+	var tail string
+	_, err := fmt.Sscanf(name, "%d.%s", &fd.Num, &tail)
+	if err == nil {
+		switch tail {
+		case "log":
+			fd.Type = storage.TypeJournal
+		case "ldb", "sst":
+			fd.Type = storage.TypeTable
+		case "tmp":
+			fd.Type = storage.TypeTemp
+		default:
+			return storage.FileDesc{}, false
+		}
+		return fd, true
+	}
+	n, _ := fmt.Sscanf(name, "MANIFEST-%d%s", &fd.Num, &tail)
+	if n == 1 {
+		fd.Type = storage.TypeManifest
+		return fd, true
+	}
+	return storage.FileDesc{}, false
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/inplace/statecheck/anomaly.go b/internal/recovery/inplace/statecheck/anomaly.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4f395e0bb1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/inplace/statecheck/anomaly.go
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+package statecheck
+
+import "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/inplace/report"
+
+// Anomaly kinds (informational; anomalies never gate).
+const (
+	// AnomalyFlagDecodedZero: an IsValidatorKey storage leaf exists but its
+	// decoded value is the zero hash - the account is unflagged (matching
+	// Object.IsValidator's decode-and-test), the stray leaf is noted.
+	AnomalyFlagDecodedZero = "flag-decoded-zero"
+	// AnomalyFlagNonCanonical: the IsValidatorKey leaf decodes non-zero but
+	// differs from the canonical staking.IsValidator value - flagged, noted.
+	AnomalyFlagNonCanonical = "flag-noncanonical-value"
+	// AnomalyCodeMultiLocation: identical code bytes found at more than one
+	// physical location (c/vc/legacy) - resolved by precedence c > vc >
+	// legacy, noted.
+	AnomalyCodeMultiLocation = "code-multiple-locations"
+	// AnomalyWrapperShapedContract: unflagged account whose code bytes
+	// RLP-decode as a validator wrapper - stays contract code, noted.
+	AnomalyWrapperShapedContract = "wrapper-shaped-contract-code"
+	// AnomalyCodeDualClass: the same code hash referenced as contract code
+	// by one account and validator code by another - counted per class,
+	// noted.
+	AnomalyCodeDualClass = "code-dual-class"
+)
+
+// maxAnomalyExamples bounds the receipt's example list.
+const maxAnomalyExamples = 20
+
+// AnomalySet keeps full per-kind counters plus the first-seen bounded
+// examples, deterministic for a given database.
+type AnomalySet struct {
+	total    int
+	byKind   map[string]int
+	examples []report.Anomaly
+}
+
+// NewAnomalySet builds an empty set.
+func NewAnomalySet() *AnomalySet {
+	return &AnomalySet{byKind: make(map[string]int)}
+}
+
+// Add records one anomaly.
+func (s *AnomalySet) Add(kind, detail string) {
+	s.total++
+	s.byKind[kind]++
+	if len(s.examples) < maxAnomalyExamples {
+		s.examples = append(s.examples, report.Anomaly{Kind: kind, Detail: detail})
+	}
+}
+
+// AddAll folds src into s preserving src's internal order (used for the
+// ordered account fold, keeping examples first-seen deterministic under
+// worker parallelism).
+func (s *AnomalySet) AddAll(src *AnomalySet) {
+	if src == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	for _, ex := range src.examples {
+		s.Add(ex.Kind, ex.Detail)
+	}
+	// Examples beyond src's own bound still count.
+	for kind, n := range src.byKind {
+		seen := 0
+		for _, ex := range src.examples {
+			if ex.Kind == kind {
+				seen++
+			}
+		}
+		for i := seen; i < n; i++ {
+			s.total++
+			s.byKind[kind]++
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// Report converts to the bounded receipt form.
+func (s *AnomalySet) Report() report.Anomalies {
+	out := report.Anomalies{
+		Total:   s.total,
+		Omitted: s.total - len(s.examples),
+	}
+	if len(s.byKind) > 0 {
+		out.ByKind = make(map[string]int, len(s.byKind))
+		for k, v := range s.byKind {
+			out.ByKind[k] = v
+		}
+	}
+	out.Example = append(out.Example, s.examples...)
+	return out
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/inplace/statecheck/digest.go b/internal/recovery/inplace/statecheck/digest.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5d558ef5a7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/inplace/statecheck/digest.go
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+package statecheck
+
+import (
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"hash"
+
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common"
+)
+
+// DigestAlgorithm names the logical state digest construction below.
+//
+//	A_i       = SHA256("HMY-PF-ACCT-V1" || leafKey || BE64(nonce) ||
+//	                   BE64(len(bal)) || bal || storageRoot || codeHash ||
+//	                   H_storage || H_code)
+//	H_storage = SHA256("HMY-PF-STOR-V1" || (slotKey || BE64(len(value)) || value)*)
+//	            in storage-trie order, or 32 zero bytes for an empty root
+//	H_code    = SHA256("HMY-PF-CODE-V1" || BE64(len(code)) || code),
+//	            or 32 zero bytes for the empty code hash
+//	digest    = SHA256("HMY-PF-STATE-V1" || stateRoot || A_1 || ... || A_n)
+//	            in account-trie order
+//
+// bal is the minimal big-endian big.Int.Bytes(); value is the decoded
+// (logical) storage byte string, making the digest invariant across
+// physical database layouts. Identical digests across validators'
+// attachments give coordinators a free cross-check; the digest is an
+// informational receipt field, never a gate.
+const DigestAlgorithm = "preflight_state_digest_v1"
+
+var zeroHash32 [32]byte
+
+func be64(n uint64) []byte {
+	var b [8]byte
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(b[:], n)
+	return b[:]
+}
+
+// storageDigest accumulates H_storage in storage-trie order.
+type storageDigest struct {
+	h     hash.Hash
+	empty bool
+}
+
+func newStorageDigest(emptyRoot bool) *storageDigest {
+	d := &storageDigest{empty: emptyRoot}
+	if !emptyRoot {
+		d.h = sha256.New()
+		d.h.Write([]byte("HMY-PF-STOR-V1"))
+	}
+	return d
+}
+
+func (d *storageDigest) addLeaf(slotKey []byte, value []byte) {
+	d.h.Write(slotKey)
+	d.h.Write(be64(uint64(len(value))))
+	d.h.Write(value)
+}
+
+func (d *storageDigest) sum() [32]byte {
+	if d.empty {
+		return zeroHash32
+	}
+	var out [32]byte
+	copy(out[:], d.h.Sum(nil))
+	return out
+}
+
+// codeDigest computes H_code (32 zero bytes for the empty code hash).
+func codeDigest(code []byte, emptyCode bool) [32]byte {
+	if emptyCode {
+		return zeroHash32
+	}
+	h := sha256.New()
+	h.Write([]byte("HMY-PF-CODE-V1"))
+	h.Write(be64(uint64(len(code))))
+	h.Write(code)
+	var out [32]byte
+	copy(out[:], h.Sum(nil))
+	return out
+}
+
+// accountDigest computes A_i.
+func accountDigest(leafKey []byte, nonce uint64, bal []byte, storageRoot common.Hash, codeHash []byte, hStorage, hCode [32]byte) [32]byte {
+	h := sha256.New()
+	h.Write([]byte("HMY-PF-ACCT-V1"))
+	h.Write(leafKey)
+	h.Write(be64(nonce))
+	h.Write(be64(uint64(len(bal))))
+	h.Write(bal)
+	h.Write(storageRoot.Bytes())
+	h.Write(codeHash)
+	h.Write(hStorage[:])
+	h.Write(hCode[:])
+	var out [32]byte
+	copy(out[:], h.Sum(nil))
+	return out
+}
+
+// stateDigest folds A_i in account-trie order.
+type stateDigest struct {
+	h hash.Hash
+}
+
+func newStateDigest(stateRoot common.Hash) *stateDigest {
+	d := &stateDigest{h: sha256.New()}
+	d.h.Write([]byte("HMY-PF-STATE-V1"))
+	d.h.Write(stateRoot.Bytes())
+	return d
+}
+
+func (d *stateDigest) addAccount(a [32]byte) { d.h.Write(a[:]) }
+
+func (d *stateDigest) sum() [32]byte {
+	var out [32]byte
+	copy(out[:], d.h.Sum(nil))
+	return out
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/inplace/statecheck/walker.go b/internal/recovery/inplace/statecheck/walker.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1eed182925
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/inplace/statecheck/walker.go
@@ -0,0 +1,535 @@
+// Package statecheck walks the complete target state: every account, every
+// storage trie, every code blob, with every standalone trie node
+// keccak-authenticated against its hash.
+//
+// It is a self-contained walker independent of core/state/iterator.go, which
+// has two confirmed defects this package must not inherit:
+//
+//  1. iterator.go:123-126 returns when ContractCode errors, making the
+//     ValidatorCode fallback unreachable for missing code (validator
+//     wrappers are stored under the "vc" namespace) - the stock iterator
+//     hard-fails on every validator account. The walker probes the three
+//     physical code namespaces (c, vc, legacy bare hash) with raw reads.
+//  2. iterator.go:116-119 drops the error of the initial storage-iterator
+//     step - a storage trie with a missing root is silently treated as
+//     empty. The walker checks Error() after every Next, including the
+//     first.
+package statecheck
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"math/big"
+	"runtime"
+	"sync"
+	"sync/atomic"
+
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common"
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto"
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/ethdb"
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/rlp"
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/trie"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/rawdb"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/state"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/inplace/report"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/inplace/rodb"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/staking"
+	staketypes "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/staking/types"
+)
+
+var (
+	emptyRootHash = common.HexToHash("56e81f171bcc55a6ff8345e692c0f86e5b48e01b996cadc001622fb5e363b421")
+	emptyCodeHash = crypto.Keccak256Hash(nil)
+)
+
+// Config configures the walk.
+type Config struct {
+	KV          ethdb.KeyValueStore
+	StateRoot   common.Hash
+	TrieCacheMB int
+	// Workers bounds the storage/code worker pool; results are folded in
+	// account order so digests, counts and anomaly examples are
+	// scheduling-independent. Default min(8, NumCPU).
+	Workers  int
+	Progress io.Writer
+}
+
+// Result is the outcome of a successful walk.
+type Result struct {
+	Counts    report.StateCounts
+	Digest    [32]byte
+	Anomalies *AnomalySet
+}
+
+// Walk runs the completeness walk. The returned error is a *report.Failure
+// for integrity FAILs (missing node, authentication mismatch, decode
+// failure, classification violation); other errors are read errors for the
+// retry runner (transient I/O swallowed by the trie layer is rescued by the
+// rodb latch).
+func Walk(cfg Config) (*Result, error) {
+	workers := cfg.Workers
+	if workers <= 0 {
+		workers = runtime.NumCPU()
+		if workers > 8 {
+			workers = 8
+		}
+	}
+	trieCfg := &trie.Config{Cache: cfg.TrieCacheMB}
+	sdb := state.NewDatabaseWithConfig(rawdb.NewDatabase(cfg.KV), trieCfg)
+
+	accountTrie, err := sdb.OpenTrie(cfg.StateRoot)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, trieFailure("account trie root", cfg.StateRoot, err)
+	}
+
+	w := &walker{cfg: cfg, sdb: sdb, workers: workers}
+	return w.run(accountTrie)
+}
+
+// trieFailure converts trie-layer errors into named FAILs. Underlying
+// transient I/O does not surface here (the trie layer swallows read errors
+// into node absence); the rodb latch records it and the retry runner
+// prefers the latched cause over this failure.
+func trieFailure(where string, root common.Hash, err error) error {
+	var missing *trie.MissingNodeError
+	if errors.As(err, &missing) {
+		return report.Failf("state_walk", "%s (root %s): missing trie node %s at path %x", where, root.Hex(), missing.NodeHash.Hex(), missing.Path)
+	}
+	return report.Failf("state_walk", "%s (root %s): %v", where, root.Hex(), err)
+}
+
+type accountJob struct {
+	index    uint64
+	leafKey  []byte // 32-byte hashed address (copied)
+	leafBlob []byte // account RLP (copied)
+}
+
+type codeRef struct {
+	class string // "contract" | "validator"
+	hash  common.Hash
+	size  uint64
+}
+
+type accountResult struct {
+	index     uint64
+	failure   error // *report.Failure or read error
+	digest    [32]byte
+	code      *codeRef
+	counts    report.StateCounts
+	anomalies *AnomalySet
+}
+
+type walker struct {
+	cfg     Config
+	sdb     state.Database
+	workers int
+
+	cancel atomic.Bool
+}
+
+func (w *walker) run(accountTrie state.Trie) (*Result, error) {
+	jobs := make(chan accountJob, w.workers*2)
+	results := make(chan accountResult, w.workers*2)
+
+	var wg sync.WaitGroup
+	for i := 0; i < w.workers; i++ {
+		wg.Add(1)
+		go func() {
+			defer wg.Done()
+			for job := range jobs {
+				if w.cancel.Load() {
+					results <- accountResult{index: job.index, failure: errCanceled}
+					continue
+				}
+				results <- w.processAccount(job)
+			}
+		}()
+	}
+
+	collector := newCollector(w, results)
+
+	// Sequential account-trie pass: authenticate every standalone node,
+	// dispatch account leaves to the pool in trie order.
+	var (
+		accountTrieNodes uint64
+		accounts         uint64
+		trieFail         error
+		nextIndex        uint64
+	)
+	it := accountTrie.NodeIterator(nil)
+	for it.Next(true) {
+		if w.cancel.Load() {
+			break
+		}
+		if it.Hash() != (common.Hash{}) {
+			accountTrieNodes++
+			blob := it.NodeBlob()
+			if blob == nil {
+				// resolveBlob failed; surfaced via it.Error() below.
+				break
+			}
+			if got := crypto.Keccak256Hash(blob); got != it.Hash() {
+				trieFail = report.Failf("state_walk",
+					"account trie node %s at path %x fails content authentication (blob hashes to %s)",
+					it.Hash().Hex(), it.Path(), got.Hex())
+				break
+			}
+		}
+		if it.Leaf() {
+			job := accountJob{
+				index:    nextIndex,
+				leafKey:  append([]byte(nil), it.LeafKey()...),
+				leafBlob: append([]byte(nil), it.LeafBlob()...),
+			}
+			nextIndex++
+			accounts++
+			jobs <- job
+			if w.cfg.Progress != nil && accounts%200000 == 0 {
+				fmt.Fprintf(w.cfg.Progress, "state walk: %d accounts dispatched, %d account-trie nodes authenticated\n", accounts, accountTrieNodes)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if trieFail == nil {
+		if err := it.Error(); err != nil {
+			trieFail = trieFailure("account trie walk", w.cfg.StateRoot, err)
+		}
+	}
+	close(jobs)
+	wg.Wait()
+	close(results)
+	collector.wait()
+
+	// Precedence: the earliest failure in walk order wins. Account leaves
+	// dispatched before the trie-level failure position precede it.
+	if collector.failure != nil && !errors.Is(collector.failure, errCanceled) {
+		return nil, collector.failure
+	}
+	if trieFail != nil {
+		return nil, trieFail
+	}
+	if collector.failure != nil {
+		return nil, collector.failure
+	}
+
+	res := collector.result
+	res.Counts.Accounts = accounts
+	res.Counts.AccountTrieNodes = accountTrieNodes
+	res.Digest = collector.digest.sum()
+	if w.cfg.Progress != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(w.cfg.Progress, "state walk: complete - %d accounts, %d account-trie nodes, %d storage tries, %d storage nodes, %d storage leaves, %d+%d unique code blobs\n",
+			res.Counts.Accounts, res.Counts.AccountTrieNodes, res.Counts.StorageTries,
+			res.Counts.StorageTrieNodes, res.Counts.StorageLeaves,
+			res.Counts.UniqueCodeContract, res.Counts.UniqueCodeValidator)
+	}
+	return &res, nil
+}
+
+var errCanceled = errors.New("statecheck: canceled after earlier failure")
+
+// collector folds worker results in account order, keeping the digest,
+// counts and anomaly examples deterministic regardless of scheduling.
+type collector struct {
+	w       *walker
+	digest  *stateDigest
+	result  Result
+	failure error
+	done    chan struct{}
+
+	uniqueCode map[codeRef]struct{}    // (class,hash) pairs seen
+	classesFor map[common.Hash][2]bool // hash -> [contract, validator]
+}
+
+func newCollector(w *walker, results <-chan accountResult) *collector {
+	c := &collector{
+		w:          w,
+		digest:     newStateDigest(w.cfg.StateRoot),
+		done:       make(chan struct{}),
+		uniqueCode: make(map[codeRef]struct{}),
+		classesFor: make(map[common.Hash][2]bool),
+	}
+	c.result.Anomalies = NewAnomalySet()
+	go c.loop(results)
+	return c
+}
+
+func (c *collector) wait() { <-c.done }
+
+func (c *collector) loop(results <-chan accountResult) {
+	defer close(c.done)
+	pending := make(map[uint64]accountResult)
+	next := uint64(0)
+	for r := range results {
+		pending[r.index] = r
+		for {
+			rr, ok := pending[next]
+			if !ok {
+				break
+			}
+			delete(pending, next)
+			next++
+			c.fold(rr)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func (c *collector) fold(r accountResult) {
+	if c.failure != nil {
+		return // draining after the first ordered failure
+	}
+	if r.failure != nil {
+		c.failure = r.failure
+		c.w.cancel.Store(true)
+		return
+	}
+	c.digest.addAccount(r.digest)
+	c.result.Counts.StorageTries += r.counts.StorageTries
+	c.result.Counts.StorageTrieNodes += r.counts.StorageTrieNodes
+	c.result.Counts.StorageLeaves += r.counts.StorageLeaves
+	c.result.Anomalies.AddAll(r.anomalies)
+	if r.code != nil {
+		key := *r.code
+		if r.code.class == "validator" {
+			c.result.Counts.CodeRefsValidator++
+		} else {
+			c.result.Counts.CodeRefsContract++
+		}
+		if _, seen := c.uniqueCode[key]; !seen {
+			c.uniqueCode[key] = struct{}{}
+			c.result.Counts.UniqueCodeBytes += r.code.size
+			if r.code.class == "validator" {
+				c.result.Counts.UniqueCodeValidator++
+			} else {
+				c.result.Counts.UniqueCodeContract++
+			}
+			classes := c.classesFor[r.code.hash]
+			if r.code.class == "validator" {
+				classes[1] = true
+			} else {
+				classes[0] = true
+			}
+			c.classesFor[r.code.hash] = classes
+			if classes[0] && classes[1] {
+				c.result.Anomalies.Add(AnomalyCodeDualClass,
+					fmt.Sprintf("code hash %s referenced as both contract and validator code", r.code.hash.Hex()))
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// processAccount runs the per-account checks: flag classification, full
+// storage-trie walk, code resolution and validation, digest contribution.
+func (w *walker) processAccount(job accountJob) accountResult {
+	res := accountResult{index: job.index, anomalies: NewAnomalySet()}
+	leafKeyHex := common.BytesToHash(job.leafKey).Hex()
+
+	var acct state.Account
+	if err := rlp.DecodeBytes(job.leafBlob, &acct); err != nil {
+		res.failure = report.Failf("state_walk", "account leaf %s does not decode: %v", leafKeyHex, err)
+		return res
+	}
+	if acct.Balance == nil {
+		acct.Balance = new(big.Int)
+	}
+	hasStorage := acct.Root != emptyRootHash
+	emptyCode := bytes.Equal(acct.CodeHash, emptyCodeHash.Bytes())
+	addrHash := common.BytesToHash(job.leafKey)
+
+	// Validator flag - for every account, independent of code presence.
+	// Empty-root accounts are trivially unflagged. The leaf value is
+	// decoded, not presence-tested, matching Object.IsValidator.
+	flagged := false
+	var storageTrie state.Trie
+	if hasStorage {
+		var err error
+		storageTrie, err = w.sdb.OpenStorageTrie(w.cfg.StateRoot, addrHash, acct.Root)
+		if err != nil {
+			res.failure = trieFailure(fmt.Sprintf("storage trie open for account %s", leafKeyHex), acct.Root, err)
+			return res
+		}
+		raw, err := storageTrie.TryGet(staking.IsValidatorKey.Bytes())
+		if err != nil {
+			res.failure = trieFailure(fmt.Sprintf("IsValidator flag lookup for account %s", leafKeyHex), acct.Root, err)
+			return res
+		}
+		if len(raw) > 0 {
+			_, content, _, err := rlp.Split(raw)
+			if err != nil {
+				res.failure = report.Failf("state_walk", "account %s IsValidator flag leaf is not an RLP byte string: %v", leafKeyHex, err)
+				return res
+			}
+			value := common.BytesToHash(content)
+			switch {
+			case value == (common.Hash{}):
+				// Stock SetState deletes zero-valued slots; a leaf whose RLP
+				// decodes to zero is unflagged (decode-and-test) + anomaly.
+				res.anomalies.Add(AnomalyFlagDecodedZero,
+					fmt.Sprintf("account %s has an IsValidator flag leaf decoding to zero", leafKeyHex))
+			case value == staking.IsValidator:
+				flagged = true
+			default:
+				flagged = true
+				res.anomalies.Add(AnomalyFlagNonCanonical,
+					fmt.Sprintf("account %s IsValidator flag value %s differs from canonical", leafKeyHex, value.Hex()))
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Full storage walk with node content authentication.
+	hStorage := newStorageDigest(!hasStorage)
+	if hasStorage {
+		res.counts.StorageTries++
+		if failure := w.walkStorage(storageTrie, acct.Root, leafKeyHex, hStorage, &res); failure != nil {
+			res.failure = failure
+			return res
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Code across the three namespaces.
+	var hCode [32]byte
+	if emptyCode {
+		if flagged {
+			res.failure = report.Failf("state_walk", "flagged validator account %s has empty code hash", leafKeyHex)
+			return res
+		}
+		hCode = codeDigest(nil, true)
+	} else {
+		codeHash := common.BytesToHash(acct.CodeHash)
+		code, class, failure := w.resolveCode(codeHash, flagged, job.leafKey, leafKeyHex, &res)
+		if failure != nil {
+			res.failure = failure
+			return res
+		}
+		hCode = codeDigest(code, false)
+		res.code = &codeRef{class: class, hash: codeHash, size: uint64(len(code))}
+	}
+
+	res.digest = accountDigest(job.leafKey, acct.Nonce, acct.Balance.Bytes(), acct.Root, acct.CodeHash, hStorage.sum(), hCode)
+	return res
+}
+
+// walkStorage iterates the full storage trie, authenticating every
+// standalone node and folding leaves into H_storage in trie order. The
+// error status of every Next step is checked, including the very first
+// (the stock iterator's defect-2 silently treats a storage trie whose
+// initial step fails as empty).
+func (w *walker) walkStorage(st state.Trie, root common.Hash, leafKeyHex string, h *storageDigest, res *accountResult) error {
+	sit := st.NodeIterator(nil)
+	for sit.Next(true) {
+		if sit.Hash() != (common.Hash{}) {
+			res.counts.StorageTrieNodes++
+			blob := sit.NodeBlob()
+			if blob == nil {
+				break // surfaced via sit.Error()
+			}
+			if got := crypto.Keccak256Hash(blob); got != sit.Hash() {
+				return report.Failf("state_walk",
+					"storage trie node %s (account %s, path %x) fails content authentication (blob hashes to %s)",
+					sit.Hash().Hex(), leafKeyHex, sit.Path(), got.Hex())
+			}
+		}
+		if sit.Leaf() {
+			blob := sit.LeafBlob()
+			if len(blob) == 0 {
+				return report.Failf("state_walk", "storage leaf %x of account %s has an empty value", sit.LeafKey(), leafKeyHex)
+			}
+			// Byte and String kinds are both byte strings in RLP (values
+			// 0x00-0x7f encode as a single byte); lists are not.
+			kind, content, rest, err := rlp.Split(blob)
+			if err != nil || (kind != rlp.String && kind != rlp.Byte) || len(rest) != 0 {
+				return report.Failf("state_walk", "storage leaf %x of account %s is not an RLP byte string", sit.LeafKey(), leafKeyHex)
+			}
+			h.addLeaf(append([]byte(nil), sit.LeafKey()...), content)
+			res.counts.StorageLeaves++
+		}
+	}
+	if err := sit.Error(); err != nil {
+		return trieFailure(fmt.Sprintf("storage trie walk for account %s", leafKeyHex), root, err)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// resolveCode probes the raw code keys in order c -> vc -> legacy bare hash
+// (physical location does not determine class), requires exactly one
+// resolved location (identical bytes at multiple locations is an anomaly
+// resolved by precedence; differing bytes FAIL), keccak-authenticates the
+// bytes, and classifies from the account's flag: flagged accounts must
+// carry a valid address-bound validator wrapper.
+func (w *walker) resolveCode(codeHash common.Hash, flagged bool, leafKey []byte, leafKeyHex string, res *accountResult) ([]byte, string, error) {
+	type loc struct {
+		name string
+		key  []byte
+	}
+	locs := []loc{
+		{"c", append([]byte("c"), codeHash.Bytes()...)},
+		{"vc", append([]byte("vc"), codeHash.Bytes()...)},
+		{"legacy", codeHash.Bytes()},
+	}
+	var (
+		found []string
+		code  []byte
+	)
+	for _, l := range locs {
+		val, ok, err := strictGet(w.cfg.KV, l.key)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, "", err
+		}
+		if !ok {
+			continue
+		}
+		if code == nil {
+			code = val
+		} else if !bytes.Equal(code, val) {
+			return nil, "", report.Failf("state_walk",
+				"code hash %s resolves to DIFFERENT bytes at locations %v and %s (account %s)",
+				codeHash.Hex(), found, l.name, leafKeyHex)
+		}
+		found = append(found, l.name)
+	}
+	if len(found) == 0 {
+		return nil, "", report.Failf("state_walk",
+			"code %s for account %s missing from all namespaces (c, vc, legacy)", codeHash.Hex(), leafKeyHex)
+	}
+	if len(found) > 1 {
+		res.anomalies.Add(AnomalyCodeMultiLocation,
+			fmt.Sprintf("code %s present at %v (identical bytes); precedence %s", codeHash.Hex(), found, found[0]))
+	}
+	if got := crypto.Keccak256Hash(code); got != codeHash {
+		return nil, "", report.Failf("state_walk",
+			"code at %v for account %s hashes to %s, want %s", found, leafKeyHex, got.Hex(), codeHash.Hex())
+	}
+
+	var wrapper staketypes.ValidatorWrapper
+	wrapperErr := rlp.DecodeBytes(code, &wrapper)
+	if flagged {
+		if wrapperErr != nil {
+			return nil, "", report.Failf("state_walk",
+				"flagged validator account %s: code %s does not decode as a validator wrapper: %v",
+				leafKeyHex, codeHash.Hex(), wrapperErr)
+		}
+		if crypto.Keccak256Hash(wrapper.Address.Bytes()) != common.BytesToHash(leafKey) {
+			return nil, "", report.Failf("state_walk",
+				"flagged validator account %s: wrapper address %s does not bind to the account leaf key",
+				leafKeyHex, wrapper.Address.Hex())
+		}
+		return code, "validator", nil
+	}
+	if wrapperErr == nil {
+		res.anomalies.Add(AnomalyWrapperShapedContract,
+			fmt.Sprintf("unflagged account %s carries wrapper-shaped code %s (stays contract)", leafKeyHex, codeHash.Hex()))
+	}
+	return code, "contract", nil
+}
+
+func strictGet(kv ethdb.KeyValueReader, key []byte) ([]byte, bool, error) {
+	val, err := kv.Get(key)
+	if err != nil {
+		if rodb.IsNotFound(err) {
+			return nil, false, nil
+		}
+		return nil, false, err
+	}
+	return val, true, nil
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/inplace/statecheck/walker_test.go b/internal/recovery/inplace/statecheck/walker_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0e471ee163
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/inplace/statecheck/walker_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,341 @@
+package statecheck_test
+
+import (
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"fmt"
+	"math/big"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common"
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto"
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/rlp"
+	"github.com/syndtr/goleveldb/leveldb"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/rawdb"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/state"
+	bls "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/crypto/bls"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/inplace/report"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/inplace/rodb"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/inplace/statecheck"
+	staketest "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/staking/types/test"
+)
+
+// buildToyState writes the 3-account toy state (EOA, contract with storage,
+// vc-namespace validator) and returns its root. tweak lets variants change
+// one value before commit.
+func buildToyState(t *testing.T, dir string, tweak func(st *state.DB)) common.Hash {
+	t.Helper()
+	db, err := rawdb.NewLevelDBDatabase(dir, 16, 64, "", false)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+	sdb := state.NewDatabase(db)
+	st, err := state.New(common.Hash{}, sdb, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	eoa := common.HexToAddress("0x1000000000000000000000000000000000000001")
+	st.SetBalance(eoa, big.NewInt(12345))
+	st.SetNonce(eoa, 7)
+
+	contract := common.HexToAddress("0x2000000000000000000000000000000000000002")
+	st.SetCode(contract, []byte("toy contract code"), false)
+	for j := 0; j < 40; j++ {
+		st.SetState(contract,
+			crypto.Keccak256Hash([]byte(fmt.Sprintf("k%d", j))),
+			crypto.Keccak256Hash([]byte(fmt.Sprintf("v%d", j))))
+	}
+
+	validator := common.HexToAddress("0x3000000000000000000000000000000000000003")
+	w := staketest.GetDefaultValidatorWrapperWithAddr(validator, []bls.SerializedPublicKey{{0x0a}})
+	if err := st.UpdateValidatorWrapper(validator, &w); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	st.SetValidatorFlag(validator)
+
+	if tweak != nil {
+		tweak(st)
+	}
+	root, err := st.Commit(false)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := sdb.TrieDB().Commit(root, false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return root
+}
+
+func walkDir(t *testing.T, dir string, root common.Hash, workers int) (*statecheck.Result, error) {
+	t.Helper()
+	db, err := rodb.Open(dir, rodb.Options{})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+	latch := &rodb.Latch{}
+	res, err := statecheck.Walk(statecheck.Config{
+		KV:        db.KV(latch),
+		StateRoot: root,
+		Workers:   workers,
+	})
+	if latch.First() != nil && err == nil {
+		t.Fatalf("latch dirty on success: %v", latch.First())
+	}
+	return res, err
+}
+
+func decodeRLP(blob []byte, out interface{}) error { return rlp.DecodeBytes(blob, out) }
+
+const goldenPath = "../../../../testdata/recovery/preflight/golden/toy_state_digest.txt"
+
+// TestDigestGoldenVector: the 3-account toy state digest is pinned to a
+// committed golden vector (regenerate with UPDATE_GOLDEN=1).
+func TestDigestGoldenVector(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "toy")
+	root := buildToyState(t, dir, nil)
+	res, err := walkDir(t, dir, root, 2)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	got := hex.EncodeToString(res.Digest[:])
+	if os.Getenv("UPDATE_GOLDEN") == "1" {
+		if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(goldenPath), 0o755); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if err := os.WriteFile(goldenPath, []byte(got+"\n"), 0o644); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		t.Logf("golden updated: %s", got)
+		return
+	}
+	want, err := os.ReadFile(goldenPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("golden vector missing (run with UPDATE_GOLDEN=1 to create): %v", err)
+	}
+	if got != strings.TrimSpace(string(want)) {
+		t.Fatalf("digest %s != golden %s", got, strings.TrimSpace(string(want)))
+	}
+	if res.Counts.Accounts != 3 || res.Counts.StorageTries != 2 || res.Counts.UniqueCodeContract != 1 || res.Counts.UniqueCodeValidator != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("toy counts %+v", res.Counts)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestDigestWorkerInvariance: byte-identical digests across worker counts.
+func TestDigestWorkerInvariance(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "toy")
+	root := buildToyState(t, dir, nil)
+	r1, err := walkDir(t, dir, root, 1)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	r8, err := walkDir(t, dir, root, 8)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if r1.Digest != r8.Digest || r1.Counts != r8.Counts {
+		t.Fatalf("worker variance: %x/%x", r1.Digest, r8.Digest)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestDigestSensitivity: one flipped storage value changes the digest.
+func TestDigestSensitivity(t *testing.T) {
+	dirA := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "a")
+	rootA := buildToyState(t, dirA, nil)
+	dirB := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "b")
+	rootB := buildToyState(t, dirB, func(st *state.DB) {
+		st.SetState(common.HexToAddress("0x2000000000000000000000000000000000000002"),
+			crypto.Keccak256Hash([]byte("k0")), common.HexToHash("0xff"))
+	})
+	if rootA == rootB {
+		t.Fatal("tweak did not change the root")
+	}
+	ra, err := walkDir(t, dirA, rootA, 2)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	rb, err := walkDir(t, dirB, rootB, 2)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if ra.Digest == rb.Digest {
+		t.Fatal("digest insensitive to a changed storage value")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestDigestRematerialization: copying every key into a fresh LevelDB in
+// reverse order (different physical layout) leaves the digest unchanged.
+func TestDigestRematerialization(t *testing.T) {
+	dirA := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "a")
+	rootA := buildToyState(t, dirA, nil)
+	ra, err := walkDir(t, dirA, rootA, 2)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	// Re-materialize: read all pairs, write them in descending key order.
+	src, err := leveldb.OpenFile(dirA, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	type kv struct{ k, v []byte }
+	var pairs []kv
+	it := src.NewIterator(nil, nil)
+	for it.Next() {
+		pairs = append(pairs, kv{
+			k: append([]byte(nil), it.Key()...),
+			v: append([]byte(nil), it.Value()...),
+		})
+	}
+	it.Release()
+	src.Close()
+
+	dirB := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "b")
+	dst, err := leveldb.OpenFile(dirB, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	for i := len(pairs) - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
+		if err := dst.Put(pairs[i].k, pairs[i].v, nil); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	dst.Close()
+
+	rb, err := walkDir(t, dirB, rootA, 4)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if ra.Digest != rb.Digest || ra.Counts != rb.Counts {
+		t.Fatalf("digest not layout-invariant: %x vs %x", ra.Digest, rb.Digest)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestStockIteratorDefectDifferential documents that the stock
+// core/state/iterator.go hard-fails on a vc-namespace validator account
+// (defect 1: the ValidatorCode fallback is unreachable because
+// ContractCode errors on a miss), while this walker passes the same state.
+func TestStockIteratorDefectDifferential(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "toy")
+	root := buildToyState(t, dir, nil)
+
+	// Our walker passes.
+	if _, err := walkDir(t, dir, root, 2); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("walker failed: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// The stock iterator fails on the validator account's vc-only code.
+	db, err := rawdb.NewLevelDBDatabase(dir, 16, 64, "", true)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+	stDB, err := state.New(root, state.NewDatabase(db), nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	it := state.NewNodeIterator(stDB)
+	for it.Next() {
+	}
+	if it.Error == nil {
+		t.Fatal("stock iterator unexpectedly succeeded on a vc-only validator account (defect 1 fixed upstream? re-evaluate the bypass)")
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(it.Error.Error(), "code") {
+		t.Fatalf("stock iterator error %q does not look like the missing-code defect", it.Error)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestWalkerStorageDeletions: unit-level defect-2 geometry - the storage
+// root resolves but a child node is missing; the walk must FAIL, never
+// silently treat the trie as empty. Companion: deleting the root itself
+// fails on the open path.
+func TestWalkerStorageDeletions(t *testing.T) {
+	contractKey := crypto.Keccak256(common.HexToAddress("0x2000000000000000000000000000000000000002").Bytes())
+
+	enumerate := func(t *testing.T, dir string, root common.Hash) (storageRoot common.Hash, internal []common.Hash) {
+		db, err := rodb.Open(dir, rodb.Options{})
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		defer db.Close()
+		sdb := state.NewDatabase(rawdb.NewDatabase(db.KV(&rodb.Latch{})))
+		tr, err := sdb.OpenTrie(root)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		it := tr.NodeIterator(nil)
+		var acct state.Account
+		for it.Next(true) {
+			if it.Leaf() && string(it.LeafKey()) == string(contractKey) {
+				if err := decodeRLP(it.LeafBlob(), &acct); err != nil {
+					t.Fatal(err)
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		if err := it.Error(); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if acct.Root == (common.Hash{}) {
+			t.Fatal("contract account not found")
+		}
+		stTrie, err := sdb.OpenStorageTrie(root, common.BytesToHash(contractKey), acct.Root)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		sit := stTrie.NodeIterator(nil)
+		for sit.Next(true) {
+			if sit.Hash() != (common.Hash{}) && sit.Hash() != acct.Root {
+				internal = append(internal, sit.Hash())
+			}
+		}
+		if err := sit.Error(); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		return acct.Root, internal
+	}
+
+	t.Run("child-node-deleted", func(t *testing.T) {
+		dir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "toy")
+		root := buildToyState(t, dir, nil)
+		_, internal := enumerate(t, dir, root)
+		if len(internal) == 0 {
+			t.Fatal("storage trie too small for a child deletion")
+		}
+		del, err := leveldb.OpenFile(dir, nil)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if err := del.Delete(internal[0].Bytes(), nil); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		del.Close()
+		_, err = walkDir(t, dir, root, 2)
+		f, ok := err.(*report.Failure)
+		if !ok || !strings.Contains(f.Reason, "missing trie node") {
+			t.Fatalf("want missing-node failure, got %v", err)
+		}
+	})
+	t.Run("root-node-deleted", func(t *testing.T) {
+		dir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "toy")
+		root := buildToyState(t, dir, nil)
+		storageRoot, _ := enumerate(t, dir, root)
+		del, err := leveldb.OpenFile(dir, nil)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if err := del.Delete(storageRoot.Bytes(), nil); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		del.Close()
+		_, err = walkDir(t, dir, root, 2)
+		f, ok := err.(*report.Failure)
+		if !ok || !strings.Contains(f.Reason, "missing trie node") {
+			t.Fatalf("want missing-node failure on the open path, got %v", err)
+		}
+	})
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/integrity/integrity.go b/internal/recovery/integrity/integrity.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bf6f14e383
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/integrity/integrity.go
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+// Package integrity implements the plain SHA-256 integrity layer (plan
+// §4.7, no signatures): sha256sum-compatible checksum files and their
+// verification. Two tiers use it: (a) internal run checksums written by
+// export-reference over its own outputs, and (b) the release SHA256SUMS
+// regenerated by the final sealing step over exactly the four release
+// files.
+package integrity
+
+import (
+	"bufio"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"sort"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+// FileSHA256Hex streams path through SHA-256.
+func FileSHA256Hex(path string) (string, error) {
+	f, err := os.Open(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	defer f.Close()
+	h := sha256.New()
+	if _, err := io.Copy(h, f); err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	return fmt.Sprintf("%x", h.Sum(nil)), nil
+}
+
+// Entry is one checksum line.
+type Entry struct {
+	SHA256Hex string
+	Name      string // base name, relative to the checksum file's directory
+}
+
+// Format renders entries in the exact `sha256sum` output format
+// ("<hex>  <name>\n", two spaces), sorted by name for determinism.
+func Format(entries []Entry) []byte {
+	sorted := append([]Entry(nil), entries...)
+	sort.Slice(sorted, func(i, j int) bool { return sorted[i].Name < sorted[j].Name })
+	var b strings.Builder
+	for _, e := range sorted {
+		fmt.Fprintf(&b, "%s  %s\n", e.SHA256Hex, e.Name)
+	}
+	return []byte(b.String())
+}
+
+// WriteSums regenerates (never appends) the checksum file at sumsPath over
+// exactly the named files (paths relative to the sums file's directory).
+func WriteSums(sumsPath string, names []string) error {
+	dir := filepath.Dir(sumsPath)
+	entries := make([]Entry, 0, len(names))
+	for _, name := range names {
+		hex, err := FileSHA256Hex(filepath.Join(dir, name))
+		if err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("integrity: hash %s: %w", name, err)
+		}
+		entries = append(entries, Entry{SHA256Hex: hex, Name: name})
+	}
+	return os.WriteFile(sumsPath, Format(entries), 0o644)
+}
+
+// Parse reads a sha256sum-format file.
+func Parse(sumsPath string) ([]Entry, error) {
+	f, err := os.Open(sumsPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	defer f.Close()
+	var entries []Entry
+	sc := bufio.NewScanner(f)
+	for sc.Scan() {
+		line := sc.Text()
+		if strings.TrimSpace(line) == "" {
+			continue
+		}
+		// "<hex><space><space or *><name>"
+		if len(line) < 66 {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("integrity: malformed line %q", line)
+		}
+		hex, rest := line[:64], line[64:]
+		if !strings.HasPrefix(rest, "  ") && !strings.HasPrefix(rest, " *") {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("integrity: malformed separator in %q", line)
+		}
+		entries = append(entries, Entry{SHA256Hex: strings.ToLower(hex), Name: rest[2:]})
+	}
+	if err := sc.Err(); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return entries, nil
+}
+
+// Verify checks every entry in the sums file against the files next to it
+// (the `sha256sum -c` behavior).
+func Verify(sumsPath string) error {
+	entries, err := Parse(sumsPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	dir := filepath.Dir(sumsPath)
+	for _, e := range entries {
+		got, err := FileSHA256Hex(filepath.Join(dir, e.Name))
+		if err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("integrity: %s: %w", e.Name, err)
+		}
+		if got != e.SHA256Hex {
+			return fmt.Errorf("integrity: %s: checksum mismatch (have %s, sums file says %s)", e.Name, got, e.SHA256Hex)
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// Seal implements the release sealing step (plan §4.7 tier (b)): the
+// staging directory must contain exactly wantFiles (plus the sums file
+// itself, regenerated here); any stray file fails the seal. Returns the
+// verification result of the freshly written sums file.
+func Seal(stagingDir string, wantFiles []string, sumsName string) error {
+	entries, err := os.ReadDir(stagingDir)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	want := make(map[string]bool, len(wantFiles))
+	for _, f := range wantFiles {
+		want[f] = true
+	}
+	for _, ent := range entries {
+		name := ent.Name()
+		if name == sumsName {
+			continue // regenerated below
+		}
+		if ent.IsDir() {
+			return fmt.Errorf("integrity: stray directory %q in staging dir fails the seal", name)
+		}
+		if !want[name] {
+			return fmt.Errorf("integrity: stray file %q in staging dir fails the seal", name)
+		}
+		delete(want, name)
+	}
+	if len(want) > 0 {
+		missing := make([]string, 0, len(want))
+		for f := range want {
+			missing = append(missing, f)
+		}
+		sort.Strings(missing)
+		return fmt.Errorf("integrity: staging dir missing release files: %s", strings.Join(missing, ", "))
+	}
+	sumsPath := filepath.Join(stagingDir, sumsName)
+	if err := WriteSums(sumsPath, wantFiles); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return Verify(sumsPath)
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/integrity/integrity_test.go b/internal/recovery/integrity/integrity_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b150b72c90
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/integrity/integrity_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+package integrity
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func write(t *testing.T, dir, name, content string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, name), []byte(content), 0o644); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestWriteVerifyRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	write(t, dir, "a.txt", "alpha")
+	write(t, dir, "b.txt", "beta")
+	sums := filepath.Join(dir, "SHA256SUMS")
+	if err := WriteSums(sums, []string{"a.txt", "b.txt"}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := Verify(sums); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("verify clean: %v", err)
+	}
+	// Tamper -> verify fails.
+	write(t, dir, "a.txt", "ALPHA")
+	if err := Verify(sums); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("verify should fail after tamper")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestFormatIsSha256sumCompatible(t *testing.T) {
+	out := Format([]Entry{{SHA256Hex: "ab", Name: "z.txt"}, {SHA256Hex: "cd", Name: "a.txt"}})
+	// Sorted by name; two-space separator; trailing newline per line.
+	want := "cd  a.txt\nab  z.txt\n"
+	if string(out) != want {
+		t.Fatalf("format = %q, want %q", out, want)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSealExactFilesOnly(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	for _, n := range []string{"one.json", "two.hmr", "three.json", "four.json"} {
+		write(t, dir, n, n)
+	}
+	want := []string{"one.json", "two.hmr", "three.json", "four.json"}
+	if err := Seal(dir, want, "SHA256SUMS"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("seal clean: %v", err)
+	}
+	// Verify the sealed sums.
+	if err := Verify(filepath.Join(dir, "SHA256SUMS")); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("verify sealed: %v", err)
+	}
+	entries, _ := Parse(filepath.Join(dir, "SHA256SUMS"))
+	if len(entries) != 4 {
+		t.Fatalf("sealed %d entries, want exactly 4", len(entries))
+	}
+
+	// A planted stray fails the seal.
+	write(t, dir, "stray.txt", "stray")
+	if err := Seal(dir, want, "SHA256SUMS"); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "stray") {
+		t.Fatalf("stray must fail the seal, got %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSealRegeneratesNoStaleEntry(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	write(t, dir, "audit.json", "v1")
+	write(t, dir, "ref.json", "ref")
+	files := []string{"audit.json", "ref.json"}
+	if err := Seal(dir, files, "SHA256SUMS"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	first, _ := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(dir, "SHA256SUMS"))
+	// The audit file changes; re-sealing must regenerate (no stale entry).
+	write(t, dir, "audit.json", "v2-different-content")
+	if err := Seal(dir, files, "SHA256SUMS"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	second, _ := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(dir, "SHA256SUMS"))
+	if string(first) == string(second) {
+		t.Fatal("re-seal did not regenerate the checksum after content change")
+	}
+	if err := Verify(filepath.Join(dir, "SHA256SUMS")); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("verify after re-seal: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSealMissingFileFails(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	write(t, dir, "present.json", "x")
+	err := Seal(dir, []string{"present.json", "absent.json"}, "SHA256SUMS")
+	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "missing") {
+		t.Fatalf("missing file must fail the seal, got %v", err)
+	}
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/metadata/TESTMAP.md b/internal/recovery/metadata/TESTMAP.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c3446a2aa7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/metadata/TESTMAP.md
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+# Metadata workstream — test map
+
+Traces each in-scope B5 acceptance bullet (as amended by the §8 operator
+decision log) to a named test. Deferred bullets are marked `B4`. Run the
+whole suite with the BLS build environment sourced
+(`scripts/setup_bls_build_flags.sh`) under `-race`.
+
+## B5 mapping (in-scope subset)
+
+| B5 bullet | Amendment | Test |
+|-----------|-----------|------|
+| (1) dirty-descendant normalizes to the clean golden | — | `acceptance.TestMechanicalCleanEquality`, `acceptance.TestJunkInsensitivity` |
+| (2) target root & wrapper bytes untouched (zero-write, wrapper-set digest) | — | `acceptance.TestScanCleanPasses` (zero-write proof), `norm.TestCleanFixturePasses` (wrapper-set digest via DigestSet) |
+| (3) ordered list + every dvl record match the golden | — | `norm.TestCleanFixturePasses`, `norm.TestDVLFilterBoundary` |
+| (4) no future snapshot/epoch record remains (harness-only mechanical apply, stats bit-identical) | — | `acceptance.TestMechanicalCleanEquality` (`assertNoFutureRecords` + stats bit-identity) |
+| (5) next-epoch election equality over the masked view | reproduced-ss byte-equality (§4.6 out 3) | `acceptance.TestAuditTwoPassCloses` (`EpochTransition.ShardStateEqual`), `acceptance.TestElectionEqualityCleanVsMasked` (`committee.Compute` clean vs masked, encoded shard-state byte-equal) |
+| (6) replacement-branch no stale-index reactivation | — | `acceptance.TestReplacementBranchNoReactivation` (real successor branch over the masked overlay; recreated dvl indexes carry only new `BlockNum`s), `norm.TestDVLFilterBoundary` |
+| (9, scan half) corrupt records/state fail with the §4.5 codes | — | `acceptance.TestScanCorruptShardStateInvalid` (21), `acceptance.TestScanFallbackMissingSS`/`TestScanFallbackMissingBlkRwd` (20); `norm.TestInvalidListDecodeFatal`, `norm.TestDVLPointerMismatchFatal`, `norm.TestNoncanonicalSnapshotKeyFatal` |
+| (7) apply crash/journal resume, second-apply zero mutations | **B4** | — |
+| (8) refusal before head cut | **B4** | — |
+| (9, head-cut half) | **B4** | — |
+| two-donor convergence | superseded by junk-insensitivity + double-run determinism (§8 Q1) | `acceptance.TestJunkInsensitivity`, `acceptance.TestExportByteReproducible`, `acceptance.TestDeterminismSelfCheckCatchesFault` |
+
+## Cross-cutting
+
+| Concern | Test |
+|---------|------|
+| Exit-code precedence (mixed MISSING+INVALID → 21) | `report.TestResolveExitPrecedence`, `report.TestExitForFindings`, `norm.TestMixedExitPrecedence` |
+| Canonical JSON stability / no HTML-escape | `report.TestCanonicalJSONStableAndSorted`, `report.TestCanonicalJSONNumbersVerbatim` |
+| Strict RO opener regressions (missing LOCK, concurrent writer, corrupt manifest no-recovery, refusing methods) | `dbopen.TestMissingLockCreatesNothing`, `TestConcurrentWriterRefused`, `TestCorruptManifestNoRecovery`, `TestStrictStorageMethodsRefuse`, `TestLockNeverCreates`, `TestErrorIfMissing`, `TestValidateOutputPathRejectsInsideDB`, `TestCheckLayout` |
+| strictdb namespace classifier + iterator error latching | `strictdb.TestClassifyNamespaces`, `TestClassifyNoncanonicalEpochSuffix`, `TestForEachChecksIteratorError` |
+| Anchor config round-trip + rejections + drift pin | `anchor.TestResolveLocalnetRoundTrip`, `TestResolveRejects*`, `TestMainnetDriftPin`, `cmd/harmony-recovery.TestAnchorDriftPin` |
+| HMR1 golden + decoder rejections + fuzz | `hmr.TestEncodeGoldenVector`, `TestDecoderRejections`, `FuzzDecode`, `TestEncodeDecodeRoundTrip`, `TestPackageDigestChangesOnFlip` |
+| Reference manifest: excludes planned_deletions/timestamps, digest bindings, junk-insensitive, exact section cardinalities + canonical assertion set/order with zero end-state | `hmr.TestManifestExcludesPlannedDeletionsAndTimestamps`, `TestReferenceDigestBindings`, `TestManifestRoundTrip`, `TestManifestRejectsUnknownFields`, `TestManifestValidationRejectsIncomplete` |
+| Integrity: seal exactly-four, stray fails, regenerate no-stale, verify | `integrity.TestSealExactFilesOnly`, `TestSealRegeneratesNoStaleEntry`, `TestWriteVerifyRoundTrip`, `TestFormatIsSha256sumCompatible` |
+| Release sealing over real artifacts + anchor_config_sha256 match | `acceptance.TestReleaseSealing` |
+| Pointer invariant solver (branch-advance, ambiguity+trusted, unique, replay validation) | `audit.TestSolverBranchAdvance`, `TestSolverAmbiguous`, `TestSolverUniqueSolution`, `TestSolverTrustedValidatesBranchReplay` |
+| Masked overlay (mask/seed/barrier, merged ordered iteration, source immutability) | `audit.TestOverlayMaskAndSeed`, `TestOverlayMergedIterationOrdered` |
+| Audit two-pass over real branch (roots match, reconciliation closes, staking + 0xfc precompile matrix reconciled, epoch-transition byte-equal, throughput floor) | `acceptance.TestAuditTwoPassCloses` |
+| 0xfc precompile delegations (direct / nested contract→0xfc / reverted / top-up) classified and reconciled | `acceptance.TestAuditTwoPassCloses` (per-event assertions over the fixture matrix at blocks 45–48) |
+| Injected-fault matrix: tampered seal → validity anomaly (24); tampered header root → fatal; tampered embedded LastCommitSignature → `verify-header` finding (24); planted future metadata key → plan-key anomaly (24); suppressed reproduction of an otherwise-expected branch rewrite (planted branch-height dvl append no branch block carries) → `plan-key-not-reproduced` (24) while the real branch rewrites still reproduce | `acceptance.TestAuditTamperedSealFinding`, `TestAuditRootMismatchFatal`, `TestAuditTamperedHeaderVerifyHeaderFinding`, `TestAuditPlantedKeyAnomaly`, `TestAuditSuppressedBranchRewriteAnomaly` |
+| Known-bad cross-check excuses ONLY the incoming-receipts exploit failure (gate satisfied ⇔ receipt failure at the first known-bad height; absent → anomaly; wrong failure → anomaly; a collateral seal/VRF/header failure at the SAME height → `known-bad-extra-failure`, exit 24) | `audit.TestCrossCheckKnownBad` (exhaustive unit drive of the pure gate incl. the receipt-only exit-0 path), `acceptance.TestAuditKnownBadGate` (absent), `TestAuditKnownBadExtraFailureAnomalous` (receipt failure reproduced but the collateral header-signature defect still gates), `TestAuditKnownBadWrongFailure` (seal failure does not satisfy) |
+| Native EditValidator + Undelegate and 0xfc precompile Undelegate inventoried and reconciled on an isolated fixture | `acceptance.TestAuditNativeDirectiveMatrix` |
+| Native CollectRewards + 0xfc precompile CollectRewards through the real audit loop (validator elected at epoch 3, localnet aggregated payout at block 47 funds both pre-snapshot delegations; branch collects natively and via 0xfc; both inventoried, reconciliation closes, exit 0) | `acceptance.TestAuditCollectRewards` |
+| Reward-cache process isolation: `internal/chain`'s payout caches are keyed only by (epoch, address), not chain identity, so two same-process fixtures with different payout-epoch snapshots cross-poison each other's block-47 payout (production `harmony-recovery` opens one chain per process and is unaffected; fixing the caches/`AddReward` is out-of-scope consensus code) — the divergent-snapshot test re-executes itself in a fresh subprocess | `acceptance.runIsolatedSubtest` (mechanism), applied by `TestAuditCollectRewards`; rationale in `acceptance/isolation_test.go` |
+| Shard-1 crosslink subset + pass-two pollution clearing + pointer solver through the real audit loop (genuine committee-signed shard-1 crosslinks pre/post target; pass-1 `errAlreadyExist` pollution → masked in pass 2 → `VerifyCrossLink` passes; pre-target pointer derived uniquely; exit 0) | `acceptance.TestAuditShard1CrossLinkPollution` |
+| Shard-1 spent-marker subset + pass-two pollution clearing through the real audit loop (genuine incoming cross-shard receipt applied at proposal, so the branch re-executes to its roots; pass-1 double-spent pollution → masked in pass 2 → full `ValidateCXReceiptsProof` passes; exit 0) | `acceptance.TestAuditSpentMarkerPollution` |
+| Mutated stored `IncomingReceipts` with roots verifying (proof-material mutation leaves execution untouched: block re-executes to its stored root, proof verification fails → `unexpected-validity-failure`, exit 24) | `acceptance.TestAuditMutatedIncomingReceiptDetected`, `TestAuditLegacyReceiptBitmapUnrestorable` |
+| Legacy `CXReceiptsProof.Copy` bitmap corruption (mainnet on-disk shape since 2019: stored `CommitBitmap` == `CommitSig`, produced NATIVELY by the fixture through the stock `WriteBlock` — a canary assertion pins the shape): the recovery-local repair restores the bitmap from the stored crosslink, proves it against the header incoming-receipt commitment, and verifies the full proof (exit 0, restoration inventoried); with the crosslink removed the corruption is unrestorable and fails closed (24) | `acceptance.TestAuditLegacyReceiptBitmapRestored`, `TestAuditLegacyReceiptBitmapUnrestorable` (restoration source removed) |
+| Negative `--scratch-reserve-gb` refused at invocation (no production bypass) | `acceptance.TestAuditRejectsNegativeReserve` |
+| Reference manifest cross-check bound into the audit report hash chain; anchor-mismatched AND content-forged references refused (15) | `acceptance.TestAuditReferenceCrossCheck` |
+| Determinism self-check fault → exit 23, no artifacts, diff dumps | `acceptance.TestDeterminismSelfCheckCatchesFault` |
+| Export publication is failure-atomic, one visible unit: artifacts, checksums AND the finalized success report are staged together, verified (exact names, none empty, any error fails) and published as `<out-dir>/release/` through ONE atomic directory rename — an incomplete set can never appear under the release name on any injected failure path (rename fault; verification fault; rename fault + cleanup fault stranding only non-consumer `.staging`) | `acceptance.TestExportPublishRenameFault`, `TestExportVerificationFault`, `TestExportPublishFaultWithCleanupFault`, run-once refusal in `TestExportRunOnceRefusesExisting`, success-report-in-release asserted in `TestExportByteReproducible` |
+| A success-shaped export report is never visible without `release/` and vice versa: the success report publishes atomically inside `release/`; failed/refused attempts write a FAILURE report at the out-dir root; a staged-report write failure blocks the whole publication; even publish fault + failure-report fault leaves no success document anywhere consumer-visible | `acceptance.TestExportStagedReportWriteFault`, `TestExportFailureReportDoubleFault`, failure-report content asserted in `TestExportPublishRenameFault` |
+| Source read errors AND malformed/incomplete canonical or header records surface as I/O/corruption (exit 14), never as absence: `side.Header` reads both keys through the strict adapter; a non-32-byte canonical mapping, a dangling canonical mapping (header record missing) and an undecodable header all fail closed everywhere; `(nil, nil)` is reserved for a genuinely absent canonical mapping; `CommitSigFor` never falls back to `block-sig-N` on any of these | `audit.TestSideHeaderCanonicalReadFault`, `TestSideHeaderRecordReadFault`, `TestSideHeaderUndecodable`, `TestSideHeaderGenuineAbsence`, `TestSideHeaderDanglingCanonicalMappingIsCorruption`, `TestSideHeaderMalformedCanonicalMapping`, `TestCommitSigForChildReadFaultNoFallback`, `TestCommitSigForGenuineAbsenceFallsBack`, `TestCommitSigForUsesChildHeader`, `TestPreconditionsChildReadFaultIsExitIO`, `TestPreconditionsChildAbsentIsBadInvocation` |
+| Canonical/header/block identity mismatches (record decodes to a different hash/height than its mapping — tampering or a redirected mapping) can NEVER exit 0: `side.Header` and `side.Block` both validate identity; the precondition check turns the mismatch into exit 14; inside the pass the mismatch is recorded as a MANDATORY `source-identity` validity failure (gating to exit 24 through the known-bad cross-check, which never excuses it) while validation continues over the decoded content so ancestry/cryptographic/execution checks classify any accompanying tamper (Fatal root mismatch, verify-header/seal findings). The redirected-mapping fixture proves the pure-redirect case — every other check passes, only source-identity convicts | `audit.TestSideHeaderHashMismatchIsCorruption`, `TestSideHeaderHeightMismatchIsCorruption`, `TestSideBlockIdentityMismatch`; end-to-end: `acceptance.TestAuditRedirectedCanonicalMappingCannotExitZero` (exit 24 with roots all matched), tamper classification preserved in `TestAuditTamperedSealFinding`, `TestAuditRootMismatchFatal`, `TestAuditTamperedHeaderVerifyHeaderFinding`, `TestAuditKnownBadExtraFailureAnomalous` |
+| CLI contract: help lists families, preflight preservation pin, no root-global flags, exit delivery | `cmd/harmony-recovery.TestRootHelpListsBothFamilies`, `TestMetadataHelpListsThreeSubcommands`, `TestPreflightPreservationPin`, `TestGoldenHelpFiles` |
+| Dependency guard byte-unchanged through WS1–WS5; WS6 single exemption | `cmd/harmony-recovery.TestDependencyGuard` |
+| Process isolation (no listeners / serve loop) | `cmd/harmony-recovery.TestMetadataProcessIsolation` |
+| Generator reproducibility | `acceptance.TestGeneratorDeterministic`, `fixture.TestGenerateTwinChain` |
+| Committed fixture kit pinned (fresh export byte-equals goldens, ground-truth digests, checksums verify) | `acceptance.TestCommittedKitGolden` over `testdata/recovery/metadata/kit` |
+| Complete-tree kit reproducibility (every committed file — LevelDB dirs incl. `*.log`, `fixture-keys/*.hex`, anchor, goldens — regenerates byte-identical) | `acceptance.TestKitRegeneratesByteIdentical` via `fixture.GenerateKit` (same code path as the `gen` command) |
+
+## Known local-fixture limitations (not blockers)
+
+- A **receipt-ONLY validity failure at a known-bad height** (the exit-0
+  gate-satisfied path) is not producible on a single-shard localnet fixture:
+  tampering `IncomingReceiptHash` necessarily also breaks the header commit
+  signature, and a body-level receipt tamper is applied by re-execution and
+  diverges the state root into a FATAL insert. The gate-satisfied path is
+  proven deterministically by the exhaustive pure-gate unit test
+  (`audit.TestCrossCheckKnownBad`); the fixture path pins the collateral-
+  failure behavior instead (`TestAuditKnownBadExtraFailureAnomalous`).
+- The **mainnet pilot performance gate (§5.7)** is operator-devops owned; the
+  runbook and report template live in `docs/recovery/metadata.md`.
diff --git a/internal/recovery/metadata/acceptance/acceptance_test.go b/internal/recovery/metadata/acceptance/acceptance_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..860264942a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/metadata/acceptance/acceptance_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+package acceptance
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+
+	metafixture "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/fixture"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/scan"
+)
+
+// target and staking schedule for the acceptance kit. localnet 16/16:
+// epoch1=[5,20], epoch2=[21,36], epoch3=[37,52]. Target 30 (epoch 2) puts
+// the 36/37 election and the post-target staking in the audit range.
+const (
+	fxBlocks     = 48
+	fxTarget     = 30
+	fxCreateVal  = 22
+	fxDelegate   = 26
+	fxFundPrec   = 28 // fund the 0xfc EOA + deploy proxy/reverter (pre-target)
+	fxPostCreate = 40
+	fxPostDeleg  = 42
+	fxPostTopUp  = 43 // repeats the 42 delegation: NO new dvl index
+	// The 0xfc precompile delegation matrix (WS6): direct, nested
+	// (contract→0xfc), reverted (contract→0xfc then REVERT), top-up.
+	fxPrecDirect = 45
+	fxPrecNested = 46
+	fxPrecRevert = 47
+	fxPrecTopUp  = 48
+)
+
+// buildFixture generates a fresh chain and returns its closed DB dir plus
+// the target hash/root read from it.
+func buildFixture(t *testing.T) (dir string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	dir = filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "harmony_db_0")
+	c, err := metafixture.Open(dir, metafixture.RepoKeysDir())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("open fixture: %v", err)
+	}
+	spec := metafixture.Spec{
+		Blocks:                fxBlocks,
+		CreateValidatorAt:     fxCreateVal,
+		DelegateAt:            fxDelegate,
+		FundPrecompileAt:      fxFundPrec,
+		PostCreateValidatorAt: fxPostCreate,
+		PostDelegateAt:        fxPostDeleg,
+		PostTopUpAt:           fxPostTopUp,
+		PrecompileDirectAt:    fxPrecDirect,
+		PrecompileNestedAt:    fxPrecNested,
+		PrecompileRevertAt:    fxPrecRevert,
+		PrecompileTopUpAt:     fxPrecTopUp,
+	}
+	if err := c.Generate(spec); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("generate: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := c.Finalize(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("finalize: %v", err)
+	}
+	return dir
+}
+
+// writeAnchor builds a localnet anchor config for fxTarget from the chain.
+// The clean fixture plants no exploit block, so known_bad_blocks is empty
+// (the audit's known-bad gate expects zero validity failures).
+func writeAnchor(t *testing.T, dir string, target uint64) string {
+	return writeAnchorKnownBad(t, dir, target, nil)
+}
+
+// writeAnchorKnownBad is writeAnchor with an explicit known-bad list (the
+// known-bad gate tests use it to assert the expected-failure-absent path).
+func writeAnchorKnownBad(t *testing.T, dir string, target uint64, knownBad []uint64) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	p := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "recovery-anchor.json")
+	if err := metafixture.WriteAnchorConfig(dir, target, fxBlocks, knownBad, p); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return p
+}
+
+func runScan(t *testing.T, dir, anchorPath string) (int, *scan.Report) {
+	t.Helper()
+	reportPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "scan-report.json")
+	code := scan.Run(context.Background(), scan.Options{
+		DBPath: dir, AnchorPath: anchorPath, ReportPath: reportPath,
+	}, os.Stderr)
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(reportPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("read scan report: %v", err)
+	}
+	var rep scan.Report
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &rep); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("parse scan report: %v", err)
+	}
+	return code, &rep
+}
+
+// TestScanCleanPasses is the B5 read-only + clean-target row: exit 0,
+// zero-write proof, the post-target validator removed, reconstruction
+// resolved on the archival fixture.
+func TestScanCleanPasses(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("fixture generation is not short")
+	}
+	dir := buildFixture(t)
+	anchorPath := writeAnchor(t, dir, fxTarget)
+	code, rep := runScan(t, dir, anchorPath)
+	if code != 0 || rep.Verdict != "OK" {
+		t.Fatalf("scan exit %d verdict %s, findings %+v", code, rep.Verdict, rep.Findings.Items)
+	}
+	if rep.NormalizedValidatorListLength != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("normalized list length %d, want 1", rep.NormalizedValidatorListLength)
+	}
+	if !rep.ZeroWriteProof || rep.WriteAttempts != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("zero-write proof failed: proof=%v attempts=%d", rep.ZeroWriteProof, rep.WriteAttempts)
+	}
+	if rep.Counts.ValidatorList.Removed != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected exactly one removed (post-target) validator, got %d", rep.Counts.ValidatorList.Removed)
+	}
+	if rep.Counts.RewardAccum.Removed == 0 {
+		t.Fatal("expected post-target reward-accumulator records removed")
+	}
+	_ = fmt.Sprint
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/metadata/acceptance/audit_test.go b/internal/recovery/metadata/acceptance/audit_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6b34cfa261
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/metadata/acceptance/audit_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,320 @@
+package acceptance
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/dbopen"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/audit"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/hmr"
+)
+
+func TestAuditTwoPassCloses(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("fixture generation is not short")
+	}
+	dir := buildFixture(t)
+	anchorPath := writeAnchor(t, dir, fxTarget)
+	outDir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "out")
+	scratch := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "scratch")
+	code := audit.Run(context.Background(), audit.Options{
+		DBPath: dir, AnchorPath: anchorPath, OutDir: outDir, Scratch: scratch,
+		SkipReserveCheckForTest: true, // CI filesystems are far below 200 GiB
+	}, os.Stderr)
+
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(outDir, "abandoned-branch-audit.json"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("read audit report: %v", err)
+	}
+	var rep audit.Report
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &rep); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("parse audit report: %v", err)
+	}
+	if code != 0 {
+		for _, a := range rep.Reconciliation.Anomalies {
+			t.Logf("ANOMALY kind=%s key=%s detail=%s", a.Kind, a.Key, a.Detail)
+		}
+		t.Logf("writes=%+v", rep.Reconciliation.Writes)
+		t.Fatalf("audit exit %d verdict %s; reconciliation anomalies=%d",
+			code, rep.Verdict, rep.Reconciliation.AnomalyCount)
+	}
+	// Both passes ran and executed the whole range.
+	if rep.Pass1 == nil || rep.Pass2 == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected both passes in the report")
+	}
+	if !rep.Pass2.Authoritative {
+		t.Fatal("pass 2 must be authoritative")
+	}
+	wantBlocks := int(rep.RangeEnd - rep.RangeStart + 1)
+	if rep.Pass2.RootsMatched != wantBlocks {
+		t.Fatalf("pass 2 matched %d roots, want %d (every branch root must match its header)",
+			rep.Pass2.RootsMatched, wantBlocks)
+	}
+	// The post-target created validator is inventoried and reconciled
+	// bidirectionally with its normalization removal.
+	if len(rep.Staking.CreatedValidators) == 0 {
+		t.Fatal("expected at least one post-target CreateValidator in the inventory")
+	}
+	if len(rep.Staking.RemovedValidators) == 0 {
+		t.Fatal("expected at least one removed validator to reconcile against")
+	}
+	// The epoch transition (36/37) was re-executed: the reproduced
+	// next-epoch shard state must byte-equal the source record.
+	if !rep.EpochTransition.Observed {
+		t.Fatal("expected the epoch transition to be observed in the audit range")
+	}
+	if !rep.EpochTransition.ShardStateEqual {
+		t.Fatal("reproduced next-epoch ss must byte-equal the source's to-be-deleted record")
+	}
+	// Reconciliation closed with zero anomalies.
+	if rep.Reconciliation.AnomalyCount != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("reconciliation anomalies: %+v", rep.Reconciliation.Anomalies)
+	}
+	// No validity failures on the clean branch, and the (empty) known-bad
+	// gate stayed quiet.
+	if rep.FirstValidityFailure != 0 || rep.Pass2.ValidityFailures != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("clean branch must have zero validity failures (first=%d count=%d)",
+			rep.FirstValidityFailure, rep.Pass2.ValidityFailures)
+	}
+	// Delegation effects match exactly once (tuple binding): the block-42
+	// delegate created the dvl index (metadata-producing); the block-43
+	// top-up to the SAME pair produced no index and must NOT be marked
+	// producing.
+	var producing, topUps int
+	for _, d := range rep.Staking.Delegations {
+		if d.Block == fxPostDeleg && d.MetadataProducing {
+			producing++
+		}
+		if d.Block == fxPostTopUp {
+			topUps++
+			if d.MetadataProducing {
+				t.Fatalf("top-up delegation at %d falsely marked metadata-producing: %+v", fxPostTopUp, d)
+			}
+			if !d.Attempted {
+				t.Fatalf("top-up delegation at %d must be inventoried as attempted", fxPostTopUp)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if producing != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected exactly one metadata-producing delegation at block %d, got %d", fxPostDeleg, producing)
+	}
+	if topUps != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected the top-up delegation at block %d in the inventory, got %d", fxPostTopUp, topUps)
+	}
+	// The 0xfc precompile matrix (WS6): four traced Delegate frames, one
+	// per classification.
+	if got := rep.Staking.PrecompileByKind["Delegate"]; got != 4 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected 4 traced 0xfc Delegate frames, got %d (by kind: %+v)", got, rep.Staking.PrecompileByKind)
+	}
+	prec := map[uint64]*audit.DelegateClass{}
+	for i := range rep.Staking.Delegations {
+		d := &rep.Staking.Delegations[i]
+		if d.Source == "precompile" {
+			if prec[d.Block] != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("duplicate precompile delegation inventory at block %d", d.Block)
+			}
+			prec[d.Block] = d
+		}
+	}
+	check := func(block uint64, wantVisible, wantReverted, wantProducing bool, label string) {
+		t.Helper()
+		d := prec[block]
+		if d == nil {
+			t.Fatalf("%s 0xfc delegation at block %d missing from the inventory", label, block)
+		}
+		if d.FrameFailed {
+			t.Fatalf("%s 0xfc frame at %d failed: %+v", label, block, d)
+		}
+		if d.StakeMsgsVisible != wantVisible || d.EnclosingReverted != wantReverted || d.MetadataProducing != wantProducing {
+			t.Fatalf("%s 0xfc delegation at %d misclassified: %+v (want visible=%v reverted=%v producing=%v)",
+				label, block, d, wantVisible, wantReverted, wantProducing)
+		}
+	}
+	check(fxPrecDirect, true, false, true, "direct")
+	check(fxPrecNested, true, false, true, "nested")
+	check(fxPrecRevert, true, true, false, "reverted")
+	check(fxPrecTopUp, true, false, false, "top-up")
+	// Throughput smoke (WS6 regression guard): the two-pass audit must
+	// sustain ≥ 20 executed blocks/s on the localnet fixture.
+	executed := rep.Pass1.ExecutedBlocks + rep.Pass2.ExecutedBlocks
+	if rep.DurationS > 0 && float64(executed)/rep.DurationS < 20 {
+		t.Fatalf("audit throughput %.1f blocks/s < 20 (executed %d in %.2fs)",
+			float64(executed)/rep.DurationS, executed, rep.DurationS)
+	}
+	// The per-block outcome evidence is digest-bound for both passes.
+	if rep.Pass1.OutcomesSHA256 == "" || rep.Pass2.OutcomesSHA256 == "" ||
+		rep.Pass2.OutcomeCount != wantBlocks {
+		t.Fatalf("per-block outcome evidence missing: p1=%q p2=%q count=%d",
+			rep.Pass1.OutcomesSHA256, rep.Pass2.OutcomesSHA256, rep.Pass2.OutcomeCount)
+	}
+	// Source immutability across the full audit: real fingerprint proof
+	// (before/after captured by the audit itself, device/inode included),
+	// cross-checked against an independent post-run fingerprint.
+	if rep.FingerprintBefore == nil || rep.FingerprintAfter == nil {
+		t.Fatal("audit report must carry both source fingerprints")
+	}
+	if !rep.SourceUnchanged {
+		t.Fatal("source fingerprint changed during the audit")
+	}
+	post, err := dbopen.FingerprintDir(dir)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("independent post-run fingerprint: %v", err)
+	}
+	if !rep.FingerprintBefore.Equal(post) {
+		t.Fatal("independent post-run fingerprint differs from the audit's before-fingerprint")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestAuditKnownBadGate pins the gating known-bad cross-check (§4.6 output
+// 1): when the anchor asserts a known-bad height but the branch produces NO
+// validity failure there, the audit must exit 24 with the
+// known-bad-failure-absent anomaly — the expected exploit failure was not
+// reproduced, so the audit did not observe what the anchor asserts.
+func TestAuditKnownBadGate(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("fixture generation is not short")
+	}
+	dir := buildFixture(t)
+	anchorPath := writeAnchorKnownBad(t, dir, fxTarget, []uint64{fxTarget + 1})
+	outDir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "out")
+	scratch := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "scratch")
+	code := runAuditForSeal(t, dir, anchorPath, outDir, scratch)
+	if code != 24 {
+		t.Fatalf("audit exit %d, want 24 (expected known-bad failure absent)", code)
+	}
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(outDir, "abandoned-branch-audit.json"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("read audit report: %v", err)
+	}
+	var rep audit.Report
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &rep); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if rep.KnownBadCrossChecked {
+		t.Fatal("known_bad_cross_checked must be false when no failure occurred")
+	}
+	found := false
+	for _, a := range rep.Reconciliation.Anomalies {
+		if a.Kind == "known-bad-failure-absent" {
+			found = true
+		}
+	}
+	if !found {
+		t.Fatalf("expected a known-bad-failure-absent anomaly, got %+v", rep.Reconciliation.Anomalies)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestAuditReferenceCrossCheck runs export-reference, then the audit with
+// --reference: the manifest must cross-check against the anchor (config
+// SHA + anchor tuple) and be sealed into the report hash chain. A
+// reference exported under a DIFFERENT anchor config must be refused with
+// exit 15.
+func TestAuditReferenceCrossCheck(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("fixture generation is not short")
+	}
+	dir := buildFixture(t)
+	anchorPath := writeAnchor(t, dir, fxTarget)
+	exportOut := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "export")
+	if code := runExportForAudit(t, dir, anchorPath, exportOut); code != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("export exit %d", code)
+	}
+	refPath := filepath.Join(exportOut, "release", "metadata-30.reference.json")
+
+	outDir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "out")
+	scratch := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "scratch")
+	code := audit.Run(context.Background(), audit.Options{
+		DBPath: dir, AnchorPath: anchorPath, OutDir: outDir, Scratch: scratch,
+		ReferencePath:           refPath,
+		SkipReserveCheckForTest: true,
+	}, os.Stderr)
+	if code != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("audit with matching reference exit %d", code)
+	}
+	var rep audit.Report
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(readFile(t, filepath.Join(outDir, "abandoned-branch-audit.json")), &rep); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if rep.Reference == nil || !rep.Reference.AnchorConfigOK || !rep.Reference.AnchorTupleOK {
+		t.Fatalf("reference cross-check not recorded: %+v", rep.Reference)
+	}
+	if rep.Reference.HashChain == "" || rep.Reference.ManifestSHA == "" {
+		t.Fatalf("reference hash chain missing: %+v", rep.Reference)
+	}
+
+	if !rep.Reference.ContentMatch || rep.Reference.ExpectedManifestSHA != rep.Reference.ManifestSHA {
+		t.Fatalf("reference content cross-check not recorded: %+v", rep.Reference)
+	}
+
+	// A reference bound to a different anchor config is refused (15).
+	otherAnchor := writeAnchorKnownBad(t, dir, fxTarget, []uint64{fxTarget + 1})
+	code = audit.Run(context.Background(), audit.Options{
+		DBPath: dir, AnchorPath: otherAnchor, OutDir: filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "out2"),
+		Scratch:                 filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "scratch2"),
+		ReferencePath:           refPath,
+		SkipReserveCheckForTest: true,
+	}, os.Stderr)
+	if code != 15 {
+		t.Fatalf("mismatched reference must exit 15, got %d", code)
+	}
+
+	// A reference whose ANCHOR still matches but whose normalized CONTENT
+	// has been forged (a flipped section digest) must be refused (15): the
+	// audit rebuilds the expected manifest from its own normalization and
+	// byte-compares, so anchor-only agreement is not enough.
+	forged := forgeManifestSection(t, readFile(t, refPath))
+	forgedPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "forged.reference.json")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(forgedPath, forged, 0o644); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	code = audit.Run(context.Background(), audit.Options{
+		DBPath: dir, AnchorPath: anchorPath, OutDir: filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "out3"),
+		Scratch:                 filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "scratch3"),
+		ReferencePath:           forgedPath,
+		SkipReserveCheckForTest: true,
+	}, os.Stderr)
+	if code != 15 {
+		t.Fatalf("content-forged reference must exit 15, got %d", code)
+	}
+}
+
+// forgeManifestSection decodes a reference manifest, flips one hex character
+// of the first section digest and re-encodes it canonically: the anchor
+// tuple and config SHA are untouched, but the normalized content no longer
+// matches what the audit derives.
+func forgeManifestSection(t *testing.T, raw []byte) []byte {
+	t.Helper()
+	m, err := hmr.DecodeManifest(raw)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("decode reference for forging: %v", err)
+	}
+	d := []byte(m.Sections[0].SHA256)
+	if d[0] == '0' {
+		d[0] = '1'
+	} else {
+		d[0] = '0'
+	}
+	m.Sections[0].SHA256 = string(d)
+	enc, err := hmr.EncodeManifest(m)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("re-encode forged reference: %v", err)
+	}
+	return enc
+}
+
+// TestAuditRejectsNegativeReserve pins that the mandatory scratch reserve
+// gate cannot be bypassed from the CLI surface (negative values are an
+// invocation error; only the test-only option field skips the gate).
+func TestAuditRejectsNegativeReserve(t *testing.T) {
+	code := audit.Run(context.Background(), audit.Options{
+		DBPath: "/nonexistent/harmony_db_0", AnchorPath: "/nonexistent/anchor.json",
+		OutDir: t.TempDir(), Scratch: t.TempDir(),
+		ScratchReserveGB: -1,
+	}, os.Stderr)
+	if code != 15 {
+		t.Fatalf("negative --scratch-reserve-gb must exit 15, got %d", code)
+	}
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/metadata/acceptance/collect_rewards_test.go b/internal/recovery/metadata/acceptance/collect_rewards_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b396ed39f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/metadata/acceptance/collect_rewards_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+package acceptance
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/audit"
+	metafixture "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/fixture"
+)
+
+// TestAuditCollectRewards closes the last WS6 directive gap through the REAL
+// audit loop: a branch that carries a native CollectRewards AND a 0xfc
+// precompile CollectRewards, both actually funded. The pre-target validator
+// (created at 22) wins a shard-0 slot in the epoch-3 election, signs blocks
+// 37+ (the fixture signs with the full elected committee, its key included),
+// and localnet's aggregated reward payout at block 47 (RewardFrequency 16)
+// credits both pre-snapshot delegations — the test account's native
+// delegation (26) and the precompile EOA's 0xfc delegation (25). The branch
+// then collects natively at 49 and through 0xfc at 50.
+//
+// The audit must re-execute the reward distribution and both collections to
+// the stored roots, inventory the native directive and the precompile frame,
+// and close reconciliation cleanly (exit 0): reward collection mutates only
+// state material (wrapper rewards, balances), never planned metadata.
+//
+// This test runs in an ISOLATED subprocess (see isolation_test.go): its
+// fixture is the only one in the package with an extra pre-snapshot
+// delegation (the 0xfc EOA at 25), so its epoch-3 delegation share map
+// differs from every other fixture's, and the process-wide reward caches in
+// internal/chain would otherwise cross-poison the payout between tests.
+func TestAuditCollectRewards(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("fixture generation is not short")
+	}
+	if !runIsolatedSubtest(t) {
+		return
+	}
+	const (
+		blocks      = 52
+		target      = 30
+		create      = 22 // validator elected into shard 0 at epoch 3
+		fund        = 23 // fund the 0xfc EOA + forwarders (pre-target)
+		precDel     = 25 // EOA→0xfc Delegate (pre-snapshot, earns a share)
+		delegate    = 26 // native delegate (pre-snapshot, earns a share)
+		collect     = 49 // native CollectRewards (after the block-47 payout)
+		precCollect = 50 // EOA→0xfc CollectRewards
+	)
+	dir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "harmony_db_0")
+	c, err := metafixture.Open(dir, metafixture.RepoKeysDir())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("open fixture: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := c.Generate(metafixture.Spec{
+		Blocks:                     blocks,
+		CreateValidatorAt:          create,
+		FundPrecompileAt:           fund,
+		PrecompileDirectAt:         precDel,
+		DelegateAt:                 delegate,
+		CollectRewardsAt:           collect,
+		PrecompileCollectRewardsAt: precCollect,
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("generate: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := c.Finalize(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("finalize: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	anchorPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "recovery-anchor.json")
+	if err := metafixture.WriteAnchorConfig(dir, target, blocks, nil, anchorPath); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	outDir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "out")
+	code := audit.Run(context.Background(), audit.Options{
+		DBPath: dir, AnchorPath: anchorPath, OutDir: outDir,
+		Scratch:                 filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "scratch"),
+		SkipReserveCheckForTest: true,
+	}, os.Stderr)
+	rep := readAuditReport(t, outDir)
+	if code != 0 {
+		for _, a := range rep.Reconciliation.Anomalies {
+			t.Logf("ANOMALY kind=%s key=%s detail=%s", a.Kind, a.Key, a.Detail)
+		}
+		for _, o := range rep.Pass2.FailedOutcomes {
+			t.Logf("PASS2 FAIL height=%d fails=%v", o.Height, o.ValidityFails)
+		}
+		t.Fatalf("collect-rewards audit exit %d verdict %s, want 0", code, rep.Verdict)
+	}
+
+	// Native census: the branch CollectRewards body entry is inventoried.
+	if rep.Staking.NativeByDirective["CollectRewards"] < 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("native CollectRewards not inventoried: %+v", rep.Staking.NativeByDirective)
+	}
+	// Precompile census: the traced 0xfc frame parsed as CollectRewards.
+	if rep.Staking.PrecompileByKind["CollectRewards"] < 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("precompile CollectRewards not inventoried: %+v", rep.Staking.PrecompileByKind)
+	}
+	// Both collections happened on the branch and the branch re-executed to
+	// its stored roots (a divergent reward payout would be a FATAL insert,
+	// and any masked-metadata effect would surface as an anomaly above).
+	for _, o := range rep.Pass2.FailedOutcomes {
+		if o.Height == collect || o.Height == precCollect {
+			t.Fatalf("collection block %d failed validity checks: %v", o.Height, o.ValidityFails)
+		}
+	}
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/metadata/acceptance/crosslink_test.go b/internal/recovery/metadata/acceptance/crosslink_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0a7714d9fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/metadata/acceptance/crosslink_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,275 @@
+package acceptance
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/audit"
+	metafixture "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/fixture"
+)
+
+// TestAuditShard1CrossLinkPollution drives the shard-1 crosslink subset and
+// the pass-two pollution-clearing path through the REAL two-pass audit loop
+// (WS6, review finding 2). The fixture proposes a genuine, validly-signed
+// shard-1 crosslink (signed by shard-1's localnet dev committee) at a
+// post-target branch block, so the crosslink marker is written to the DB by
+// block insertion. On the abandoned branch:
+//
+//   - PASS 1 (branch crosslink records unmasked) re-runs VerifyBlockCrossLinks
+//     and sees the marker already in the DB — an errAlreadyExist pollution
+//     finding at that height, classified pollution-suspect.
+//   - The pass-1 write log yields a shard-1 crosslink SUBSET (crosslink_block_nums).
+//   - PASS 2 masks that crosslink key (seed extra_masked_keys) so
+//     VerifyBlockCrossLinks no longer sees a duplicate; the still-embedded
+//     crosslink now re-verifies against shard-1's committee and PASSES.
+//
+// The audit therefore closes cleanly (exit 0): the pollution existed in pass 1
+// and was cleared in pass 2. This is the end-to-end coverage the prior rounds
+// only had via unit vectors (audit.TestSolver*/TestOverlay*).
+func TestAuditShard1CrossLinkPollution(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("fixture generation is not short")
+	}
+	const (
+		blocks   = 46
+		target   = 30
+		create   = 22
+		delegate = 26
+		preXlink = 24 // pre-target block carrying shard-1 crosslink (block 3), epoch 2
+		xlink    = 40 // post-target branch block carrying shard-1 crosslink (block 4), epoch 3
+	)
+	dir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "harmony_db_0")
+	c, err := metafixture.Open(dir, metafixture.RepoKeysDir())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("open fixture: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := c.Generate(metafixture.Spec{
+		Blocks:               blocks,
+		CreateValidatorAt:    create,
+		DelegateAt:           delegate,
+		PreCrossLinkShard1At: preXlink,
+		CrossLinkShard1At:    xlink,
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("generate: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := c.Finalize(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("finalize: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	anchorPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "recovery-anchor.json")
+	if err := metafixture.WriteAnchorConfig(dir, target, blocks, nil, anchorPath); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	outDir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "out")
+	code := audit.Run(context.Background(), audit.Options{
+		DBPath: dir, AnchorPath: anchorPath, OutDir: outDir,
+		Scratch:                 filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "scratch"),
+		SkipReserveCheckForTest: true,
+	}, os.Stderr)
+	rep := readAuditReport(t, outDir)
+	if code != 0 {
+		for _, a := range rep.Reconciliation.Anomalies {
+			t.Logf("ANOMALY kind=%s key=%s detail=%s", a.Kind, a.Key, a.Detail)
+		}
+		for _, o := range rep.Pass2.FailedOutcomes {
+			t.Logf("PASS2 FAIL height=%d fails=%v", o.Height, o.ValidityFails)
+		}
+		t.Fatalf("shard-1 crosslink audit exit %d verdict %s, want 0", code, rep.Verdict)
+	}
+
+	// Subset: shard 1 must appear with the crosslink block number the branch wrote.
+	var shard1 *audit.ShardSubset
+	for i := range rep.ShardSubsets {
+		if rep.ShardSubsets[i].ShardID == 1 {
+			shard1 = &rep.ShardSubsets[i]
+		}
+	}
+	if shard1 == nil {
+		t.Fatalf("no shard-1 subset extracted from the branch write log: %+v", rep.ShardSubsets)
+	}
+	// The branch (post-target) wrote shard-1 crosslink block 4.
+	if !containsU64(shard1.CrossLinkNums, 4) {
+		t.Fatalf("shard-1 subset missing branch crosslink block 4: %+v", shard1.CrossLinkNums)
+	}
+
+	// The invariant solver derived the pre-target continuity pointer (3)
+	// uniquely from the stored pointer (4) and the pre/branch record sets.
+	var solved bool
+	for _, p := range rep.Pointers {
+		if p.ShardID != 1 {
+			continue
+		}
+		solved = true
+		if p.Ambiguous {
+			t.Fatalf("shard-1 pointer came out ambiguous: %+v", p)
+		}
+		if !p.Derived || p.DerivedBlockNum != 3 {
+			t.Fatalf("shard-1 pointer derived=%v block=%d, want derived pre-target pointer 3", p.Derived, p.DerivedBlockNum)
+		}
+	}
+	if !solved {
+		t.Fatalf("pointer solver did not run for shard 1: %+v", rep.Pointers)
+	}
+
+	// Pass 2 masked the crosslink key (pollution seed).
+	if rep.Pass2 == nil || rep.Pass2.Seed == nil || rep.Pass2.Seed.ExtraMaskedKeys < 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("pass 2 did not mask any branch crosslink/spent key: %+v", rep.Pass2)
+	}
+
+	// Pollution appeared in pass 1 and was CLEARED in pass 2: a crosslinks
+	// validity failure at the crosslink height in pass 1, none in pass 2.
+	if !passHasCrossLinkFail(rep.Pass1, xlink) {
+		t.Fatalf("expected a pass-1 crosslinks pollution failure at %d: %+v", xlink, failedHeights(rep.Pass1))
+	}
+	if passHasCrossLinkFail(rep.Pass2, xlink) {
+		t.Fatalf("pass-2 still reports a crosslinks failure at %d (pollution not cleared): %+v", xlink, failedHeights(rep.Pass2))
+	}
+
+	// The crosslink write is inventoried, not flagged anomalous.
+	if rep.Reconciliation.Writes.CrossLinkSubset < 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("crosslink write not inventoried in the reconciliation census: %+v", rep.Reconciliation.Writes)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestAuditSpentMarkerPollution is the spent-marker analog of the crosslink
+// test (WS6, review finding 2): a post-target branch block carries a GENUINE
+// incoming cross-shard receipt from shard 1 — the CXReceiptsProof's source
+// header is signed by shard-1's dev committee and the merkle proof verifies —
+// and the receipt is applied at proposal time, so the stored root includes the
+// credit and the audit re-executes the branch to its roots. Block insertion
+// wrote the spent marker, so on the abandoned branch:
+//
+//   - PASS 1 re-runs VerifyIncomingReceipts and IsSpent sees the marker —
+//     an errDoubleSpent pollution finding at that height;
+//   - the pass-1 write log yields a shard-1 SPENT subset (spent_block_nums);
+//   - PASS 2 masks the spent key; the stored receipt then re-verifies through
+//     the FULL ValidateCXReceiptsProof chain (trie root, outgoing hash,
+//     source-header hash and shard-1 commit signature) and PASSES.
+//
+// Exit 0: stored incoming receipts re-executed with roots verifying, spent
+// pollution cleared in pass 2, spent write inventoried — end-to-end.
+func TestAuditSpentMarkerPollution(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("fixture generation is not short")
+	}
+	const (
+		blocks   = 46
+		target   = 30
+		create   = 22
+		delegate = 26
+		receipt  = 38 // post-target branch block carrying the incoming receipt (epoch 3)
+	)
+	dir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "harmony_db_0")
+	c, err := metafixture.Open(dir, metafixture.RepoKeysDir())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("open fixture: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := c.Generate(metafixture.Spec{
+		Blocks:            blocks,
+		CreateValidatorAt: create,
+		DelegateAt:        delegate,
+		IncomingReceiptAt: receipt,
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("generate: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := c.Finalize(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("finalize: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	anchorPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "recovery-anchor.json")
+	if err := metafixture.WriteAnchorConfig(dir, target, blocks, nil, anchorPath); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	outDir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "out")
+	code := audit.Run(context.Background(), audit.Options{
+		DBPath: dir, AnchorPath: anchorPath, OutDir: outDir,
+		Scratch:                 filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "scratch"),
+		SkipReserveCheckForTest: true,
+	}, os.Stderr)
+	rep := readAuditReport(t, outDir)
+	if code != 0 {
+		for _, a := range rep.Reconciliation.Anomalies {
+			t.Logf("ANOMALY kind=%s key=%s detail=%s", a.Kind, a.Key, a.Detail)
+		}
+		for _, o := range rep.Pass2.FailedOutcomes {
+			t.Logf("PASS2 FAIL height=%d fails=%v", o.Height, o.ValidityFails)
+		}
+		t.Fatalf("spent-marker audit exit %d verdict %s, want 0", code, rep.Verdict)
+	}
+
+	// Subset: shard 1 must appear with the spent source block number (5).
+	var shard1 *audit.ShardSubset
+	for i := range rep.ShardSubsets {
+		if rep.ShardSubsets[i].ShardID == 1 {
+			shard1 = &rep.ShardSubsets[i]
+		}
+	}
+	if shard1 == nil {
+		t.Fatalf("no shard-1 subset extracted from the branch write log: %+v", rep.ShardSubsets)
+	}
+	if !containsU64(shard1.SpentNums, 5) {
+		t.Fatalf("shard-1 subset missing spent marker for source block 5: %+v", shard1.SpentNums)
+	}
+
+	// Pass 2 masked the spent key.
+	if rep.Pass2 == nil || rep.Pass2.Seed == nil || rep.Pass2.Seed.ExtraMaskedKeys < 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("pass 2 did not mask the branch spent key: %+v", rep.Pass2)
+	}
+
+	// Double-spent pollution in pass 1, cleared in pass 2.
+	if !passHasFailPrefix(rep.Pass1, receipt, "incoming-receipts:") {
+		t.Fatalf("expected a pass-1 incoming-receipts pollution failure at %d: %+v", receipt, failedHeights(rep.Pass1))
+	}
+	if passHasFailPrefix(rep.Pass2, receipt, "incoming-receipts:") {
+		t.Fatalf("pass-2 still reports an incoming-receipts failure at %d (pollution not cleared): %+v", receipt, failedHeights(rep.Pass2))
+	}
+
+	// The spent write is inventoried, not flagged anomalous.
+	if rep.Reconciliation.Writes.SpentSubset < 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("spent write not inventoried in the reconciliation census: %+v", rep.Reconciliation.Writes)
+	}
+}
+
+func containsU64(xs []uint64, v uint64) bool {
+	for _, x := range xs {
+		if x == v {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+func passHasCrossLinkFail(p *audit.PassSection, height uint64) bool {
+	return passHasFailPrefix(p, height, "crosslinks:")
+}
+
+func passHasFailPrefix(p *audit.PassSection, height uint64, prefix string) bool {
+	if p == nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	for _, o := range p.FailedOutcomes {
+		if o.Height != height {
+			continue
+		}
+		for _, f := range o.ValidityFails {
+			if strings.HasPrefix(f, prefix) {
+				return true
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+func failedHeights(p *audit.PassSection) []uint64 {
+	if p == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	var out []uint64
+	for _, o := range p.FailedOutcomes {
+		out = append(out, o.Height)
+	}
+	return out
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/metadata/acceptance/election_test.go b/internal/recovery/metadata/acceptance/election_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..aa0c0876c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/metadata/acceptance/election_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+package acceptance
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"math/big"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common"
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/rlp"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/rawdb"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/vm"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/chain"
+	nodeconfig "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/configs/node"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/anchor"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/dbopen"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/audit"
+	metafixture "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/fixture"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/norm"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/source"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/shard/committee"
+)
+
+// kvCanonReader adapts the strict source KV to the seed builder's
+// canonical-hash reader (raw "h"+num+"n" key, error-propagating).
+type kvCanonReader struct {
+	open *source.Open
+}
+
+func (r kvCanonReader) CanonicalHash(n uint64) (common.Hash, error) {
+	key := make([]byte, 0, 10)
+	key = append(key, 'h')
+	for i := 7; i >= 0; i-- {
+		key = append(key, byte(n>>uint(8*i)))
+	}
+	key = append(key, 'n')
+	has, err := r.open.KV.Has(key)
+	if err != nil || !has {
+		return common.Hash{}, err
+	}
+	raw, err := r.open.KV.Get(key)
+	if err != nil {
+		return common.Hash{}, err
+	}
+	return common.BytesToHash(raw), nil
+}
+
+// TestElectionEqualityCleanVsMasked is the B5 bullet-(5) election check in
+// its literal form: committee.WithStakingEnabled.Compute for the next
+// epoch, evaluated over (a) the CLEAN twin chain ended at the target and
+// (b) the dirty chain seen through the audit's masked overlay (deletion
+// plan applied, post-target chain records tombstoned, heads rewound),
+// must produce byte-identical encoded shard states — the mask changes no
+// election input.
+func TestElectionEqualityCleanVsMasked(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("fixture generation is not short")
+	}
+	// (a) Clean twin: the same deterministic chain ended at the target.
+	cleanDir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "harmony_db_0")
+	c, err := metafixture.Open(cleanDir, metafixture.RepoKeysDir())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := c.Generate(metafixture.Spec{
+		Blocks: fxTarget, CreateValidatorAt: fxCreateVal, DelegateAt: fxDelegate,
+		FundPrecompileAt: fxFundPrec, // identical pre-target ops = identical blocks 1..target
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := c.Finalize(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	// (b) Dirty chain through the masked overlay.
+	dirtyDir := buildFixture(t)
+	anchorPath := writeAnchor(t, dirtyDir, fxTarget)
+	res, err := anchor.Resolve(anchorPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	open, err := source.OpenSource(dirtyDir, res, dbopen.Options{})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer open.Close()
+	srcs, err := open.BuildSources()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	nres, err := norm.Normalize(open.NormA, srcs)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	overlay, err := audit.NewOverlay(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "scratch"), open.KV)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer overlay.Close()
+	if _, err := audit.Seed(overlay, nres, kvCanonReader{open}, res.TargetHash, res.Config.TargetHeight, nil, nil); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	cfg := nodeconfig.GetShardConfig(0).GetNetworkType().ChainConfig()
+	cfg.EthCompatibleChainID = big.NewInt(cfg.EthCompatibleShard0ChainID.Int64())
+
+	maskedBc, err := core.NewBlockChainWithOptions(
+		rawdb.NewDatabase(overlay), nil, nil,
+		&core.CacheConfig{Disabled: true, SnapshotLimit: 0},
+		&cfg, chain.NewEngine(), vm.Config{}, core.Options{},
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("open masked chain: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got := maskedBc.CurrentBlock().NumberU64(); got != fxTarget {
+		t.Fatalf("masked head %d, want the target %d", got, fxTarget)
+	}
+
+	// Read-write: NewBlockChainWithOptions rewrites head markers on open
+	// (the clean twin is a disposable per-test generation, not a source).
+	cleanDB, err := rawdb.NewLevelDBDatabase(cleanDir, 16, 64, "", false)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer cleanDB.Close()
+	cleanBc, err := core.NewBlockChainWithOptions(
+		cleanDB, nil, nil,
+		&core.CacheConfig{Disabled: true, SnapshotLimit: 0},
+		&cfg, chain.NewEngine(), vm.Config{}, core.Options{},
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("open clean chain: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got := cleanBc.CurrentBlock().NumberU64(); got != fxTarget {
+		t.Fatalf("clean head %d, want the target %d", got, fxTarget)
+	}
+	if maskedBc.CurrentBlock().Hash() != cleanBc.CurrentBlock().Hash() {
+		t.Fatal("masked and clean heads differ (twin construction broken)")
+	}
+
+	// The literal election: next-epoch committee.Compute on both views.
+	nextEpoch := new(big.Int).SetUint64(res.Config.Epoch + 1)
+	maskedSS, err := committee.WithStakingEnabled.Compute(nextEpoch, maskedBc)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("masked election: %v", err)
+	}
+	cleanSS, err := committee.WithStakingEnabled.Compute(nextEpoch, cleanBc)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("clean election: %v", err)
+	}
+	maskedEnc, err := rlp.EncodeToBytes(maskedSS)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	cleanEnc, err := rlp.EncodeToBytes(cleanSS)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if !bytes.Equal(maskedEnc, cleanEnc) {
+		t.Fatal("next-epoch election over the masked view differs from the clean twin")
+	}
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/metadata/acceptance/export_test.go b/internal/recovery/metadata/acceptance/export_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..aeb7e40220
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/metadata/acceptance/export_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,490 @@
+package acceptance
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/integrity"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/hmr"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/refexport"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/report"
+)
+
+func runExport(t *testing.T, dir, anchorPath, outDir string, opts refexport.Options) int {
+	t.Helper()
+	opts.DBPath, opts.AnchorPath, opts.OutDir = dir, anchorPath, outDir
+	return refexport.Run(context.Background(), opts, os.Stderr)
+}
+
+// TestExportByteReproducible: two invocations over one fixture produce
+// byte-identical .hmr and reference manifests; the self-check passes; the
+// package digest equals an independent sha256 of the .hmr; the run
+// checksum file verifies.
+func TestExportByteReproducible(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("fixture generation is not short")
+	}
+	dir := buildFixture(t)
+	anchorPath := writeAnchor(t, dir, fxTarget)
+
+	outA := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "a")
+	outB := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "b")
+	if code := runExport(t, dir, anchorPath, outA, refexport.Options{}); code != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("export A exit %d", code)
+	}
+	if code := runExport(t, dir, anchorPath, outB, refexport.Options{}); code != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("export B exit %d", code)
+	}
+	hmrName := filepath.Join("release", "metadata-30.hmr")
+	refName := filepath.Join("release", "metadata-30.reference.json")
+	hmrA := readFile(t, filepath.Join(outA, hmrName))
+	hmrB := readFile(t, filepath.Join(outB, hmrName))
+	if !bytes.Equal(hmrA, hmrB) {
+		t.Fatal("two export invocations produced different .hmr bytes")
+	}
+	refA := readFile(t, filepath.Join(outA, refName))
+	refB := readFile(t, filepath.Join(outB, refName))
+	if !bytes.Equal(refA, refB) {
+		t.Fatal("two export invocations produced different reference manifests")
+	}
+
+	// The manifest's package digest equals an independent sha256 of the
+	// .hmr; the reference is decodable and its container round-trips.
+	m, err := hmr.DecodeManifest(refA)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if m.PackageSHA256 != report.SHA256Hex(hmrA) {
+		t.Fatalf("manifest package digest %s != sha256(.hmr) %s", m.PackageSHA256, report.SHA256Hex(hmrA))
+	}
+	if _, err := hmr.Decode(hmrA); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("emitted .hmr does not decode: %v", err)
+	}
+	// The internal run-checksum file verifies.
+	if err := integrity.Verify(filepath.Join(outA, "release", "run-checksums.sha256")); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("run checksums do not verify: %v", err)
+	}
+	// The success reports are published atomically INSIDE release/ with
+	// the artifacts; they differ only in run evidence (they share the same
+	// artifact digests).
+	var repA, repB refexport.Report
+	_ = json.Unmarshal(readFile(t, filepath.Join(outA, "release", "export-report.json")), &repA)
+	_ = json.Unmarshal(readFile(t, filepath.Join(outB, "release", "export-report.json")), &repB)
+	if repA.Artifacts.ManifestSHA != repB.Artifacts.ManifestSHA {
+		t.Fatal("reference digests differ across runs")
+	}
+	if !repA.Determinism.Ran || !repA.Determinism.Passed {
+		t.Fatal("determinism self-check must run and pass by default")
+	}
+	if repA.ExitCode != 0 || repA.Artifacts.ReleaseDir != "release" {
+		t.Fatalf("published success report must record exit 0 and the release dir; got exit %d dir %q",
+			repA.ExitCode, repA.Artifacts.ReleaseDir)
+	}
+	// No stray failure report at the out-dir root on a clean run.
+	if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(outA, "export-report.json")); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		t.Fatalf("clean run must not leave a root-level report (stat err %v)", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestExportRefusesOnFatal(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("fixture generation is not short")
+	}
+	dir := buildFixture(t)
+	anchorPath := writeAnchor(t, dir, fxTarget)
+	// Corrupt a retained metadata record: overwrite ss<target-epoch> with
+	// junk so the boundary byte-equality check fails (INVALID_RETAINED).
+	corruptSS(t, dir)
+	out := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "out")
+	code := runExport(t, dir, anchorPath, out, refexport.Options{})
+	if code != report.ExitInvalidRetained {
+		t.Fatalf("export over corrupt ss exit %d, want %d", code, report.ExitInvalidRetained)
+	}
+	// No release directory emitted on refusal.
+	if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(out, "release")); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		t.Fatal("refused export must not create the release directory")
+	}
+	// The export report records the refusal.
+	var rep refexport.Report
+	_ = json.Unmarshal(readFile(t, filepath.Join(out, "export-report.json")), &rep)
+	if !rep.Refused {
+		t.Fatal("export report must record the refusal")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestReleaseSealing stages exactly the four release files and seals.
+func TestReleaseSealing(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("fixture generation is not short")
+	}
+	dir := buildFixture(t)
+	anchorPath := writeAnchor(t, dir, fxTarget)
+	out := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "out")
+	if code := runExport(t, dir, anchorPath, out, refexport.Options{}); code != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("export exit %d", code)
+	}
+	// Run the audit to produce the fourth release file.
+	auditOut := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "audit")
+	scratch := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "scratch")
+	if code := runAuditForSeal(t, dir, anchorPath, auditOut, scratch); code != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("audit exit %d", code)
+	}
+
+	// Stage exactly the four release files (§3): anchor config, .hmr,
+	// reference JSON, audit report.
+	staging := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "staging")
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(staging, 0o755); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	files := map[string]string{
+		"recovery-anchor.json":        anchorPath,
+		"metadata-30.hmr":             filepath.Join(out, "release", "metadata-30.hmr"),
+		"metadata-30.reference.json":  filepath.Join(out, "release", "metadata-30.reference.json"),
+		"abandoned-branch-audit.json": filepath.Join(auditOut, "abandoned-branch-audit.json"),
+	}
+	var want []string
+	for name, src := range files {
+		if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(staging, name), readFile(t, src), 0o644); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		want = append(want, name)
+	}
+	if err := integrity.Seal(staging, want, "SHA256SUMS"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("seal failed: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := integrity.Verify(filepath.Join(staging, "SHA256SUMS")); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("verify sealed: %v", err)
+	}
+	entries, _ := integrity.Parse(filepath.Join(staging, "SHA256SUMS"))
+	if len(entries) != 4 {
+		t.Fatalf("SHA256SUMS must list exactly 4 files, got %d", len(entries))
+	}
+
+	// The reference manifest's anchor_config_sha256 matches the staged
+	// recovery-anchor.json.
+	m, err := hmr.DecodeManifest(readFile(t, filepath.Join(staging, "metadata-30.reference.json")))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	stagedAnchorSHA := report.SHA256Hex(readFile(t, filepath.Join(staging, "recovery-anchor.json")))
+	if m.AnchorConfigSHA != stagedAnchorSHA {
+		t.Fatalf("manifest anchor_config_sha256 %s != staged anchor sha %s", m.AnchorConfigSHA, stagedAnchorSHA)
+	}
+
+	// A planted stray (internal report) fails the seal.
+	if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(staging, "export-report.json"), []byte("{}"), 0o644); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := integrity.Seal(staging, want, "SHA256SUMS"); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("a stray file must fail the seal")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestDeterminismSelfCheckCatchesFault injects nondeterminism into the
+// second derivation's serialization: the self-check must exit 23, emit no
+// release artifacts, and write the determinism-diff dumps.
+func TestDeterminismSelfCheckCatchesFault(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("fixture generation is not short")
+	}
+	dir := buildFixture(t)
+	anchorPath := writeAnchor(t, dir, fxTarget)
+	out := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "out")
+
+	refexport.TestMutatePassB = func(hmrBytes, manifest []byte) ([]byte, []byte) {
+		// Flip the last .hmr byte on the second pass only.
+		mutated := append([]byte(nil), hmrBytes...)
+		mutated[len(mutated)-1] ^= 0xff
+		return mutated, manifest
+	}
+	defer func() { refexport.TestMutatePassB = nil }()
+
+	code := runExport(t, dir, anchorPath, out, refexport.Options{})
+	if code != report.ExitDeterminismMismatch {
+		t.Fatalf("self-check fault exit %d, want %d", code, report.ExitDeterminismMismatch)
+	}
+	if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(out, "release")); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		t.Fatal("determinism mismatch must not create the release directory")
+	}
+	for _, dump := range []string{"pass-a.hmr", "pass-b.hmr", "pass-a.reference.json", "pass-b.reference.json"} {
+		if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(out, "determinism-diff", dump)); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("missing determinism diff dump %s: %v", dump, err)
+		}
+	}
+	// The two dumped .hmr files must differ at the reported offset.
+	a := readFile(t, filepath.Join(out, "determinism-diff", "pass-a.hmr"))
+	b := readFile(t, filepath.Join(out, "determinism-diff", "pass-b.hmr"))
+	if bytes.Equal(a, b) {
+		t.Fatal("pass-a and pass-b dumps must differ")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestExportRunOnceRefusesExisting pins the transactional run-once
+// contract: an out-dir already holding a release directory is refused
+// (exit 15) and the existing artifacts stay byte-untouched.
+func TestExportRunOnceRefusesExisting(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("fixture generation is not short")
+	}
+	dir := buildFixture(t)
+	anchorPath := writeAnchor(t, dir, fxTarget)
+	out := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "out")
+	if code := runExport(t, dir, anchorPath, out, refexport.Options{}); code != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("first export exit %d", code)
+	}
+	before := readFile(t, filepath.Join(out, "release", "metadata-30.hmr"))
+	if code := runExport(t, dir, anchorPath, out, refexport.Options{}); code != report.ExitBadInvocation {
+		t.Fatalf("second export into the same out-dir exit %d, want %d", code, report.ExitBadInvocation)
+	}
+	after := readFile(t, filepath.Join(out, "release", "metadata-30.hmr"))
+	if !bytes.Equal(before, after) {
+		t.Fatal("a refused rerun must not touch existing artifacts")
+	}
+	// No staging leftovers.
+	if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(out, ".staging")); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		t.Fatal("staging directory must not survive a run")
+	}
+}
+
+// assertNoReleaseNames requires that NOTHING consumer-facing exists in the
+// out-dir after a failed publication: no release/ directory and no
+// release-named file at the top level. (The export report and diagnostic
+// dumps are run evidence, not release names.)
+func assertNoReleaseNames(t *testing.T, out string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(out, "release")); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		t.Fatalf("release directory exists after a failed publication (stat err %v)", err)
+	}
+	for _, name := range []string{"metadata-30.hmr", "metadata-30.reference.json", "run-checksums.sha256"} {
+		if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(out, name)); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+			t.Fatalf("release-named file %s exists at the out-dir top level after a failed publication", name)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// TestExportPublishRenameFault pins the atomic-publication contract on the
+// rename path: the single os.Rename publishing the release directory fails,
+// so the release name must not appear AT ALL — there is no partially
+// promoted state to roll back — and the run exits 14 with the report
+// written.
+func TestExportPublishRenameFault(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("fixture generation is not short")
+	}
+	dir := buildFixture(t)
+	anchorPath := writeAnchor(t, dir, fxTarget)
+	out := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "out")
+
+	refexport.TestPromoteFault = func(string) error { return errInjectedPromoteFault }
+	defer func() { refexport.TestPromoteFault = nil }()
+
+	code := runExport(t, dir, anchorPath, out, refexport.Options{})
+	if code != report.ExitIO {
+		t.Fatalf("publish fault exit %d, want %d", code, report.ExitIO)
+	}
+	assertNoReleaseNames(t, out)
+	// Staging is cleaned up too.
+	if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(out, ".staging")); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		t.Fatal("staging directory must not survive a run")
+	}
+	// The success report only ever exists inside release/ (which never
+	// appeared); the surviving root document is the FAILURE report,
+	// carrying exit 14 and no release artifacts.
+	var rep refexport.Report
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(readFile(t, filepath.Join(out, "export-report.json")), &rep); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failure report must be written on a failed publish: %v", err)
+	}
+	if rep.ExitCode != report.ExitIO || rep.Artifacts.ReleaseDir != "" || rep.Artifacts.HMRFile != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("report after failed publish must record exit %d with no release artifacts; got exit %d release %q hmr %q",
+			report.ExitIO, rep.ExitCode, rep.Artifacts.ReleaseDir, rep.Artifacts.HMRFile)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestExportStagedReportWriteFault pins the one-atomic-unit protocol on the
+// report side: the success report is staged WITH the artifacts and
+// published by the same rename, so a failure to write it blocks the whole
+// publication — exit 14, no release names, and the root document is a
+// failure report.
+func TestExportStagedReportWriteFault(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("fixture generation is not short")
+	}
+	dir := buildFixture(t)
+	anchorPath := writeAnchor(t, dir, fxTarget)
+	out := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "out")
+
+	refexport.TestReportFault = func(path string) error {
+		if filepath.Base(filepath.Dir(path)) == ".staging" {
+			return errInjectedReportFault
+		}
+		return nil
+	}
+	defer func() { refexport.TestReportFault = nil }()
+
+	code := runExport(t, dir, anchorPath, out, refexport.Options{})
+	if code != report.ExitIO {
+		t.Fatalf("staged-report fault exit %d, want %d", code, report.ExitIO)
+	}
+	assertNoReleaseNames(t, out)
+	if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(out, ".staging")); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		t.Fatal("staging directory must not survive a run")
+	}
+	var rep refexport.Report
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(readFile(t, filepath.Join(out, "export-report.json")), &rep); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failure report must be written when the staged report cannot be: %v", err)
+	}
+	if rep.ExitCode != report.ExitIO || rep.Artifacts.ReleaseDir != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("root document must be a failure report (exit %d, no release dir); got exit %d dir %q",
+			report.ExitIO, rep.ExitCode, rep.Artifacts.ReleaseDir)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestExportFailureReportDoubleFault drives the reviewer's worst case: the
+// publication rename fails AND the failure report cannot be written either
+// (its root path is occupied by a non-empty directory). Even then no
+// success-shaped report is visible anywhere — the success report only ever
+// existed inside non-consumer .staging — no release names appear, and the
+// process exit code carries the failure.
+func TestExportFailureReportDoubleFault(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("fixture generation is not short")
+	}
+	dir := buildFixture(t)
+	anchorPath := writeAnchor(t, dir, fxTarget)
+	out := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "out")
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(out, "export-report.json", "occupied"), 0o755); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	refexport.TestPromoteFault = func(string) error { return errInjectedPromoteFault }
+	defer func() { refexport.TestPromoteFault = nil }()
+
+	code := runExport(t, dir, anchorPath, out, refexport.Options{})
+	if code != report.ExitIO {
+		t.Fatalf("double fault exit %d, want %d", code, report.ExitIO)
+	}
+	assertNoReleaseNames(t, out)
+	// No success-shaped report can be visible: release/ (and its report)
+	// never appeared, and the root path holds no report document.
+	if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(out, "release", "export-report.json")); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		t.Fatalf("no published report may exist after a failed publish (stat err %v)", err)
+	}
+	if fi, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(out, "export-report.json")); err != nil || !fi.IsDir() {
+		t.Fatalf("root report path must still be the occupying directory (fi %v err %v)", fi, err)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestExportVerificationFault pins the pre-publication verification: a
+// staged artifact that cannot be verified (any error, not only IsNotExist)
+// blocks publication BEFORE anything is visible — the release name never
+// appears, exit 14.
+func TestExportVerificationFault(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("fixture generation is not short")
+	}
+	dir := buildFixture(t)
+	anchorPath := writeAnchor(t, dir, fxTarget)
+	out := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "out")
+
+	refexport.TestVerifyFault = func(name string) error {
+		if name == "metadata-30.reference.json" {
+			return errInjectedVerifyFault
+		}
+		return nil
+	}
+	defer func() { refexport.TestVerifyFault = nil }()
+
+	code := runExport(t, dir, anchorPath, out, refexport.Options{})
+	if code != report.ExitIO {
+		t.Fatalf("verification fault exit %d, want %d", code, report.ExitIO)
+	}
+	assertNoReleaseNames(t, out)
+}
+
+// TestExportPublishFaultWithCleanupFault drives BOTH faults at once: the
+// publish rename fails AND the staging cleanup afterwards fails too. With
+// the atomic protocol a failed cleanup can strand only the non-consumer
+// .staging directory — never anything under a release name — and the exit
+// code stays the hard I/O failure of the publish.
+func TestExportPublishFaultWithCleanupFault(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("fixture generation is not short")
+	}
+	dir := buildFixture(t)
+	anchorPath := writeAnchor(t, dir, fxTarget)
+	out := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "out")
+
+	refexport.TestPromoteFault = func(string) error { return errInjectedPromoteFault }
+	refexport.TestCleanupFault = func(string) error { return errInjectedCleanupFault }
+	defer func() {
+		refexport.TestPromoteFault = nil
+		refexport.TestCleanupFault = nil
+	}()
+
+	code := runExport(t, dir, anchorPath, out, refexport.Options{})
+	if code != report.ExitIO {
+		t.Fatalf("publish+cleanup fault exit %d, want %d", code, report.ExitIO)
+	}
+	assertNoReleaseNames(t, out)
+	// The stranded staging directory is the WORST outcome this double
+	// fault can produce — and it is not a consumer-facing name.
+	if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(out, ".staging")); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("expected the stranded staging dir for this scenario, stat err: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(out, "export-report.json")); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("export report must be written even on failed publish+cleanup: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+var errInjectedPromoteFault = errInjected("injected publish fault")
+var errInjectedVerifyFault = errInjected("injected verification fault")
+var errInjectedCleanupFault = errInjected("injected cleanup fault")
+var errInjectedReportFault = errInjected("injected report-write fault")
+
+type errInjected string
+
+func (e errInjected) Error() string { return string(e) }
+
+// TestGeneratorDeterministic proves two independent generations of the
+// fixture chain export byte-identical .hmr and reference manifests (the
+// fixture kit is reproducible from the generator — WS7 acceptance).
+func TestGeneratorDeterministic(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("fixture generation is not short")
+	}
+	dir1 := buildFixture(t)
+	dir2 := buildFixture(t)
+	a1 := writeAnchor(t, dir1, fxTarget)
+	a2 := writeAnchor(t, dir2, fxTarget)
+	out1 := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "1")
+	out2 := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "2")
+	if code := runExport(t, dir1, a1, out1, refexport.Options{}); code != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("export 1 exit %d", code)
+	}
+	if code := runExport(t, dir2, a2, out2, refexport.Options{}); code != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("export 2 exit %d", code)
+	}
+	h1 := readFile(t, filepath.Join(out1, "release", "metadata-30.hmr"))
+	h2 := readFile(t, filepath.Join(out2, "release", "metadata-30.hmr"))
+	if !bytes.Equal(h1, h2) {
+		t.Fatal("two independent generations produced different .hmr (generator is not deterministic)")
+	}
+	r1 := readFile(t, filepath.Join(out1, "release", "metadata-30.reference.json"))
+	r2 := readFile(t, filepath.Join(out2, "release", "metadata-30.reference.json"))
+	if !bytes.Equal(r1, r2) {
+		t.Fatal("two independent generations produced different reference manifests")
+	}
+}
+
+func readFile(t *testing.T, p string) []byte {
+	t.Helper()
+	b, err := os.ReadFile(p)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("read %s: %v", p, err)
+	}
+	return b
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/metadata/acceptance/helpers_test.go b/internal/recovery/metadata/acceptance/helpers_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ac8b222720
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/metadata/acceptance/helpers_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+package acceptance
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"math/big"
+	"os"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/rawdb"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/audit"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/refexport"
+)
+
+// corruptSS overwrites ss<target-epoch> with junk (cold-DB surgery). Epoch
+// 2 canonical suffix is 0x02.
+func corruptSS(t *testing.T, dir string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	db, err := rawdb.NewLevelDBDatabase(dir, 16, 64, "", false)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	key := append([]byte("ss"), big.NewInt(2).Bytes()...)
+	if err := db.Put(key, []byte("corrupted-shard-state")); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := db.Close(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+}
+
+// runExportForAudit runs export-reference into outDir (for tests that
+// need the reference manifest artifact).
+func runExportForAudit(t *testing.T, dir, anchorPath, outDir string) int {
+	t.Helper()
+	return refexport.Run(context.Background(), refexport.Options{
+		DBPath: dir, AnchorPath: anchorPath, OutDir: outDir,
+	}, os.Stderr)
+}
+
+// runAuditForSeal runs a CI-scoped audit (reserve gate skipped).
+func runAuditForSeal(t *testing.T, dir, anchorPath, outDir, scratch string) int {
+	t.Helper()
+	return audit.Run(context.Background(), audit.Options{
+		DBPath: dir, AnchorPath: anchorPath, OutDir: outDir, Scratch: scratch,
+		SkipReserveCheckForTest: true,
+	}, os.Stderr)
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/metadata/acceptance/isolation_test.go b/internal/recovery/metadata/acceptance/isolation_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7624ee312a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/metadata/acceptance/isolation_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+package acceptance
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"os/exec"
+	"regexp"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// internal/chain keeps process-wide reward-payout caches (votingPowerCache,
+// delegateShareCache) keyed only by (epoch, shard) / (epoch, validator) —
+// NOT by chain identity. The production harmony-recovery binary opens exactly
+// one chain per process, so those caches are always coherent there. A test
+// binary, however, generates MANY chains in one process; two fixtures whose
+// epoch-3 validator snapshots differ (e.g. an extra pre-snapshot delegation)
+// then poison each other's block-47 aggregated payout through the shared
+// cache: the stale share map is missing the extra delegator, AddReward's
+// nil-error wrap (errors.Wrapf with a nil err) silently aborts the payout
+// loop midway, and the delegator accrues nothing — no error surfaces.
+//
+// Fixing the caches or AddReward lives in consensus code and is explicitly
+// out of scope for this recovery branch, so the recovery-local mechanism is
+// PROCESS isolation: any test whose fixture's payout-epoch snapshot diverges
+// from the package's shared shape re-executes itself in a fresh test process
+// where the caches start cold. Everything else in the package shares one
+// identical snapshot shape, so its cache collisions are value-identical and
+// harmless.
+
+// isolatedEnv marks the re-executed child process.
+const isolatedEnv = "HMY_RECOVERY_TEST_ISOLATED"
+
+// runIsolatedSubtest re-executes exactly the calling test in a fresh process
+// (cold internal/chain caches) and reports its result. Returns true when the
+// caller IS the isolated child and should run the real test body; returns
+// false in the parent after the child completed (the parent must return
+// immediately).
+func runIsolatedSubtest(t *testing.T) bool {
+	t.Helper()
+	if os.Getenv(isolatedEnv) == "1" {
+		return true
+	}
+	exe, err := os.Executable()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("isolation: locate test binary: %v", err)
+	}
+	cmd := exec.Command(exe,
+		"-test.run=^"+regexp.QuoteMeta(t.Name())+"$",
+		"-test.count=1", "-test.v")
+	cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), isolatedEnv+"=1")
+	out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("isolated re-exec of %s failed: %v\n%s", t.Name(), err, out)
+	}
+	return false
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/metadata/acceptance/kit_test.go b/internal/recovery/metadata/acceptance/kit_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3d55625583
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/metadata/acceptance/kit_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+package acceptance
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"io"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/integrity"
+	metafixture "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/fixture"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/report"
+)
+
+// committedKitDir locates the committed fixture kit from the repo root
+// (the .hmy directory anchors the root, same trick as RepoKeysDir).
+func committedKitDir(t *testing.T) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	root := filepath.Dir(metafixture.RepoKeysDir())
+	kit := filepath.Join(root, "testdata", "recovery", "metadata", "kit")
+	if _, err := os.Stat(kit); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("committed fixture kit missing (regenerate with scripts/recovery/gen-metadata-fixtures.sh): %v", err)
+	}
+	return kit
+}
+
+// TestCommittedKitGolden pins the committed fixture kit (WS7): a fresh
+// in-process export over the committed dirty DB reproduces the committed
+// golden .hmr and reference manifest byte-for-byte, the ground-truth
+// digests match, and the run checksum file verifies. Any drift between the
+// generator, the normalization ruleset and the committed tree fails here.
+func TestCommittedKitGolden(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("export over the kit is not short")
+	}
+	kit := committedKitDir(t)
+	dirty := filepath.Join(kit, "harmony_db_0")
+	anchorPath := filepath.Join(kit, "recovery-anchor.localnet.json")
+
+	goldenHMR := readFile(t, filepath.Join(kit, "reference", "metadata-30.hmr"))
+	goldenRef := readFile(t, filepath.Join(kit, "reference", "metadata-30.reference.json"))
+
+	var truth struct {
+		Blocks       uint64 `json:"blocks"`
+		TargetHeight uint64 `json:"target_height"`
+		HMRSHA256    string `json:"hmr_sha256"`
+		RefSHA256    string `json:"reference_sha256"`
+	}
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(readFile(t, filepath.Join(kit, "ground-truth.json")), &truth); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if truth.Blocks != fxBlocks || truth.TargetHeight != fxTarget {
+		t.Fatalf("committed kit shape (blocks %d target %d) does not match the suite constants (%d/%d) — regenerate the kit",
+			truth.Blocks, truth.TargetHeight, fxBlocks, fxTarget)
+	}
+	if got := report.SHA256Hex(goldenHMR); got != truth.HMRSHA256 {
+		t.Fatalf("committed .hmr digest %s != ground truth %s", got, truth.HMRSHA256)
+	}
+	if got := report.SHA256Hex(goldenRef); got != truth.RefSHA256 {
+		t.Fatalf("committed reference digest %s != ground truth %s", got, truth.RefSHA256)
+	}
+	if err := integrity.Verify(filepath.Join(kit, "reference", "run-checksums.sha256")); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("committed run checksums do not verify: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Fresh export over the committed DB reproduces the goldens exactly.
+	out := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "out")
+	if code := runExportForAudit(t, dirty, anchorPath, out); code != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("export over the committed kit exit %d", code)
+	}
+	if !bytes.Equal(readFile(t, filepath.Join(out, "release", "metadata-30.hmr")), goldenHMR) {
+		t.Fatal("fresh export .hmr differs from the committed golden (ruleset/generator drift — regenerate the kit and review)")
+	}
+	if !bytes.Equal(readFile(t, filepath.Join(out, "release", "metadata-30.reference.json")), goldenRef) {
+		t.Fatal("fresh export reference manifest differs from the committed golden")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestKitRegeneratesByteIdentical is the complete-tree reproducibility
+// pin (WS7 / F7): regenerating the whole kit into a fresh directory with
+// metafixture.GenerateKit (the same code path the `gen` command uses)
+// reproduces the committed tree file-for-file and byte-for-byte. This
+// covers every artifact — both LevelDB directories (including the *.log
+// write-ahead files), the fixture-key *.hex files, the anchor config, the
+// golden reference artifacts and ground-truth.json — not just the .hmr and
+// manifest. Any generator/ruleset/canonicalization drift fails here and
+// tells the operator to regenerate and review the committed kit.
+func TestKitRegeneratesByteIdentical(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("kit regeneration is not short")
+	}
+	kit := committedKitDir(t)
+	fresh := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "kit")
+	if err := metafixture.GenerateKit(fresh, metafixture.RepoKeysDir(), io.Discard); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("regenerate kit: %v", err)
+	}
+	assertTreesEqual(t, kit, fresh)
+}
+
+// assertTreesEqual fails if the two directory trees differ in the set of
+// relative file paths or in any file's bytes.
+func assertTreesEqual(t *testing.T, a, b string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	fa := treeFiles(t, a)
+	fb := treeFiles(t, b)
+	for rel := range fa {
+		if _, ok := fb[rel]; !ok {
+			t.Errorf("committed kit has %s, regenerated tree does not", rel)
+		}
+	}
+	for rel := range fb {
+		if _, ok := fa[rel]; !ok {
+			t.Errorf("regenerated tree has %s, committed kit does not", rel)
+		}
+		if !bytes.Equal(fa[rel], fb[rel]) {
+			t.Errorf("file %s differs between committed and regenerated kit (%d vs %d bytes)", rel, len(fa[rel]), len(fb[rel]))
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func treeFiles(t *testing.T, root string) map[string][]byte {
+	t.Helper()
+	out := map[string][]byte{}
+	err := filepath.Walk(root, func(path string, info os.FileInfo, err error) error {
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if !info.Mode().IsRegular() {
+			return nil
+		}
+		rel, rerr := filepath.Rel(root, path)
+		if rerr != nil {
+			return rerr
+		}
+		data, rerr := os.ReadFile(path)
+		if rerr != nil {
+			return rerr
+		}
+		out[rel] = data
+		return nil
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("walk %s: %v", root, err)
+	}
+	return out
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/metadata/acceptance/legacy_receipt_test.go b/internal/recovery/metadata/acceptance/legacy_receipt_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ebdff3dcf3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/metadata/acceptance/legacy_receipt_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,283 @@
+package acceptance
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/rawdb"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/audit"
+	metafixture "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/fixture"
+)
+
+// The CXReceiptsProof.Copy bug (core/types/cx_receipt.go, present since
+// 2019-09-09) makes rawdb.WriteBlock store every incoming-receipt-carrying
+// body with CommitBitmap set to a byte-copy of the 96-byte CommitSig — the
+// quorum bitmap is simply gone from the stored body. The production fix is
+// out of scope for this recovery branch (no consensus/core changes), so the
+// fixture reproduces the mainnet on-disk shape NATIVELY: generation goes
+// through the stock WriteBlock and stores the corrupted body, while the true
+// bitmap survives only in the separately stored source-shard crosslink —
+// exactly as on the mainnet beacon chain. The audit restores the bitmap from
+// that crosslink and proves the restoration against the header's
+// IncomingReceiptHash commitment (audit/legacybitmap.go).
+
+// fixtureSrcShard1Block is the shard-1 source block number the fixture's
+// incoming receipt references (fixture.makeShard1IncomingReceipt call site).
+const fixtureSrcShard1Block = 5
+
+// assertStoredReceiptBitmapCorrupted pins the mainnet on-disk shape on the
+// freshly generated fixture: the stored proof's CommitBitmap must be the
+// Copy-bug signature copy. This is a canary — if the production Copy bug is
+// ever fixed, newly generated fixtures stop exhibiting the corruption and
+// this assertion fails, signalling that the restoration path lost its
+// natural fixture coverage and these tests must re-apply the corruption
+// manually to keep covering mainnet-era DBs.
+func assertStoredReceiptBitmapCorrupted(t *testing.T, dir string, n uint64) {
+	t.Helper()
+	db, err := rawdb.NewLevelDBDatabase(dir, 16, 64, "", false)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+	hash := rawdb.ReadCanonicalHash(db, n)
+	if hash == (common.Hash{}) {
+		t.Fatalf("no canonical hash at %d", n)
+	}
+	body := rawdb.ReadBody(db, hash, n)
+	if body == nil {
+		t.Fatalf("no body at %d", n)
+	}
+	cxps := body.IncomingReceipts()
+	if len(cxps) == 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("block %d carries no incoming receipts", n)
+	}
+	if len(cxps[0].CommitSig) != 96 || !bytes.Equal(cxps[0].CommitBitmap, cxps[0].CommitSig) {
+		t.Fatalf("stored proof at %d does not exhibit the legacy Copy-bug corruption "+
+			"(bitmap %d bytes, sig %d bytes) — was CXReceiptsProof.Copy fixed? These tests "+
+			"must then corrupt the stored body manually to keep covering mainnet-era DBs",
+			n, len(cxps[0].CommitBitmap), len(cxps[0].CommitSig))
+	}
+}
+
+// mutateStoredReceiptProof flips one byte of the stored proof's merkle-proof
+// shard hash at height n: execution (which applies only the receipts) is
+// untouched, so the block still re-executes to its stored root, but the
+// stored proof no longer verifies and the header commitment breaks.
+func mutateStoredReceiptProof(t *testing.T, dir string, n uint64) {
+	t.Helper()
+	db, err := rawdb.NewLevelDBDatabase(dir, 16, 64, "", false)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+	hash := rawdb.ReadCanonicalHash(db, n)
+	body := rawdb.ReadBody(db, hash, n)
+	if body == nil {
+		t.Fatalf("no body at %d", n)
+	}
+	cxps := body.IncomingReceipts()
+	if len(cxps) == 0 || cxps[0].MerkleProof == nil || len(cxps[0].MerkleProof.CXShardHashes) == 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("block %d has no receipt merkle proof to mutate", n)
+	}
+	cxps[0].MerkleProof.CXShardHashes[0][0] ^= 0xff
+	body.SetIncomingReceipts(cxps)
+	if err := rawdb.WriteBody(db, hash, n, body); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+}
+
+// removeShard1CrossLink deletes the stored shard-1 crosslink record for the
+// fixture's incoming-receipt source block, removing the audit's only
+// restoration source.
+func removeShard1CrossLink(t *testing.T, dir string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	db, err := rawdb.NewLevelDBDatabase(dir, 16, 64, "", false)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+	if _, err := rawdb.ReadCrossLinkShardBlock(db, 1, fixtureSrcShard1Block); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("fixture did not store the shard-1 crosslink to remove: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := rawdb.DeleteCrossLinkShardBlock(db, 1, fixtureSrcShard1Block); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+}
+
+// buildSpentFixture generates the incoming-receipt fixture shared by the
+// legacy-bitmap tests (same shape as TestAuditSpentMarkerPollution).
+func buildSpentFixture(t *testing.T, receiptAt uint64) (dir, anchorPath string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	const (
+		blocks   = 46
+		target   = 30
+		create   = 22
+		delegate = 26
+	)
+	dir = filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "harmony_db_0")
+	c, err := metafixture.Open(dir, metafixture.RepoKeysDir())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("open fixture: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := c.Generate(metafixture.Spec{
+		Blocks:            blocks,
+		CreateValidatorAt: create,
+		DelegateAt:        delegate,
+		IncomingReceiptAt: receiptAt,
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("generate: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := c.Finalize(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("finalize: %v", err)
+	}
+	anchorPath = filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "recovery-anchor.json")
+	if err := metafixture.WriteAnchorConfig(dir, target, blocks, nil, anchorPath); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return dir, anchorPath
+}
+
+func runAuditOn(t *testing.T, dir, anchorPath, outDir string) int {
+	t.Helper()
+	return audit.Run(context.Background(), audit.Options{
+		DBPath: dir, AnchorPath: anchorPath, OutDir: outDir,
+		Scratch:                 filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "scratch"),
+		SkipReserveCheckForTest: true,
+	}, os.Stderr)
+}
+
+// TestAuditLegacyReceiptBitmapRestored proves the audit runs cleanly against
+// the MAINNET on-disk shape, produced natively by the fixture: the stored
+// body's CommitBitmap is the Copy-bug signature copy, and the matching
+// crosslink exists (as it does on the beacon chain for every source-shard
+// block). The audit must restore the bitmap from the crosslink, prove the
+// restoration against the header's incoming-receipt commitment, and then
+// pass the FULL proof verification in pass 2 — exit 0, with the restoration
+// inventoried in both pass sections.
+func TestAuditLegacyReceiptBitmapRestored(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("fixture generation is not short")
+	}
+	const receipt = 38
+	dir, anchorPath := buildSpentFixture(t, receipt)
+	assertStoredReceiptBitmapCorrupted(t, dir, receipt)
+
+	outDir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "out")
+	code := runAuditOn(t, dir, anchorPath, outDir)
+	rep := readAuditReport(t, outDir)
+	if code != 0 {
+		for _, a := range rep.Reconciliation.Anomalies {
+			t.Logf("ANOMALY kind=%s key=%s detail=%s", a.Kind, a.Key, a.Detail)
+		}
+		for _, o := range rep.Pass2.FailedOutcomes {
+			t.Logf("PASS2 FAIL height=%d fails=%v", o.Height, o.ValidityFails)
+		}
+		t.Fatalf("legacy-bitmap audit exit %d verdict %s, want 0", code, rep.Verdict)
+	}
+	if rep.Pass1.LegacyBitmapsRestored < 1 || rep.Pass2.LegacyBitmapsRestored < 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("legacy bitmap restoration not inventoried: pass1=%d pass2=%d",
+			rep.Pass1.LegacyBitmapsRestored, rep.Pass2.LegacyBitmapsRestored)
+	}
+	// The restored proof passes the FULL verification chain in pass 2 (the
+	// pass-1 failure is only the expected spent-marker pollution).
+	if passHasFailPrefix(rep.Pass2, receipt, "incoming-receipts:") {
+		t.Fatalf("pass-2 incoming-receipts failure remains despite restoration: %+v", failedHeights(rep.Pass2))
+	}
+}
+
+// TestAuditLegacyReceiptBitmapUnrestorable pins the fail-closed side: the
+// same corruption WITHOUT a stored crosslink cannot be verifiably restored,
+// so the stored proof must fail validation (the bitmap truly is gone) and
+// gate the audit at 24 — restoration never guesses. The block still
+// re-executes to its stored root (the corruption is in the proof material,
+// not the applied receipts), which is exactly the "mutated stored incoming
+// receipts with roots verifying" shape.
+func TestAuditLegacyReceiptBitmapUnrestorable(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("fixture generation is not short")
+	}
+	const receipt = 38
+	dir, anchorPath := buildSpentFixture(t, receipt)
+	assertStoredReceiptBitmapCorrupted(t, dir, receipt)
+	removeShard1CrossLink(t, dir) // restoration source gone
+
+	outDir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "out")
+	code := runAuditOn(t, dir, anchorPath, outDir)
+	rep := readAuditReport(t, outDir)
+	if code != 24 {
+		t.Fatalf("unrestorable legacy-bitmap audit exit %d, want 24", code)
+	}
+	if !passHasFailPrefix(rep.Pass2, receipt, "incoming-receipts:") {
+		t.Fatalf("expected a pass-2 incoming-receipts failure at %d: %+v", receipt, failedHeights(rep.Pass2))
+	}
+	assertRootMatchedFailure(t, rep.Pass2, receipt)
+	assertUnexpectedValidityAnomaly(t, rep, receipt)
+}
+
+// TestAuditMutatedIncomingReceiptDetected is the direct review-finding case:
+// a stored incoming receipt whose PROOF material was mutated post-hoc (merkle
+// shard hash flipped) while execution — and therefore the state root — is
+// untouched. The audit must re-execute the block to its root AND still flag
+// the mutation via the failed proof verification, gating at 24. The
+// crosslink restoration source is still present, so the audit ATTEMPTS the
+// bitmap restoration — but the mutated proof bytes can no longer reproduce
+// the header's incoming-receipt commitment, so the substitution is rolled
+// back and nothing is silently repaired.
+func TestAuditMutatedIncomingReceiptDetected(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("fixture generation is not short")
+	}
+	const receipt = 38
+	dir, anchorPath := buildSpentFixture(t, receipt)
+	mutateStoredReceiptProof(t, dir, receipt)
+
+	outDir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "out")
+	code := runAuditOn(t, dir, anchorPath, outDir)
+	rep := readAuditReport(t, outDir)
+	if code != 24 {
+		t.Fatalf("mutated-receipt audit exit %d, want 24", code)
+	}
+	if !passHasFailPrefix(rep.Pass2, receipt, "incoming-receipts:") {
+		t.Fatalf("expected a pass-2 incoming-receipts failure at %d: %+v", receipt, failedHeights(rep.Pass2))
+	}
+	assertRootMatchedFailure(t, rep.Pass2, receipt)
+	assertUnexpectedValidityAnomaly(t, rep, receipt)
+	// The commitment check must have rolled the substitution back: no
+	// restoration may be counted for a proof whose bytes were tampered.
+	if rep.Pass1.LegacyBitmapsRestored != 0 || rep.Pass2.LegacyBitmapsRestored != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("restoration fired on a tampered proof: pass1=%d pass2=%d",
+			rep.Pass1.LegacyBitmapsRestored, rep.Pass2.LegacyBitmapsRestored)
+	}
+}
+
+// assertRootMatchedFailure requires the failed outcome at height to have
+// re-executed to its stored root — the failure is proof-material-only.
+func assertRootMatchedFailure(t *testing.T, p *audit.PassSection, height uint64) {
+	t.Helper()
+	for _, o := range p.FailedOutcomes {
+		if o.Height == height {
+			if !o.Executed || !o.RootMatched {
+				t.Fatalf("outcome at %d executed=%v root_matched=%v, want both true (roots must verify)", height, o.Executed, o.RootMatched)
+			}
+			return
+		}
+	}
+	t.Fatalf("no failed outcome at %d: %+v", height, failedHeights(p))
+}
+
+func assertUnexpectedValidityAnomaly(t *testing.T, rep *audit.Report, height uint64) {
+	t.Helper()
+	want := fmt.Sprintf("%d", height)
+	for _, a := range rep.Reconciliation.Anomalies {
+		if a.Kind == "unexpected-validity-failure" && a.Key == want {
+			return
+		}
+	}
+	t.Fatalf("no unexpected-validity-failure anomaly at %d: %+v", height, rep.Reconciliation.Anomalies)
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/metadata/acceptance/matrix_test.go b/internal/recovery/metadata/acceptance/matrix_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c68a2b4e3f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/metadata/acceptance/matrix_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,588 @@
+package acceptance
+
+import (
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"math/big"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common"
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/rlp"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/rawdb"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/audit"
+	staking "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/staking/types"
+)
+
+// ---- cold-DB raw tamper helpers (WS6 injected-fault matrix; be8 lives
+// in scan_codes_test.go) ----
+
+// tamperBlockSig flips a byte inside the raw block-sig-N record (the
+// aggregate commit signature): seal verification of block N must fail as a
+// recorded finding while everything else stays intact.
+func tamperBlockSig(t *testing.T, dir string, n uint64) {
+	t.Helper()
+	db, err := rawdb.NewLevelDBDatabase(dir, 16, 64, "", false)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+	key := append([]byte("block-sig-"), be8(n)...)
+	v, err := db.Get(key)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("read block-sig-%d: %v", n, err)
+	}
+	v = append([]byte(nil), v...)
+	v[0] ^= 0xff
+	if err := db.Put(key, v); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+}
+
+// tamperHeaderRoot rewrites branch header N in place (same h+num+hash key)
+// with a corrupted state root: re-execution to the original root must
+// diverge from the tampered header, a Fatal abort naming the height.
+func tamperHeaderRoot(t *testing.T, dir string, n uint64) {
+	t.Helper()
+	db, err := rawdb.NewLevelDBDatabase(dir, 16, 64, "", false)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+	hash := rawdb.ReadCanonicalHash(db, n)
+	if hash == (common.Hash{}) {
+		t.Fatalf("no canonical hash at %d", n)
+	}
+	hdr := rawdb.ReadHeader(db, hash, n)
+	if hdr == nil {
+		t.Fatalf("no header at %d", n)
+	}
+	hdr.SetRoot(common.HexToHash("0xdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeef"))
+	enc, err := rlp.EncodeToBytes(hdr)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	key := append(append([]byte("h"), be8(n)...), hash.Bytes()...)
+	if err := db.Put(key, enc); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+}
+
+// tamperIncomingReceiptHash rewrites header N in place with a nonzero
+// IncomingReceiptHash while the block carries no incoming receipts: the
+// patched incoming-receipts validation must fail as a recorded finding
+// (this is the exploit signature the known-bad gate keys on).
+func tamperIncomingReceiptHash(t *testing.T, dir string, n uint64) {
+	t.Helper()
+	db, err := rawdb.NewLevelDBDatabase(dir, 16, 64, "", false)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+	hash := rawdb.ReadCanonicalHash(db, n)
+	if hash == (common.Hash{}) {
+		t.Fatalf("no canonical hash at %d", n)
+	}
+	hdr := rawdb.ReadHeader(db, hash, n)
+	if hdr == nil {
+		t.Fatalf("no header at %d", n)
+	}
+	hdr.SetIncomingReceiptHash(common.HexToHash("0xbadbadbadbadbadbadbadbadbadbadbadbadbadbadbadbadbadbadbadbadbad01"))
+	enc, err := rlp.EncodeToBytes(hdr)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	key := append(append([]byte("h"), be8(n)...), hash.Bytes()...)
+	if err := db.Put(key, enc); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+}
+
+// tamperLastCommit corrupts header N's embedded LastCommitSignature in
+// place: engine.VerifyHeader(seal=true) — the mandatory general header
+// verification that InsertChain(..., false) skips — must fail as a recorded
+// verify-header finding.
+func tamperLastCommit(t *testing.T, dir string, n uint64) {
+	t.Helper()
+	db, err := rawdb.NewLevelDBDatabase(dir, 16, 64, "", false)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+	hash := rawdb.ReadCanonicalHash(db, n)
+	if hash == (common.Hash{}) {
+		t.Fatalf("no canonical hash at %d", n)
+	}
+	hdr := rawdb.ReadHeader(db, hash, n)
+	if hdr == nil {
+		t.Fatalf("no header at %d", n)
+	}
+	sig := hdr.LastCommitSignature()
+	sig[0] ^= 0xff
+	hdr.SetLastCommitSignature(sig)
+	enc, err := rlp.EncodeToBytes(hdr)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	key := append(append([]byte("h"), be8(n)...), hash.Bytes()...)
+	if err := db.Put(key, enc); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+}
+
+// redirectCanonicalMapping repoints canonical(n) at a WRONG hash and moves
+// the true header/body/receipt records under that wrong key (the originals
+// are deleted — the true records exist ONLY under the wrong key). Every
+// record remains individually valid: ancestry holds, execution reproduces
+// the true roots, and every signature verifies over the true content. The
+// ONLY defect is the mapping/record identity mismatch, so this fixture
+// isolates the mandatory source-identity validation.
+func redirectCanonicalMapping(t *testing.T, dir string, n uint64) {
+	t.Helper()
+	db, err := rawdb.NewLevelDBDatabase(dir, 16, 64, "", false)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+	hash := rawdb.ReadCanonicalHash(db, n)
+	if hash == (common.Hash{}) {
+		t.Fatalf("no canonical hash at %d", n)
+	}
+	wrong := hash
+	wrong[31] ^= 0xff
+	for _, prefix := range []byte{'h', 'b', 'r'} {
+		key := append(append([]byte{prefix}, be8(n)...), hash.Bytes()...)
+		v, err := db.Get(key)
+		if err != nil {
+			if prefix == 'r' {
+				continue // receipts are optional at this height
+			}
+			t.Fatalf("read %c record at %d: %v", prefix, n, err)
+		}
+		if err := db.Put(append(append([]byte{prefix}, be8(n)...), wrong.Bytes()...), v); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if err := db.Delete(key); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	canonical := append(append([]byte("h"), be8(n)...), 'n')
+	if err := db.Put(canonical, wrong.Bytes()); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+}
+
+// plantFutureSS copies the epoch-2 shard state to the never-written key
+// ss<5>: a planned future-epoch deletion the branch can never reproduce.
+func plantFutureSS(t *testing.T, dir string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	db, err := rawdb.NewLevelDBDatabase(dir, 16, 64, "", false)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+	v, err := db.Get(append([]byte("ss"), 0x02))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("read ss<2>: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := db.Put(append([]byte("ss"), 0x05), v); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+}
+
+func readAuditReport(t *testing.T, outDir string) *audit.Report {
+	t.Helper()
+	var rep audit.Report
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(outDir, "abandoned-branch-audit.json"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("read audit report: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &rep); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return &rep
+}
+
+// TestAuditTamperedSealFinding is the WS6 header-validation fixture: a
+// raw-tampered aggregate commit signature (block-sig of the head, the only
+// height whose seal source is the exact key rather than the child header)
+// must surface as a recorded seal-verification finding at that height —
+// the InsertChain(..., false)-skips-headers regression — and, being a
+// validity failure outside the anchored known-bad list, gate the audit to
+// exit 24.
+func TestAuditTamperedSealFinding(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("fixture generation is not short")
+	}
+	dir := buildFixture(t)
+	tamperBlockSig(t, dir, fxBlocks)
+	anchorPath := writeAnchor(t, dir, fxTarget)
+	outDir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "out")
+	code := runAuditForSeal(t, dir, anchorPath, outDir, filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "scratch"))
+	if code != 24 {
+		t.Fatalf("tampered-seal audit exit %d, want 24", code)
+	}
+	rep := readAuditReport(t, outDir)
+	var sealFail bool
+	for _, o := range rep.Pass2.FailedOutcomes {
+		if o.Height != fxBlocks {
+			t.Fatalf("unexpected validity failure at %d: %+v", o.Height, o)
+		}
+		for _, f := range o.ValidityFails {
+			if strings.Contains(f, "seal") || strings.Contains(f, "signature") {
+				sealFail = true
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if !sealFail {
+		t.Fatalf("expected a seal/signature validity failure at %d: %+v", fxBlocks, rep.Pass2.FailedOutcomes)
+	}
+	// Execution itself is unaffected: every root still matched.
+	if rep.Pass2.RootsMatched != rep.Pass2.ExecutedBlocks {
+		t.Fatal("a seal tamper must not affect execution roots")
+	}
+	found := false
+	for _, a := range rep.Reconciliation.Anomalies {
+		if a.Kind == "unexpected-validity-failure" {
+			found = true
+		}
+	}
+	if !found {
+		t.Fatalf("expected an unexpected-validity-failure anomaly, got %+v", rep.Reconciliation.Anomalies)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestAuditRootMismatchFatal is the WS6 root-mismatch fixture: a branch
+// header whose state root is raw-tampered in place must abort the audit as
+// Fatal naming the height (state-root divergence on the branch would be a
+// major discovery; the report is still written).
+func TestAuditRootMismatchFatal(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("fixture generation is not short")
+	}
+	const tamperAt = fxPostCreate // any branch height works
+	dir := buildFixture(t)
+	tamperHeaderRoot(t, dir, tamperAt)
+	anchorPath := writeAnchor(t, dir, fxTarget)
+	outDir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "out")
+	code := runAuditForSeal(t, dir, anchorPath, outDir, filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "scratch"))
+	if code == 0 {
+		t.Fatal("root-mismatch audit must not exit 0")
+	}
+	rep := readAuditReport(t, outDir)
+	if rep.Pass1 == nil || !rep.Pass1.Fatal {
+		t.Fatalf("expected a Fatal pass-1 abort, got %+v", rep.Pass1)
+	}
+	if rep.Pass1.FatalHeight != tamperAt {
+		t.Fatalf("fatal at height %d, want %d", rep.Pass1.FatalHeight, tamperAt)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestAuditTamperedHeaderVerifyHeaderFinding pins that the mandatory
+// engine.VerifyHeader(seal=true) call — the general header verification
+// InsertChain(..., false) skips entirely — runs per branch block and
+// records failures: a corrupted embedded LastCommitSignature on the head
+// header must surface as a verify-header validity finding at that height
+// and, being outside the (empty) known-bad list, gate the audit to 24.
+func TestAuditTamperedHeaderVerifyHeaderFinding(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("fixture generation is not short")
+	}
+	dir := buildFixture(t)
+	tamperLastCommit(t, dir, fxBlocks)
+	anchorPath := writeAnchor(t, dir, fxTarget)
+	outDir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "out")
+	code := runAuditForSeal(t, dir, anchorPath, outDir, filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "scratch"))
+	if code != 24 {
+		t.Fatalf("tampered-header audit exit %d, want 24", code)
+	}
+	rep := readAuditReport(t, outDir)
+	var verifyHeaderFail bool
+	for _, o := range rep.Pass2.FailedOutcomes {
+		// The tampered head header is ALSO block N-1's commit-sig source
+		// (CommitSigFor reads the child header), so a collateral
+		// header-signature failure at N-1 is expected alongside the
+		// verify-header failure at N.
+		if o.Height != fxBlocks && o.Height != fxBlocks-1 {
+			t.Fatalf("unexpected validity failure at %d: %+v", o.Height, o)
+		}
+		if o.Height != fxBlocks {
+			continue
+		}
+		for _, f := range o.ValidityFails {
+			if strings.HasPrefix(f, "verify-header:") {
+				verifyHeaderFail = true
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if !verifyHeaderFail {
+		t.Fatalf("expected a verify-header validity failure at %d: %+v", fxBlocks, rep.Pass2.FailedOutcomes)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestAuditRedirectedCanonicalMappingCannotExitZero is the source-identity
+// end-to-end fixture: canonical(n) is redirected to a wrong hash whose
+// records are the TRUE block's bytes (stored only under the wrong key).
+// Ancestry holds, execution reproduces the true roots, and every signature
+// verifies over the true content — no ancestry/cryptographic/execution
+// check can convict the redirect. The audit must still record the identity
+// mismatch as a mandatory source-identity validity failure at n (plus the
+// collateral commit-sig-source finding at n-1, whose extracted material
+// still verifies) and gate to exit 24 — such a DB can never exit 0.
+func TestAuditRedirectedCanonicalMappingCannotExitZero(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("fixture generation is not short")
+	}
+	const redirectAt = fxPostCreate // any branch height works
+	dir := buildFixture(t)
+	redirectCanonicalMapping(t, dir, redirectAt)
+	anchorPath := writeAnchor(t, dir, fxTarget)
+	outDir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "out")
+	code := runAuditForSeal(t, dir, anchorPath, outDir, filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "scratch"))
+	if code != 24 {
+		t.Fatalf("redirected-mapping audit exit %d, want 24", code)
+	}
+	rep := readAuditReport(t, outDir)
+	var sawBlockIdentity, sawSigIdentity bool
+	for _, o := range rep.Pass2.FailedOutcomes {
+		if o.Height != redirectAt && o.Height != redirectAt-1 {
+			t.Fatalf("unexpected validity failure at %d: %+v", o.Height, o)
+		}
+		for _, f := range o.ValidityFails {
+			if !strings.HasPrefix(f, "source-identity:") {
+				t.Fatalf("only source-identity failures expected (everything else verifies), got at %d: %s", o.Height, f)
+			}
+			if o.Height == redirectAt {
+				sawBlockIdentity = true
+			} else {
+				sawSigIdentity = true
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if !sawBlockIdentity || !sawSigIdentity {
+		t.Fatalf("want source-identity failures at %d (block) and %d (commit-sig source), got %+v",
+			redirectAt, redirectAt-1, rep.Pass2.FailedOutcomes)
+	}
+	// The redirect gates through the known-bad cross-check (empty list →
+	// unexpected-validity-failure anomalies).
+	var anom bool
+	for _, a := range rep.Reconciliation.Anomalies {
+		if a.Kind == "unexpected-validity-failure" {
+			anom = true
+		}
+	}
+	if !anom {
+		t.Fatalf("expected unexpected-validity-failure anomalies, got %+v", rep.Reconciliation.Anomalies)
+	}
+	// Execution itself is untouched: the content is the true block, so
+	// every executed root still matched.
+	if rep.Pass2.RootsMatched != rep.Pass2.ExecutedBlocks {
+		t.Fatal("a pure mapping redirect must not affect execution roots")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestAuditKnownBadExtraFailureAnomalous is the F1 round-2 pin: a known-bad
+// height reproduces the expected incoming-receipts exploit failure (so the
+// exploit signature IS cross-checked) but the same tamper also breaks the
+// header commit signature. The anchor excuses ONLY the receipt failure, so
+// the collateral header-signature defect must surface as a
+// known-bad-extra-failure anomaly and gate the audit to 24 — the known-bad
+// entry is not a blanket amnesty for every failure at the height.
+//
+// Note: tampering IncomingReceiptHash necessarily also invalidates the commit
+// signature over the header, and a body-level incoming-receipt tamper is
+// applied by re-execution and diverges the state root into a FATAL insert.
+// A clean receipt-ONLY validity failure is therefore not producible on a
+// single-shard localnet fixture; the gate-satisfied (exit 0) path is proven
+// deterministically by the unit test audit.TestCrossCheckKnownBad
+// ("receipt_only_at_known_bad_satisfies_gate").
+func TestAuditKnownBadExtraFailureAnomalous(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("fixture generation is not short")
+	}
+	dir := buildFixture(t)
+	tamperIncomingReceiptHash(t, dir, fxBlocks)
+	anchorPath := writeAnchorKnownBad(t, dir, fxTarget, []uint64{fxBlocks})
+	outDir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "out")
+	code := runAuditForSeal(t, dir, anchorPath, outDir, filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "scratch"))
+	if code != 24 {
+		rep := readAuditReport(t, outDir)
+		for _, a := range rep.Reconciliation.Anomalies {
+			t.Logf("ANOMALY kind=%s key=%s detail=%s", a.Kind, a.Key, a.Detail)
+		}
+		t.Fatalf("known-bad extra-failure audit exit %d, want 24", code)
+	}
+	rep := readAuditReport(t, outDir)
+	// The exploit signature (incoming-receipts) was reproduced ...
+	if !rep.KnownBadCrossChecked {
+		t.Fatal("known_bad_cross_checked must be true when the known-bad block reproduces the incoming-receipts failure")
+	}
+	var sawReceipts, sawSig bool
+	for _, o := range rep.Pass2.FailedOutcomes {
+		// The tampered head header is ALSO block N-1's commit-sig source:
+		// its in-place rewrite fails child-record identity validation, so a
+		// collateral source-identity failure at N-1 is expected alongside
+		// the failures at N.
+		if o.Height != fxBlocks && o.Height != fxBlocks-1 {
+			t.Fatalf("unexpected validity failure at %d", o.Height)
+		}
+		if o.Height != fxBlocks {
+			continue
+		}
+		for _, f := range o.ValidityFails {
+			if strings.HasPrefix(f, "incoming-receipts:") {
+				sawReceipts = true
+			}
+			if strings.HasPrefix(f, "header-signature:") {
+				sawSig = true
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if !sawReceipts || !sawSig {
+		t.Fatalf("expected both incoming-receipts and header-signature failures at %d: %+v", fxBlocks, rep.Pass2.FailedOutcomes)
+	}
+	// ... but the collateral header-signature defect is NOT excused: a
+	// known-bad-extra-failure anomaly at the height gates the audit.
+	found := false
+	for _, a := range rep.Reconciliation.Anomalies {
+		if a.Kind == "known-bad-extra-failure" && a.Key == "48" {
+			found = true
+		}
+	}
+	if !found {
+		t.Fatalf("expected a known-bad-extra-failure anomaly at 48, got %+v", rep.Reconciliation.Anomalies)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestAuditKnownBadWrongFailure is the NEGATIVE known-bad-gate case (F1): a
+// seal/signature failure at the anchored known-bad height is NOT the
+// exploit signature. The gate must reject it (known_bad_cross_checked
+// false), raise a known-bad-wrong-failure anomaly, and exit 24 — a
+// non-incoming-receipts defect must never satisfy the exploit detector.
+func TestAuditKnownBadWrongFailure(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("fixture generation is not short")
+	}
+	dir := buildFixture(t)
+	tamperBlockSig(t, dir, fxBlocks)
+	anchorPath := writeAnchorKnownBad(t, dir, fxTarget, []uint64{fxBlocks})
+	outDir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "out")
+	code := runAuditForSeal(t, dir, anchorPath, outDir, filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "scratch"))
+	if code != 24 {
+		t.Fatalf("seal failure at the known-bad height must exit 24 (wrong defect), got %d", code)
+	}
+	rep := readAuditReport(t, outDir)
+	if rep.KnownBadCrossChecked {
+		t.Fatal("a seal/signature failure must NOT satisfy the incoming-receipts exploit gate")
+	}
+	found := false
+	for _, a := range rep.Reconciliation.Anomalies {
+		if a.Kind == "known-bad-wrong-failure" && a.Key == "48" {
+			found = true
+		}
+	}
+	if !found {
+		t.Fatalf("expected a known-bad-wrong-failure anomaly at 48, got %+v", rep.Reconciliation.Anomalies)
+	}
+}
+
+// plantSuppressedDVLAppend plants a dvl reverse-index key whose single entry
+// claims a BRANCH delegation (BlockNum fxPostDeleg, a real branch height) by
+// a delegator that appears in NO branch block. Normalization classifies the
+// key post-target-only and schedules its deletion — i.e. the plan expects
+// the branch re-execution to REWRITE it (the way it rewrites the genuine
+// fxPostDeleg dvl append). Re-execution never writes this delegator's key,
+// so its reproduction is SUPPRESSED. Returns the planted key.
+func plantSuppressedDVLAppend(t *testing.T, dir string) []byte {
+	t.Helper()
+	delegator := common.HexToAddress("0x00000000000000000000000000000000dEaDD0d0")
+	validator := common.HexToAddress("0x00000000000000000000000000000000dEaDbEEF")
+	value, err := rlp.EncodeToBytes(staking.DelegationIndexes{{
+		ValidatorAddress: validator,
+		Index:            1,
+		BlockNum:         big.NewInt(fxPostDeleg),
+	}})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	key := append([]byte("dvl"), delegator.Bytes()...)
+	db, err := rawdb.NewLevelDBDatabase(dir, 16, 64, "", false)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+	if err := db.Put(key, value); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return key
+}
+
+// TestAuditSuppressedBranchRewriteAnomaly is the review-round pin on plan
+// reconciliation (finding 2): unlike the planted FUTURE key below (ss<5>,
+// a key nothing could ever write), this plants a key in a namespace the
+// branch genuinely rewrites (a dvl append attributed to the fxPostDeleg
+// branch height) whose reproduction is then suppressed because no branch
+// block carries that delegator's op. The bidirectional reconciliation must
+// flag the missing rewrite (plan-key-not-reproduced naming the exact key)
+// and gate the audit at 24 — while the REAL branch dvl rewrites still
+// reproduce.
+func TestAuditSuppressedBranchRewriteAnomaly(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("fixture generation is not short")
+	}
+	dir := buildFixture(t)
+	key := plantSuppressedDVLAppend(t, dir)
+	anchorPath := writeAnchor(t, dir, fxTarget)
+	outDir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "out")
+	code := runAuditForSeal(t, dir, anchorPath, outDir, filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "scratch"))
+	if code != 24 {
+		t.Fatalf("suppressed-rewrite audit exit %d, want 24", code)
+	}
+	rep := readAuditReport(t, outDir)
+	found := false
+	for _, a := range rep.Reconciliation.Anomalies {
+		if a.Kind == "plan-key-not-reproduced" && a.Key == fmt.Sprintf("%x", key) {
+			found = true
+		}
+	}
+	if !found {
+		t.Fatalf("expected plan-key-not-reproduced naming the planted dvl key %x, got %+v",
+			key, rep.Reconciliation.Anomalies)
+	}
+	// The genuine branch metadata rewrites still reproduce: the suppression
+	// finding is specific to the planted key, not a blanket failure.
+	if rep.Reconciliation.Reproduced < 1 || rep.Reconciliation.ByteEqual < 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("real branch rewrites did not reproduce: %+v", rep.Reconciliation)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestAuditPlantedKeyAnomaly is WS6 injected-anomaly (a): a planted
+// post-target metadata key (ss<5>, an epoch the branch never reaches) is a
+// planned deletion the re-execution can never reproduce — exit 24 naming
+// the key.
+func TestAuditPlantedKeyAnomaly(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("fixture generation is not short")
+	}
+	dir := buildFixture(t)
+	plantFutureSS(t, dir)
+	anchorPath := writeAnchor(t, dir, fxTarget)
+	outDir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "out")
+	code := runAuditForSeal(t, dir, anchorPath, outDir, filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "scratch"))
+	if code != 24 {
+		t.Fatalf("planted-key audit exit %d, want 24", code)
+	}
+	rep := readAuditReport(t, outDir)
+	found := false
+	for _, a := range rep.Reconciliation.Anomalies {
+		if a.Kind == "plan-key-not-reproduced" && a.Key == "737305" { // "ss\x05"
+			found = true
+		}
+	}
+	if !found {
+		t.Fatalf("expected plan-key-not-reproduced naming ss<5> (737305), got %+v", rep.Reconciliation.Anomalies)
+	}
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/metadata/acceptance/native_matrix_test.go b/internal/recovery/metadata/acceptance/native_matrix_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8daa6f902c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/metadata/acceptance/native_matrix_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+package acceptance
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/audit"
+	metafixture "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/fixture"
+)
+
+// TestAuditNativeDirectiveMatrix extends the WS6 staking coverage beyond
+// Delegate/CreateValidator: it drives a branch that also carries a native
+// EditValidator and a native Undelegate, plus a 0xfc precompile Delegate
+// and a 0xfc precompile Undelegate, and asserts the audit inventories every
+// directive in both the native and precompile censuses while the two-pass
+// reconciliation still closes cleanly (exit 0).
+//
+// CollectRewards needs a longer, reward-funded branch and is covered
+// end-to-end by TestAuditCollectRewards (collect_rewards_test.go).
+func TestAuditNativeDirectiveMatrix(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("fixture generation is not short")
+	}
+	const (
+		blocks    = 46
+		target    = 30
+		create    = 22
+		delegate  = 26
+		fund      = 28
+		precDel   = 40 // EOA→0xfc Delegate to the pre-target validator
+		edit      = 42 // native EditValidator (deployer edits its validator)
+		undeleg   = 44 // native Undelegate (test account, from block-26 stake)
+		precUndel = 46 // EOA→0xfc Undelegate of its own delegation
+	)
+	dir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "harmony_db_0")
+	c, err := metafixture.Open(dir, metafixture.RepoKeysDir())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("open fixture: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := c.Generate(metafixture.Spec{
+		Blocks:                 blocks,
+		CreateValidatorAt:      create,
+		DelegateAt:             delegate,
+		FundPrecompileAt:       fund,
+		PrecompileDirectAt:     precDel,
+		EditValidatorAt:        edit,
+		UndelegateAt:           undeleg,
+		PrecompileUndelegateAt: precUndel,
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("generate: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := c.Finalize(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("finalize: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	anchorPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "recovery-anchor.json")
+	if err := metafixture.WriteAnchorConfig(dir, target, blocks, nil, anchorPath); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	outDir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "out")
+	code := audit.Run(context.Background(), audit.Options{
+		DBPath: dir, AnchorPath: anchorPath, OutDir: outDir,
+		Scratch:                 filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "scratch"),
+		SkipReserveCheckForTest: true,
+	}, os.Stderr)
+	rep := readAuditReport(t, outDir)
+	if code != 0 {
+		for _, a := range rep.Reconciliation.Anomalies {
+			t.Logf("ANOMALY kind=%s key=%s detail=%s", a.Kind, a.Key, a.Detail)
+		}
+		t.Fatalf("directive-matrix audit exit %d verdict %s", code, rep.Verdict)
+	}
+	// Native directive census: EditValidator and Undelegate present.
+	for _, d := range []string{"EditValidator", "Undelegate"} {
+		if rep.Staking.NativeByDirective[d] < 1 {
+			t.Fatalf("native directive %q not inventoried: %+v", d, rep.Staking.NativeByDirective)
+		}
+	}
+	// Precompile census: a Delegate and an Undelegate frame, both parseable.
+	if rep.Staking.PrecompileByKind["Delegate"] < 1 || rep.Staking.PrecompileByKind["Undelegate"] != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("precompile kinds unexpected: %+v", rep.Staking.PrecompileByKind)
+	}
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/metadata/acceptance/norm_direct_test.go b/internal/recovery/metadata/acceptance/norm_direct_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..792bebaebc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/metadata/acceptance/norm_direct_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,243 @@
+package acceptance
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"math/big"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/rawdb"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/anchor"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/dbopen"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/fixture"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/norm"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/source"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/report"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/strictdb"
+)
+
+// normalizeDir runs the shared library directly over a DB dir and returns
+// the result (digests + normalized values).
+func normalizeDir(t *testing.T, dir, anchorPath string) *norm.Result {
+	t.Helper()
+	res, err := anchor.Resolve(anchorPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	open, err := source.OpenSource(dir, res, dbopen.Options{})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("open source: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer open.Close()
+	srcs, err := open.BuildSources()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	r, err := norm.Normalize(open.NormA, srcs)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return r
+}
+
+func digestJSON(t *testing.T, r *norm.Result) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	b, err := report.CanonicalJSON(r.Digests)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return string(b)
+}
+
+// TestJunkInsensitivity: independently junked copies of the same chain
+// (extra pendingCL, sync markers, stats content) produce byte-identical
+// digests and absence assertions.
+func TestJunkInsensitivity(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("fixture generation is not short")
+	}
+	dir := buildFixture(t)
+	anchorPath := writeAnchor(t, dir, fxTarget)
+	base := normalizeDir(t, dir, anchorPath)
+	baseDigest := digestJSON(t, base)
+
+	junk := t.TempDir() + "/harmony_db_0"
+	if err := fixture.CopyDir(dir, junk); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	addJunk(t, junk)
+	jres := normalizeDir(t, junk, anchorPath)
+	if digestJSON(t, jres) != baseDigest {
+		t.Fatal("junked copy produced different digests (normalization is not junk-insensitive)")
+	}
+	// Absence assertions (predicate + expected_remaining) must be identical.
+	if len(jres.Assertions) != len(base.Assertions) {
+		t.Fatalf("assertion counts differ: %d vs %d", len(jres.Assertions), len(base.Assertions))
+	}
+	for i := range base.Assertions {
+		if base.Assertions[i].Namespace != jres.Assertions[i].Namespace ||
+			base.Assertions[i].Predicate != jres.Assertions[i].Predicate ||
+			base.Assertions[i].ExpectedRemaining != jres.Assertions[i].ExpectedRemaining {
+			t.Fatalf("absence assertion %d differs under junk", i)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// TestMechanicalCleanEquality is B5 test 1: the dirty descendant normalizes
+// to the clean golden. Mechanically apply the deletion plan (deletions +
+// rewrites) to a copy, then re-normalize: the digests must match, no
+// epoch>T / post-T record remains, and the stats namespace is bit-identical
+// to the input.
+func TestMechanicalCleanEquality(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("fixture generation is not short")
+	}
+	dir := buildFixture(t)
+	anchorPath := writeAnchor(t, dir, fxTarget)
+	base := normalizeDir(t, dir, anchorPath)
+	baseDigest := digestJSON(t, base)
+
+	// Snapshot the source stats namespace for the bit-identical check.
+	srcStats := readNamespace(t, dir, []byte("validator-stats"))
+
+	clean := t.TempDir() + "/harmony_db_0"
+	if err := fixture.CopyDir(dir, clean); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	applyPlan(t, clean, base)
+
+	// Re-normalize the cleaned copy: identical digests (the dirty
+	// descendant reduced to the clean golden).
+	cres := normalizeDir(t, clean, anchorPath)
+	if digestJSON(t, cres) != baseDigest {
+		t.Fatal("mechanically cleaned copy does not normalize to the same digests")
+	}
+
+	// Raw-prefix scans: no epoch>T snapshot/ss, no post-T blk-rwd, no
+	// post-T dvl index remain.
+	assertNoFutureRecords(t, clean)
+
+	// Stats namespace bit-identical (kept untouched, §8 Q4).
+	cleanStats := readNamespace(t, clean, []byte("validator-stats"))
+	if !equalKV(srcStats, cleanStats) {
+		t.Fatal("stats namespace changed under mechanical cleanup (must be bit-identical)")
+	}
+}
+
+// addJunk writes node-local / sync-era junk that normalization must ignore.
+func addJunk(t *testing.T, dir string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	db, err := rawdb.NewLevelDBDatabase(dir, 16, 64, "", false)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+	put := func(k, v []byte) {
+		if err := db.Put(k, v); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	put([]byte("pendingCL"), []byte("junk-pending-crosslinks"))
+	put([]byte("pendingSC"), []byte("junk-pending-slashing"))
+	put([]byte("LastPivot"), []byte("junk-pivot"))
+	put([]byte("SnapdbInfo"), []byte("junk-snapdb"))
+	put([]byte("unclean-shutdown"), []byte("junk"))
+	put([]byte("LastCommits"), []byte("junk-legacy-commits"))
+}
+
+// applyPlan mechanically applies the deletion plan to a DB copy
+// (test-harness only; B4 owns production apply).
+func applyPlan(t *testing.T, dir string, r *norm.Result) {
+	t.Helper()
+	db, err := rawdb.NewLevelDBDatabase(dir, 16, 64, "", false)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+	for _, d := range r.Deletions.Deletions() {
+		if err := db.Delete(common.FromHex(d.Key)); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	// Rewrites: materialize the normalized values from the set.
+	rewrite := map[string][]byte{}
+	rewrite[string(r.Normalized.ValidatorList.Key)] = r.Normalized.ValidatorList.Value
+	for _, rec := range r.Normalized.DVL {
+		rewrite[string(rec.Key)] = rec.Value
+	}
+	for _, rw := range r.Deletions.Rewrites() {
+		key := common.FromHex(rw.Key)
+		val, ok := rewrite[string(key)]
+		if !ok {
+			t.Fatalf("no normalized value to materialize rewrite %s", rw.Key)
+		}
+		if report.SHA256Hex(val) != rw.NewValueSHA256 {
+			t.Fatalf("rewrite value hash mismatch for %s", rw.Key)
+		}
+		if err := db.Put(key, val); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func assertNoFutureRecords(t *testing.T, dir string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	db, err := dbopen.OpenStrictReadOnly(dir, dbopen.Options{})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+	kv := db.KV()
+	target := uint64(fxTarget)
+	epoch := uint64(2)
+
+	check := func(prefix []byte) {
+		_ = strictdb.ForEach(kv, prefix, func(key, value []byte) error {
+			ns, meta := strictdb.Classify(key)
+			switch ns {
+			case strictdb.NsValidatorSnapshot, strictdb.NsShardState:
+				if meta.Epoch != nil && meta.Epoch.Uint64() > epoch {
+					t.Fatalf("epoch>%d record remains in cleaned DB: %s %x", epoch, ns, key)
+				}
+			case strictdb.NsBlockRewardAccum:
+				if meta.Number > target {
+					t.Fatalf("post-target blk-rwd remains: %d", meta.Number)
+				}
+			}
+			return nil
+		})
+	}
+	check([]byte("validator-snapshot"))
+	check([]byte("ss"))
+	check([]byte("blk-rwd-"))
+}
+
+func readNamespace(t *testing.T, dir string, prefix []byte) map[string][]byte {
+	t.Helper()
+	db, err := dbopen.OpenStrictReadOnly(dir, dbopen.Options{})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+	out := map[string][]byte{}
+	_ = strictdb.ForEach(db.KV(), prefix, func(k, v []byte) error {
+		out[string(k)] = append([]byte(nil), v...)
+		return nil
+	})
+	return out
+}
+
+func equalKV(a, b map[string][]byte) bool {
+	if len(a) != len(b) {
+		return false
+	}
+	for k, v := range a {
+		if !bytes.Equal(b[k], v) {
+			return false
+		}
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+var _ = big.NewInt
diff --git a/internal/recovery/metadata/acceptance/replacement_test.go b/internal/recovery/metadata/acceptance/replacement_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0db4f67dbc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/metadata/acceptance/replacement_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+package acceptance
+
+import (
+	"math/big"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core"
+	coregenesis "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/genesis"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/rawdb"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/types"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/vm"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/chain"
+	nodeconfig "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/configs/node"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/anchor"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/dbopen"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/audit"
+	metafixture "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/fixture"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/norm"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/source"
+)
+
+// replacement post-target schedule: the SAME validator address is
+// re-created and re-delegated-to at heights that differ from the dirty
+// branch (40/42), so any reactivated stale index is unambiguous.
+const (
+	rpPostCreate = 41
+	rpPostDeleg  = 43
+)
+
+// TestReplacementBranchNoReactivation is B5 bullet (6) in its literal
+// form: over the masked overlay of the dirty chain (deletion plan applied,
+// post-target records tombstoned, heads rewound), InsertChain a FRESH
+// valid successor branch that re-creates the post-target validator address
+// and re-delegates to it. Every resulting dvl index must carry the fresh
+// branch's BlockNums — the old branch's indexes (created at 40/42 and
+// removed by normalization) never reactivate.
+func TestReplacementBranchNoReactivation(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("fixture generation is not short")
+	}
+	dirty := buildFixture(t)
+
+	// The replacement branch: identical pre-target ops (deterministic ⇒
+	// byte-identical blocks 1..target), different post-target schedule.
+	replDir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "harmony_db_0")
+	c, err := metafixture.Open(replDir, metafixture.RepoKeysDir())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := c.Generate(metafixture.Spec{
+		Blocks:                fxBlocks,
+		CreateValidatorAt:     fxCreateVal,
+		DelegateAt:            fxDelegate,
+		FundPrecompileAt:      fxFundPrec,
+		PostCreateValidatorAt: rpPostCreate,
+		PostDelegateAt:        rpPostDeleg,
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := c.Finalize(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	// Masked overlay over the dirty chain (the audit's post-apply view).
+	anchorPath := writeAnchor(t, dirty, fxTarget)
+	res, err := anchor.Resolve(anchorPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	open, err := source.OpenSource(dirty, res, dbopen.Options{})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer open.Close()
+	srcs, err := open.BuildSources()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	nres, err := norm.Normalize(open.NormA, srcs)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	overlay, err := audit.NewOverlay(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "scratch"), open.KV)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer overlay.Close()
+	if _, err := audit.Seed(overlay, nres, kvCanonReader{open}, res.TargetHash, res.Config.TargetHeight, nil, nil); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	cfg := nodeconfig.GetShardConfig(0).GetNetworkType().ChainConfig()
+	cfg.EthCompatibleChainID = big.NewInt(cfg.EthCompatibleShard0ChainID.Int64())
+	overlayDB := rawdb.NewDatabase(overlay)
+	bc, err := core.NewBlockChainWithOptions(
+		overlayDB, nil, nil,
+		&core.CacheConfig{Disabled: true, SnapshotLimit: 0},
+		&cfg, chain.NewEngine(), vm.Config{}, core.Options{},
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("open masked chain: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got := bc.CurrentBlock().NumberU64(); got != fxTarget {
+		t.Fatalf("masked head %d, want the target %d", got, fxTarget)
+	}
+
+	// Feed the replacement branch through the production InsertChain with
+	// full header verification (the twin construction guarantees block
+	// target+1 parents the target).
+	rdb, err := rawdb.NewLevelDBDatabase(replDir, 16, 64, "", true)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer rdb.Close()
+	if rawdb.ReadCanonicalHash(rdb, fxTarget) != bc.CurrentBlock().Hash() {
+		t.Fatal("replacement chain does not share the target block (twin construction broken)")
+	}
+	for n := uint64(fxTarget + 1); n <= fxBlocks; n++ {
+		hash := rawdb.ReadCanonicalHash(rdb, n)
+		blk := rawdb.ReadBlock(rdb, hash, n)
+		if blk == nil {
+			t.Fatalf("replacement block %d unreadable", n)
+		}
+		sig, err := rawdb.ReadBlockCommitSig(rdb, n)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("replacement commit sig %d: %v", n, err)
+		}
+		blk.SetCurrentCommitSig(sig)
+		if _, err := bc.InsertChain(types.Blocks{blk}, true); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("insert replacement block %d over the masked view: %v", n, err)
+		}
+	}
+
+	// The re-created validator and its delegations carry ONLY fresh
+	// BlockNums; the old branch's 40/42 indexes never reactivate.
+	postValidator := c.PostValidatorAddr
+	deployer := crypto.PubkeyToAddress(coregenesis.ContractDeployerKey.PublicKey)
+
+	selfIdx, err := rawdb.ReadDelegationsByDelegator(overlayDB, postValidator)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	var selfSeen bool
+	for _, di := range selfIdx {
+		if di.ValidatorAddress != postValidator {
+			continue
+		}
+		selfSeen = true
+		if di.BlockNum.Uint64() != rpPostCreate {
+			t.Fatalf("self-delegation index BlockNum %d, want the replacement create height %d (stale reactivation?)",
+				di.BlockNum.Uint64(), rpPostCreate)
+		}
+	}
+	if !selfSeen {
+		t.Fatal("re-created validator has no self-delegation index after the replacement branch")
+	}
+
+	depIdx, err := rawdb.ReadDelegationsByDelegator(overlayDB, deployer)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	var delegSeen bool
+	for _, di := range depIdx {
+		if di.ValidatorAddress != postValidator {
+			continue
+		}
+		delegSeen = true
+		if got := di.BlockNum.Uint64(); got != rpPostDeleg {
+			t.Fatalf("delegation index BlockNum %d, want the replacement delegate height %d (the dirty branch delegated at %d — stale index reactivated)",
+				got, rpPostDeleg, fxPostDeleg)
+		}
+	}
+	if !delegSeen {
+		t.Fatal("replacement delegation produced no dvl index")
+	}
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/metadata/acceptance/scan_codes_test.go b/internal/recovery/metadata/acceptance/scan_codes_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1f8ce1da74
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/metadata/acceptance/scan_codes_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+package acceptance
+
+import (
+	"math/big"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/rawdb"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/fixture"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/report"
+)
+
+// TestScanFallbackMissingSS: deleting ss<target-epoch> is a clean-DB
+// fallback signal -> exit 20 (MISSING_REQUIRED_METADATA).
+func TestScanFallbackMissingSS(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("fixture generation is not short")
+	}
+	dir := buildFixture(t)
+	anchorPath := writeAnchor(t, dir, fxTarget)
+	copyDir := t.TempDir() + "/harmony_db_0"
+	if err := fixture.CopyDir(dir, copyDir); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	deleteKey(t, copyDir, append([]byte("ss"), big.NewInt(2).Bytes()...))
+	code, rep := runScan(t, copyDir, anchorPath)
+	if code != report.ExitMissingRequired {
+		t.Fatalf("deleted ss exit %d, want 20 (findings %+v)", code, rep.Findings.Items)
+	}
+	if rep.Verdict != "MISSING_REQUIRED_METADATA" {
+		t.Fatalf("verdict %s", rep.Verdict)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestScanFallbackMissingBlkRwd: deleting blk-rwd-<target> -> exit 20.
+func TestScanFallbackMissingBlkRwd(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("fixture generation is not short")
+	}
+	dir := buildFixture(t)
+	anchorPath := writeAnchor(t, dir, fxTarget)
+	copyDir := t.TempDir() + "/harmony_db_0"
+	if err := fixture.CopyDir(dir, copyDir); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	deleteKey(t, copyDir, append([]byte("blk-rwd-"), be8(fxTarget)...))
+	code, _ := runScan(t, copyDir, anchorPath)
+	if code != report.ExitMissingRequired {
+		t.Fatalf("deleted blk-rwd exit %d, want 20", code)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestScanCorruptShardStateInvalid: a well-formed-key but wrong-value
+// ss<target-epoch> is fatal corruption -> exit 21.
+func TestScanCorruptShardStateInvalid(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("fixture generation is not short")
+	}
+	dir := buildFixture(t)
+	anchorPath := writeAnchor(t, dir, fxTarget)
+	copyDir := t.TempDir() + "/harmony_db_0"
+	if err := fixture.CopyDir(dir, copyDir); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	corruptSS(t, copyDir)
+	code, _ := runScan(t, copyDir, anchorPath)
+	if code != report.ExitInvalidRetained {
+		t.Fatalf("corrupt ss exit %d, want 21", code)
+	}
+}
+
+func be8(n uint64) []byte {
+	b := make([]byte, 8)
+	for i := 7; i >= 0; i-- {
+		b[i] = byte(n)
+		n >>= 8
+	}
+	return b
+}
+
+func deleteKey(t *testing.T, dir string, key []byte) {
+	t.Helper()
+	db, err := rawdb.NewLevelDBDatabase(dir, 16, 64, "", false)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := db.Delete(key); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := db.Close(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/metadata/audit/audit.go b/internal/recovery/metadata/audit/audit.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e260c49701
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/metadata/audit/audit.go
@@ -0,0 +1,702 @@
+package audit
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"math/big"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/rawdb"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/types"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/vm"
+	bls_cosi "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/crypto/bls"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/chain"
+	nodeconfig "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/configs/node"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/params"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/anchor"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/dbopen"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/norm"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/source"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/report"
+	staking "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/staking/types"
+)
+
+// Tool is the report tool identifier.
+const Tool = "harmony-recovery metadata audit-branch"
+
+// Schema identifies the audit report document.
+const Schema = "abandoned-branch-audit-v1"
+
+// Options configures an audit run.
+type Options struct {
+	DBPath     string
+	AnchorPath string
+	OutDir     string
+	Scratch    string
+	EndHeight  uint64 // 0 = anchor audit_end_height
+	KeepScratch bool
+	SinglePass  bool // debug only; output marked non-authoritative
+
+	// TrustedShard1Pointer optionally names a pre-incident pointer per
+	// shard: "<shardID>:<blockNum>". Accepted only if it satisfies the
+	// §4.4 invariants.
+	TrustedShard1Pointer string
+	TrustedProvenance    string
+
+	// ReferencePath optionally names the exported reference manifest
+	// (metadata-<target>.reference.json); the audit cross-checks it
+	// against the resolved anchor and binds it into the report hash chain.
+	ReferencePath string
+
+	ScratchReserveGB int // pre-run free-space check (default 200; must be >= 0)
+
+	// SkipReserveCheckForTest disables the mandatory scratch free-space
+	// gate. It exists only for tests on small CI filesystems; the CLI
+	// never sets it (there is no flag for it and negative
+	// --scratch-reserve-gb values are rejected).
+	SkipReserveCheckForTest bool
+
+	Handles int
+	CacheMB int
+}
+
+// blockOutcome is one height's record-mode + execution result.
+type blockOutcome struct {
+	Height        uint64   `json:"height"`
+	Hash          string   `json:"hash"`
+	Executed      bool     `json:"executed"`
+	RootMatched   bool     `json:"root_matched"`
+	ValidityFails []string `json:"validity_failures,omitempty"`
+}
+
+// NativeOp is one staking transaction from a branch block body.
+type NativeOp struct {
+	Block     uint64 `json:"block"`
+	Directive string `json:"directive"`
+	Address   string `json:"address,omitempty"`   // validator (create/edit) or delegator
+	Validator string `json:"validator,omitempty"` // delegate/undelegate target
+	Amount    string `json:"amount,omitempty"`
+	TxHash    string `json:"tx_hash"`
+}
+
+// passResult carries one pass's outputs.
+type passResult struct {
+	Outcomes    []blockOutcome
+	Findings    []report.Finding
+	FCOps       []FCOp
+	NativeOps   []NativeOp
+	Log         map[string]WriteLogEntry
+	PointerEnd  map[uint32][]byte // final pointer values in the overlay per shard
+	SeedSpec    *SeedSpec
+	Fatal       bool
+	FatalHeight uint64
+	FatalReason string
+	// LegacyBitmapsRestored counts incoming-receipt proofs whose Copy-bug
+	// corrupted CommitBitmap was verifiably restored (legacybitmap.go).
+	LegacyBitmapsRestored int
+	overlay               *Overlay
+}
+
+// Run executes the audit. See run() for the pipeline; this wrapper owns
+// scratch lifecycle.
+//
+// NOTE (process isolation): internal/chain keeps process-wide reward-payout
+// caches keyed only by (epoch, shard) / (epoch, validator) — not by chain
+// identity. The production harmony-recovery binary opens exactly one chain
+// per process, so the caches are always coherent there. Test code that opens
+// MORE than one chain in a process (several generated fixtures) must isolate
+// reward-sensitive runs in a subprocess instead; see
+// acceptance.runIsolatedSubtest. Purging those caches from here was rejected
+// in review as an out-of-scope internal/chain change.
+func Run(ctx context.Context, opts Options, stderr io.Writer) int {
+	code, scratchUsed := run(ctx, opts, stderr)
+	if scratchUsed != "" && !opts.KeepScratch && code == report.ExitOK {
+		if err := os.RemoveAll(scratchUsed); err != nil {
+			fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "warning: could not remove scratch %s: %v\n", scratchUsed, err)
+		}
+	} else if scratchUsed != "" {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "scratch retained at %s\n", scratchUsed)
+	}
+	return code
+}
+
+func run(ctx context.Context, opts Options, stderr io.Writer) (int, string) {
+	started := time.Now()
+	usage := func(format string, args ...interface{}) (int, string) {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "invalid invocation: "+format+"\n", args...)
+		return report.ExitBadInvocation, ""
+	}
+	if opts.DBPath == "" || opts.AnchorPath == "" || opts.OutDir == "" || opts.Scratch == "" {
+		return usage("--db, --anchor, --out-dir and --scratch are required")
+	}
+	if opts.ScratchReserveGB < 0 {
+		return usage("--scratch-reserve-gb must be >= 0 (the reserve gate cannot be bypassed from the CLI)")
+	}
+	res, err := anchor.Resolve(opts.AnchorPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		return usage("%v", err)
+	}
+	for _, p := range []string{opts.OutDir, opts.Scratch} {
+		if err := dbopen.ValidateOutputPath(p, opts.DBPath); err != nil {
+			return usage("%v", err)
+		}
+	}
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(opts.OutDir, 0o755); err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "error: create out dir: %v\n", err)
+		return report.ExitIO, ""
+	}
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(opts.Scratch, 0o755); err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "error: create scratch dir: %v\n", err)
+		return report.ExitIO, ""
+	}
+	reserve := opts.ScratchReserveGB
+	if reserve == 0 {
+		reserve = 200
+	}
+	if !opts.SkipReserveCheckForTest {
+		// The reserve gate FAILS CLOSED: if free space cannot be
+		// established the run is refused (exit 14), never allowed through.
+		free, ferr := dbopen.FreeBytes(opts.Scratch)
+		if ferr != nil {
+			fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "error: cannot determine free space on the scratch filesystem: %v\n", ferr)
+			return report.ExitIO, ""
+		}
+		if free < uint64(reserve)<<30 {
+			fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "error: scratch filesystem has %d GiB free, %d GiB reserve required (--scratch-reserve-gb)\n", free>>30, reserve)
+			return report.ExitBadInvocation, ""
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Source-immutability evidence: fingerprint before the strict open,
+	// re-fingerprint after the audit; any change or read failure is exit
+	// 14 (the audit writes only to scratch — the source must be inert).
+	fpBefore, err := dbopen.FingerprintDir(opts.DBPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "error: fingerprint source: %v\n", err)
+		return report.ExitIO, ""
+	}
+
+	// Open the source strictly and normalize (the audit's own derivation:
+	// the mask is built from it).
+	open, err := source.OpenSource(opts.DBPath, res, dbopen.Options{Handles: opts.Handles, BlockCacheMB: opts.CacheMB})
+	if err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "error: open source: %v\n", err)
+		return dbopen.ClassifyExit(err), ""
+	}
+	defer open.Close()
+	srcs, err := open.BuildSources()
+	if err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "error: %v\n", err)
+		return report.ExitTargetStateUnavailable, ""
+	}
+	srcs.Ctx = ctx // long raw iterations observe cancellation (SIGINT)
+	nres, err := norm.Normalize(open.NormA, srcs)
+	if err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "error: normalize: %v\n", err)
+		if errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) || errors.Is(err, context.DeadlineExceeded) {
+			return report.InterruptExit(ctx), ""
+		}
+		return report.ExitIO, ""
+	}
+	if nres.HasFatalOrMissing() {
+		// The mask would be built from an unreliable plan; the §4.5 codes
+		// route the operator to the right investigation first.
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "audit refused: normalization produced fatal findings (run metadata scan for the report)\n")
+		return nres.ExitCode(), ""
+	}
+
+	sd := newSide(open.KV)
+	endHeight := opts.EndHeight
+	if endHeight == 0 {
+		endHeight = res.Config.AuditEndHeight
+	}
+
+	// Preconditions (plan §4.6).
+	if code := checkPreconditions(sd, res, endHeight, stderr); code != 0 {
+		return code, ""
+	}
+
+	rep := newReport(res, open, opts, endHeight, started)
+	rep.FingerprintBefore = fpBefore
+
+	// Optional reference cross-check (§4.6): the exported reference
+	// manifest must bind to the same anchor; mismatch is an invocation
+	// error (wrong reference for this anchor).
+	if opts.ReferencePath != "" {
+		if code := loadReference(rep, opts.ReferencePath, res, open.NormA, nres, stderr); code != 0 {
+			return code, ""
+		}
+	}
+
+	// PASS 1 — mask discovery: branch crosslink/spent records unmasked;
+	// affected findings classified pollution-suspect.
+	pass1Scratch := filepath.Join(opts.Scratch, "pass-1")
+	pass1, code := runPass(ctx, passConfig{
+		label: "pass-1", scratch: pass1Scratch, side: sd, open: open, res: nres,
+		anchorRes: res, endHeight: endHeight, stderr: stderr,
+	})
+	defer closeOverlay(pass1)
+	if code != 0 {
+		writeFatalReport(rep, pass1, nil, opts, stderr, code)
+		return code, opts.Scratch
+	}
+
+	// Branch-written crosslink/spent subsets from the pass-1 write log.
+	subsets := extractShardSubsets(pass1.Log)
+
+	// Pointer solving per shard (§4.4 invariant solver).
+	pointer, code := solvePointers(sd, nres, subsets, opts, rep, stderr)
+	if code != 0 && code != report.ExitAuditAnomaly {
+		return code, opts.Scratch
+	}
+	pointerAmbiguous := code == report.ExitAuditAnomaly
+
+	var pass2 *passResult
+	if !opts.SinglePass {
+		// PASS 2 — authoritative: scratch reset, pass-1 subsets join the
+		// mask, derived pointers seeded.
+		pass2Scratch := filepath.Join(opts.Scratch, "pass-2")
+		pass2, code = runPass(ctx, passConfig{
+			label: "pass-2", scratch: pass2Scratch, side: sd, open: open, res: nres,
+			anchorRes: res, endHeight: endHeight, stderr: stderr,
+			extraMask: subsets.allKeys(), pointerSeeds: pointer.seeds,
+		})
+		defer closeOverlay(pass2)
+		if code != 0 {
+			writeFatalReport(rep, pass1, pass2, opts, stderr, code)
+			return code, opts.Scratch
+		}
+		// State roots must be identical across passes.
+		if code := crossPassRootCheck(pass1, pass2, rep, stderr); code != 0 {
+			writeFatalReport(rep, pass1, pass2, opts, stderr, code)
+			return code, opts.Scratch
+		}
+	}
+
+	authoritative := pass2
+	if opts.SinglePass {
+		authoritative = pass1
+		rep.NonAuthoritative = true
+	}
+
+	// Reconciliation + report assembly over the authoritative pass.
+	exit := assembleReport(rep, nres, sd, open, pass1, authoritative, subsets, pointer, pointerAmbiguous)
+
+	// Bind the reference into the report hash chain: anchor config →
+	// reference digest → per-pass outcome digests.
+	if rep.Reference != nil {
+		chain := rep.AnchorConfigSHA + rep.Reference.ManifestSHA
+		if rep.Pass1 != nil {
+			chain += rep.Pass1.OutcomesSHA256
+		}
+		if rep.Pass2 != nil {
+			chain += rep.Pass2.OutcomesSHA256
+		}
+		rep.Reference.HashChain = report.SHA256Hex([]byte(chain))
+	}
+
+	// Source-immutability gate: re-fingerprint and require equality
+	// (device/inode included). Failure is exit 14, never an anomaly.
+	if fpAfter, ferr := dbopen.FingerprintDir(opts.DBPath); ferr != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "error: fingerprint source after audit: %v\n", ferr)
+		exit = report.ResolveExit(exit, report.ExitIO)
+	} else {
+		rep.FingerprintAfter = fpAfter
+		rep.SourceUnchanged = fpBefore.Equal(fpAfter)
+		if !rep.SourceUnchanged {
+			fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "error: source fingerprint changed during the audit\n")
+			exit = report.ResolveExit(exit, report.ExitIO)
+		}
+	}
+
+	rep.DurationS = time.Since(started).Seconds()
+	rep.ExitCode = exit
+	reportPath := filepath.Join(opts.OutDir, "abandoned-branch-audit.json")
+	if err := report.WriteJSONAtomic(reportPath, rep); err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "error: write audit report: %v\n", err)
+		return report.ResolveExit(exit, report.ExitIO), opts.Scratch
+	}
+	fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "audit report written to %s\n", reportPath)
+	return exit, opts.Scratch
+}
+
+func checkPreconditions(sd *side, res *anchor.Resolved, endHeight uint64, stderr io.Writer) int {
+	child, err := sd.Header(res.Config.TargetHeight + 1)
+	if err != nil {
+		// A read/decode failure is an I/O error (14), never a "missing
+		// header" invocation error: the header may well exist.
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "error: abandoned child header: %v\n", err)
+		return report.ExitIO
+	}
+	if child == nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "error: no canonical header at %d (abandoned child) in the source\n", res.Config.TargetHeight+1)
+		return report.ExitBadInvocation
+	}
+	if child.Hash() != res.ChildHash {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "error: canonical(%d) = %s, anchor abandoned_child_hash = %s\n",
+			res.Config.TargetHeight+1, child.Hash().Hex(), res.Config.AbandonedChildHash)
+		return report.ExitBadInvocation
+	}
+	if child.ParentHash() != res.TargetHash {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "error: abandoned child %d parent %s is not the target %s\n",
+			res.Config.TargetHeight+1, child.ParentHash().Hex(), res.Config.TargetHash)
+		return report.ExitBadInvocation
+	}
+	head, err := sd.HeadHeight()
+	if err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "error: %v\n", err)
+		return report.ExitIO
+	}
+	if head < endHeight {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "error: source head %d is below --end-height %d\n", head, endHeight)
+		return report.ExitBadInvocation
+	}
+	return 0
+}
+
+type passConfig struct {
+	label        string
+	scratch      string
+	side         *side
+	open         *source.Open
+	res          *norm.Result
+	anchorRes    *anchor.Resolved
+	endHeight    uint64
+	stderr       io.Writer
+	extraMask    [][]byte
+	pointerSeeds map[string][]byte
+}
+
+// runPass executes one full masked re-execution pass.
+func runPass(ctx context.Context, pc passConfig) (*passResult, int) {
+	if err := os.RemoveAll(pc.scratch); err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(pc.stderr, "error: reset scratch: %v\n", err)
+		return nil, report.ExitIO
+	}
+	overlay, err := NewOverlay(pc.scratch, pc.open.KV)
+	if err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(pc.stderr, "error: open scratch overlay: %v\n", err)
+		return nil, report.ExitIO
+	}
+	pr := &passResult{overlay: overlay}
+	// The overlay is NOT closed here: reconciliation reads final values
+	// from the authoritative pass's scratch after runPass returns. The
+	// caller (run) owns overlay lifetime and closes both passes' overlays.
+
+	spec, err := Seed(overlay, pc.res, pc.side, pc.anchorRes.TargetHash, pc.anchorRes.Config.TargetHeight,
+		pc.extraMask, pc.pointerSeeds)
+	if err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(pc.stderr, "error: seed overlay: %v\n", err)
+		return nil, report.ExitIO
+	}
+	pr.SeedSpec = spec
+
+	// Harness (plan §4.6): archival cache config over the overlay,
+	// self-beacon shard 0, stock engine. The chain never initializes
+	// networking, RPC, txpool, consensus services, or BLS signing.
+	chainConfig := chainConfigFor(pc.anchorRes)
+	db := rawdb.NewDatabase(overlay)
+	bc, err := core.NewBlockChainWithOptions(
+		db, nil, nil,
+		&core.CacheConfig{Disabled: true, Preimages: false, SnapshotLimit: 0},
+		chainConfig, chain.NewEngine(), vm.Config{}, core.Options{},
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(pc.stderr, "error: open overlay chain: %v\n", err)
+		return nil, report.ExitIO
+	}
+	if got := bc.CurrentBlock().Hash(); got != pc.anchorRes.TargetHash {
+		fmt.Fprintf(pc.stderr, "error: overlay head is %s, want the target %s (seed failure)\n",
+			got.Hex(), pc.anchorRes.Config.TargetHash)
+		return nil, report.ExitIO
+	}
+
+	tracer := newFCTracer()
+	target := pc.anchorRes.Config.TargetHeight
+	prevHash := pc.anchorRes.TargetHash
+	for n := target + 1; n <= pc.endHeight; n++ {
+		if ctx.Err() != nil {
+			return pr, report.InterruptExit(ctx)
+		}
+		blk, err := pc.side.Block(n)
+		// Source-identity failures collected for this height (recorded
+		// ahead of the record-mode checks): a canonical mapping whose
+		// record decodes to a different hash/height is a MANDATORY
+		// validity failure — a redirected mapping over otherwise-valid
+		// bytes passes ancestry, cryptographic and execution checks, so
+		// without this finding it could exit 0. Validation continues over
+		// the decoded content to classify any accompanying tamper too.
+		var srcFails []string
+		if err != nil {
+			var ide *identityError
+			if !errors.As(err, &ide) || ide.block == nil {
+				fmt.Fprintf(pc.stderr, "error: %v\n", err)
+				return pr, report.ExitIO
+			}
+			blk = ide.block
+			srcFails = append(srcFails, recordSourceIdentityFail(ide, n, pc.stderr, &pr.Findings))
+		}
+		out := blockOutcome{Height: n, Hash: blk.Hash().Hex()}
+
+		// Abandoned-parent ancestry (first parent == target hash; block
+		// target+1's hash == anchor AbandonedChildHash).
+		if blk.ParentHash() != prevHash {
+			pr.Fatal, pr.FatalHeight = true, n
+			pr.FatalReason = fmt.Sprintf("branch ancestry broken at %d: parent %s, want %s", n, blk.ParentHash().Hex(), prevHash.Hex())
+			fmt.Fprintf(pc.stderr, "fatal: %s\n", pr.FatalReason)
+			pr.Outcomes = append(pr.Outcomes, out)
+			return pr, report.ExitBadInvocation
+		}
+		if n == target+1 && blk.Hash() != pc.anchorRes.ChildHash {
+			pr.Fatal, pr.FatalHeight = true, n
+			pr.FatalReason = fmt.Sprintf("block %d hash %s is not the anchored abandoned child %s", n, blk.Hash().Hex(), pc.anchorRes.Config.AbandonedChildHash)
+			fmt.Fprintf(pc.stderr, "fatal: %s\n", pr.FatalReason)
+			pr.Outcomes = append(pr.Outcomes, out)
+			return pr, report.ExitBadInvocation
+		}
+		prevHash = blk.Hash()
+
+		// Commit signature: child header or exact block-sig key. A child
+		// record failing identity validation still yields its material
+		// (the cryptographic checks below convict tampered material), but
+		// the identity mismatch itself is a mandatory validity failure —
+		// even material that verifies (a redirected mapping over a copy of
+		// the true child) must gate the audit.
+		sigAndBitmap, sigIdent, err := pc.side.CommitSigFor(n)
+		if err != nil {
+			fmt.Fprintf(pc.stderr, "error: %v\n", err)
+			return pr, report.ExitIO
+		}
+		if sigIdent != nil {
+			srcFails = append(srcFails, recordSourceIdentityFail(sigIdent, n, pc.stderr, &pr.Findings))
+		}
+		blk.SetCurrentCommitSig(sigAndBitmap)
+
+		// Repair legacy Copy-bug CommitBitmap corruption on stored incoming
+		// receipt proofs (legacybitmap.go) before validation: mainnet bodies
+		// stored the aggregate signature where the quorum bitmap belongs, so
+		// without a verified restoration every receipt-carrying block would
+		// fail validation for a storage artifact, not a chain defect.
+		restored, restoreNotes := restoreLegacyReceiptBitmaps(pc.side, blk)
+		if restored > 0 {
+			pr.LegacyBitmapsRestored += restored
+			pr.Findings = append(pr.Findings, report.Finding{
+				Severity: report.SeverityInfo,
+				Class:    report.ClassDiagnostic,
+				Code:     "legacy-receipt-bitmap-restored",
+				Key:      fmt.Sprintf("%d", n),
+				Detail:   fmt.Sprintf("restored %d Copy-bug-corrupted incoming-receipt bitmap(s) from stored crosslinks; header incoming-receipt commitment reproduced", restored),
+			})
+		}
+		for _, note := range restoreNotes {
+			pr.Findings = append(pr.Findings, report.Finding{
+				Severity: report.SeverityReviewItem,
+				Class:    report.ClassDiagnostic,
+				Code:     "legacy-receipt-bitmap-unrestored",
+				Key:      fmt.Sprintf("%d", n),
+				Detail:   note,
+			})
+		}
+
+		// Record-mode validity checks: each failure is a Finding, not an
+		// abort (§4.6). Exploit blocks are EXPECTED to fail patched
+		// receipt validation while re-executing to their header roots.
+		// Source-identity failures recorded above lead the list.
+		out.ValidityFails = append(srcFails, recordModeChecks(bc, blk, sigAndBitmap, pc.label, &pr.Findings)...)
+
+		// Native staking-op inventory from the body.
+		pr.NativeOps = append(pr.NativeOps, nativeOps(blk)...)
+
+		// Traced execution: the traced Process result lands in the
+		// processor result cache; the immediately following InsertChain
+		// consumes it verbatim (§2.3) — the traced execution IS the
+		// committed execution.
+		parentState, err := bc.StateAt(bc.CurrentBlock().Root())
+		if err != nil {
+			pr.Fatal, pr.FatalHeight, pr.FatalReason = true, n, fmt.Sprintf("parent state unavailable at %d: %v", n, err)
+			fmt.Fprintf(pc.stderr, "fatal: %s\n", pr.FatalReason)
+			pr.Outcomes = append(pr.Outcomes, out)
+			return pr, report.ExitAuditAnomaly
+		}
+		tracer.BeginBlock(n)
+		_, _, _, _, _, _, _, err = bc.Processor().Process(blk, parentState, vm.Config{Debug: true, Tracer: tracer}, false)
+		if err != nil {
+			pr.Fatal, pr.FatalHeight, pr.FatalReason = true, n, fmt.Sprintf("branch execution failed at %d: %v", n, err)
+			fmt.Fprintf(pc.stderr, "fatal: %s\n", pr.FatalReason)
+			pr.Outcomes = append(pr.Outcomes, out)
+			return pr, report.ExitAuditAnomaly
+		}
+		out.Executed = true
+		if _, err := bc.InsertChain(types.Blocks{blk}, false); err != nil {
+			// ValidateState failures (root/receipt/gas/bloom divergence)
+			// land here: state-root divergence on the branch would be a
+			// major discovery; stop, scratch preserved.
+			pr.Fatal, pr.FatalHeight, pr.FatalReason = true, n, fmt.Sprintf("insert failed at %d (root/state validation): %v", n, err)
+			fmt.Fprintf(pc.stderr, "fatal: %s\n", pr.FatalReason)
+			pr.Outcomes = append(pr.Outcomes, out)
+			return pr, report.ExitAuditAnomaly
+		}
+		out.RootMatched = true
+		pr.Outcomes = append(pr.Outcomes, out)
+	}
+
+	pr.FCOps = tracer.Ops()
+	pr.Log = overlay.Log()
+	pr.PointerEnd = readPointerEnds(overlay)
+	return pr, 0
+}
+
+// chainConfigFor copies the network chain config with beacon-shard chain-id
+// semantics (internal/shardchain/shardchains.go:130-133).
+func chainConfigFor(res *anchor.Resolved) *params.ChainConfig {
+	nt := nodeconfig.NetworkType(res.Config.Network)
+	cfg := nt.ChainConfig()
+	if res.Config.Shard == 0 {
+		cfg.EthCompatibleChainID = big.NewInt(cfg.EthCompatibleShard0ChainID.Int64())
+	}
+	return &cfg
+}
+
+// recordSourceIdentityFail records one canonical-mapping identity mismatch
+// (redirected/tampered header or block record) as a validity failure of the
+// block being audited: it joins that block's ValidityFails (gating the
+// audit to a non-zero exit through the known-bad cross-check — the gate
+// excuses only incoming-receipts failures, never source-identity) and is
+// itemized as a Finding. Returns the failure label.
+func recordSourceIdentityFail(ide *identityError, atBlock uint64, stderr io.Writer, findings *[]report.Finding) string {
+	fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "source-identity failure at %d: %v\n", atBlock, ide)
+	*findings = append(*findings, report.Finding{
+		Severity: report.SeverityReviewItem,
+		Class:    report.ClassDiagnostic,
+		Code:     "branch-validity-source-identity",
+		Key:      fmt.Sprintf("%d", atBlock),
+		Detail:   ide.Error(),
+	})
+	return fmt.Sprintf("source-identity: %v", ide)
+}
+
+// recordModeChecks runs the §4.6 per-block validity checks; failures become
+// findings (pollution-suspect classification for the crosslink/spent checks
+// happens in pass 1 — pass 2 masks the pollution, plan §4.6).
+func recordModeChecks(bc core.BlockChain, blk *types.Block, sigAndBitmap []byte, label string, findings *[]report.Finding) []string {
+	var fails []string
+	addFail := func(check string, err error, pollutable bool) {
+		if err == nil {
+			return
+		}
+		fails = append(fails, fmt.Sprintf("%s: %v", check, err))
+		class := report.ClassDiagnostic
+		if pollutable && label == "pass-1" {
+			class = report.ClassPollutionSuspect
+		}
+		*findings = append(*findings, report.Finding{
+			Severity: report.SeverityReviewItem,
+			Class:    class,
+			Code:     "branch-validity-" + check,
+			Key:      fmt.Sprintf("%d", blk.NumberU64()),
+			Detail:   err.Error(),
+		})
+	}
+	header := blk.Header()
+	engine := bc.Engine()
+	// InsertChain(..., false) skips general header verification entirely
+	// (§2.3) — VerifyHeader incl. seal is mandatory here.
+	addFail("verify-header", engine.VerifyHeader(bc, header, true), false)
+	if len(sigAndBitmap) > 96 {
+		var sig bls_cosi.SerializedSignature
+		copy(sig[:], sigAndBitmap[:96])
+		addFail("header-signature", engine.VerifyHeaderSignature(bc, header, sig, sigAndBitmap[96:]), false)
+	} else {
+		addFail("header-signature", fmt.Errorf("commit signature material too short (%d bytes)", len(sigAndBitmap)), false)
+	}
+	addFail("vrf", engine.VerifyVRF(bc, header), false)
+	addFail("shard-state", engine.VerifyShardState(bc, bc, header), false)
+	if len(header.CrossLinks()) > 0 {
+		// Rejects any crosslink already in the DB (errAlreadyExist):
+		// pass-1 pollution; masked in pass 2.
+		addFail("crosslinks", core.VerifyBlockCrossLinks(bc, blk), true)
+	}
+	// IsSpent sees future markers in pass 1: pollution; masked in pass 2.
+	addFail("incoming-receipts", core.VerifyIncomingReceipts(bc, blk), true)
+	return fails
+}
+
+// nativeOps inventories the staking transactions of one block by
+// directive (§4.6 output 2).
+func nativeOps(blk *types.Block) []NativeOp {
+	var out []NativeOp
+	for _, tx := range blk.StakingTransactions() {
+		op := NativeOp{
+			Block:     blk.NumberU64(),
+			Directive: tx.StakingType().String(),
+			TxHash:    tx.Hash().Hex(),
+		}
+		if payload, err := tx.RLPEncodeStakeMsg(); err == nil {
+			if decoded, err := staking.RLPDecodeStakeMsg(payload, tx.StakingType()); err == nil {
+				switch m := decoded.(type) {
+				case *staking.CreateValidator:
+					op.Address = m.ValidatorAddress.Hex()
+				case *staking.EditValidator:
+					op.Address = m.ValidatorAddress.Hex()
+				case *staking.Delegate:
+					op.Address = m.DelegatorAddress.Hex()
+					op.Validator = m.ValidatorAddress.Hex()
+					op.Amount = bigString(m.Amount)
+				case *staking.Undelegate:
+					op.Address = m.DelegatorAddress.Hex()
+					op.Validator = m.ValidatorAddress.Hex()
+					op.Amount = bigString(m.Amount)
+				case *staking.CollectRewards:
+					op.Address = m.DelegatorAddress.Hex()
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		out = append(out, op)
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
+// readPointerEnds reads the final pointer values from the overlay.
+func readPointerEnds(o *Overlay) map[uint32][]byte {
+	out := map[uint32][]byte{}
+	for sid := uint32(0); sid < 8; sid++ {
+		key := append([]byte("cl"), u32be4(sid)...)
+		if v, err := o.Get(key); err == nil {
+			out[sid] = v
+		}
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
+func u32be4(n uint32) []byte {
+	return []byte{byte(n >> 24), byte(n >> 16), byte(n >> 8), byte(n)}
+}
+
+// closeOverlay closes a pass's scratch overlay (owned by run, not runPass,
+// because reconciliation reads final values after the pass returns).
+func closeOverlay(pr *passResult) {
+	if pr != nil && pr.overlay != nil {
+		_ = pr.overlay.Close()
+	}
+}
+
+// crossPassRootCheck: any root difference across passes is Fatal (§4.6).
+func crossPassRootCheck(p1, p2 *passResult, rep *Report, stderr io.Writer) int {
+	if len(p1.Outcomes) != len(p2.Outcomes) {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "fatal: pass outcome counts differ (%d vs %d)\n", len(p1.Outcomes), len(p2.Outcomes))
+		return report.ExitAuditAnomaly
+	}
+	for i := range p1.Outcomes {
+		a, b := p1.Outcomes[i], p2.Outcomes[i]
+		if a.Hash != b.Hash || a.RootMatched != b.RootMatched {
+			fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "fatal: pass results diverge at height %d\n", a.Height)
+			return report.ExitAuditAnomaly
+		}
+	}
+	return 0
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/metadata/audit/knownbad_test.go b/internal/recovery/metadata/audit/knownbad_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9904f13f0f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/metadata/audit/knownbad_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+package audit
+
+import (
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// TestCrossCheckKnownBad exhaustively drives the known-bad gate (§4.6 output
+// 1). It is a UNIT test on purpose: on any single-shard localnet fixture it is
+// impossible to produce a block that fails ONLY incoming-receipts validation
+// while still re-executing to its stored root — see the package note. A header
+// IncomingReceiptHash tamper necessarily also breaks the commit signature
+// (collateral header-signature failure), and a body incoming-receipt tamper is
+// applied by re-execution (ApplyIncomingReceipt) and diverges the state root
+// into a FATAL insert failure rather than a recorded validity finding. Driving
+// the pure gate with synthesized outcomes is therefore the only deterministic
+// way to exercise the gate-satisfied path and the exact set of anomalies.
+func TestCrossCheckKnownBad(t *testing.T) {
+	const kb = 100
+	out := func(h uint64, fails ...string) blockOutcome {
+		return blockOutcome{Height: h, ValidityFails: fails}
+	}
+	receipts := "incoming-receipts: [verifyIncomingReceipts] Invalid IncomingReceiptHash in block header"
+	seal := "header-signature: deserialize signature and bitmap: bad"
+	vrf := "vrf: bad vrf"
+
+	tests := []struct {
+		name         string
+		outcomes     []blockOutcome
+		knownBad     []uint64
+		wantChecked  bool
+		wantAnomaly  []string // kinds expected, in order
+		wantNoAnomly bool
+	}{
+		{
+			name:         "receipt_only_at_known_bad_satisfies_gate",
+			outcomes:     []blockOutcome{out(kb, receipts)},
+			knownBad:     []uint64{kb},
+			wantChecked:  true,
+			wantNoAnomly: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "extra_seal_failure_at_known_bad_is_anomalous",
+			outcomes:    []blockOutcome{out(kb, receipts, seal)},
+			knownBad:    []uint64{kb},
+			wantChecked: true, // exploit signature reproduced ...
+			wantAnomaly: []string{"known-bad-extra-failure"}, // ... but the extra defect still gates
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "wrong_failure_only_does_not_satisfy_gate",
+			outcomes:    []blockOutcome{out(kb, seal)},
+			knownBad:    []uint64{kb},
+			wantChecked: false,
+			wantAnomaly: []string{"known-bad-extra-failure", "known-bad-wrong-failure"},
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "no_failure_at_known_bad_is_absent",
+			outcomes:    []blockOutcome{out(kb + 1)}, // no fails anywhere
+			knownBad:    []uint64{kb},
+			wantChecked: false,
+			wantAnomaly: []string{"known-bad-failure-absent"},
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "failure_off_the_known_bad_list_is_unexpected",
+			outcomes:    []blockOutcome{out(kb, receipts), out(42, vrf)},
+			knownBad:    []uint64{kb},
+			wantChecked: true,
+			wantAnomaly: []string{"unexpected-validity-failure"},
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "multiple_extra_failures_each_anomalous",
+			outcomes:    []blockOutcome{out(kb, receipts, seal, vrf)},
+			knownBad:    []uint64{kb},
+			wantChecked: true,
+			wantAnomaly: []string{"known-bad-extra-failure", "known-bad-extra-failure"},
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tc := range tests {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			checked, _, anomalies := crossCheckKnownBad(tc.outcomes, tc.knownBad)
+			if checked != tc.wantChecked {
+				t.Fatalf("crossChecked=%v, want %v", checked, tc.wantChecked)
+			}
+			if tc.wantNoAnomly && len(anomalies) != 0 {
+				t.Fatalf("expected no anomalies, got %+v", anomalies)
+			}
+			if len(anomalies) != len(tc.wantAnomaly) {
+				t.Fatalf("got %d anomalies %+v, want kinds %v", len(anomalies), anomalies, tc.wantAnomaly)
+			}
+			for i, want := range tc.wantAnomaly {
+				if anomalies[i].Kind != want {
+					t.Fatalf("anomaly %d kind=%q, want %q (all: %+v)", i, anomalies[i].Kind, want, anomalies)
+				}
+			}
+		})
+	}
+
+	// Guard the exact label prefix the gate keys on: recordModeChecks emits
+	// "incoming-receipts: <err>", so a change to that label would silently
+	// break the gate. Pin the prefix here.
+	if !strings.HasPrefix(receipts, "incoming-receipts:") {
+		t.Fatal("test receipts label must carry the incoming-receipts prefix the gate matches")
+	}
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/metadata/audit/legacybitmap.go b/internal/recovery/metadata/audit/legacybitmap.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3d820f16b8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/metadata/audit/legacybitmap.go
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+package audit
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"fmt"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/types"
+)
+
+// Legacy CommitBitmap corruption (the CXReceiptsProof.Copy bug, present
+// since 2019-09-09, core/types/cx_receipt.go): rawdb.WriteBlock publishes
+// the body through Block.Body() → SetIncomingReceipts → CXReceiptsProofs.Copy,
+// which copies CommitSig INTO CommitBitmap. Every mainnet body stored with
+// incoming receipts therefore carries a 96-byte copy of the aggregate
+// signature where the quorum bitmap belongs, so a stored proof can never
+// re-verify as-is (seal check needs the bitmap, and DeriveSha over the
+// corrupted list no longer reproduces the header's IncomingReceiptHash).
+// Fixing Copy itself is consensus-adjacent core code and out of scope for
+// this recovery branch (no consensus/core behavior changes), so the repair
+// below is strictly recovery-local: it operates on the in-memory block the
+// audit read from the source DB and never touches stored bytes.
+//
+// The original bitmap is recoverable: the beacon DB stores the source
+// shard's crosslink for the same source block, whose (signature, bitmap)
+// pair is the commit signature material the proof carried. Restoration is
+// VERIFIED, never assumed — the substituted list must reproduce the
+// header's IncomingReceiptHash commitment (keccak-binding over the exact
+// original proof bytes), otherwise every substitution is rolled back and
+// the stored proof fails validation the normal way.
+
+// crossLinkReader supplies stored crosslinks from the UNMASKED source: the
+// restoration source must not depend on pass-2 masking (branch-written
+// crosslink records are masked there) because bitmap restoration is a data
+// repair on the stored bytes, not a chain-semantics check — its correctness
+// is proven by the header commitment, not by where the bitmap came from.
+type crossLinkReader interface {
+	CrossLink(shardID uint32, blockNum uint64) (*types.CrossLink, error)
+}
+
+// restoreLegacyReceiptBitmaps repairs Copy-bug-corrupted CommitBitmaps on the
+// block's incoming receipt proofs in place. Only proofs exhibiting the exact
+// corruption signature (CommitBitmap byte-identical to the 96-byte CommitSig)
+// are touched; the candidate bitmap comes from the stored crosslink of the
+// proof's source block, gated on the crosslink covering the same source
+// header hash. The whole substitution set is kept only if the restored list
+// reproduces header.IncomingReceiptHash; otherwise it is rolled back and the
+// proofs are left exactly as stored. Returns the number of restored proofs
+// and diagnostic notes for proofs that matched the corruption signature but
+// could not be verifiably restored.
+func restoreLegacyReceiptBitmaps(src crossLinkReader, blk *types.Block) (restored int, notes []string) {
+	cxps := blk.IncomingReceipts()
+	if len(cxps) == 0 {
+		return 0, nil
+	}
+	type undo struct {
+		i   int
+		old []byte
+	}
+	var undos []undo
+	for i, cxp := range cxps {
+		if cxp == nil || cxp.Header == nil || len(cxp.CommitSig) != 96 ||
+			len(cxp.CommitBitmap) != 96 || !bytes.Equal(cxp.CommitBitmap, cxp.CommitSig) {
+			continue
+		}
+		srcShard, srcNum := cxp.Header.ShardID(), cxp.Header.Number().Uint64()
+		cl, err := src.CrossLink(srcShard, srcNum)
+		if err != nil {
+			notes = append(notes, fmt.Sprintf(
+				"proof for shard-%d block %d matches the legacy Copy-bug corruption but its crosslink is unreadable: %v", srcShard, srcNum, err))
+			continue
+		}
+		if cl == nil {
+			notes = append(notes, fmt.Sprintf(
+				"proof for shard-%d block %d matches the legacy Copy-bug corruption but no stored crosslink exists to restore the bitmap from", srcShard, srcNum))
+			continue
+		}
+		if cl.Hash() != cxp.Header.Hash() {
+			notes = append(notes, fmt.Sprintf(
+				"proof for shard-%d block %d matches the legacy Copy-bug corruption but the stored crosslink covers a different source block (%s, proof %s)",
+				srcShard, srcNum, cl.Hash().Hex(), cxp.Header.Hash().Hex()))
+			continue
+		}
+		undos = append(undos, undo{i: i, old: cxp.CommitBitmap})
+		cxps[i].CommitBitmap = append([]byte(nil), cl.Bitmap()...)
+	}
+	if len(undos) == 0 {
+		return 0, notes
+	}
+	// The header's IncomingReceiptHash commits to the exact original proof
+	// bytes; reproducing it proves every substituted bitmap is the original.
+	if types.DeriveSha(cxps) == blk.Header().IncomingReceiptHash() {
+		return len(undos), notes
+	}
+	for _, u := range undos {
+		cxps[u.i].CommitBitmap = u.old
+	}
+	return 0, append(notes, fmt.Sprintf(
+		"crosslink-restored bitmaps do not reproduce the header incoming-receipt commitment at block %d; substitutions rolled back, proofs left as stored", blk.NumberU64()))
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/metadata/audit/overlay.go b/internal/recovery/metadata/audit/overlay.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..80304a8df9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/metadata/audit/overlay.go
@@ -0,0 +1,404 @@
+// Package audit implements `harmony-recovery metadata audit-branch` (plan
+// §4.6): the masked-overlay re-execution of the abandoned branch. Reads
+// consult scratch first, then the source minus a mask; every write and
+// delete goes to scratch only. Before any chain object is constructed,
+// scratch is seeded with the full mechanical application of the
+// normalization output plus the post-target chain tombstones and the heads
+// rewound to the target — the overlay presents exactly the post-apply
+// target DB (a dry run of B4's end state). Branch-write accounting starts
+// after a seed barrier; seed writes are baseline.
+package audit
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"sync"
+
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/ethdb"
+	"github.com/syndtr/goleveldb/leveldb"
+	ldberrors "github.com/syndtr/goleveldb/leveldb/errors"
+	"github.com/syndtr/goleveldb/leveldb/util"
+)
+
+// Overlay is the masked overlay ethdb.KeyValueStore.
+type Overlay struct {
+	mu      sync.RWMutex
+	scratch *leveldb.DB
+	source  ethdb.KeyValueStore
+	// masked hides source keys: seed tombstones plus runtime deletes.
+	masked map[string]struct{}
+	// barrier separates seed writes (baseline) from branch writes.
+	barrier bool
+	// log records post-barrier touched keys (op counts only; final values
+	// are read back from scratch at reconciliation time).
+	log map[string]*WriteLogEntry
+	// pointerTrail records every successive value written to crosslink
+	// pointer keys (pointer write evolution, plan §4.6 output 6).
+	pointerTrail map[string][][]byte
+}
+
+// WriteLogEntry summarizes post-barrier activity on one key.
+type WriteLogEntry struct {
+	Puts    int
+	Deletes int
+}
+
+// NewOverlay opens the scratch database (created fresh by the caller).
+func NewOverlay(scratchPath string, source ethdb.KeyValueStore) (*Overlay, error) {
+	sdb, err := leveldb.OpenFile(scratchPath, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return &Overlay{
+		scratch:      sdb,
+		source:       source,
+		masked:       map[string]struct{}{},
+		log:          map[string]*WriteLogEntry{},
+		pointerTrail: map[string][][]byte{},
+	}, nil
+}
+
+// SealSeed marks the seed complete: subsequent writes are branch writes.
+func (o *Overlay) SealSeed() {
+	o.mu.Lock()
+	defer o.mu.Unlock()
+	o.barrier = true
+}
+
+// Mask hides a source key (seed tombstone).
+func (o *Overlay) Mask(key []byte) {
+	o.mu.Lock()
+	defer o.mu.Unlock()
+	o.masked[string(key)] = struct{}{}
+}
+
+// SeedPut materializes a rewrite during seeding.
+func (o *Overlay) SeedPut(key, value []byte) error {
+	o.mu.Lock()
+	defer o.mu.Unlock()
+	delete(o.masked, string(key))
+	return o.scratch.Put(key, value, nil)
+}
+
+// Log returns a copy of the post-barrier write log.
+func (o *Overlay) Log() map[string]WriteLogEntry {
+	o.mu.RLock()
+	defer o.mu.RUnlock()
+	out := make(map[string]WriteLogEntry, len(o.log))
+	for k, v := range o.log {
+		out[k] = *v
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
+// PointerTrail returns the recorded pointer write evolution.
+func (o *Overlay) PointerTrail() map[string][][]byte {
+	o.mu.RLock()
+	defer o.mu.RUnlock()
+	out := make(map[string][][]byte, len(o.pointerTrail))
+	for k, v := range o.pointerTrail {
+		out[k] = v
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
+// Close closes the scratch handle (the source is owned by the caller).
+func (o *Overlay) Close() error { return o.scratch.Close() }
+
+var _ ethdb.KeyValueStore = (*Overlay)(nil)
+
+// Get consults scratch, then the unmasked source.
+func (o *Overlay) Get(key []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	o.mu.RLock()
+	defer o.mu.RUnlock()
+	return o.getLocked(key)
+}
+
+func (o *Overlay) getLocked(key []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	v, err := o.scratch.Get(key, nil)
+	if err == nil {
+		return v, nil
+	}
+	if err != leveldb.ErrNotFound {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if _, hidden := o.masked[string(key)]; hidden {
+		return nil, ldberrors.ErrNotFound
+	}
+	return o.source.Get(key)
+}
+
+// Has mirrors Get.
+func (o *Overlay) Has(key []byte) (bool, error) {
+	o.mu.RLock()
+	defer o.mu.RUnlock()
+	if ok, err := o.scratch.Has(key, nil); err != nil {
+		return false, err
+	} else if ok {
+		return true, nil
+	}
+	if _, hidden := o.masked[string(key)]; hidden {
+		return false, nil
+	}
+	return o.source.Has(key)
+}
+
+// Put writes to scratch only, unhides the key, and logs post-barrier.
+func (o *Overlay) Put(key, value []byte) error {
+	o.mu.Lock()
+	defer o.mu.Unlock()
+	return o.putLocked(key, value)
+}
+
+func (o *Overlay) putLocked(key, value []byte) error {
+	if err := o.scratch.Put(key, value, nil); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	delete(o.masked, string(key))
+	if o.barrier {
+		e := o.log[string(key)]
+		if e == nil {
+			e = &WriteLogEntry{}
+			o.log[string(key)] = e
+		}
+		e.Puts++
+		if isPointerKey(key) {
+			o.pointerTrail[string(key)] = append(o.pointerTrail[string(key)], append([]byte(nil), value...))
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// Delete tombstones the key (masking any source value) and logs.
+func (o *Overlay) Delete(key []byte) error {
+	o.mu.Lock()
+	defer o.mu.Unlock()
+	return o.deleteLocked(key)
+}
+
+func (o *Overlay) deleteLocked(key []byte) error {
+	if err := o.scratch.Delete(key, nil); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	o.masked[string(key)] = struct{}{}
+	if o.barrier {
+		e := o.log[string(key)]
+		if e == nil {
+			e = &WriteLogEntry{}
+			o.log[string(key)] = e
+		}
+		e.Deletes++
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func isPointerKey(key []byte) bool {
+	return len(key) == 6 && key[0] == 'c' && key[1] == 'l'
+}
+
+func (o *Overlay) Stat(property string) (string, error) { return o.scratch.GetProperty(property) }
+
+// Compact compacts scratch only.
+func (o *Overlay) Compact(start, limit []byte) error {
+	return o.scratch.CompactRange(util.Range{Start: start, Limit: limit})
+}
+
+// NewBatch buffers ops and replays them through the overlay on Write, so
+// tombstones and the write log stay consistent.
+func (o *Overlay) NewBatch() ethdb.Batch { return &overlayBatch{o: o} }
+
+// NewBatchWithSize is NewBatch.
+func (o *Overlay) NewBatchWithSize(size int) ethdb.Batch { return &overlayBatch{o: o} }
+
+// NewSnapshot returns a point-in-time read view. The audit's sequential
+// single-writer flow never needs isolation beyond the live view.
+func (o *Overlay) NewSnapshot() (ethdb.Snapshot, error) { return &overlaySnap{o: o}, nil }
+
+type overlaySnap struct{ o *Overlay }
+
+func (s *overlaySnap) Has(key []byte) (bool, error)   { return s.o.Has(key) }
+func (s *overlaySnap) Get(key []byte) ([]byte, error) { return s.o.Get(key) }
+func (s *overlaySnap) Release()                       {}
+
+type batchOp struct {
+	del        bool
+	key, value []byte
+}
+
+type overlayBatch struct {
+	o    *Overlay
+	ops  []batchOp
+	size int
+}
+
+var _ ethdb.Batch = (*overlayBatch)(nil)
+
+func (b *overlayBatch) Put(key, value []byte) error {
+	b.ops = append(b.ops, batchOp{key: append([]byte(nil), key...), value: append([]byte(nil), value...)})
+	b.size += len(key) + len(value)
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (b *overlayBatch) Delete(key []byte) error {
+	b.ops = append(b.ops, batchOp{del: true, key: append([]byte(nil), key...)})
+	b.size += len(key)
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (b *overlayBatch) ValueSize() int { return b.size }
+
+func (b *overlayBatch) Write() error {
+	b.o.mu.Lock()
+	defer b.o.mu.Unlock()
+	for _, op := range b.ops {
+		if op.del {
+			if err := b.o.deleteLocked(op.key); err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+			continue
+		}
+		if err := b.o.putLocked(op.key, op.value); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (b *overlayBatch) Reset() { b.ops, b.size = nil, 0 }
+
+func (b *overlayBatch) Replay(w ethdb.KeyValueWriter) error {
+	for _, op := range b.ops {
+		if op.del {
+			if err := w.Delete(op.key); err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+			continue
+		}
+		if err := w.Put(op.key, op.value); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// NewIterator merges scratch and unmasked-source iterators in ascending
+// key order; scratch wins ties.
+func (o *Overlay) NewIterator(prefix []byte, start []byte) ethdb.Iterator {
+	r := util.BytesPrefix(prefix)
+	r.Start = append(r.Start, start...)
+	scratchIt := o.scratch.NewIterator(r, nil)
+	srcIt := o.source.NewIterator(prefix, start)
+	it := &mergedIterator{o: o, a: &ldbIter{scratchIt}, b: srcIt}
+	return it
+}
+
+// ldbIter adapts a goleveldb iterator to the ethdb.Iterator shape.
+type ldbIter struct{ it interface {
+	Next() bool
+	Key() []byte
+	Value() []byte
+	Release()
+	Error() error
+} }
+
+func (l *ldbIter) Next() bool    { return l.it.Next() }
+func (l *ldbIter) Key() []byte   { return l.it.Key() }
+func (l *ldbIter) Value() []byte { return l.it.Value() }
+func (l *ldbIter) Release()      { l.it.Release() }
+func (l *ldbIter) Error() error  { return l.it.Error() }
+
+// mergedIterator is a 2-way merge; a = scratch (wins ties), b = source
+// (masked keys skipped).
+type mergedIterator struct {
+	o    *Overlay
+	a, b ethdb.Iterator
+
+	aDone, bDone   bool
+	aValid, bValid bool
+	inited         bool
+
+	key, value []byte
+	err        error
+}
+
+func (m *mergedIterator) advanceA() {
+	m.aValid = m.a.Next()
+	if !m.aValid {
+		m.aDone = true
+	}
+}
+
+func (m *mergedIterator) advanceB() {
+	for {
+		m.bValid = m.b.Next()
+		if !m.bValid {
+			m.bDone = true
+			return
+		}
+		m.o.mu.RLock()
+		_, hidden := m.o.masked[string(m.b.Key())]
+		m.o.mu.RUnlock()
+		if !hidden {
+			return
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func (m *mergedIterator) Next() bool {
+	if m.err != nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	if !m.inited {
+		m.inited = true
+		m.advanceA()
+		m.advanceB()
+	} else {
+		// Consume whichever side(s) produced the last key.
+		switch {
+		case m.aValid && m.bValid && bytes.Equal(m.a.Key(), m.b.Key()):
+			m.advanceA()
+			m.advanceB()
+		case m.aValid && (!m.bValid || bytes.Compare(m.a.Key(), m.b.Key()) < 0):
+			m.advanceA()
+		case m.bValid:
+			m.advanceB()
+		}
+	}
+	switch {
+	case m.aValid && m.bValid:
+		c := bytes.Compare(m.a.Key(), m.b.Key())
+		if c <= 0 {
+			m.key, m.value = cp(m.a.Key()), cp(m.a.Value())
+		} else {
+			m.key, m.value = cp(m.b.Key()), cp(m.b.Value())
+		}
+		return true
+	case m.aValid:
+		m.key, m.value = cp(m.a.Key()), cp(m.a.Value())
+		return true
+	case m.bValid:
+		m.key, m.value = cp(m.b.Key()), cp(m.b.Value())
+		return true
+	default:
+		return false
+	}
+}
+
+func cp(b []byte) []byte { return append([]byte(nil), b...) }
+
+func (m *mergedIterator) Key() []byte   { return m.key }
+func (m *mergedIterator) Value() []byte { return m.value }
+
+func (m *mergedIterator) Release() {
+	m.a.Release()
+	m.b.Release()
+}
+
+func (m *mergedIterator) Error() error {
+	if m.err != nil {
+		return m.err
+	}
+	if err := m.a.Error(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return m.b.Error()
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/metadata/audit/overlay_test.go b/internal/recovery/metadata/audit/overlay_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7ed3a91253
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/metadata/audit/overlay_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+package audit
+
+import (
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/syndtr/goleveldb/leveldb"
+	ldberrors "github.com/syndtr/goleveldb/leveldb/errors"
+	"github.com/syndtr/goleveldb/leveldb/util"
+
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/ethdb"
+)
+
+// openSourceKV writes a small source leveldb and returns a plain
+// ethdb.KeyValueStore adapter over it (writable, but the overlay never
+// writes to it).
+func openSourceKV(t *testing.T, kvs map[string]string) (ethdb.KeyValueStore, func()) {
+	t.Helper()
+	dir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "src")
+	db, err := leveldb.OpenFile(dir, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	for k, v := range kvs {
+		if err := db.Put([]byte(k), []byte(v), nil); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	return &ldbKV{db}, func() { db.Close() }
+}
+
+// ldbKV is a minimal ethdb.KeyValueStore over goleveldb for the overlay's
+// source side.
+type ldbKV struct{ db *leveldb.DB }
+
+func (k *ldbKV) Get(key []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	v, err := k.db.Get(key, nil)
+	if err == leveldb.ErrNotFound {
+		return nil, ldberrors.ErrNotFound
+	}
+	return v, err
+}
+func (k *ldbKV) Has(key []byte) (bool, error)      { return k.db.Has(key, nil) }
+func (k *ldbKV) Put(key, value []byte) error       { return k.db.Put(key, value, nil) }
+func (k *ldbKV) Delete(key []byte) error           { return k.db.Delete(key, nil) }
+func (k *ldbKV) Stat(p string) (string, error)     { return "", nil }
+func (k *ldbKV) Compact(a, b []byte) error         { return nil }
+func (k *ldbKV) Close() error                      { return nil }
+func (k *ldbKV) NewBatch() ethdb.Batch             { return nil }
+func (k *ldbKV) NewBatchWithSize(int) ethdb.Batch  { return nil }
+func (k *ldbKV) NewSnapshot() (ethdb.Snapshot, error) { return nil, nil }
+func (k *ldbKV) NewIterator(prefix, start []byte) ethdb.Iterator {
+	r := util.BytesPrefix(prefix)
+	r.Start = append(r.Start, start...)
+	return k.db.NewIterator(r, nil)
+}
+
+func TestOverlayMaskAndSeed(t *testing.T) {
+	src, closeSrc := openSourceKV(t, map[string]string{
+		"keep":    "sourceval",
+		"masked":  "shouldhide",
+		"rewrite": "oldval",
+	})
+	defer closeSrc()
+	o, err := NewOverlay(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "scratch"), src)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer o.Close()
+
+	o.Mask([]byte("masked"))
+	if err := o.SeedPut([]byte("rewrite"), []byte("newval")); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	o.SealSeed()
+
+	// keep -> source value; masked -> absent; rewrite -> materialized.
+	if v, _ := o.Get([]byte("keep")); string(v) != "sourceval" {
+		t.Fatalf("keep = %q", v)
+	}
+	if _, err := o.Get([]byte("masked")); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("masked key must read absent")
+	}
+	if v, _ := o.Get([]byte("rewrite")); string(v) != "newval" {
+		t.Fatalf("rewrite = %q, want materialized newval", v)
+	}
+	// Seed writes are baseline: the post-barrier log is empty.
+	if len(o.Log()) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("post-barrier log should be empty after seeding, got %v", o.Log())
+	}
+
+	// A post-barrier write is logged; the source is never touched.
+	if err := o.Put([]byte("branchkey"), []byte("bval")); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if entry, ok := o.Log()["branchkey"]; !ok || entry.Puts != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("branch write not logged: %v", o.Log())
+	}
+	if v, _ := src.Get([]byte("branchkey")); v != nil {
+		t.Fatal("overlay must never write to the source")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestOverlayMergedIterationOrdered(t *testing.T) {
+	src, closeSrc := openSourceKV(t, map[string]string{
+		"p1": "s1", "p2": "s2", "p3": "s3", "p5": "s5",
+	})
+	defer closeSrc()
+	o, err := NewOverlay(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "scratch"), src)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer o.Close()
+	o.Mask([]byte("p2"))                          // hide a source key
+	_ = o.SeedPut([]byte("p3"), []byte("OVER"))   // scratch wins tie
+	_ = o.SeedPut([]byte("p4"), []byte("scratch4")) // scratch-only key
+	o.SealSeed()
+
+	it := o.NewIterator([]byte("p"), nil)
+	defer it.Release()
+	var gotKeys []string
+	var gotVals []string
+	for it.Next() {
+		gotKeys = append(gotKeys, string(it.Key()))
+		gotVals = append(gotVals, string(it.Value()))
+	}
+	if err := it.Error(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	wantKeys := []string{"p1", "p3", "p4", "p5"} // p2 masked
+	if len(gotKeys) != len(wantKeys) {
+		t.Fatalf("keys = %v, want %v", gotKeys, wantKeys)
+	}
+	for i := range wantKeys {
+		if gotKeys[i] != wantKeys[i] {
+			t.Fatalf("key[%d] = %s, want %s (order broken)", i, gotKeys[i], wantKeys[i])
+		}
+	}
+	// p3 must be the scratch value (scratch wins ties).
+	if gotVals[1] != "OVER" {
+		t.Fatalf("p3 = %s, want scratch OVER", gotVals[1])
+	}
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/metadata/audit/report.go b/internal/recovery/metadata/audit/report.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..68ea0d6504
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/metadata/audit/report.go
@@ -0,0 +1,1026 @@
+package audit
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"sort"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/types"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/anchor"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/dbopen"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/hmr"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/norm"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/scan"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/source"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/report"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/strictdb"
+)
+
+// PassSection summarizes one pass for the report. The full per-block
+// outcome list (every height: executed / root-matched / validity failures)
+// is digest-bound via OutcomesSHA256 so the report carries complete
+// per-block evidence even though only failed outcomes are itemized.
+type PassSection struct {
+	Label            string               `json:"label"`
+	Authoritative    bool                 `json:"authoritative"`
+	Seed             *SeedSpec            `json:"seed"`
+	ExecutedBlocks   int                  `json:"executed_blocks"`
+	RootsMatched     int                  `json:"roots_matched"`
+	ValidityFailures int                  `json:"validity_failures"`
+	OutcomeCount     int                  `json:"outcome_count"`
+	OutcomesSHA256   string               `json:"outcomes_sha256"`
+	// LegacyBitmapsRestored counts incoming-receipt proofs whose Copy-bug
+	// corrupted CommitBitmap was verifiably restored from stored crosslinks
+	// (legacybitmap.go); restoration evidence is itemized in Findings.
+	LegacyBitmapsRestored int             `json:"legacy_bitmaps_restored"`
+	FailedOutcomes   []blockOutcome       `json:"failed_outcomes,omitempty"`
+	Findings         scan.FindingsSection `json:"findings"`
+	Fatal            bool                 `json:"fatal,omitempty"`
+	FatalHeight      uint64               `json:"fatal_height,omitempty"`
+	FatalReason      string               `json:"fatal_reason,omitempty"`
+}
+
+// Anomaly is one reconciliation gap (exit 24 when any exist).
+type Anomaly struct {
+	Kind   string `json:"kind"`
+	Key    string `json:"key,omitempty"`
+	Detail string `json:"detail"`
+}
+
+// WriteClassCounts is the fixed-shape post-barrier write census.
+type WriteClassCounts struct {
+	PlanReconciled   int `json:"plan_reconciled"`
+	MetadataNoOp     int `json:"metadata_noop_rewrites"`
+	ChainRecords     int `json:"chain_records"`
+	StateMaterial    int `json:"state_material"`
+	CrossLinkSubset  int `json:"crosslink_subset"`
+	SpentSubset      int `json:"spent_subset"`
+	Pointers         int `json:"pointers"`
+	Stats            int `json:"validator_stats"`
+	Heads            int `json:"head_pointers"`
+	PendingQueues    int `json:"pending_queues"`
+	Anomalous        int `json:"anomalous"`
+}
+
+// ReconciliationSection is §4.6 output 4.
+type ReconciliationSection struct {
+	PlanKeys        int              `json:"plan_keys"`
+	Reproduced      int              `json:"reproduced"`
+	ByteEqual       int              `json:"byte_equal"`
+	Excluded        int              `json:"excluded"`
+	ExcludedReasons []string         `json:"excluded_reasons,omitempty"`
+	Writes          WriteClassCounts `json:"writes"`
+	Anomalies       []Anomaly        `json:"anomalies,omitempty"`
+	AnomaliesOmitted int             `json:"anomalies_omitted"`
+	AnomalyCount    int              `json:"anomaly_count"`
+}
+
+// DelegateClass classifies one observed delegation op (§4.6 output 5).
+type DelegateClass struct {
+	Source            string `json:"source"` // native | precompile
+	Block             uint64 `json:"block"`
+	Delegator         string `json:"delegator"`
+	Validator         string `json:"validator"`
+	Attempted         bool   `json:"attempted"`
+	StakeMsgsVisible  bool   `json:"stake_msgs_visible"`
+	MetadataProducing bool   `json:"metadata_producing"`
+	FrameFailed       bool   `json:"frame_failed,omitempty"`
+	EnclosingReverted bool   `json:"enclosing_reverted,omitempty"`
+}
+
+// StakingSection is §4.6 outputs 2 and 5.
+type StakingSection struct {
+	NativeByDirective map[string]int  `json:"native_by_directive"`
+	PrecompileByKind  map[string]int  `json:"precompile_by_kind"`
+	Native            []NativeOp      `json:"native_ops,omitempty"`
+	NativeOmitted     int             `json:"native_omitted"`
+	Precompile        []FCOp          `json:"precompile_ops,omitempty"`
+	PrecompileOmitted int             `json:"precompile_omitted"`
+	Delegations       []DelegateClass `json:"delegations,omitempty"`
+	DelegationsOmitted int            `json:"delegations_omitted"`
+	CreatedValidators []string        `json:"created_validators"`
+	RemovedValidators []string        `json:"removed_validators"`
+}
+
+// EpochTransitionSection is §4.6 output 3.
+type EpochTransitionSection struct {
+	Observed          bool   `json:"observed"`
+	NextEpoch         uint64 `json:"next_epoch,omitempty"`
+	ShardStateEqual   bool   `json:"shard_state_byte_equal"`
+	SnapshotBatch     int    `json:"snapshot_batch_records"`
+	SnapshotBatchEqual int   `json:"snapshot_batch_byte_equal"`
+}
+
+// ShardSubset is §4.6 output 6 (B4 consumes these).
+type ShardSubset struct {
+	ShardID        uint32   `json:"shard_id"`
+	CrossLinkNums  []uint64 `json:"crosslink_block_nums"`
+	CrossLinkKeys  []string `json:"crosslink_keys"`
+	SpentNums      []uint64 `json:"spent_block_nums"`
+	SpentKeys      []string `json:"spent_keys"`
+	PointerWritten bool     `json:"pointer_written"`
+}
+
+// PointerResult is the per-shard solver outcome.
+type PointerResult struct {
+	ShardID              uint32   `json:"shard_id"`
+	StoredBlockNum       uint64   `json:"stored_block_num"`
+	StoredValueSHA       string   `json:"stored_value_sha256"`
+	PreTargetRecords     int      `json:"pre_target_records"`
+	BranchWrittenRecords int      `json:"branch_written_records"`
+	Derived              bool     `json:"derived"`
+	DerivedBlockNum      uint64   `json:"derived_block_num,omitempty"`
+	Ambiguous            bool     `json:"ambiguous"`
+	Candidates           []uint64 `json:"candidates,omitempty"`
+	TrustedUsed          bool     `json:"trusted_used,omitempty"`
+	TrustedProvenance    string   `json:"trusted_provenance,omitempty"`
+	Pass2EndEqualsStored bool     `json:"pass2_end_equals_stored"`
+}
+
+// Report is abandoned-branch-audit.json.
+type Report struct {
+	Tool   string `json:"tool"`
+	Schema string `json:"schema"`
+
+	Network string `json:"network"`
+	Shard   uint32 `json:"shard"`
+	DBPath  string `json:"db_path"`
+
+	AnchorConfigSHA string          `json:"anchor_config_sha256"`
+	Anchor          hmr.AnchorTuple `json:"anchor"`
+
+	RangeStart uint64 `json:"range_start"`
+	RangeEnd   uint64 `json:"range_end"`
+	Blocks     uint64 `json:"blocks"`
+
+	NonAuthoritative bool `json:"non_authoritative,omitempty"` // --single-pass
+
+	KnownBadBlocks       []uint64 `json:"known_bad_blocks"`
+	FirstValidityFailure uint64   `json:"first_validity_failure,omitempty"`
+	KnownBadCrossChecked bool     `json:"known_bad_cross_checked"`
+
+	Pass1 *PassSection `json:"pass1,omitempty"` // provenance, non-authoritative
+	Pass2 *PassSection `json:"pass2,omitempty"` // authoritative
+
+	EpochTransition EpochTransitionSection `json:"epoch_transition"`
+	Staking         StakingSection         `json:"staking"`
+	Reconciliation  ReconciliationSection  `json:"reconciliation"`
+	ShardSubsets    []ShardSubset          `json:"shard_subsets"`
+	Pointers        []PointerResult        `json:"pointers"`
+
+	// Optional --reference cross-check (nil when not supplied).
+	Reference *ReferenceSection `json:"reference,omitempty"`
+
+	// Source-immutability evidence: fingerprints compared before/after
+	// (device/inode included); inequality is exit 14.
+	FingerprintBefore *dbopen.Fingerprint `json:"db_fingerprint_before"`
+	FingerprintAfter  *dbopen.Fingerprint `json:"db_fingerprint_after"`
+	SourceUnchanged   bool                `json:"source_unchanged"`
+
+	StartedAt string  `json:"started_at"`
+	DurationS float64 `json:"duration_s"`
+
+	Verdict  string `json:"verdict"`
+	ExitCode int    `json:"exit_code"`
+}
+
+// ReferenceSection binds the audit to the exported reference manifest: the
+// manifest must carry the same anchor config SHA and anchor tuple AND its
+// normalized-content digest must equal the manifest the audit rebuilds from
+// its OWN normalization result (package/section/wrapper/diagnostics/
+// assertion digests). The hash chain seals anchor → reference digest →
+// per-pass outcome digests.
+type ReferenceSection struct {
+	File                string `json:"file"`
+	ManifestSHA         string `json:"manifest_sha256"` // THE reference digest (supplied file)
+	AnchorConfigOK      bool   `json:"anchor_config_sha256_match"`
+	AnchorTupleOK       bool   `json:"anchor_tuple_match"`
+	ContentMatch        bool   `json:"content_match"`
+	ExpectedManifestSHA string `json:"expected_manifest_sha256"` // rebuilt from the audit's normalization
+	HashChain           string `json:"hash_chain_sha256"`
+}
+
+// loadReference reads, strictly decodes and cross-checks the reference
+// manifest against the resolved anchor AND against the manifest the audit
+// rebuilds from its own normalization result. Any mismatch — anchor tuple,
+// config SHA, or normalized content (a forged package/section/wrapper/
+// diagnostics/assertion digest) — is an invocation error (exit 15): the
+// supplied reference does not belong to this source under this anchor.
+func loadReference(rep *Report, path string, res *anchor.Resolved, normA norm.Anchor, nres *norm.Result, stderr io.Writer) int {
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "error: read reference manifest: %v\n", err)
+		return report.ExitIO
+	}
+	man, err := hmr.DecodeManifest(raw)
+	if err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "invalid invocation: reference manifest: %v\n", err)
+		return report.ExitBadInvocation
+	}
+	sec := &ReferenceSection{File: filepath.Base(path), ManifestSHA: report.SHA256Hex(raw)}
+	sec.AnchorConfigOK = man.AnchorConfigSHA == res.ConfigSHAHex()
+	sec.AnchorTupleOK = man.Anchor == rep.Anchor && man.Network == rep.Network && man.Shard == rep.Shard
+
+	// Rebuild the expected manifest from the audit's own normalization and
+	// compare byte-for-byte: this binds the reference to the normalized
+	// CONTENT, not just the anchor identity.
+	pkg, err := hmr.Encode(nres.Normalized, res.ConfigSHA)
+	if err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "error: rebuild reference package: %v\n", err)
+		return report.ExitIO
+	}
+	expected, err := hmr.EncodeManifest(hmr.BuildManifest(normA, nres, pkg))
+	if err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "error: rebuild reference manifest: %v\n", err)
+		return report.ExitIO
+	}
+	sec.ExpectedManifestSHA = report.SHA256Hex(expected)
+	sec.ContentMatch = bytes.Equal(expected, raw)
+	rep.Reference = sec
+	if !sec.AnchorConfigOK || !sec.AnchorTupleOK || !sec.ContentMatch {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "invalid invocation: reference manifest does not match this source under the resolved anchor (config match %v, tuple match %v, content match %v)\n",
+			sec.AnchorConfigOK, sec.AnchorTupleOK, sec.ContentMatch)
+		return report.ExitBadInvocation
+	}
+	return 0
+}
+
+func newReport(res *anchor.Resolved, open *source.Open, opts Options, endHeight uint64, started time.Time) *Report {
+	return &Report{
+		Tool:            Tool,
+		Schema:          Schema,
+		Network:         res.Config.Network,
+		Shard:           res.Config.Shard,
+		DBPath:          open.DB.Path(),
+		AnchorConfigSHA: res.ConfigSHAHex(),
+		Anchor: hmr.AnchorTuple{
+			TargetHeight:       open.NormA.TargetHeight,
+			TargetHash:         open.NormA.TargetHash.Hex(),
+			TargetRoot:         open.NormA.TargetRoot.Hex(),
+			Epoch:              open.NormA.Epoch,
+			EpochFirstBlock:    open.NormA.EpochFirst,
+			EpochLastBlock:     open.NormA.EpochLast,
+			SnapshotBaseHeight: open.NormA.SnapshotBase,
+			AbandonedChildHash: open.NormA.AbandonedChildHash.Hex(),
+		},
+		RangeStart:     res.Config.TargetHeight + 1,
+		RangeEnd:       endHeight,
+		Blocks:         endHeight - res.Config.TargetHeight,
+		KnownBadBlocks: res.Config.KnownBadBlocks,
+		StartedAt:      started.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
+	}
+}
+
+func passSection(label string, authoritative bool, pr *passResult) *PassSection {
+	if pr == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	sec := &PassSection{
+		Label:                 label,
+		Authoritative:         authoritative,
+		Seed:                  pr.SeedSpec,
+		Fatal:                 pr.Fatal,
+		FatalHeight:           pr.FatalHeight,
+		FatalReason:           pr.FatalReason,
+		LegacyBitmapsRestored: pr.LegacyBitmapsRestored,
+	}
+	for _, o := range pr.Outcomes {
+		if o.Executed {
+			sec.ExecutedBlocks++
+		}
+		if o.RootMatched {
+			sec.RootsMatched++
+		}
+		if len(o.ValidityFails) > 0 {
+			sec.ValidityFailures++
+			if len(sec.FailedOutcomes) < scan.ItemLimit {
+				sec.FailedOutcomes = append(sec.FailedOutcomes, o)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	sec.OutcomeCount = len(pr.Outcomes)
+	sec.OutcomesSHA256, _ = report.DigestCanonicalJSON(pr.Outcomes)
+	sec.Findings, _ = scan.BuildFindingsSection(pr.Findings)
+	return sec
+}
+
+// shardSubsets extracted from a pass write log.
+type shardSubsets struct {
+	byShard map[uint32]*ShardSubset
+}
+
+func (s *shardSubsets) allKeys() [][]byte {
+	var out [][]byte
+	ids := make([]uint32, 0, len(s.byShard))
+	for id := range s.byShard {
+		ids = append(ids, id)
+	}
+	sort.Slice(ids, func(i, j int) bool { return ids[i] < ids[j] })
+	for _, id := range ids {
+		sub := s.byShard[id]
+		for _, k := range sub.CrossLinkKeys {
+			out = append(out, common.FromHex(k))
+		}
+		for _, k := range sub.SpentKeys {
+			out = append(out, common.FromHex(k))
+		}
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
+func (s *shardSubsets) sorted() []ShardSubset {
+	ids := make([]uint32, 0, len(s.byShard))
+	for id := range s.byShard {
+		ids = append(ids, id)
+	}
+	sort.Slice(ids, func(i, j int) bool { return ids[i] < ids[j] })
+	out := make([]ShardSubset, 0, len(ids))
+	for _, id := range ids {
+		out = append(out, *s.byShard[id])
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
+func extractShardSubsets(log map[string]WriteLogEntry) *shardSubsets {
+	s := &shardSubsets{byShard: map[uint32]*ShardSubset{}}
+	get := func(sid uint32) *ShardSubset {
+		sub, ok := s.byShard[sid]
+		if !ok {
+			sub = &ShardSubset{ShardID: sid}
+			s.byShard[sid] = sub
+		}
+		return sub
+	}
+	keys := make([]string, 0, len(log))
+	for k := range log {
+		keys = append(keys, k)
+	}
+	sort.Strings(keys)
+	for _, k := range keys {
+		ns, meta := strictdb.Classify([]byte(k))
+		switch ns {
+		case strictdb.NsCrossLink:
+			sub := get(meta.ShardID)
+			sub.CrossLinkNums = append(sub.CrossLinkNums, meta.Number)
+			sub.CrossLinkKeys = append(sub.CrossLinkKeys, fmt.Sprintf("%x", k))
+		case strictdb.NsCXReceiptSpent:
+			sub := get(meta.ShardID)
+			sub.SpentNums = append(sub.SpentNums, meta.Number)
+			sub.SpentKeys = append(sub.SpentKeys, fmt.Sprintf("%x", k))
+		case strictdb.NsCrossLinkPointer:
+			get(meta.ShardID).PointerWritten = true
+		}
+	}
+	return s
+}
+
+// pointerPlan carries solver outputs into pass 2 and the report.
+type pointerPlan struct {
+	results []PointerResult
+	seeds   map[string][]byte // pointer key -> derived record value
+}
+
+// solvePointers runs the §4.4 invariant solver per shard.
+func solvePointers(sd *side, nres *norm.Result, subsets *shardSubsets, opts Options, rep *Report, stderr io.Writer) (*pointerPlan, int) {
+	// Source crosslink record sets + pointers per shard.
+	type srcShard struct {
+		nums    map[uint64]bool
+		values  map[uint64][]byte
+		pointer []byte
+	}
+	shards := map[uint32]*srcShard{}
+	get := func(sid uint32) *srcShard {
+		sh, ok := shards[sid]
+		if !ok {
+			sh = &srcShard{nums: map[uint64]bool{}, values: map[uint64][]byte{}}
+			shards[sid] = sh
+		}
+		return sh
+	}
+	err := strictdb.ForEach(sd.kv, []byte("cl"), func(key, value []byte) error {
+		ns, meta := strictdb.Classify(key)
+		switch ns {
+		case strictdb.NsCrossLink:
+			sh := get(meta.ShardID)
+			sh.nums[meta.Number] = true
+			sh.values[meta.Number] = append([]byte(nil), value...)
+		case strictdb.NsCrossLinkPointer:
+			get(meta.ShardID).pointer = append([]byte(nil), value...)
+		}
+		return nil
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "error: read source crosslinks: %v\n", err)
+		return nil, report.ExitIO
+	}
+
+	trustedShard, trustedNum, trustedSet, terr := parseTrustedPointer(opts.TrustedShard1Pointer)
+	if terr != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "invalid --trusted-shard1-pointer: %v\n", terr)
+		return nil, report.ExitBadInvocation
+	}
+
+	plan := &pointerPlan{seeds: map[string][]byte{}}
+	anyAmbiguous := false
+	ids := make([]uint32, 0, len(shards))
+	for id := range shards {
+		ids = append(ids, id)
+	}
+	sort.Slice(ids, func(i, j int) bool { return ids[i] < ids[j] })
+	for _, sid := range ids {
+		sh := shards[sid]
+		if sh.pointer == nil {
+			continue // shard never crosslinked; nothing to solve
+		}
+		prr := PointerResult{ShardID: sid, StoredValueSHA: report.SHA256Hex(sh.pointer)}
+		if cl, err := types.DeserializeCrossLink(sh.pointer); err == nil {
+			prr.StoredBlockNum = cl.BlockNum()
+		} else {
+			fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "error: stored pointer for shard %d undecodable: %v\n", sid, err)
+			return nil, report.ExitIO
+		}
+
+		branch := map[uint64]bool{}
+		if sub, ok := subsets.byShard[sid]; ok {
+			for _, n := range sub.CrossLinkNums {
+				branch[n] = true
+			}
+		}
+		sPre := map[uint64]bool{}
+		for n := range sh.nums {
+			if !branch[n] {
+				sPre[n] = true
+			}
+		}
+		prr.PreTargetRecords = len(sPre)
+		prr.BranchWrittenRecords = len(branch)
+
+		q := prr.StoredBlockNum
+		if trustedSet && trustedShard == sid {
+			if err := ValidateTrustedPointer(trustedNum, sPre, branch, q); err != nil {
+				fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "error: %v\n", err)
+				return nil, report.ExitBadInvocation
+			}
+			prr.Derived, prr.DerivedBlockNum, prr.TrustedUsed = true, trustedNum, true
+			prr.TrustedProvenance = opts.TrustedProvenance
+		} else {
+			p, ok, candidates := SolvePointer(sPre, branch, q)
+			prr.Candidates = candidates
+			if ok {
+				prr.Derived, prr.DerivedBlockNum = true, p
+			} else {
+				prr.Ambiguous = true
+				anyAmbiguous = true
+				fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "POINTER_AMBIGUOUS: shard %d has %d gap-maximal candidates %v (supply --trusted-shard1-pointer)\n",
+					sid, len(candidates), candidates)
+			}
+		}
+		if prr.Derived {
+			val, ok := sh.values[prr.DerivedBlockNum]
+			if !ok {
+				fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "error: derived pointer %d for shard %d has no retained record\n", prr.DerivedBlockNum, sid)
+				return nil, report.ExitIO
+			}
+			key := append([]byte("cl"), u32be4(sid)...)
+			plan.seeds[string(key)] = val
+		}
+		plan.results = append(plan.results, prr)
+	}
+	if anyAmbiguous {
+		return plan, report.ExitAuditAnomaly
+	}
+	return plan, 0
+}
+
+func parseTrustedPointer(s string) (uint32, uint64, bool, error) {
+	if s == "" {
+		return 0, 0, false, nil
+	}
+	parts := strings.SplitN(s, ":", 2)
+	if len(parts) != 2 {
+		return 0, 0, false, fmt.Errorf("want <shardID>:<blockNum>, got %q", s)
+	}
+	sid, err := strconv.ParseUint(parts[0], 10, 32)
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, 0, false, err
+	}
+	num, err := strconv.ParseUint(parts[1], 10, 64)
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, 0, false, err
+	}
+	return uint32(sid), num, true, nil
+}
+
+func writeFatalReport(rep *Report, p1, p2 *passResult, opts Options, stderr io.Writer, code int) {
+	rep.Pass1 = passSection("pass-1", false, p1)
+	rep.Pass2 = passSection("pass-2", !opts.SinglePass, p2)
+	rep.ExitCode = code
+	rep.Verdict = scan.Verdict(code)
+	path := filepath.Join(opts.OutDir, "abandoned-branch-audit.json")
+	if err := report.WriteJSONAtomic(path, rep); err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "error: write audit report: %v\n", err)
+		return
+	}
+	fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "audit report (fatal) written to %s; scratch preserved at %s\n", path, opts.Scratch)
+}
+
+// crossCheckKnownBad evaluates the known-bad gate (§4.6 output 1) over the
+// authoritative pass outcomes. It is a pure function of the observed validity
+// failures and the anchored known-bad list so the gate can be unit-tested
+// exhaustively (the only deterministic way to exercise the gate-satisfied
+// path locally — see the note below).
+//
+// The anchored known-bad list is the expected set of validity failures on the
+// branch. On mainnet the exploit block MUST fail the PATCHED incoming-receipts
+// validation specifically — that is the signature the exploit detector gates
+// on. The known-bad entry excuses EXACTLY that one receipt failure and nothing
+// else: a seal/VRF/shard-state/header failure is a DIFFERENT defect, and even
+// when it coincides with the expected receipt failure at the same height it
+// remains anomalous (the anchor did not anticipate it). Anomaly conditions:
+//
+//	(a) any validity failure at a height NOT in the anchored known-bad set
+//	    (an unanticipated invalid block);
+//	(b) at a known-bad height, any failure OTHER than incoming-receipts (an
+//	    unexpected additional defect the anchor does not excuse);
+//	(c) the first anchored known-bad block produced no validity failure at
+//	    all (the expected exploit failure is absent); and
+//	(d) the first anchored known-bad block failed, but NOT with an
+//	    incoming-receipts failure (wrong defect for the exploit gate).
+//
+// crossChecked is true iff the first known-bad block reproduced the expected
+// incoming-receipts failure; it is independent of conditions (a)/(b), which
+// record their own gating anomalies (an extra defect at the exploit height
+// still fails the audit via the anomaly, even though the exploit signature
+// itself was reproduced).
+func crossCheckKnownBad(outcomes []blockOutcome, knownBadBlocks []uint64) (crossChecked bool, firstFail uint64, anomalies []Anomaly) {
+	add := func(kind, key, detail string) {
+		anomalies = append(anomalies, Anomaly{Kind: kind, Key: key, Detail: detail})
+	}
+	knownBad := map[uint64]bool{}
+	for _, h := range knownBadBlocks {
+		knownBad[h] = true
+	}
+	// isIncomingReceiptsFail reports whether a single failure label is the
+	// patched incoming-receipts check (recordModeChecks prefixes it with
+	// "incoming-receipts: ").
+	isIncomingReceiptsFail := func(f string) bool {
+		return strings.HasPrefix(f, "incoming-receipts:")
+	}
+	failsByHeight := map[uint64][]string{}
+	for _, o := range outcomes {
+		if len(o.ValidityFails) == 0 {
+			continue
+		}
+		if firstFail == 0 {
+			firstFail = o.Height
+		}
+		failsByHeight[o.Height] = o.ValidityFails
+		if !knownBad[o.Height] {
+			add("unexpected-validity-failure", fmt.Sprintf("%d", o.Height),
+				fmt.Sprintf("block %d failed validity checks (%v) but is not in the anchor's known-bad list", o.Height, o.ValidityFails))
+			continue
+		}
+		// Known-bad height: the anchor excuses ONLY the incoming-receipts
+		// failure. Any other failure at the same height is an additional,
+		// unanticipated defect and must still surface as an anomaly (condition
+		// (b)) — the known-bad entry is not a blanket amnesty for the height.
+		for _, f := range o.ValidityFails {
+			if isIncomingReceiptsFail(f) {
+				continue
+			}
+			add("known-bad-extra-failure", fmt.Sprintf("%d", o.Height),
+				fmt.Sprintf("known-bad block %d additionally failed %q; the anchor only excuses the incoming-receipts exploit failure, not unrelated seal/VRF/shard-state/header defects", o.Height, f))
+		}
+	}
+	if len(knownBadBlocks) > 0 {
+		kb := knownBadBlocks[0]
+		fails, failed := failsByHeight[kb]
+		var sawReceipts bool
+		for _, f := range fails {
+			if isIncomingReceiptsFail(f) {
+				sawReceipts = true
+			}
+		}
+		switch {
+		case !failed:
+			add("known-bad-failure-absent", fmt.Sprintf("%d", kb),
+				fmt.Sprintf("anchor expects a validity failure at known-bad block %d, none observed — the expected receipt-validation failure was not reproduced", kb))
+		case !sawReceipts:
+			add("known-bad-wrong-failure", fmt.Sprintf("%d", kb),
+				fmt.Sprintf("known-bad block %d failed validity checks %v but NOT incoming-receipts; the exploit-detector gate requires the patched incoming-receipts failure and rejects an unrelated seal/VRF/shard-state defect", kb, fails))
+		default:
+			crossChecked = true
+		}
+	}
+	return crossChecked, firstFail, anomalies
+}
+
+// assembleReport runs the bidirectional reconciliation (§4.6 outputs 3-6)
+// over the authoritative pass and fills the report. Returns the exit code.
+func assembleReport(rep *Report, nres *norm.Result, sd *side, open *source.Open,
+	pass1, auth *passResult, subsets *shardSubsets, pointer *pointerPlan, pointerAmbiguous bool) int {
+
+	rep.Pass1 = passSection("pass-1", auth == pass1, pass1)
+	if auth != pass1 {
+		rep.Pass2 = passSection("pass-2", true, auth)
+	}
+
+	var anomalies []Anomaly
+	addAnomaly := func(kind, key, detail string) {
+		anomalies = append(anomalies, Anomaly{Kind: kind, Key: key, Detail: detail})
+	}
+
+	// srcGet wraps side.Get, latching genuine I/O failures: a read error is
+	// exit 14 (I/O), never re-classified as absence or an audit anomaly.
+	var ioErr error
+	srcGet := func(key []byte) ([]byte, bool) {
+		v, ok, err := sd.Get(key)
+		if err != nil {
+			if ioErr == nil {
+				ioErr = fmt.Errorf("source read %x: %w", key, err)
+			}
+			addAnomaly("source-io-error", fmt.Sprintf("%x", key), err.Error())
+			return nil, false
+		}
+		return v, ok
+	}
+
+	// ---- Output 1: known-bad cross-check — GATING, not informational. ----
+	crossChecked, firstFail, kbAnomalies := crossCheckKnownBad(auth.Outcomes, rep.KnownBadBlocks)
+	rep.FirstValidityFailure = firstFail
+	rep.KnownBadCrossChecked = crossChecked
+	anomalies = append(anomalies, kbAnomalies...)
+
+	// ---- Output 4: bidirectional plan/write reconciliation. ----
+	planKeys := map[string]string{} // raw key -> reason
+	for _, d := range nres.Deletions.Deletions() {
+		planKeys[string(common.FromHex(d.Key))] = d.Reason
+	}
+	for _, rw := range nres.Deletions.Rewrites() {
+		planKeys[string(common.FromHex(rw.Key))] = rw.Reason
+	}
+	rec := &rep.Reconciliation
+	rec.PlanKeys = len(planKeys)
+
+	excludedReason := func(key []byte) string {
+		ns, _ := strictdb.Classify(key)
+		switch ns {
+		case strictdb.NsPendingCrossLink, strictdb.NsPendingSlashing:
+			return "node-local queue (never reproduced by re-execution)"
+		case strictdb.NsLastCommits:
+			return "dead legacy key (nothing writes it)"
+		case strictdb.NsEpochBlockNumber, strictdb.NsEpochVRF, strictdb.NsEpochVDF:
+			return "dead-writer namespace (§2.1)"
+		default:
+			return ""
+		}
+	}
+
+	planKeyList := make([]string, 0, len(planKeys))
+	for k := range planKeys {
+		planKeyList = append(planKeyList, k)
+	}
+	sort.Strings(planKeyList)
+	excludedSeen := map[string]bool{}
+	for _, k := range planKeyList {
+		key := []byte(k)
+		if reason := excludedReason(key); reason != "" {
+			rec.Excluded++
+			if !excludedSeen[reason] {
+				excludedSeen[reason] = true
+				rec.ExcludedReasons = append(rec.ExcludedReasons, reason)
+			}
+			continue
+		}
+		entry, written := auth.Log[k]
+		if !written || entry.Puts == 0 {
+			addAnomaly("plan-key-not-reproduced", fmt.Sprintf("%x", k),
+				fmt.Sprintf("deletion-plan key (reason %s) was never re-written by the branch re-execution", planKeys[k]))
+			continue
+		}
+		rec.Reproduced++
+		// Chain-deterministic namespaces byte-compare final overlay value
+		// against the source (non-reverted source expectation).
+		final, ferr := auth.overlay.Get(key)
+		srcVal, ok := srcGet(key)
+		if ferr != nil || !ok {
+			addAnomaly("plan-key-compare-unreadable", fmt.Sprintf("%x", k),
+				"final or source value unreadable for byte comparison")
+			continue
+		}
+		if !bytes.Equal(final, srcVal) {
+			addAnomaly("plan-key-byte-mismatch", fmt.Sprintf("%x", k),
+				"re-executed value differs from the source's record (non-reverted source expected byte equality)")
+			continue
+		}
+		rec.ByteEqual++
+	}
+
+	// Every post-barrier post-target write must be in the plan, the
+	// shard-1/B4 cleanup sets, or the stats namespace — anything else is
+	// an anomaly.
+	logKeys := make([]string, 0, len(auth.Log))
+	for k := range auth.Log {
+		logKeys = append(logKeys, k)
+	}
+	sort.Strings(logKeys)
+	target := rep.Anchor.TargetHeight
+	for _, k := range logKeys {
+		key := []byte(k)
+		if _, inPlan := planKeys[k]; inPlan {
+			rec.Writes.PlanReconciled++
+			continue
+		}
+		ns, meta := strictdb.Classify(key)
+		switch ns {
+		case strictdb.NsCrossLink:
+			rec.Writes.CrossLinkSubset++
+		case strictdb.NsCXReceiptSpent:
+			rec.Writes.SpentSubset++
+		case strictdb.NsCrossLinkPointer:
+			rec.Writes.Pointers++
+		case strictdb.NsValidatorStats:
+			rec.Writes.Stats++ // kept namespace: inventoried, never anomalous (§8 Q4)
+		case strictdb.NsHead:
+			rec.Writes.Heads++
+		case strictdb.NsPendingCrossLink, strictdb.NsPendingSlashing:
+			rec.Writes.PendingQueues++
+		case strictdb.NsHeader, strictdb.NsHeaderTD, strictdb.NsCanonicalHash, strictdb.NsBody,
+			strictdb.NsReceipts, strictdb.NsBlockCommitSig, strictdb.NsSkeleton:
+			if meta.Number != 0 && meta.Number <= target {
+				addAnomaly("chain-record-below-target", fmt.Sprintf("%x", k),
+					fmt.Sprintf("%s write at height %d <= target", ns, meta.Number))
+				rec.Writes.Anomalous++
+				continue
+			}
+			rec.Writes.ChainRecords++
+		case strictdb.NsHeaderNumber, strictdb.NsTxLookup, strictdb.NsCXLookup, strictdb.NsCXReceipt:
+			rec.Writes.ChainRecords++ // hash-keyed lookup/cx material (B4 cleanup domain)
+		case strictdb.NsStateNode, strictdb.NsCode, strictdb.NsValidatorCode, strictdb.NsPreimage, strictdb.NsBloom:
+			rec.Writes.StateMaterial++
+		case strictdb.NsValidatorList, strictdb.NsDVL, strictdb.NsValidatorSnapshot,
+			strictdb.NsShardState, strictdb.NsBlockRewardAccum:
+			// Metadata write outside the plan: acceptable only as a no-op
+			// rewrite (e.g. a top-up delegate rewriting identical dvl
+			// bytes).
+			final, ferr := auth.overlay.Get(key)
+			srcVal, ok := srcGet(key)
+			if ferr == nil && ok && bytes.Equal(final, srcVal) {
+				rec.Writes.MetadataNoOp++
+				continue
+			}
+			addAnomaly("unplanned-metadata-write", fmt.Sprintf("%x", k),
+				fmt.Sprintf("%s write outside the deletion plan whose value does not match the source", ns))
+			rec.Writes.Anomalous++
+		default:
+			addAnomaly("unclassified-write", fmt.Sprintf("%x", k),
+				fmt.Sprintf("post-barrier write to unexpected namespace %s", ns))
+			rec.Writes.Anomalous++
+		}
+	}
+
+	// ---- Output 5: staking-metadata reconciliation. ----
+	exitStaking := stakingReconciliation(rep, nres, auth, addAnomaly)
+
+	// ---- Output 3: epoch-transition byte-equality record. ----
+	epochTransition(rep, nres, auth, srcGet)
+
+	// ---- Output 6: shard subsets + pointer end-state check. ----
+	rep.ShardSubsets = subsets.sorted()
+	for i := range pointer.results {
+		prr := &pointer.results[i]
+		key := append([]byte("cl"), u32be4(prr.ShardID)...)
+		final, err := auth.overlay.Get(key)
+		srcVal, ok := srcGet(key)
+		if err == nil && ok && bytes.Equal(final, srcVal) {
+			prr.Pass2EndEqualsStored = true
+		} else if prr.Derived {
+			addAnomaly("pointer-end-state-mismatch", fmt.Sprintf("%x", key),
+				fmt.Sprintf("pass-2 replay seeded with %d did not end byte-equal to the stored pointer", prr.DerivedBlockNum))
+		}
+	}
+	rep.Pointers = pointer.results
+
+	// Bounded anomaly section.
+	rec.AnomalyCount = len(anomalies)
+	if len(anomalies) > scan.ItemLimit {
+		rec.Anomalies = anomalies[:scan.ItemLimit]
+		rec.AnomaliesOmitted = len(anomalies) - scan.ItemLimit
+	} else {
+		rec.Anomalies = anomalies
+	}
+
+	exit := report.ExitOK
+	if rec.AnomalyCount > 0 || pointerAmbiguous {
+		exit = report.ExitAuditAnomaly
+	}
+	exit = report.ResolveExit(exit, exitStaking)
+	if ioErr != nil {
+		// Genuine source read failures during reconciliation are I/O (exit
+		// 14), not audit anomalies (14 outranks 24 in the precedence table).
+		exit = report.ResolveExit(exit, report.ExitIO)
+	}
+	rep.Verdict = scan.Verdict(exit)
+	return exit
+}
+
+// stakingReconciliation binds operations to metadata effects (§4.6 output
+// 5): CreateValidator addresses <-> removals bidirectionally; delegations
+// classified attempted / StakeMsgs-visible / metadata-producing with the
+// binding requirement bidirectional between metadata-producing delegations
+// and removed dvl entries.
+func stakingReconciliation(rep *Report, nres *norm.Result, auth *passResult, addAnomaly func(kind, key, detail string)) int {
+	sec := &rep.Staking
+	sec.NativeByDirective = map[string]int{}
+	sec.PrecompileByKind = map[string]int{}
+
+	removedVals := map[string]bool{}
+	for _, a := range nres.RemovedValidators {
+		removedVals[a.Hex()] = true
+		sec.RemovedValidators = append(sec.RemovedValidators, a.Hex())
+	}
+	sort.Strings(sec.RemovedValidators)
+
+	// Removed dvl entries keyed by the full effect tuple
+	// {delegator, validator, blockNum}: a delegation is metadata-producing
+	// only if a removed entry exists for that exact pair AT that exact
+	// block (the dvl index BlockNum is the block the index was appended
+	// at), and each removed entry is consumed exactly once. Subsequent
+	// delegations to an already-indexed pair (top-ups) match no tuple and
+	// are correctly NOT metadata-producing (addDelegationIndex appends
+	// only when the pair is absent, §2.1).
+	tupleKey := func(delegator, validator string, block uint64) string {
+		return delegator + "|" + validator + "|" + strconv.FormatUint(block, 10)
+	}
+	removedTuples := map[string]bool{} // tuple -> consumed
+	for _, e := range nres.RemovedDVLEntries {
+		removedTuples[tupleKey(e.Delegator.Hex(), e.Validator.Hex(), e.BlockNum)] = false
+	}
+	consume := func(delegator, validator string, block uint64) bool {
+		k := tupleKey(delegator, validator, block)
+		consumed, ok := removedTuples[k]
+		if !ok || consumed {
+			return false
+		}
+		removedTuples[k] = true
+		return true
+	}
+
+	created := map[string]bool{}
+	var delegations []DelegateClass
+	for _, op := range auth.NativeOps {
+		sec.NativeByDirective[op.Directive]++
+		switch op.Directive {
+		case "CreateValidator":
+			created[op.Address] = true
+			// CreateValidator implies a self-delegation index
+			// {validator, 0, blockNum} (prepareStakingMetaData); it
+			// reconciles the removed self-delegation dvl tuple at the
+			// create block.
+			consume(op.Address, op.Address, op.Block)
+		case "Delegate":
+			dc := DelegateClass{
+				Source: "native", Block: op.Block,
+				Delegator: op.Address, Validator: op.Validator,
+				Attempted: true, StakeMsgsVisible: false,
+			}
+			dc.MetadataProducing = consume(op.Address, op.Validator, op.Block)
+			delegations = append(delegations, dc)
+		}
+	}
+	sec.CreatedValidators = make([]string, 0, len(created))
+	for a := range created {
+		sec.CreatedValidators = append(sec.CreatedValidators, a)
+	}
+	sort.Strings(sec.CreatedValidators)
+
+	for _, op := range auth.FCOps {
+		sec.PrecompileByKind[op.Kind]++
+		if op.Kind != "Delegate" {
+			continue
+		}
+		dc := DelegateClass{
+			Source: "precompile", Block: op.Block,
+			Delegator: op.Delegator, Validator: op.Validator,
+			Attempted:         true,
+			StakeMsgsVisible:  !op.FrameFailed, // appended to evm.StakeMsgs on frame success, survives enclosing reverts
+			FrameFailed:       op.FrameFailed,
+			EnclosingReverted: op.EnclosingReverted,
+		}
+		if dc.StakeMsgsVisible && !op.EnclosingReverted {
+			dc.MetadataProducing = consume(op.Delegator, op.Validator, op.Block)
+		}
+		delegations = append(delegations, dc)
+	}
+
+	// Bidirectional checks.
+	for _, a := range sec.RemovedValidators {
+		if !created[a] {
+			addAnomaly("removed-validator-without-create", a,
+				"validator removed from the normalized list has no observed post-target CreateValidator")
+		}
+	}
+	for _, a := range sec.CreatedValidators {
+		if !removedVals[a] {
+			addAnomaly("created-validator-without-removal", a,
+				"post-target CreateValidator has no matching validator-list removal")
+		}
+	}
+	tupleList := make([]string, 0, len(removedTuples))
+	for p := range removedTuples {
+		tupleList = append(tupleList, p)
+	}
+	sort.Strings(tupleList)
+	for _, p := range tupleList {
+		if !removedTuples[p] {
+			addAnomaly("removed-dvl-entry-without-delegation", p,
+				"removed dvl entry (delegator|validator|blockNum) has no observed metadata-producing delegation at that block")
+		}
+	}
+
+	sort.SliceStable(delegations, func(i, j int) bool {
+		if delegations[i].Block != delegations[j].Block {
+			return delegations[i].Block < delegations[j].Block
+		}
+		return delegations[i].Delegator < delegations[j].Delegator
+	})
+	if len(delegations) > scan.ItemLimit {
+		sec.Delegations = delegations[:scan.ItemLimit]
+		sec.DelegationsOmitted = len(delegations) - scan.ItemLimit
+	} else {
+		sec.Delegations = delegations
+	}
+	if len(auth.NativeOps) > scan.ItemLimit {
+		sec.Native = auth.NativeOps[:scan.ItemLimit]
+		sec.NativeOmitted = len(auth.NativeOps) - scan.ItemLimit
+	} else {
+		sec.Native = auth.NativeOps
+	}
+	if len(auth.FCOps) > scan.ItemLimit {
+		sec.Precompile = auth.FCOps[:scan.ItemLimit]
+		sec.PrecompileOmitted = len(auth.FCOps) - scan.ItemLimit
+	} else {
+		sec.Precompile = auth.FCOps
+	}
+	return report.ExitOK
+}
+
+// epochTransition records the §4.6 output-3 byte-equality evidence: the
+// reproduced next-epoch ss and snapshot batch byte-compared to the
+// source's to-be-deleted records (the main compensating evidence for low
+// snapshot-reconstruction coverage, §8 Q1). The per-key comparisons are
+// already part of output 4; this section aggregates them.
+func epochTransition(rep *Report, nres *norm.Result, auth *passResult, srcGet func([]byte) ([]byte, bool)) {
+	sec := &rep.EpochTransition
+	nextEpoch := rep.Anchor.Epoch + 1
+	ssKey := append([]byte("ss"), newBig(nextEpoch)...)
+	if entry, ok := auth.Log[string(ssKey)]; ok && entry.Puts > 0 {
+		sec.Observed = true
+		sec.NextEpoch = nextEpoch
+		final, err := auth.overlay.Get(ssKey)
+		srcVal, ok := srcGet(ssKey)
+		sec.ShardStateEqual = err == nil && ok && bytes.Equal(final, srcVal)
+	}
+	// Snapshot batch: future-epoch snapshot deletions rewritten by the
+	// replay.
+	for _, d := range nres.Deletions.Deletions() {
+		if d.Reason != "future-epoch" {
+			continue
+		}
+		key := common.FromHex(d.Key)
+		ns, _ := strictdb.Classify(key)
+		if ns != strictdb.NsValidatorSnapshot {
+			continue
+		}
+		sec.SnapshotBatch++
+		if entry, ok := auth.Log[string(key)]; ok && entry.Puts > 0 {
+			final, err := auth.overlay.Get(key)
+			srcVal, ok2 := srcGet(key)
+			if err == nil && ok2 && bytes.Equal(final, srcVal) {
+				sec.SnapshotBatchEqual++
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func newBig(n uint64) []byte {
+	if n == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+	var buf [8]byte
+	i := 8
+	for n > 0 {
+		i--
+		buf[i] = byte(n)
+		n >>= 8
+	}
+	return buf[i:]
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/metadata/audit/seed.go b/internal/recovery/metadata/audit/seed.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..413e33df11
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/metadata/audit/seed.go
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+package audit
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/norm"
+)
+
+// chain tombstone key builders (mirroring core/rawdb/schema.go shapes).
+func u64be8(n uint64) []byte {
+	b := make([]byte, 8)
+	for i := 7; i >= 0; i-- {
+		b[i] = byte(n)
+		n >>= 8
+	}
+	return b
+}
+
+func canonicalKey(n uint64) []byte { return append(append([]byte("h"), u64be8(n)...), 'n') }
+func headerKey(n uint64, h common.Hash) []byte {
+	return append(append([]byte("h"), u64be8(n)...), h.Bytes()...)
+}
+func headerTDKey(n uint64, h common.Hash) []byte  { return append(headerKey(n, h), 't') }
+func headerNumberKey(h common.Hash) []byte        { return append([]byte("H"), h.Bytes()...) }
+func bodyKey(n uint64, h common.Hash) []byte      { return append(append([]byte("b"), u64be8(n)...), h.Bytes()...) }
+func receiptsKey(n uint64, h common.Hash) []byte  { return append(append([]byte("r"), u64be8(n)...), h.Bytes()...) }
+func blockSigKey(n uint64) []byte                 { return append([]byte("block-sig-"), u64be8(n)...) }
+func crosslinkKey(shardID uint32, n uint64) []byte {
+	return append(append([]byte("cl"), u32be4(shardID)...), u64be8(n)...)
+}
+
+var headKeys = [][]byte{[]byte("LastHeader"), []byte("LastBlock"), []byte("LastFast"), []byte("LastFinalized")}
+
+// SeedSpec captures what was seeded, for the report and the seed-equality
+// acceptance test.
+type SeedSpec struct {
+	PlanDeletions   int      `json:"plan_deletions"`
+	PlanRewrites    int      `json:"plan_rewrites"`
+	ChainTombstones int      `json:"chain_tombstones"`
+	BranchHashes    int      `json:"branch_hashes"`
+	ExtraMaskedKeys int      `json:"extra_masked_keys"` // pass-2 crosslink/spent masks
+	PointerSeeds    []string `json:"pointer_seeds,omitempty"`
+}
+
+// Seed applies the full mechanical application of the normalization output
+// to the overlay (plan §4.6): every DeletionPlan deletion becomes a
+// tombstone, every rewrite is materialized (masking alone would make
+// rewritten keys read absent — not B4's end state), post-target canonical
+// chain records are tombstoned, and the heads are rewritten to the target
+// tuple. extraMask carries pass-2's branch-written crosslink/spent keys;
+// pointerSeeds carries the derived pass-2 pointer records.
+func Seed(o *Overlay, res *norm.Result, src sourceReader, targetHash common.Hash, targetHeight uint64,
+	extraMask [][]byte, pointerSeeds map[string][]byte) (*SeedSpec, error) {
+	spec := &SeedSpec{}
+
+	// 1. Deletion tombstones.
+	for _, d := range res.Deletions.Deletions() {
+		o.Mask(common.FromHex(d.Key))
+		spec.PlanDeletions++
+	}
+	// 2. Materialized rewrites: the normalized values for every rewrite
+	// key come from the NormalizedSet (the plan itself carries hashes
+	// only).
+	rewriteKeys := map[string]struct{}{}
+	for _, rw := range res.Deletions.Rewrites() {
+		rewriteKeys[string(common.FromHex(rw.Key))] = struct{}{}
+	}
+	seedRecord := func(r norm.Record) error {
+		if _, ok := rewriteKeys[string(r.Key)]; !ok {
+			return nil
+		}
+		if err := o.SeedPut(r.Key, r.Value); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		spec.PlanRewrites++
+		return nil
+	}
+	if err := seedRecord(res.Normalized.ValidatorList); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	for _, r := range res.Normalized.DVL {
+		if err := seedRecord(r); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+	}
+	if spec.PlanRewrites != len(rewriteKeys) {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("audit: %d rewrites in the plan but only %d normalized values found to materialize",
+			len(rewriteKeys), spec.PlanRewrites)
+	}
+
+	// 3. Post-target canonical chain tombstones: walk the source's
+	// canonical mappings upward until the first gap.
+	for n := targetHeight + 1; ; n++ {
+		hash, err := src.CanonicalHash(n)
+		if err != nil || hash == (common.Hash{}) {
+			break
+		}
+		o.Mask(canonicalKey(n))
+		o.Mask(headerKey(n, hash))
+		o.Mask(headerTDKey(n, hash))
+		o.Mask(headerNumberKey(hash))
+		o.Mask(bodyKey(n, hash))
+		o.Mask(receiptsKey(n, hash))
+		o.Mask(blockSigKey(n))
+		spec.ChainTombstones += 7
+		spec.BranchHashes++
+	}
+	// Legacy LastCommits is masked (plan §4.6; its deletion is already in
+	// the plan when present, but the mask is unconditional).
+	o.Mask([]byte("LastCommits"))
+
+	// 4. Heads rewound to the target tuple.
+	for _, hk := range headKeys {
+		if err := o.SeedPut(hk, targetHash.Bytes()); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+	}
+
+	// 5. Pass-2 additions: branch-written crosslink/spent masks and the
+	// derived pointer seeds.
+	for _, k := range extraMask {
+		o.Mask(k)
+		spec.ExtraMaskedKeys++
+	}
+	for k, v := range pointerSeeds {
+		if err := o.SeedPut([]byte(k), v); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		spec.PointerSeeds = append(spec.PointerSeeds, fmt.Sprintf("%x", k))
+	}
+
+	o.SealSeed()
+	return spec, nil
+}
+
+// sourceReader is the minimal side-handle surface Seed needs.
+type sourceReader interface {
+	CanonicalHash(n uint64) (common.Hash, error)
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/metadata/audit/side.go b/internal/recovery/metadata/audit/side.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9ff9e98608
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/metadata/audit/side.go
@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
+package audit
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common"
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/ethdb"
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/rlp"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/block"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/rawdb"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/types"
+)
+
+// side is the unmasked read-only view of the source: the audit reads the
+// original branch blocks (and reconciliation baselines) from here while
+// the overlay presents the post-apply view to the chain.
+type side struct {
+	kv ethdb.KeyValueStore // strict read-only source adapter
+	db ethdb.Database      // rawdb wrapper
+}
+
+func newSide(kv ethdb.KeyValueStore) *side {
+	return &side{kv: kv, db: rawdb.NewDatabase(kv)}
+}
+
+// CanonicalHash implements sourceReader for the seed builder. It reads the
+// raw canonical key through the strict adapter (never the fail-open
+// rawdb.ReadCanonicalHash, which converts I/O errors into an empty hash —
+// here a read error would silently truncate the seed's tombstone walk).
+// A mapping value that is not exactly 32 bytes is corruption, never
+// absence: BytesToHash would silently pad/truncate it into a plausible
+// hash and reroute every downstream read.
+func (s *side) CanonicalHash(n uint64) (common.Hash, error) {
+	raw, found, err := s.Get(canonicalKey(n))
+	if err != nil {
+		return common.Hash{}, fmt.Errorf("canonical hash %d unreadable: %w", n, err)
+	}
+	if !found {
+		return common.Hash{}, nil
+	}
+	if len(raw) != common.HashLength {
+		return common.Hash{}, fmt.Errorf("canonical mapping %d malformed: %d bytes, want %d (corrupt source)",
+			n, len(raw), common.HashLength)
+	}
+	return common.BytesToHash(raw), nil
+}
+
+// identityError reports a WELL-FORMED header or block record whose
+// recomputed hash or claimed height contradicts the canonical mapping it
+// was found under: stored-content tampering (or a redirected mapping)
+// rather than a broken or incomplete read. It carries the decoded object.
+// The default disposition is fail-closed (checkPreconditions turns any
+// Header error into exit 14); the pass runner alone unwraps it — the
+// mismatch is recorded as a MANDATORY source-identity validity failure
+// (gating the audit to a non-zero exit via the known-bad cross-check)
+// while validation continues over the decoded content, so the remaining
+// ancestry/cryptographic/execution checks classify the tamper too instead
+// of the run aborting as I/O and masking where it sits.
+type identityError struct {
+	kind   string // "header" or "block"
+	n      uint64
+	mapped common.Hash
+	header *block.Header
+	block  *types.Block
+	reason string
+}
+
+func (e *identityError) Error() string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("%s record at %d %s %s (tampered, redirected or corrupt source)",
+		e.kind, e.n, e.mapped.Hex(), e.reason)
+}
+
+// Header reads the canonical header at n. (nil, nil) means EXACTLY one
+// thing: no canonical mapping exists at n (genuine absence). Everything
+// else fails closed with a non-nil error:
+//
+//   - read errors on the canonical key or the header record (strict
+//     adapter; never the fail-open rawdb readers, which convert read
+//     errors into nil and would let an unreadable child header masquerade
+//     as absence, silently rerouting CommitSigFor to the block-sig
+//     fallback or turning a precondition I/O failure into a "missing
+//     header" invocation error);
+//   - a malformed canonical mapping (not exactly 32 bytes);
+//   - a canonical mapping whose header record is MISSING — a dangling
+//     mapping is corruption, not absence;
+//   - a header record that does not decode;
+//   - a decoded header whose recomputed hash or claimed height contradicts
+//     the mapping it sits under — reported as *headerIdentityError, which
+//     still carries the decoded header for the one caller (CommitSigFor)
+//     that must classify content tampering through the validity pipeline
+//     instead of aborting.
+func (s *side) Header(n uint64) (*block.Header, error) {
+	hash, err := s.CanonicalHash(n)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if hash == (common.Hash{}) {
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+	raw, found, err := s.Get(headerKey(n, hash))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("header %d %s unreadable: %w", n, hash.Hex(), err)
+	}
+	if !found {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("canonical mapping %d points at %s but the header record is missing (corrupt source)",
+			n, hash.Hex())
+	}
+	header := new(block.Header)
+	if err := rlp.Decode(bytes.NewReader(raw), header); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("header %d %s undecodable: %w", n, hash.Hex(), err)
+	}
+	if got := header.Hash(); got != hash {
+		return nil, &identityError{kind: "header", n: n, mapped: hash, header: header,
+			reason: fmt.Sprintf("decodes to hash %s", got.Hex())}
+	}
+	if header.Number() == nil || !header.Number().IsUint64() || header.Number().Uint64() != n {
+		return nil, &identityError{kind: "header", n: n, mapped: hash, header: header,
+			reason: fmt.Sprintf("decodes to height %v", header.Number())}
+	}
+	return header, nil
+}
+
+// Block reads the canonical block at n and verifies its identity: the
+// decoded content must reproduce the mapped hash and claim height n. A
+// mismatch — a redirected canonical mapping over otherwise-valid bytes
+// would pass ancestry and cryptographic checks unnoticed — is returned as
+// *identityError carrying the decoded block, which the pass runner records
+// as a mandatory source-identity validity failure before continuing.
+func (s *side) Block(n uint64) (*types.Block, error) {
+	hash, err := s.CanonicalHash(n)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if hash == (common.Hash{}) {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("no canonical hash at height %d in the source", n)
+	}
+	b := rawdb.ReadBlock(s.db, hash, n)
+	if b == nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("block %d %s not readable from the source", n, hash.Hex())
+	}
+	if got := b.Hash(); got != hash {
+		return nil, &identityError{kind: "block", n: n, mapped: hash, block: b,
+			reason: fmt.Sprintf("decodes to hash %s", got.Hex())}
+	}
+	if b.NumberU64() != n {
+		return nil, &identityError{kind: "block", n: n, mapped: hash, block: b,
+			reason: fmt.Sprintf("decodes to height %d", b.NumberU64())}
+	}
+	return b, nil
+}
+
+// CommitSigFor returns sigAndBitmap covering block n: the child header's
+// LastCommit fields, or the exact block-sig-N key when no child GENUINELY
+// exists. A child-header read/decode error is propagated, never treated as
+// absence — silently falling back to block-sig-N on an I/O failure would
+// swap the signature source without anyone noticing.
+//
+// A child record whose hash/height contradicts its mapping (stored-content
+// tampering or a redirected mapping — *identityError) does NOT abort:
+// the commit material extracted here is UNTRUSTED input to the audit's
+// cryptographic header-signature and seal checks, which classify such
+// tampering at the affected heights. The identity error itself is returned
+// alongside the material so the pass runner records it as a MANDATORY
+// source-identity validity failure — it can never be discarded, even when
+// the tampered record still carries commit material that verifies (e.g. a
+// redirected mapping over a copy of the true child).
+func (s *side) CommitSigFor(n uint64) ([]byte, *identityError, error) {
+	child, err := s.Header(n + 1)
+	var ide *identityError
+	if err != nil {
+		if !errors.As(err, &ide) || ide.header == nil {
+			return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("commit signature source for block %d: child %w", n, err)
+		}
+		child = ide.header
+	}
+	if child != nil {
+		sig := child.LastCommitSignature()
+		bitmap := child.LastCommitBitmap()
+		if len(bitmap) > 0 {
+			return append(append([]byte(nil), sig[:]...), bitmap...), ide, nil
+		}
+	}
+	raw, err := s.kv.Get(blockSigKey(n))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("no commit signature source for block %d (no child header, no block-sig key): %w", n, err)
+	}
+	return raw, ide, nil
+}
+
+// CrossLink reads the stored crosslink for (shardID, blockNum) from the raw
+// source (nil when absent). Restoration source for legacy Copy-bug bitmap
+// repair — see legacybitmap.go.
+func (s *side) CrossLink(shardID uint32, blockNum uint64) (*types.CrossLink, error) {
+	raw, found, err := s.Get(crosslinkKey(shardID, blockNum))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if !found {
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+	return types.DeserializeCrossLink(raw)
+}
+
+// Get reads a raw source key. found=false with a nil error means genuine
+// absence; a non-nil error is a real I/O failure that must surface as exit
+// 14, never as absence/corruption/anomaly.
+func (s *side) Get(key []byte) (val []byte, found bool, err error) {
+	has, err := s.kv.Has(key)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, false, err
+	}
+	if !has {
+		return nil, false, nil
+	}
+	v, err := s.kv.Get(key)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, false, err
+	}
+	return v, true, nil
+}
+
+// HeadHeight resolves the source head height via LastHeader.
+func (s *side) HeadHeight() (uint64, error) {
+	raw, err := s.kv.Get([]byte("LastHeader"))
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf("source LastHeader unreadable: %w", err)
+	}
+	num := rawdb.ReadHeaderNumber(s.db, common.BytesToHash(raw))
+	if num == nil {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf("source LastHeader %x has no number mapping", raw)
+	}
+	return *num, nil
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/metadata/audit/side_test.go b/internal/recovery/metadata/audit/side_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..239275c716
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/metadata/audit/side_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,400 @@
+package audit
+
+// Injected source read-error tests for side.Header and its two callers
+// (checkPreconditions, CommitSigFor): an I/O failure on the canonical-hash
+// key or the header record must surface as an error (exit 14 at the
+// callers), never be misread as absence — absence reroutes CommitSigFor to
+// the block-sig fallback and turns the precondition check into a spurious
+// "missing header" invocation error (exit 15).
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"errors"
+	"math/big"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/ethdb"
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/ethdb/memorydb"
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/rlp"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/block"
+	blockfactory "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/block/factory"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/rawdb"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/types"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/anchor"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/report"
+)
+
+// faultKV injects read errors on selected keys over a real memory store.
+type faultKV struct {
+	ethdb.KeyValueStore
+	failOn func(key []byte) error
+}
+
+func (f faultKV) Has(key []byte) (bool, error) {
+	if err := f.failOn(key); err != nil {
+		return false, err
+	}
+	return f.KeyValueStore.Has(key)
+}
+
+func (f faultKV) Get(key []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	if err := f.failOn(key); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return f.KeyValueStore.Get(key)
+}
+
+func failKeys(bad ...[]byte) func([]byte) error {
+	return func(key []byte) error {
+		for _, b := range bad {
+			if bytes.Equal(key, b) {
+				return errors.New("injected read fault")
+			}
+		}
+		return nil
+	}
+}
+
+// childHeader builds a decodable header carrying LastCommit material.
+func childHeader(t *testing.T, n uint64) (*block.Header, []byte) {
+	t.Helper()
+	var sig [96]byte
+	for i := range sig {
+		sig[i] = byte(i + 1)
+	}
+	h := blockfactory.ForTest.NewHeader(big.NewInt(3)).With().
+		Number(new(big.Int).SetUint64(n)).
+		LastCommitSignature(sig).
+		LastCommitBitmap([]byte{0xff, 0x01}).
+		Header()
+	want := append(append([]byte(nil), sig[:]...), 0xff, 0x01)
+	return h, want
+}
+
+func storeHeader(t *testing.T, mem ethdb.KeyValueStore, n uint64, h *block.Header) {
+	t.Helper()
+	raw, err := rlp.EncodeToBytes(h)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("encode header: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := mem.Put(canonicalKey(n), h.Hash().Bytes()); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := mem.Put(headerKey(n, h.Hash()), raw); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSideHeaderCanonicalReadFault(t *testing.T) {
+	mem := memorydb.New()
+	h, _ := childHeader(t, 42)
+	storeHeader(t, mem, 42, h)
+	sd := newSide(faultKV{mem, failKeys(canonicalKey(42))})
+	if _, err := sd.Header(42); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "canonical hash 42 unreadable") {
+		t.Fatalf("want canonical read fault, got %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSideHeaderRecordReadFault(t *testing.T) {
+	mem := memorydb.New()
+	h, _ := childHeader(t, 42)
+	storeHeader(t, mem, 42, h)
+	sd := newSide(faultKV{mem, failKeys(headerKey(42, h.Hash()))})
+	if _, err := sd.Header(42); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "unreadable") {
+		t.Fatalf("want header record read fault, got %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSideHeaderUndecodable(t *testing.T) {
+	mem := memorydb.New()
+	h, _ := childHeader(t, 42)
+	storeHeader(t, mem, 42, h)
+	if err := mem.Put(headerKey(42, h.Hash()), []byte("garbage")); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	sd := newSide(mem)
+	if _, err := sd.Header(42); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "undecodable") {
+		t.Fatalf("want decode error, got %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSideHeaderGenuineAbsence(t *testing.T) {
+	sd := newSide(memorydb.New())
+	h, err := sd.Header(42)
+	if err != nil || h != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("want (nil, nil) for genuine absence, got (%v, %v)", h, err)
+	}
+}
+
+// A canonical mapping whose header record is missing is corruption, never
+// absence: it must fail closed at Header, block the CommitSigFor fallback,
+// and surface as exit 14 (not 15) from the precondition check.
+func TestSideHeaderDanglingCanonicalMappingIsCorruption(t *testing.T) {
+	mem := memorydb.New()
+	h, _ := childHeader(t, 42)
+	storeHeader(t, mem, 42, h)
+	if err := mem.Delete(headerKey(42, h.Hash())); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := mem.Put(blockSigKey(41), []byte("planted-fallback")); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	sd := newSide(mem)
+	if _, err := sd.Header(42); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "header record is missing") {
+		t.Fatalf("want dangling-mapping corruption error, got %v", err)
+	}
+	if got, _, err := sd.CommitSigFor(41); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "header record is missing") {
+		t.Fatalf("CommitSigFor must not fall back over a dangling mapping, got (%x, %v)", got, err)
+	}
+	res := &anchor.Resolved{Config: anchor.Config{TargetHeight: 41}}
+	var errBuf strings.Builder
+	if code := checkPreconditions(sd, res, 0, &errBuf); code != report.ExitIO {
+		t.Fatalf("want exit %d (I/O/corruption), got %d (stderr: %s)", report.ExitIO, code, errBuf.String())
+	}
+}
+
+// A canonical mapping value that is not exactly 32 bytes is corruption:
+// BytesToHash would silently pad/truncate it into a plausible hash.
+func TestSideHeaderMalformedCanonicalMapping(t *testing.T) {
+	for name, val := range map[string][]byte{
+		"short": bytes.Repeat([]byte{0xaa}, 31),
+		"long":  bytes.Repeat([]byte{0xbb}, 33),
+	} {
+		mem := memorydb.New()
+		if err := mem.Put(canonicalKey(42), val); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if err := mem.Put(blockSigKey(41), []byte("planted-fallback")); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		sd := newSide(mem)
+		if _, err := sd.CanonicalHash(42); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "malformed") {
+			t.Fatalf("%s: want malformed-mapping error from CanonicalHash, got %v", name, err)
+		}
+		if _, err := sd.Header(42); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "malformed") {
+			t.Fatalf("%s: want malformed-mapping error from Header, got %v", name, err)
+		}
+		if got, _, err := sd.CommitSigFor(41); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "malformed") {
+			t.Fatalf("%s: CommitSigFor must not fall back over a malformed mapping, got (%x, %v)", name, got, err)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// A header record that decodes to a hash other than the mapping it was
+// found under fails closed at Header (exit 14 from the precondition
+// check). CommitSigFor alone proceeds with the stored record's commit
+// material — never the block-sig fallback — so the audit's cryptographic
+// checks classify the tamper at the affected heights instead of masking
+// it as an I/O abort.
+func TestSideHeaderHashMismatchIsCorruption(t *testing.T) {
+	mem := memorydb.New()
+	real, _ := childHeader(t, 42)
+	other, want := childHeader(t, 43) // different header, different hash
+	raw, err := rlp.EncodeToBytes(other)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := mem.Put(canonicalKey(42), real.Hash().Bytes()); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := mem.Put(headerKey(42, real.Hash()), raw); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := mem.Put(blockSigKey(41), []byte("planted-fallback")); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	sd := newSide(mem)
+	if _, err := sd.Header(42); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "decodes to hash") {
+		t.Fatalf("want hash-mismatch error, got %v", err)
+	}
+	res := &anchor.Resolved{Config: anchor.Config{TargetHeight: 41}}
+	var errBuf strings.Builder
+	if code := checkPreconditions(sd, res, 0, &errBuf); code != report.ExitIO {
+		t.Fatalf("want exit %d for a tampered precondition header, got %d (stderr: %s)",
+			report.ExitIO, code, errBuf.String())
+	}
+	got, ide, err := sd.CommitSigFor(41)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("CommitSigFor must classify identity tampering through the validity pipeline, got error %v", err)
+	}
+	if ide == nil {
+		t.Fatal("CommitSigFor must surface the identity mismatch (mandatory finding), got nil")
+	}
+	if !bytes.Equal(got, want) {
+		t.Fatalf("CommitSigFor must use the stored record's material (never the fallback): got %x want %x", got, want)
+	}
+}
+
+// A header record that decodes cleanly and matches its own hash but claims
+// a different height than the mapping it sits under is the same identity
+// tampering: Header errors, preconditions exit 14, CommitSigFor proceeds
+// with the stored material for the validity pipeline to convict.
+func TestSideHeaderHeightMismatchIsCorruption(t *testing.T) {
+	mem := memorydb.New()
+	h, want := childHeader(t, 43) // header says height 43
+	raw, err := rlp.EncodeToBytes(h)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := mem.Put(canonicalKey(42), h.Hash().Bytes()); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := mem.Put(headerKey(42, h.Hash()), raw); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := mem.Put(blockSigKey(41), []byte("planted-fallback")); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	sd := newSide(mem)
+	if _, err := sd.Header(42); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "decodes to height") {
+		t.Fatalf("want height-mismatch error, got %v", err)
+	}
+	res := &anchor.Resolved{Config: anchor.Config{TargetHeight: 41}}
+	var errBuf strings.Builder
+	if code := checkPreconditions(sd, res, 0, &errBuf); code != report.ExitIO {
+		t.Fatalf("want exit %d for a tampered precondition header, got %d (stderr: %s)",
+			report.ExitIO, code, errBuf.String())
+	}
+	got, ide, err := sd.CommitSigFor(41)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("CommitSigFor must classify identity tampering through the validity pipeline, got error %v", err)
+	}
+	if ide == nil {
+		t.Fatal("CommitSigFor must surface the identity mismatch (mandatory finding), got nil")
+	}
+	if !bytes.Equal(got, want) {
+		t.Fatalf("CommitSigFor must use the stored record's material (never the fallback): got %x want %x", got, want)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCommitSigForUsesChildHeader(t *testing.T) {
+	mem := memorydb.New()
+	h, want := childHeader(t, 42)
+	storeHeader(t, mem, 42, h)
+	sd := newSide(mem)
+	got, ide, err := sd.CommitSigFor(41)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if ide != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("clean child must carry no identity error, got %v", ide)
+	}
+	if !bytes.Equal(got, want) {
+		t.Fatalf("sigAndBitmap mismatch: got %x want %x", got, want)
+	}
+}
+
+// A child-header read fault must abort CommitSigFor — never silently swap
+// the signature source to the block-sig fallback (planted here to prove the
+// fallback WOULD have answered).
+func TestCommitSigForChildReadFaultNoFallback(t *testing.T) {
+	mem := memorydb.New()
+	h, _ := childHeader(t, 42)
+	storeHeader(t, mem, 42, h)
+	if err := mem.Put(blockSigKey(41), []byte("planted-fallback")); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	for name, key := range map[string][]byte{
+		"canonical": canonicalKey(42),
+		"header":    headerKey(42, h.Hash()),
+	} {
+		sd := newSide(faultKV{mem, failKeys(key)})
+		got, _, err := sd.CommitSigFor(41)
+		if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "injected read fault") {
+			t.Fatalf("%s fault: want propagated read error, got (%x, %v)", name, got, err)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCommitSigForGenuineAbsenceFallsBack(t *testing.T) {
+	mem := memorydb.New()
+	if err := mem.Put(blockSigKey(41), []byte("stored-sig")); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	sd := newSide(mem)
+	got, ide, err := sd.CommitSigFor(41)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if ide != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("genuine absence must carry no identity error, got %v", ide)
+	}
+	if string(got) != "stored-sig" {
+		t.Fatalf("want block-sig fallback, got %q", got)
+	}
+}
+
+// A redirected canonical mapping — otherwise-valid block bytes stored under
+// a wrong hash key — must fail block identity validation, carrying the
+// decoded block for the pass runner to record and keep validating.
+func TestSideBlockIdentityMismatch(t *testing.T) {
+	mem := memorydb.New()
+	db := rawdb.NewDatabase(mem)
+	h, _ := childHeader(t, 42)
+	blk := types.NewBlockWithHeader(h)
+	if err := rawdb.WriteBlock(db, blk); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	// Redirect: canonical(42) points at a wrong hash, with the true
+	// header/body records copied under that wrong key.
+	wrong := blk.Hash()
+	wrong[0] ^= 0xff
+	if err := mem.Put(canonicalKey(42), wrong.Bytes()); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	hdrRaw, err := mem.Get(headerKey(42, blk.Hash()))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := mem.Put(headerKey(42, wrong), hdrRaw); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	bodyRaw, err := mem.Get(bodyKey(42, blk.Hash()))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := mem.Put(bodyKey(42, wrong), bodyRaw); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	sd := newSide(mem)
+	_, err = sd.Block(42)
+	var ide *identityError
+	if !errors.As(err, &ide) {
+		t.Fatalf("want *identityError from redirected mapping, got %v", err)
+	}
+	if ide.kind != "block" || ide.block == nil || ide.block.Hash() != blk.Hash() {
+		t.Fatalf("identity error must carry the decoded block: %+v", ide)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "decodes to hash") {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected identity error text: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPreconditionsChildReadFaultIsExitIO(t *testing.T) {
+	mem := memorydb.New()
+	h, _ := childHeader(t, 42)
+	storeHeader(t, mem, 42, h)
+	sd := newSide(faultKV{mem, failKeys(canonicalKey(42))})
+	res := &anchor.Resolved{Config: anchor.Config{TargetHeight: 41}}
+	var errBuf strings.Builder
+	if code := checkPreconditions(sd, res, 0, &errBuf); code != report.ExitIO {
+		t.Fatalf("want exit %d (I/O), got %d (stderr: %s)", report.ExitIO, code, errBuf.String())
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(errBuf.String(), "injected read fault") {
+		t.Fatalf("stderr must carry the read fault, got: %s", errBuf.String())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPreconditionsChildAbsentIsBadInvocation(t *testing.T) {
+	sd := newSide(memorydb.New())
+	res := &anchor.Resolved{Config: anchor.Config{TargetHeight: 41}}
+	var errBuf strings.Builder
+	if code := checkPreconditions(sd, res, 0, &errBuf); code != report.ExitBadInvocation {
+		t.Fatalf("want exit %d (bad invocation), got %d", report.ExitBadInvocation, code)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(errBuf.String(), "no canonical header at 42") {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected stderr: %s", errBuf.String())
+	}
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/metadata/audit/solver.go b/internal/recovery/metadata/audit/solver.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..63e369e287
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/metadata/audit/solver.go
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+package audit
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"sort"
+)
+
+// SolvePointer implements the §4.4 invariant solver for the target-time
+// last-crosslink pointer. The pointer advances on every beacon block from
+// the stored value through consecutive numbers until the first gap, so:
+//
+//	(i)  closure_pre(p*)  = p*  — saturation: the target-time pointer was
+//	     maximal over pre-target records;
+//	(ii) closure_full(p*) = Q   — replaying branch writes from p*
+//	     reproduces the stored pointer.
+//
+// "Highest retained key" is NOT a valid reconstruction, and replay
+// observation cannot prove the branch left the pointer alone (a replay
+// seeded with the possibly-branch-advanced stored value writes nothing,
+// vacuously).
+//
+// sPre is the set of pre-target crosslink block numbers (current records
+// minus the audit's branch-written subset); branch is the branch-written
+// subset; q is the stored pointer's block number. Returns the unique
+// solution, or ok=false with every candidate for the POINTER_AMBIGUOUS
+// report.
+func SolvePointer(sPre, branch map[uint64]bool, q uint64) (p uint64, ok bool, candidates []uint64) {
+	full := make(map[uint64]bool, len(sPre)+len(branch))
+	for n := range sPre {
+		full[n] = true
+	}
+	for n := range branch {
+		full[n] = true
+	}
+	closure := func(set map[uint64]bool, from uint64) uint64 {
+		for set[from+1] {
+			from++
+		}
+		return from
+	}
+	var sols []uint64
+	for n := range sPre {
+		if sPre[n+1] {
+			continue // not saturated over pre
+		}
+		if closure(full, n) == q {
+			sols = append(sols, n)
+		}
+	}
+	sort.Slice(sols, func(i, j int) bool { return sols[i] < sols[j] })
+	if len(sols) == 1 {
+		return sols[0], true, sols
+	}
+	return 0, false, sols
+}
+
+// ValidateTrustedPointer checks a --trusted-shard1-pointer value against
+// both invariants (a trusted value violating either fails the audit).
+func ValidateTrustedPointer(trusted uint64, sPre, branch map[uint64]bool, q uint64) error {
+	if !sPre[trusted] {
+		return fmt.Errorf("trusted pointer %d is not a retained pre-target crosslink record", trusted)
+	}
+	if sPre[trusted+1] {
+		return fmt.Errorf("trusted pointer %d violates saturation: pre-target record %d exists", trusted, trusted+1)
+	}
+	full := make(map[uint64]bool, len(sPre)+len(branch))
+	for n := range sPre {
+		full[n] = true
+	}
+	for n := range branch {
+		full[n] = true
+	}
+	c := trusted
+	for full[c+1] {
+		c++
+	}
+	if c != q {
+		return fmt.Errorf("trusted pointer %d violates branch replay: closure over full set reaches %d, stored pointer is %d", trusted, c, q)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/metadata/audit/solver_test.go b/internal/recovery/metadata/audit/solver_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b744eb3f80
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/metadata/audit/solver_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+package audit
+
+import "testing"
+
+func set(nums ...uint64) map[uint64]bool {
+	m := map[uint64]bool{}
+	for _, n := range nums {
+		m[n] = true
+	}
+	return m
+}
+
+// TestSolverBranchAdvance is the regression for the circular "replay showed
+// no writes so Q stands" rule: pre-target pointer K, pre-target set gapped
+// at K+1, branch fills K+1..Q; the solver must recover exactly K.
+func TestSolverBranchAdvance(t *testing.T) {
+	// Pre-target records: ...8,9,10 (K=10), gap at 11.
+	sPre := set(8, 9, 10)
+	// Branch fills 11,12,13 (Q=13).
+	branch := set(11, 12, 13)
+	q := uint64(13)
+	p, ok, cands := SolvePointer(sPre, branch, q)
+	if !ok || p != 10 {
+		t.Fatalf("branch-advance: got p=%d ok=%v candidates=%v, want 10", p, ok, cands)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestSolverAmbiguous: two gap-maximal candidates whose branch-filled
+// closures both reach Q -> POINTER_AMBIGUOUS.
+func TestSolverAmbiguous(t *testing.T) {
+	// Pre: 3 (gap at 4) and 7 (gap at 8). Branch fills 4,5,6,7? No — 7 is
+	// pre. Make two disjoint saturated pre candidates both closing to Q
+	// via branch fills.
+	sPre := set(3, 6) // 3 saturated (no 4), 6 saturated (no 7)
+	branch := set(4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10)
+	q := uint64(10)
+	// From 3: full has 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 -> closure 10 == Q.
+	// From 6: full has 6,7,8,9,10 -> closure 10 == Q.
+	_, ok, cands := SolvePointer(sPre, branch, q)
+	if ok {
+		t.Fatalf("expected ambiguity, got unique %v", cands)
+	}
+	if len(cands) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected 2 candidates, got %v", cands)
+	}
+	// The trusted escape hatch picks one and validates.
+	if err := ValidateTrustedPointer(3, sPre, branch, q); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("trusted pointer 3 should validate: %v", err)
+	}
+	// A trusted value violating saturation fails.
+	if err := ValidateTrustedPointer(6, set(3, 6, 7), branch, q); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("trusted pointer violating saturation must fail")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestSolverUniqueSolution: contiguous run T..K, K+1 absent everywhere, K+2
+// retained -> solver finds K with no trusted input.
+func TestSolverUniqueSolution(t *testing.T) {
+	// Pre-target contiguous 1..5 (K=5), 6 absent everywhere, 7 retained.
+	sPre := set(1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7)
+	branch := map[uint64]bool{}
+	q := uint64(5)
+	// Candidate 5: saturated (no 6), closure over full (no 6) stays 5 == Q. Good.
+	// Candidate 7: saturated (no 8), closure 7 != Q. Rejected.
+	p, ok, cands := SolvePointer(sPre, branch, q)
+	if !ok || p != 5 {
+		t.Fatalf("unique: got p=%d ok=%v cands=%v, want 5", p, ok, cands)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSolverTrustedValidatesBranchReplay(t *testing.T) {
+	sPre := set(10)
+	branch := set(11, 12)
+	q := uint64(12)
+	if err := ValidateTrustedPointer(10, sPre, branch, q); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("valid trusted pointer rejected: %v", err)
+	}
+	// Trusted value whose branch replay does not reach Q fails.
+	if err := ValidateTrustedPointer(10, sPre, set(11), q); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("trusted pointer failing branch replay must be rejected")
+	}
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/metadata/audit/tracer.go b/internal/recovery/metadata/audit/tracer.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5eb35e4019
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/metadata/audit/tracer.go
@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+package audit
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"math/big"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/vm"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/staking"
+	stakingTypes "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/staking/types"
+)
+
+// fcAddress is the only write-capable staking precompile (§2.3).
+var fcAddress = common.BytesToAddress([]byte{252})
+
+// FCOp is one recorded call frame targeting 0xfc: the complete precompile
+// inventory including Undelegate/CollectRewards, sufficient to classify
+// reverted and top-up operations.
+type FCOp struct {
+	Block     uint64 `json:"block"`
+	TxOrdinal int    `json:"tx_ordinal"` // message application order within the block
+	Depth     int    `json:"depth"`
+	Caller    string `json:"caller"`
+	Kind      string `json:"kind"` // Delegate | Undelegate | CollectRewards | unparseable
+	Delegator string `json:"delegator,omitempty"`
+	Validator string `json:"validator,omitempty"`
+	Amount    string `json:"amount,omitempty"`
+	// FrameFailed: the 0xfc frame itself returned an error.
+	FrameFailed bool `json:"frame_failed,omitempty"`
+	// EnclosingReverted: an ancestor frame exited with an error after this
+	// call (its state effect rolled back; StakeMsgs entries survive).
+	EnclosingReverted bool `json:"enclosing_reverted,omitempty"`
+}
+
+// fcTracer implements vm.EVMLogger, recording every call frame that
+// targets 0xfc with caller, ParseStakeMsg-decoded input, depth, frame
+// success and enclosing-revert status.
+type fcTracer struct {
+	block     uint64
+	txOrdinal int
+
+	// frame stack: frame ids of currently open frames.
+	stack   []int
+	nextID  int
+	ops     []FCOp
+	opPaths [][]int // ops[i]'s enclosing frame-id path (excluding the fc frame itself)
+
+	// open fc frames by frame id -> ops index (to set FrameFailed on exit).
+	openFC map[int]int
+}
+
+var _ vm.EVMLogger = (*fcTracer)(nil)
+
+func newFCTracer() *fcTracer { return &fcTracer{openFC: map[int]int{}} }
+
+// BeginBlock resets per-block counters (the tracer is reused per block).
+func (t *fcTracer) BeginBlock(number uint64) {
+	t.block = number
+	t.txOrdinal = -1
+	t.stack = t.stack[:0]
+}
+
+// Ops returns the recorded inventory.
+func (t *fcTracer) Ops() []FCOp { return t.ops }
+
+func (t *fcTracer) CaptureTxStart(gasLimit uint64) {
+	t.txOrdinal++
+	t.stack = t.stack[:0]
+}
+
+func (t *fcTracer) CaptureTxEnd(restGas uint64) {}
+
+func (t *fcTracer) push() int {
+	id := t.nextID
+	t.nextID++
+	t.stack = append(t.stack, id)
+	return id
+}
+
+func (t *fcTracer) pop(err error) {
+	if len(t.stack) == 0 {
+		return
+	}
+	id := t.stack[len(t.stack)-1]
+	t.stack = t.stack[:len(t.stack)-1]
+	if opIdx, ok := t.openFC[id]; ok {
+		delete(t.openFC, id)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.ops[opIdx].FrameFailed = true
+		}
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		// Every recorded op whose path contains this frame had its state
+		// effect rolled back.
+		for i, path := range t.opPaths {
+			for _, fid := range path {
+				if fid == id {
+					t.ops[i].EnclosingReverted = true
+					break
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func (t *fcTracer) record(from, to common.Address, input []byte) {
+	if to != fcAddress {
+		return
+	}
+	op := FCOp{
+		Block:     t.block,
+		TxOrdinal: t.txOrdinal,
+		Depth:     len(t.stack), // depth of the fc frame (stack includes it)
+		Caller:    from.Hex(),
+		Kind:      "unparseable",
+	}
+	msg, err := staking.ParseStakeMsg(from, input)
+	if err == nil {
+		switch m := msg.(type) {
+		case *stakingTypes.Delegate:
+			op.Kind = "Delegate"
+			op.Delegator = m.DelegatorAddress.Hex()
+			op.Validator = m.ValidatorAddress.Hex()
+			op.Amount = bigString(m.Amount)
+		case *stakingTypes.Undelegate:
+			op.Kind = "Undelegate"
+			op.Delegator = m.DelegatorAddress.Hex()
+			op.Validator = m.ValidatorAddress.Hex()
+			op.Amount = bigString(m.Amount)
+		case *stakingTypes.CollectRewards:
+			op.Kind = "CollectRewards"
+			op.Delegator = m.DelegatorAddress.Hex()
+		default:
+			op.Kind = fmt.Sprintf("unexpected:%T", msg)
+		}
+	}
+	// The enclosing path excludes the fc frame itself (top of stack).
+	path := append([]int(nil), t.stack[:len(t.stack)-1]...)
+	t.ops = append(t.ops, op)
+	t.opPaths = append(t.opPaths, path)
+	t.openFC[t.stack[len(t.stack)-1]] = len(t.ops) - 1
+}
+
+func (t *fcTracer) CaptureStart(env *vm.EVM, from, to common.Address, create bool, input []byte, gas uint64, value *big.Int) {
+	id := t.push()
+	_ = id
+	if !create {
+		t.record(from, to, input)
+	}
+}
+
+func (t *fcTracer) CaptureEnd(output []byte, gasUsed uint64, d time.Duration, err error) {
+	t.pop(err)
+}
+
+func (t *fcTracer) CaptureEnter(typ vm.OpCode, from, to common.Address, input []byte, gas uint64, value *big.Int) {
+	t.push()
+	t.record(from, to, input)
+}
+
+func (t *fcTracer) CaptureExit(output []byte, gasUsed uint64, err error) {
+	t.pop(err)
+}
+
+func (t *fcTracer) CaptureState(env *vm.EVM, pc uint64, op vm.OpCode, gas, cost uint64, scope *vm.ScopeContext, rData []byte, depth int, err error) {
+}
+
+func (t *fcTracer) CaptureFault(pc uint64, op vm.OpCode, gas, cost uint64, scope *vm.ScopeContext, depth int, err error) {
+}
+
+func bigString(b *big.Int) string {
+	if b == nil {
+		return ""
+	}
+	return b.String()
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/metadata/fixture/fixture.go b/internal/recovery/metadata/fixture/fixture.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5e9acff11b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/metadata/fixture/fixture.go
@@ -0,0 +1,1083 @@
+// Package fixture generates the metadata acceptance kit: deterministic
+// localnet twin chains with REAL BLS commit certificates from the
+// well-known public dev keys (.hmy/*.key, empty passphrase), driven through
+// the stock worker + processor + InsertChain path so they are replay-grade
+// by construction (plan WS7).
+//
+// Block timestamps are fully deterministic (a fixed base plus a fixed step,
+// below the localnet TimestampValidationEpoch) so a committed golden .hmr
+// digest is stable across regenerations. Never used in production; the dev
+// keys are public test keys and leak no secrets.
+package fixture
+
+import (
+	"crypto/ecdsa"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"math/big"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common"
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto"
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/ethdb"
+	bls_core "github.com/harmony-one/bls/ffi/go/bls"
+	"github.com/syndtr/goleveldb/leveldb"
+	"github.com/syndtr/goleveldb/leveldb/opt"
+	"github.com/syndtr/goleveldb/leveldb/util"
+
+	blockfactory "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/block/factory"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/common/denominations"
+	consensus_sig "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/consensus/signature"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core"
+	coregenesis "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/genesis"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/rawdb"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/types"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/vm"
+	bls2 "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/crypto/bls"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/crypto/hash"
+	vrf_bls "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/crypto/vrf/bls"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/blsgen"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/chain"
+	nodeconfig "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/configs/node"
+	shardingconfig "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/configs/sharding"
+	recoveryanchor "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/anchor"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/utils"
+	pkgworker "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/node/harmony/worker"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/numeric"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/shard"
+	staking "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/staking/types"
+)
+
+// LocalnetTestKeyHex is the committed localnet-only funded test key
+// (core/genesis.go).
+const LocalnetTestKeyHex = "1f84c95ac16e6a50f08d44c7bde7aff8742212fda6e4321fde48bf83bef266dc"
+
+const baseTime = 1_700_000_000
+
+// Spec drives one deterministic chain generation.
+type Spec struct {
+	Dir     string
+	KeysDir string
+	Blocks  uint64 // total blocks to produce past genesis
+
+	CreateValidatorAt uint64 // pre-target create-validator (0 = never)
+	DelegateAt        uint64 // native delegate from the test account (0 = never)
+
+	// Post-target ops (produce the removals the audit reconciles).
+	PostCreateValidatorAt uint64
+	PostDelegateAt        uint64
+
+	// PostTopUpAt repeats the PostDelegateAt delegation (same delegator,
+	// same validator, larger stake): it produces NO new dvl index
+	// (addDelegationIndex appends only when the pair is absent), so the
+	// audit must classify it attempted-but-not-metadata-producing.
+	PostTopUpAt uint64
+
+	// Precompile (0xfc) delegation matrix (WS6 acceptance): at
+	// FundPrecompileAt (pre-target) a deterministic fixture EOA is funded
+	// and two tiny forwarder contracts are deployed with balance — proxy
+	// (forwards calldata to 0xfc, propagates failure) and reverter (same,
+	// then always REVERTs). The post-target heights then produce one 0xfc
+	// Delegate of each classification:
+	//   direct   EOA→0xfc, new pair            → metadata-producing
+	//   nested   EOA→proxy→0xfc (contract
+	//            self-delegation), new pair    → metadata-producing
+	//   reverted EOA→reverter→0xfc then REVERT → StakeMsgs-visible, NOT producing
+	//   top-up   direct repeat of the same pair→ visible, NOT producing
+	FundPrecompileAt   uint64
+	PrecompileDirectAt uint64
+	PrecompileNestedAt uint64
+	PrecompileRevertAt uint64
+	PrecompileTopUpAt  uint64
+
+	// Additional native staking directives (WS6 directive-matrix
+	// acceptance) on the PRE-target validator, which exists and holds
+	// delegations by the target so these succeed immediately (no reward
+	// maturity required): EditValidator (deployer edits its own validator),
+	// Undelegate (the test account undelegates part of its block-26
+	// delegation). PrecompileUndelegateAt undelegates the precompile EOA's
+	// own delegation through 0xfc (requires a prior 0xfc/native Delegate
+	// from that EOA).
+	EditValidatorAt        uint64
+	UndelegateAt           uint64
+	PrecompileUndelegateAt uint64
+
+	// CollectRewardsAt (native, test account) and PrecompileCollectRewardsAt
+	// (0xfc, precompile EOA) collect accrued delegation rewards. Rewards only
+	// exist once the pre-target validator is ELECTED and its signing is paid
+	// out: the block-22 validator wins a shard-0 slot in the epoch-3 election
+	// (blocks 37+ are signed with the full committee including its key), and
+	// localnet pays aggregated rewards every 16 blocks (at heights ≡15 mod
+	// 16), so the first funded payout lands at block 47. Both delegations
+	// must predate the epoch-3 snapshot (block 36) to receive a share, and
+	// collections must be scheduled at heights ≥48 with Blocks ≥ them.
+	CollectRewardsAt           uint64
+	PrecompileCollectRewardsAt uint64
+
+	// IncomingReceiptAt (post-target) makes the block at that height carry a
+	// GENUINE, fully-verifiable incoming cross-shard receipt from shard 1
+	// (see makeShard1IncomingReceipt): the CXReceiptsProof's source header is
+	// signed by shard-1's dev committee, the merkle proof verifies, and the
+	// receipt is APPLIED to the proposal state so the block re-executes to its
+	// root. Block insertion writes the spent marker, so on the abandoned
+	// branch the audit's pass 1 sees the receipt as already spent
+	// (incoming-receipts pollution) and pass 2 masks the marker, after which
+	// the full proof re-verifies cleanly — the spent-marker analog of the
+	// crosslink pollution path.
+	IncomingReceiptAt uint64
+
+	// PreCrossLinkShard1At (pre-target) and CrossLinkShard1At (post-target)
+	// make those blocks carry GENUINE, validly-signed shard-1 crosslinks (see
+	// makeShard1CrossLink) referencing shard-1 blocks 3 and 4 respectively.
+	// Block insertion writes the crosslink markers and advances the shard-1
+	// continuity pointer to 4. On the abandoned branch the audit therefore:
+	//   - retains the pre-target crosslink (shard-1 block 3) as sPre;
+	//   - sees the post-target crosslink (block 4) as an already-exist
+	//     crosslink in pass 1 (pollution-suspect) and masks it in pass 2;
+	//   - derives the pre-target continuity pointer (3) uniquely from the
+	//     stored pointer (4) via the invariant solver.
+	// This exercises the shard-1 crosslink subset, pass-two pollution
+	// clearing, and the pointer solver end-to-end. Set both for the full path.
+	PreCrossLinkShard1At uint64
+	CrossLinkShard1At    uint64
+}
+
+// Chain is an open fixture chain.
+type Chain struct {
+	DB      ethdb.Database
+	Bc      core.BlockChain
+	Keys    []bls2.PrivateKeyWrapper
+	Slots   shard.SlotList
+	KeysDir string
+
+	ValidatorAddr     common.Address // pre-target validator (contract-deployer account)
+	PostValidatorAddr common.Address // post-target validator (test account)
+
+	// Precompile matrix actors (populated when the Spec schedules them).
+	PrecompileEOA common.Address // deterministic fixture EOA (0xfc caller)
+	ProxyAddr     common.Address // forwarder contract (nested delegate)
+	ReverterAddr  common.Address // forwarder that always REVERTs after the 0xfc call
+
+	precompileKey *ecdsa.PrivateKey
+	extraKeysDir  string
+}
+
+// Open opens (or initializes) the localnet chain database.
+func Open(dir, keysDir string) (*Chain, error) {
+	shardingconfig.InitLocalnetConfig(
+		nodeconfig.GetDefaultLocalnetBlocksPerEpoch(),
+		nodeconfig.GetDefaultLocalnetBlocksPerEpochV2(),
+	)
+	shard.Schedule = shardingconfig.LocalnetSchedule
+	nodeconfig.SetNetworkType(nodeconfig.Localnet)
+	nodeconfig.SetShardingSchedule(shardingconfig.LocalnetSchedule)
+	utils.SetLogVerbosity(2)
+
+	db, err := rawdb.NewLevelDBDatabase(dir, 64, 512, "", false)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("fixture: open db: %w", err)
+	}
+	if rawdb.ReadCanonicalHash(db, 0) == (common.Hash{}) {
+		gi := &core.GenesisInitializer{NetworkType: nodeconfig.Localnet}
+		if err := gi.InitChainDB(db, 0); err != nil {
+			db.Close()
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("fixture: init genesis: %w", err)
+		}
+	}
+	cfg := nodeconfig.GetShardConfig(0).GetNetworkType().ChainConfig()
+	// beacon shard-0 chain-id semantics (shardchains.go:130-133).
+	cfg.EthCompatibleChainID = big.NewInt(cfg.EthCompatibleShard0ChainID.Int64())
+	bc, err := core.NewBlockChainWithOptions(
+		db, nil, nil,
+		&core.CacheConfig{Disabled: true, Preimages: true, SnapshotLimit: 0},
+		&cfg, chain.NewEngine(), vm.Config{}, core.Options{},
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		db.Close()
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("fixture: open chain: %w", err)
+	}
+	c := &Chain{
+		DB: db, Bc: bc, KeysDir: keysDir,
+		ValidatorAddr: crypto.PubkeyToAddress(coregenesis.ContractDeployerKey.PublicKey),
+		extraKeysDir:  filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(dir), "fixture-keys"),
+	}
+	testKey, _ := crypto.HexToECDSA(LocalnetTestKeyHex)
+	c.PostValidatorAddr = crypto.PubkeyToAddress(testKey.PublicKey)
+	// Deterministic fixture-only 0xfc-caller EOA (never a real key).
+	precKey, err := crypto.ToECDSA(crypto.Keccak256([]byte("hmy-metadata-fixture-precompile-eoa")))
+	if err != nil {
+		db.Close()
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("fixture: precompile eoa key: %w", err)
+	}
+	c.precompileKey = precKey
+	c.PrecompileEOA = crypto.PubkeyToAddress(precKey.PublicKey)
+	if err := c.loadCommittee(c.Bc.CurrentBlock().Epoch()); err != nil {
+		db.Close()
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return c, nil
+}
+
+// loadCommittee loads the shard-0 committee for the given epoch (the
+// committee that signs blocks of that epoch). At an epoch boundary the
+// block being produced belongs to the NEW epoch, whose shard state was
+// written at the last block of the prior epoch.
+func (c *Chain) loadCommittee(epoch *big.Int) error {
+	ss, err := rawdb.ReadShardState(c.DB, epoch)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("fixture: read shard state epoch %d: %w", epoch, err)
+	}
+	comm, err := ss.FindCommitteeByID(0)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	keys, err := c.loadKeysForSlots(comm.Slots)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	c.Slots = comm.Slots
+	c.Keys = keys
+	return nil
+}
+
+// loadKeysForSlots loads the BLS secret keys backing a committee's slots,
+// trying the repo dev keys (KeysDir/<pub>.key, empty passphrase) first and
+// falling back to the fixture-only *.hex secrets under extraKeysDir. Used for
+// both the shard-0 signer committee and, for the crosslink fixture, another
+// shard's committee whose dev keys sign a genuine cross-shard crosslink.
+func (c *Chain) loadKeysForSlots(slots shard.SlotList) ([]bls2.PrivateKeyWrapper, error) {
+	var keys []bls2.PrivateKeyWrapper
+	for _, slot := range slots {
+		keyFile := filepath.Join(c.KeysDir, slot.BLSPublicKey.Hex()+".key")
+		sec, err := blsgen.LoadBLSKeyWithPassPhrase(keyFile, "")
+		if err != nil {
+			raw, rerr := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(c.extraKeysDir, slot.BLSPublicKey.Hex()+".hex"))
+			if rerr != nil {
+				return nil, fmt.Errorf("fixture: load committee key %s: %w (no fixture key either: %v)", keyFile, err, rerr)
+			}
+			sec = &bls_core.SecretKey{}
+			if err := sec.DeserializeHexStr(strings.TrimSpace(string(raw))); err != nil {
+				return nil, fmt.Errorf("fixture: decode fixture key %s: %w", slot.BLSPublicKey.Hex(), err)
+			}
+		}
+		keys = append(keys, bls2.WrapperFromPrivateKey(sec))
+	}
+	return keys, nil
+}
+
+// makeShard1CrossLink builds a GENUINE, validly-signed crosslink for shard 1
+// at the given epoch: it reads shard-1's committee for that epoch from the
+// beacon shard state and aggregate-signs the commit payload with that
+// committee's dev secret keys (full bitmap → quorum). engine.VerifyCrossLink
+// therefore accepts it. The referenced shard-1 block need not exist in the
+// beacon DB — VerifyCrossLink authenticates only the signature over
+// (epoch, hash, blockNum, viewID). Used to drive the audit's shard-1
+// crosslink subset extraction and pass-2 pollution masking through the real
+// two-pass loop (blockNum must be > 1 and epoch must be a crosslink epoch).
+func (c *Chain) makeShard1CrossLink(epoch *big.Int, blockNum, viewID uint64, hash common.Hash) (*types.CrossLink, error) {
+	ss, err := rawdb.ReadShardState(c.DB, epoch)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("fixture: read shard state epoch %d for shard-1 crosslink: %w", epoch, err)
+	}
+	comm, err := ss.FindCommitteeByID(1)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("fixture: no shard-1 committee at epoch %d: %w", epoch, err)
+	}
+	keys, err := c.loadKeysForSlots(comm.Slots)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	pubs := make([]bls2.PublicKeyWrapper, len(keys))
+	for i, k := range keys {
+		pubs[i] = *k.Pub
+	}
+	mask := bls2.NewMask(pubs)
+	payload := consensus_sig.ConstructCommitPayload(
+		c.Bc.Config(), epoch, hash, blockNum, viewID,
+	)
+	var agg bls_core.Sign
+	for i, k := range keys {
+		if err := mask.SetBit(i, true); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		agg.Add(k.Pri.SignHash(payload))
+	}
+	var sig [96]byte
+	copy(sig[:], agg.Serialize())
+	return &types.CrossLink{
+		HashF:        hash,
+		BlockNumberF: new(big.Int).SetUint64(blockNum),
+		ViewIDF:      new(big.Int).SetUint64(viewID),
+		SignatureF:   sig,
+		BitmapF:      mask.Mask(),
+		ShardIDF:     1,
+		EpochF:       new(big.Int).Set(epoch),
+	}, nil
+}
+
+func (c *Chain) makeCreateValidatorTx(validator common.Address, signer *ecdsaSigner, nonce uint64) (*staking.StakingTransaction, error) {
+	// Deterministic fixture-only BLS secret (a fixed small scalar keyed by
+	// the validator address) so the whole chain — and therefore the golden
+	// .hmr — is byte-reproducible. Never used outside tests.
+	blsSec := deterministicBLSSecret(validator)
+	pub := bls2.SerializedPublicKey{}
+	if err := pub.FromLibBLSPublicKey(blsSec.GetPublicKey()); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	msgHash := hash.Keccak256([]byte(staking.BLSVerificationStr))
+	var sig bls2.SerializedSignature
+	copy(sig[:], blsSec.SignHash(msgHash[:]).Serialize())
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(c.extraKeysDir, 0o755); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(c.extraKeysDir, pub.Hex()+".hex"), []byte(blsSec.SerializeToHexStr()), 0o644); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	one := big.NewInt(denominations.One)
+	rate, _ := numeric.NewDecFromStr("0.1")
+	maxRate, _ := numeric.NewDecFromStr("0.9")
+	maxChangeRate, _ := numeric.NewDecFromStr("0.05")
+	maker := func() (staking.Directive, interface{}) {
+		return staking.DirectiveCreateValidator, staking.CreateValidator{
+			ValidatorAddress: validator,
+			Description: staking.Description{
+				Name: "fixture-validator", Identity: "fx-" + validator.Hex()[:8],
+				Website: "https://fixture.invalid", SecurityContact: "fixture", Details: "metadata fixture validator",
+			},
+			CommissionRates:    staking.CommissionRates{Rate: rate, MaxRate: maxRate, MaxChangeRate: maxChangeRate},
+			MinSelfDelegation:  new(big.Int).Mul(big.NewInt(10_000), one),
+			MaxTotalDelegation: new(big.Int).Mul(big.NewInt(1_000_000), one),
+			SlotPubKeys:        []bls2.SerializedPublicKey{pub},
+			SlotKeySigs:        []bls2.SerializedSignature{sig},
+			Amount:             new(big.Int).Mul(big.NewInt(100_000), one),
+		}
+	}
+	tx, err := staking.NewStakingTransaction(nonce, 10_000_000, big.NewInt(100e9), maker)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return staking.Sign(tx, staking.NewEIP155Signer(c.Bc.Config().ChainID), signer.key)
+}
+
+func (c *Chain) makeDelegateTx(delegator, validator common.Address, signer *ecdsaSigner, nonce uint64) (*staking.StakingTransaction, error) {
+	one := big.NewInt(denominations.One)
+	maker := func() (staking.Directive, interface{}) {
+		return staking.DirectiveDelegate, staking.Delegate{
+			DelegatorAddress: delegator, ValidatorAddress: validator,
+			Amount: new(big.Int).Mul(big.NewInt(1_000), one),
+		}
+	}
+	tx, err := staking.NewStakingTransaction(nonce, 10_000_000, big.NewInt(100e9), maker)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return staking.Sign(tx, staking.NewEIP155Signer(c.Bc.Config().ChainID), signer.key)
+}
+
+func (c *Chain) makeEditValidatorTx(validator common.Address, signer *ecdsaSigner, nonce uint64) (*staking.StakingTransaction, error) {
+	// Minimal edit: bump the commission rate (always valid, no maturity or
+	// election required). Produces a native EditValidator body entry.
+	newRate, _ := numeric.NewDecFromStr("0.11")
+	maker := func() (staking.Directive, interface{}) {
+		return staking.DirectiveEditValidator, staking.EditValidator{
+			ValidatorAddress: validator,
+			Description:      staking.Description{Name: "fixture-validator-edited"},
+			CommissionRate:   &newRate,
+		}
+	}
+	tx, err := staking.NewStakingTransaction(nonce, 10_000_000, big.NewInt(100e9), maker)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return staking.Sign(tx, staking.NewEIP155Signer(c.Bc.Config().ChainID), signer.key)
+}
+
+func (c *Chain) makeUndelegateTx(delegator, validator common.Address, amount *big.Int, signer *ecdsaSigner, nonce uint64) (*staking.StakingTransaction, error) {
+	maker := func() (staking.Directive, interface{}) {
+		return staking.DirectiveUndelegate, staking.Undelegate{
+			DelegatorAddress: delegator, ValidatorAddress: validator, Amount: amount,
+		}
+	}
+	tx, err := staking.NewStakingTransaction(nonce, 10_000_000, big.NewInt(100e9), maker)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return staking.Sign(tx, staking.NewEIP155Signer(c.Bc.Config().ChainID), signer.key)
+}
+
+func (c *Chain) makeCollectRewardsTx(delegator common.Address, signer *ecdsaSigner, nonce uint64) (*staking.StakingTransaction, error) {
+	maker := func() (staking.Directive, interface{}) {
+		return staking.DirectiveCollectRewards, staking.CollectRewards{
+			DelegatorAddress: delegator,
+		}
+	}
+	tx, err := staking.NewStakingTransaction(nonce, 10_000_000, big.NewInt(100e9), maker)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return staking.Sign(tx, staking.NewEIP155Signer(c.Bc.Config().ChainID), signer.key)
+}
+
+// fcAddr is the write-capable staking precompile (core/vm/contracts_write.go).
+var fcAddr = common.BytesToAddress([]byte{252})
+
+// forwarderRuntime is the shared forwarder body: copy the full calldata to
+// memory and CALL 0xfc with it (no value — the delegation amount is an ABI
+// argument deducted from the delegator's balance by the precompile).
+//
+//	CALLDATASIZE PUSH1 0 PUSH1 0 CALLDATACOPY
+//	PUSH1 0 PUSH1 0 CALLDATASIZE PUSH1 0 PUSH1 0 PUSH1 0xfc GAS CALL
+//
+// leaving the CALL success flag on the stack (19 bytes).
+var forwarderRuntime = []byte{
+	0x36, 0x60, 0x00, 0x60, 0x00, 0x37,
+	0x60, 0x00, 0x60, 0x00, 0x36, 0x60, 0x00, 0x60, 0x00, 0x60, 0xfc, 0x5a, 0xf1,
+}
+
+// proxyRuntime propagates the inner result: STOP on success, REVERT(0,0)
+// on failure (ISZERO PUSH1 24 JUMPI STOP JUMPDEST PUSH1 0 PUSH1 0 REVERT).
+var proxyRuntime = append(append([]byte(nil), forwarderRuntime...),
+	0x15, 0x60, 0x18, 0x57, 0x00, 0x5b, 0x60, 0x00, 0x60, 0x00, 0xfd)
+
+// reverterRuntime always REVERTs after the (successful) inner 0xfc call:
+// the recorded op is StakeMsgs-visible but its state effect rolls back.
+var reverterRuntime = append(append([]byte(nil), forwarderRuntime...),
+	0x50, 0x60, 0x00, 0x60, 0x00, 0xfd) // POP REVERT(0,0)
+
+// deployCode wraps a runtime blob in the minimal init code
+// (PUSH1 len PUSH1 12 PUSH1 0 CODECOPY PUSH1 len PUSH1 0 RETURN).
+func deployCode(runtime []byte) []byte {
+	l := byte(len(runtime))
+	init := []byte{0x60, l, 0x60, 0x0c, 0x60, 0x00, 0x39, 0x60, l, 0x60, 0x00, 0xf3}
+	return append(init, runtime...)
+}
+
+// delegateCalldata ABI-encodes Delegate(delegatorAddress, validatorAddress,
+// amount) for the 0xfc staking precompile (staking/precompile.go ABI).
+func delegateCalldata(delegator, validator common.Address, amount *big.Int) []byte {
+	return tripletCalldata("Delegate(address,address,uint256)", delegator, validator, amount)
+}
+
+// undelegateCalldata ABI-encodes Undelegate(delegatorAddress,
+// validatorAddress, amount) for the 0xfc staking precompile.
+func undelegateCalldata(delegator, validator common.Address, amount *big.Int) []byte {
+	return tripletCalldata("Undelegate(address,address,uint256)", delegator, validator, amount)
+}
+
+// collectRewardsCalldata ABI-encodes CollectRewards(delegatorAddress) for
+// the 0xfc staking precompile.
+func collectRewardsCalldata(delegator common.Address) []byte {
+	sel := crypto.Keccak256([]byte("CollectRewards(address)"))[:4]
+	data := make([]byte, 4+32)
+	copy(data, sel)
+	copy(data[4+12:4+32], delegator.Bytes())
+	return data
+}
+
+func tripletCalldata(sig string, delegator, validator common.Address, amount *big.Int) []byte {
+	sel := crypto.Keccak256([]byte(sig))[:4]
+	data := make([]byte, 4+3*32)
+	copy(data, sel)
+	copy(data[4+12:4+32], delegator.Bytes())
+	copy(data[36+12:36+32], validator.Bytes())
+	amount.FillBytes(data[68:100])
+	return data
+}
+
+func (c *Chain) signCommit(blk *types.Block) ([]byte, error) {
+	pubs := make([]bls2.PublicKeyWrapper, len(c.Keys))
+	for i, k := range c.Keys {
+		pubs[i] = *k.Pub
+	}
+	mask := bls2.NewMask(pubs)
+	payload := consensus_sig.ConstructCommitPayload(
+		c.Bc.Config(), blk.Epoch(), blk.Hash(), blk.NumberU64(), blk.Header().ViewID().Uint64(),
+	)
+	var agg bls_core.Sign
+	for i, k := range c.Keys {
+		if err := mask.SetBit(i, true); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		agg.Add(k.Pri.SignHash(payload))
+	}
+	return append(agg.Serialize(), mask.Mask()...), nil
+}
+
+// Generate produces spec.Blocks blocks with deterministic timestamps and
+// the scheduled staking operations.
+func (c *Chain) Generate(spec Spec) error {
+	testKey, err := crypto.HexToECDSA(LocalnetTestKeyHex)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	testSigner := &ecdsaSigner{key: testKey, addr: crypto.PubkeyToAddress(testKey.PublicKey)}
+	deployerSigner := &ecdsaSigner{key: coregenesis.ContractDeployerKey, addr: c.ValidatorAddr}
+
+	head := c.Bc.CurrentBlock()
+	lastSig := head.GetCurrentCommitSig()
+	if head.NumberU64() == 0 {
+		lastSig = nil
+	}
+	sched := shard.Schedule
+
+	for produced := uint64(0); produced < spec.Blocks; produced++ {
+		number := c.Bc.CurrentBlock().NumberU64() + 1
+		// The block being produced belongs to epoch(number); its signers
+		// (whose bitmap the child's reward calc validates) are that epoch's
+		// committee, which may differ from the parent's at a boundary.
+		if err := c.loadCommittee(sched.CalcEpochNumber(number)); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		leaderSlot := c.Slots[0]
+		leaderKey := c.Keys[0]
+
+		worker := pkgworker.New(c.Bc, c.Bc)
+		hdr := worker.GetCurrentHeader()
+		hdr.SetTime(big.NewInt(baseTime + int64(number)*2)) // deterministic
+
+		coinbase := leaderSlot.EcdsaAddress
+		if c.Bc.Config().IsStaking(hdr.Epoch()) {
+			coinbase = utils.GetAddressFromBLSPubKeyBytes(leaderSlot.BLSPublicKey[:])
+		}
+		if c.Bc.Config().IsVRF(hdr.Epoch()) {
+			sk := vrf_bls.NewVRFSigner(leaderKey.Pri)
+			parentHash := c.Bc.CurrentBlock().Hash()
+			vrf, proof := sk.Evaluate(parentHash[:])
+			if proof == nil {
+				return fmt.Errorf("fixture: VRF generation failed at %d", number)
+			}
+			hdr.SetVrf(append(vrf[:], proof...))
+		}
+
+		st, err := c.Bc.State()
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+
+		var pendingStaking staking.StakingTransactions
+		if spec.CreateValidatorAt != 0 && number == spec.CreateValidatorAt {
+			stx, err := c.makeCreateValidatorTx(c.ValidatorAddr, deployerSigner, st.GetNonce(c.ValidatorAddr))
+			if err != nil {
+				return fmt.Errorf("fixture: create-validator at %d: %w", number, err)
+			}
+			pendingStaking = append(pendingStaking, stx)
+		}
+		if spec.DelegateAt != 0 && number == spec.DelegateAt {
+			stx, err := c.makeDelegateTx(testSigner.addr, c.ValidatorAddr, testSigner, st.GetNonce(testSigner.addr))
+			if err != nil {
+				return fmt.Errorf("fixture: delegate at %d: %w", number, err)
+			}
+			pendingStaking = append(pendingStaking, stx)
+		}
+		if spec.PostCreateValidatorAt != 0 && number == spec.PostCreateValidatorAt {
+			stx, err := c.makeCreateValidatorTx(c.PostValidatorAddr, testSigner, st.GetNonce(testSigner.addr))
+			if err != nil {
+				return fmt.Errorf("fixture: post create-validator at %d: %w", number, err)
+			}
+			pendingStaking = append(pendingStaking, stx)
+		}
+		if spec.PostDelegateAt != 0 && number == spec.PostDelegateAt {
+			stx, err := c.makeDelegateTx(deployerSigner.addr, c.PostValidatorAddr, deployerSigner, st.GetNonce(deployerSigner.addr))
+			if err != nil {
+				return fmt.Errorf("fixture: post delegate at %d: %w", number, err)
+			}
+			pendingStaking = append(pendingStaking, stx)
+		}
+		if spec.PostTopUpAt != 0 && number == spec.PostTopUpAt {
+			stx, err := c.makeDelegateTx(deployerSigner.addr, c.PostValidatorAddr, deployerSigner, st.GetNonce(deployerSigner.addr))
+			if err != nil {
+				return fmt.Errorf("fixture: post top-up delegate at %d: %w", number, err)
+			}
+			pendingStaking = append(pendingStaking, stx)
+		}
+		if spec.EditValidatorAt != 0 && number == spec.EditValidatorAt {
+			stx, err := c.makeEditValidatorTx(c.ValidatorAddr, deployerSigner, st.GetNonce(deployerSigner.addr))
+			if err != nil {
+				return fmt.Errorf("fixture: edit-validator at %d: %w", number, err)
+			}
+			pendingStaking = append(pendingStaking, stx)
+		}
+		if spec.UndelegateAt != 0 && number == spec.UndelegateAt {
+			// The test account undelegates half of its block-26 delegation
+			// to the pre-target validator (immediate; no maturity needed).
+			half := new(big.Int).Mul(big.NewInt(500), big.NewInt(denominations.One))
+			stx, err := c.makeUndelegateTx(testSigner.addr, c.ValidatorAddr, half, testSigner, st.GetNonce(testSigner.addr))
+			if err != nil {
+				return fmt.Errorf("fixture: undelegate at %d: %w", number, err)
+			}
+			pendingStaking = append(pendingStaking, stx)
+		}
+		if spec.CollectRewardsAt != 0 && number == spec.CollectRewardsAt {
+			// Collects the test account's accrued delegation rewards (the
+			// block-26 delegation shares the elected validator's block-47
+			// aggregated payout — see the Spec comment).
+			stx, err := c.makeCollectRewardsTx(testSigner.addr, testSigner, st.GetNonce(testSigner.addr))
+			if err != nil {
+				return fmt.Errorf("fixture: collect-rewards at %d: %w", number, err)
+			}
+			pendingStaking = append(pendingStaking, stx)
+		}
+		pendingRegular := map[common.Address]types.Transactions{}
+		gasPrice := big.NewInt(100e9)
+		one := big.NewInt(denominations.One)
+		addRegular := func(signer *ecdsaSigner, tx *types.Transaction) error {
+			signed, err := types.SignTx(tx, types.NewEIP155Signer(c.Bc.Config().ChainID), signer.key)
+			if err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+			pendingRegular[signer.addr] = append(pendingRegular[signer.addr], signed)
+			return nil
+		}
+		precSigner := &ecdsaSigner{key: c.precompileKey, addr: c.PrecompileEOA}
+		delegAmt := new(big.Int).Mul(big.NewInt(1_000), one)
+		if spec.FundPrecompileAt != 0 && number == spec.FundPrecompileAt {
+			// Fund the 0xfc-caller EOA and deploy the two forwarders with
+			// balance (the precompile deducts the delegation amount from
+			// the delegator — the proxy delegates its OWN balance).
+			// STRICTLY DESCENDING gas prices: the block packs txs by
+			// price, and equal prices across senders tie-break by map
+			// iteration order — nondeterministic block bytes otherwise.
+			fund := new(big.Int).Mul(big.NewInt(100_000), one)
+			if err := addRegular(testSigner, types.NewTransaction(
+				st.GetNonce(testSigner.addr), c.PrecompileEOA, 0, fund, 21_000, big.NewInt(103e9), nil)); err != nil {
+				return fmt.Errorf("fixture: fund precompile eoa at %d: %w", number, err)
+			}
+			contractFund := new(big.Int).Mul(big.NewInt(10_000), one)
+			dn := st.GetNonce(deployerSigner.addr)
+			c.ProxyAddr = crypto.CreateAddress(deployerSigner.addr, dn)
+			c.ReverterAddr = crypto.CreateAddress(deployerSigner.addr, dn+1)
+			if err := addRegular(deployerSigner, types.NewContractCreation(
+				dn, 0, contractFund, 3_000_000, big.NewInt(102e9), deployCode(proxyRuntime))); err != nil {
+				return fmt.Errorf("fixture: deploy proxy at %d: %w", number, err)
+			}
+			if err := addRegular(deployerSigner, types.NewContractCreation(
+				dn+1, 0, contractFund, 3_000_000, big.NewInt(102e9), deployCode(reverterRuntime))); err != nil {
+				return fmt.Errorf("fixture: deploy reverter at %d: %w", number, err)
+			}
+		}
+		if spec.PrecompileDirectAt != 0 && number == spec.PrecompileDirectAt {
+			if err := addRegular(precSigner, types.NewTransaction(
+				st.GetNonce(c.PrecompileEOA), fcAddr, 0, big.NewInt(0), 2_000_000, gasPrice,
+				delegateCalldata(c.PrecompileEOA, c.ValidatorAddr, delegAmt))); err != nil {
+				return fmt.Errorf("fixture: direct 0xfc delegate at %d: %w", number, err)
+			}
+		}
+		if spec.PrecompileNestedAt != 0 && number == spec.PrecompileNestedAt {
+			if err := addRegular(precSigner, types.NewTransaction(
+				st.GetNonce(c.PrecompileEOA), c.ProxyAddr, 0, big.NewInt(0), 2_000_000, gasPrice,
+				delegateCalldata(c.ProxyAddr, c.ValidatorAddr, delegAmt))); err != nil {
+				return fmt.Errorf("fixture: nested 0xfc delegate at %d: %w", number, err)
+			}
+		}
+		if spec.PrecompileRevertAt != 0 && number == spec.PrecompileRevertAt {
+			if err := addRegular(precSigner, types.NewTransaction(
+				st.GetNonce(c.PrecompileEOA), c.ReverterAddr, 0, big.NewInt(0), 2_000_000, gasPrice,
+				delegateCalldata(c.ReverterAddr, c.ValidatorAddr, delegAmt))); err != nil {
+				return fmt.Errorf("fixture: reverted 0xfc delegate at %d: %w", number, err)
+			}
+		}
+		if spec.PrecompileTopUpAt != 0 && number == spec.PrecompileTopUpAt {
+			if err := addRegular(precSigner, types.NewTransaction(
+				st.GetNonce(c.PrecompileEOA), fcAddr, 0, big.NewInt(0), 2_000_000, gasPrice,
+				delegateCalldata(c.PrecompileEOA, c.ValidatorAddr, delegAmt))); err != nil {
+				return fmt.Errorf("fixture: top-up 0xfc delegate at %d: %w", number, err)
+			}
+		}
+		if spec.PrecompileUndelegateAt != 0 && number == spec.PrecompileUndelegateAt {
+			half := new(big.Int).Mul(big.NewInt(500), one)
+			if err := addRegular(precSigner, types.NewTransaction(
+				st.GetNonce(c.PrecompileEOA), fcAddr, 0, big.NewInt(0), 2_000_000, gasPrice,
+				undelegateCalldata(c.PrecompileEOA, c.ValidatorAddr, half))); err != nil {
+				return fmt.Errorf("fixture: 0xfc undelegate at %d: %w", number, err)
+			}
+		}
+		if spec.PrecompileCollectRewardsAt != 0 && number == spec.PrecompileCollectRewardsAt {
+			// Collects the precompile EOA's accrued rewards through 0xfc
+			// (its pre-snapshot delegation shares the block-47 payout).
+			if err := addRegular(precSigner, types.NewTransaction(
+				st.GetNonce(c.PrecompileEOA), fcAddr, 0, big.NewInt(0), 2_000_000, gasPrice,
+				collectRewardsCalldata(c.PrecompileEOA))); err != nil {
+				return fmt.Errorf("fixture: 0xfc collect-rewards at %d: %w", number, err)
+			}
+		}
+		if len(pendingStaking) > 0 || len(pendingRegular) > 0 {
+			if err := worker.CommitTransactions(pendingRegular, pendingStaking, coinbase); err != nil {
+				return fmt.Errorf("fixture: commit txs at %d: %w", number, err)
+			}
+		}
+		if spec.IncomingReceiptAt != 0 && number == spec.IncomingReceiptAt {
+			// Incoming receipts are applied after transactions (consistent
+			// with the proposal order in the stock node). Shard-1 source
+			// block 5 (arbitrary, distinct from the crosslink numbers).
+			cxp, err := c.makeShard1IncomingReceipt(
+				hdr.Epoch(), 5, 5, testSigner.addr,
+				new(big.Int).Mul(big.NewInt(7), big.NewInt(denominations.One)))
+			if err != nil {
+				return fmt.Errorf("fixture: incoming receipt at %d: %w", number, err)
+			}
+			if err := worker.CommitReceipts([]*types.CXReceiptsProof{cxp}); err != nil {
+				return fmt.Errorf("fixture: commit incoming receipt at %d: %w", number, err)
+			}
+			// Store the source shard's crosslink alongside, as mainnet does:
+			// the beacon accepts an incoming receipt only after storing the
+			// source block's crosslink, whose (signature, bitmap) pair comes
+			// from the consensus message — NOT from the stored body. That
+			// stored body is corrupted by the long-standing
+			// CXReceiptsProof.Copy bug (CommitBitmap overwritten with a copy
+			// of CommitSig at rawdb.WriteBlock time), so this crosslink is
+			// the only surviving carrier of the true quorum bitmap and the
+			// audit's restoration source (audit/legacybitmap.go).
+			if err := c.writeShard1CrossLinkFor(cxp); err != nil {
+				return fmt.Errorf("fixture: store crosslink for incoming receipt at %d: %w", number, err)
+			}
+		}
+
+		var nextShardState *shard.State
+		if sched.IsLastBlock(number) {
+			nextShardState, err = c.Bc.SuperCommitteeForNextEpoch(c.Bc, hdr, false)
+			if err != nil {
+				return fmt.Errorf("fixture: next-epoch committee at %d: %w", number, err)
+			}
+		}
+
+		var crossLinks types.CrossLinks
+		// Shard-1 crosslinks: pre-target references shard-1 block 3, post-target
+		// references shard-1 block 4 (both >1, crosslink-epoch). The hash is a
+		// deterministic placeholder — VerifyCrossLink authenticates the
+		// signature over (epoch, hash, blockNum, viewID), not block existence.
+		if xl := shard1CrossLinkNum(spec, number); xl != 0 {
+			clHash := crypto.Keccak256Hash([]byte(fmt.Sprintf("hmy-metadata-fixture-shard1-crosslink-%d", xl)))
+			cl, err := c.makeShard1CrossLink(hdr.Epoch(), xl, xl, clHash)
+			if err != nil {
+				return fmt.Errorf("fixture: shard-1 crosslink at %d: %w", number, err)
+			}
+			crossLinks = types.CrossLinks{*cl}
+		}
+
+		commitSigs := make(chan []byte, 1)
+		if len(lastSig) > 0 {
+			commitSigs <- lastSig
+		} else {
+			commitSigs <- []byte{}
+		}
+		viewID := number
+		blk, err := worker.FinalizeNewBlock(commitSigs, func() uint64 { return viewID }, coinbase, crossLinks, nextShardState)
+		if err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("fixture: finalize %d: %w", number, err)
+		}
+		sig, err := c.signCommit(blk)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		blk.SetCurrentCommitSig(sig)
+		if err := c.Bc.ValidateNewBlock(blk, c.Bc); err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("fixture: ValidateNewBlock(%d): %w", number, err)
+		}
+		if _, err := c.Bc.InsertChain(types.Blocks{blk}, true); err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("fixture: InsertChain(%d): %w", number, err)
+		}
+		lastSig = sig
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// makeShard1IncomingReceipt builds a GENUINE incoming cross-shard receipt
+// proof from shard 1 to shard 0 that passes the FULL ValidateCXReceiptsProof
+// chain: a real shard-1 source header whose OutgoingReceiptHash commits to
+// the receipt root, a matching merkle proof, and a commit signature from
+// shard-1's dev committee for the header's epoch (quorum bitmap). The
+// receipt credits `to` with `amount`, and the caller must apply it to the
+// proposal state (worker.CommitReceipts) so the block's root includes the
+// credit and the audit's re-execution reproduces it exactly.
+func (c *Chain) makeShard1IncomingReceipt(epoch *big.Int, srcBlockNum, viewID uint64, to common.Address, amount *big.Int) (*types.CXReceiptsProof, error) {
+	receipts := types.CXReceipts{{
+		TxHash:    crypto.Keccak256Hash([]byte("hmy-metadata-fixture-cx-tx")),
+		From:      to,
+		To:        &to,
+		ShardID:   1,
+		ToShardID: 0,
+		Amount:    new(big.Int).Set(amount),
+	}}
+	shardRoot := types.DeriveSha(receipts)
+	// Outgoing receipt hash per CXMerkleProof: keccak(be32(toShard) || root)
+	// over the ordered destination-shard list (here just shard 0).
+	sKey := []byte{0, 0, 0, 0}
+	outHash := crypto.Keccak256Hash(append(sKey, shardRoot.Bytes()...))
+
+	hdr := blockfactory.NewFactory(c.Bc.Config()).NewHeader(new(big.Int).Set(epoch))
+	hdr.SetShardID(1)
+	hdr.SetNumber(new(big.Int).SetUint64(srcBlockNum))
+	hdr.SetViewID(new(big.Int).SetUint64(viewID))
+	hdr.SetOutgoingReceiptHash(outHash)
+
+	ss, err := rawdb.ReadShardState(c.DB, epoch)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("fixture: read shard state epoch %d for incoming receipt: %w", epoch, err)
+	}
+	comm, err := ss.FindCommitteeByID(1)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("fixture: no shard-1 committee at epoch %d: %w", epoch, err)
+	}
+	keys, err := c.loadKeysForSlots(comm.Slots)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	pubs := make([]bls2.PublicKeyWrapper, len(keys))
+	for i, k := range keys {
+		pubs[i] = *k.Pub
+	}
+	mask := bls2.NewMask(pubs)
+	payload := consensus_sig.ConstructCommitPayload(
+		c.Bc.Config(), epoch, hdr.Hash(), srcBlockNum, viewID,
+	)
+	var agg bls_core.Sign
+	for i, k := range keys {
+		if err := mask.SetBit(i, true); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		agg.Add(k.Pri.SignHash(payload))
+	}
+	cxp := &types.CXReceiptsProof{
+		Receipts: receipts,
+		MerkleProof: &types.CXMerkleProof{
+			BlockNum:      new(big.Int).SetUint64(srcBlockNum),
+			BlockHash:     hdr.Hash(),
+			ShardID:       1,
+			CXReceiptHash: outHash,
+			ShardIDs:      []uint32{0},
+			CXShardHashes: []common.Hash{shardRoot},
+		},
+		Header:       hdr,
+		CommitSig:    agg.Serialize(),
+		CommitBitmap: mask.Mask(),
+	}
+	// Self-check against the live chain: the fixture must never emit a proof
+	// that would not survive the full ValidateCXReceiptsProof chain.
+	if err := core.NewBlockValidator(c.Bc).ValidateCXReceiptsProof(cxp); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("fixture: constructed incoming receipt does not verify: %w", err)
+	}
+	return cxp, nil
+}
+
+// writeShard1CrossLinkFor persists the shard-1 crosslink record for the
+// incoming receipt's source block, carrying the proof's TRUE commit
+// signature material. See the call site in Generate for why this must come
+// from the in-memory proof rather than the stored body.
+func (c *Chain) writeShard1CrossLinkFor(cxp *types.CXReceiptsProof) error {
+	var sig [96]byte
+	copy(sig[:], cxp.CommitSig)
+	cl := &types.CrossLink{
+		HashF:        cxp.Header.Hash(),
+		BlockNumberF: new(big.Int).Set(cxp.Header.Number()),
+		ViewIDF:      new(big.Int).Set(cxp.Header.ViewID()),
+		SignatureF:   sig,
+		BitmapF:      append([]byte(nil), cxp.CommitBitmap...),
+		ShardIDF:     cxp.Header.ShardID(),
+		EpochF:       new(big.Int).Set(cxp.Header.Epoch()),
+	}
+	return rawdb.WriteCrossLinkShardBlock(
+		c.DB, cl.ShardID(), cl.BlockNum(), cl.Serialize())
+}
+
+// shard1CrossLinkNum returns the shard-1 crosslink block number to propose at
+// beacon height number (0 = none): pre-target block → shard-1 block 3,
+// post-target block → shard-1 block 4 (see Spec.PreCrossLinkShard1At).
+func shard1CrossLinkNum(spec Spec, number uint64) uint64 {
+	switch {
+	case spec.PreCrossLinkShard1At != 0 && number == spec.PreCrossLinkShard1At:
+		return 3
+	case spec.CrossLinkShard1At != 0 && number == spec.CrossLinkShard1At:
+		return 4
+	default:
+		return 0
+	}
+}
+
+// Finalize commits preimages and closes the database cleanly.
+func (c *Chain) Finalize() error {
+	head := c.Bc.CurrentBlock().NumberU64()
+	if err := c.Bc.CommitPreimages(); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("fixture: commit preimages: %w", err)
+	}
+	if _, _, err := rawdb.WritePreImageStartEndBlock(c.DB, 1, head); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("fixture: preimage markers: %w", err)
+	}
+	if err := c.DB.Close(); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("fixture: close: %w", err)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+type ecdsaSigner struct {
+	key  *ecdsa.PrivateKey
+	addr common.Address
+}
+
+// deterministicBLSSecret derives a fixture-only BLS secret from a 32-byte
+// little-endian scalar keyed by the address (the pinned SecretKey
+// SetLittleEndian performs no modular reduction), so fixtures are
+// byte-reproducible. Test-only; never a real key.
+func deterministicBLSSecret(seed common.Address) *bls_core.SecretKey {
+	var buf [32]byte
+	h := crypto.Keccak256([]byte("hmy-metadata-fixture-bls/"), seed.Bytes())
+	copy(buf[:], h)
+	buf[31] = 0 // keep within the field for the pinned lib
+	sec := &bls_core.SecretKey{}
+	if err := sec.SetLittleEndian(buf[:]); err != nil {
+		panic("fixture: bls scalar: " + err.Error())
+	}
+	return sec
+}
+
+// RepoKeysDir locates the repo's .hmy directory from the current working
+// directory (test-time helper).
+func RepoKeysDir() string {
+	wd, err := os.Getwd()
+	if err != nil {
+		return ".hmy"
+	}
+	dir := wd
+	for i := 0; i < 8; i++ {
+		if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(dir, ".hmy")); err == nil {
+			return filepath.Join(dir, ".hmy")
+		}
+		parent := filepath.Dir(dir)
+		if parent == dir {
+			break
+		}
+		dir = parent
+	}
+	return ".hmy"
+}
+
+// WriteAnchorConfig builds a localnet anchor config for the given target
+// from a CLOSED fixture chain directory and writes it as JSON to path.
+// knownBad lists heights expected to fail validity checks during the audit
+// (empty for clean fixtures: they plant no exploit block).
+func WriteAnchorConfig(dir string, target, auditEnd uint64, knownBad []uint64, path string) error {
+	db, err := rawdb.NewLevelDBDatabase(dir, 16, 64, "", true)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("fixture: open for anchor: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+	targetHash := rawdb.ReadCanonicalHash(db, target)
+	childHash := rawdb.ReadCanonicalHash(db, target+1)
+	sched := shard.Schedule
+	epoch := sched.CalcEpochNumber(target).Uint64()
+	cfg := recoveryanchor.Config{
+		Schema:             recoveryanchor.Schema,
+		Network:            "localnet",
+		Shard:              0,
+		TargetHeight:       target,
+		TargetHash:         targetHash.Hex(),
+		AbandonedChildHash: childHash.Hex(),
+		Epoch:              epoch,
+		EpochFirstBlock:    sched.EpochLastBlock(epoch-1) + 1,
+		EpochLastBlock:     sched.EpochLastBlock(epoch),
+		SnapshotBaseHeight: sched.EpochLastBlock(epoch-1) - 1,
+		AuditEndHeight:     auditEnd,
+		KnownBadBlocks:     knownBad,
+	}
+	raw, err := json.Marshal(cfg)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return os.WriteFile(path, raw, 0o644)
+}
+
+// Canonicalize rewrites a closed fixture database into a byte-reproducible
+// canonical form (mirrors the preflight fixture, WS7): LevelDB embeds
+// per-write sequence numbers in its tables, so the physical bytes depend on
+// the write ORDER, which upstream map iteration makes nondeterministic even
+// for identical logical content. Re-inserting every key-value pair in
+// sorted key order makes the tables and manifest a pure function of the
+// content; the timestamped LOG file is dropped. Two generations of the same
+// spec are byte-identical afterwards (the committed kit is diffable).
+func Canonicalize(dir string) error {
+	src, err := leveldb.OpenFile(dir, &opt.Options{ReadOnly: true, ErrorIfMissing: true})
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("fixture: canonicalize open source: %w", err)
+	}
+	tmp := dir + ".canonical"
+	if err := os.RemoveAll(tmp); err != nil {
+		src.Close()
+		return err
+	}
+	dst, err := leveldb.OpenFile(tmp, &opt.Options{ErrorIfExist: true})
+	if err != nil {
+		src.Close()
+		return fmt.Errorf("fixture: canonicalize open dest: %w", err)
+	}
+	it := src.NewIterator(nil, nil)
+	batch := new(leveldb.Batch)
+	n := 0
+	fail := func(err error) error {
+		it.Release()
+		src.Close()
+		dst.Close()
+		return err
+	}
+	for it.Next() {
+		batch.Put(append([]byte(nil), it.Key()...), append([]byte(nil), it.Value()...))
+		if n++; n%1024 == 0 {
+			if err := dst.Write(batch, nil); err != nil {
+				return fail(err)
+			}
+			batch.Reset()
+		}
+	}
+	if err := it.Error(); err != nil {
+		return fail(fmt.Errorf("fixture: canonicalize iterate: %w", err))
+	}
+	it.Release()
+	if err := dst.Write(batch, nil); err != nil {
+		src.Close()
+		dst.Close()
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := src.Close(); err != nil {
+		dst.Close()
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := dst.CompactRange(util.Range{}); err != nil {
+		dst.Close()
+		return fmt.Errorf("fixture: canonicalize compact: %w", err)
+	}
+	if err := dst.Close(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := os.Remove(filepath.Join(tmp, "LOG")); err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := os.RemoveAll(dir); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return os.Rename(tmp, dir)
+}
+
+// CopyDir snapshots a closed chain directory (twin/junk copies).
+func CopyDir(src, dst string) error {
+	return filepath.Walk(src, func(path string, info os.FileInfo, err error) error {
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		rel, err := filepath.Rel(src, path)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		target := filepath.Join(dst, rel)
+		if info.IsDir() {
+			return os.MkdirAll(target, 0o755)
+		}
+		if !info.Mode().IsRegular() {
+			return nil
+		}
+		data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		return os.WriteFile(target, data, 0o644)
+	})
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/metadata/fixture/fixture_test.go b/internal/recovery/metadata/fixture/fixture_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e958896875
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/metadata/fixture/fixture_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+package fixture
+
+import (
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/rawdb"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/shard"
+)
+
+// TestGenerateTwinChain proves the generator builds a replay-grade localnet
+// chain spanning an epoch boundary with pre- and post-target staking.
+func TestGenerateTwinChain(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("fixture generation is not short")
+	}
+	dir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "harmony_db_0")
+	c, err := Open(dir, RepoKeysDir())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("open: %v", err)
+	}
+	// localnet 16/16: epoch boundaries at 4,20,36,52,... (block1=5). A
+	// target at 30 (epoch 2, staking) with the 36/37 boundary in the
+	// post-target range gives a transition to audit.
+	spec := Spec{
+		Blocks:                44,
+		CreateValidatorAt:     10,
+		DelegateAt:            14,
+		PostCreateValidatorAt: 40,
+		PostDelegateAt:        42,
+	}
+	if err := c.Generate(spec); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("generate: %v", err)
+	}
+	head := c.Bc.CurrentBlock()
+	if head.NumberU64() != 44 {
+		t.Fatalf("head at %d, want 44", head.NumberU64())
+	}
+	// The pre-target validator must be in the validator list.
+	list, err := rawdb.ReadValidatorList(c.DB)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("read validator list: %v", err)
+	}
+	found := false
+	for _, a := range list {
+		if a == c.ValidatorAddr {
+			found = true
+		}
+	}
+	if !found {
+		t.Fatalf("pre-target validator %s not in list %v", c.ValidatorAddr.Hex(), list)
+	}
+	t.Logf("validator list has %d entries at head epoch %s", len(list), head.Epoch())
+	epochAt := func(n uint64) uint64 { return shard.Schedule.CalcEpochNumber(n).Uint64() }
+	t.Logf("epoch(30)=%d epoch(36)=%d epoch(37)=%d epoch(44)=%d",
+		epochAt(30), epochAt(36), epochAt(37), epochAt(44))
+	if err := c.Finalize(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("finalize: %v", err)
+	}
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/metadata/fixture/gen/main.go b/internal/recovery/metadata/fixture/gen/main.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7d0c5ebedf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/metadata/fixture/gen/main.go
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+// Command gen regenerates the committed metadata acceptance fixture kit
+// (default testdata/recovery/metadata/kit). The kit is byte-reproducible
+// (deterministic block times, fixture-only BLS secrets, and canonicalized
+// LevelDB directories — sorted-order reinsertion makes the physical bytes a
+// pure function of the logical content), so a fresh run reproduces the
+// committed tree exactly. Layout (plan WS7):
+//
+//	kit/harmony_db_0/         — the dirty chain (head 48, target 30, the
+//	                            abandoned branch with post-target staking
+//	                            and the 0xfc precompile delegation matrix)
+//	kit/clean/harmony_db_0/   — the clean twin (the same deterministic
+//	                            chain ended at the target, no branch)
+//	kit/fixture-keys/         — fixture-only BLS secrets (public test keys)
+//	kit/recovery-anchor.localnet.json — the anchor config for the kit
+//	kit/reference/            — golden export artifacts over the dirty DB
+//	                            (metadata-30.hmr, metadata-30.reference.json,
+//	                            run-checksums.sha256)
+//	kit/ground-truth.json     — target tuple + reference digest summary
+//
+// The acceptance suite also generates fixtures in-process; this kit is the
+// committed golden the suite pins against (acceptance.TestCommittedKitGolden
+// and TestKitRegeneratesByteIdentical), the devops-pilot input and the
+// manual-inspection artifact (§5.7). The generation logic lives in
+// metafixture.GenerateKit so there is exactly one code path.
+package main
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+
+	metafixture "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/fixture"
+)
+
+func main() {
+	outRoot := "testdata/recovery/metadata/kit"
+	if len(os.Args) > 1 {
+		outRoot = os.Args[1]
+	}
+	abs, err := filepath.Abs(outRoot)
+	if err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "resolve out root: %v\n", err)
+		os.Exit(1)
+	}
+	if err := metafixture.GenerateKit(abs, metafixture.RepoKeysDir(), os.Stderr); err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "gen: %v\n", err)
+		os.Exit(1)
+	}
+	fmt.Printf("metadata fixture kit written to %s\n", outRoot)
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/metadata/fixture/kit.go b/internal/recovery/metadata/fixture/kit.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f7c2867f12
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/metadata/fixture/kit.go
@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
+package fixture
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/rawdb"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/refexport"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/report"
+)
+
+// Kit schedule constants (WS7). Exported so the generator command, the
+// acceptance suite and the reproducibility test all pin the same shape.
+const (
+	KitBlocks     = 48
+	KitTarget     = 30
+	KitCreateVal  = 22
+	KitDelegate   = 26
+	KitFundPrec   = 28
+	KitPostCreate = 40
+	KitPostDeleg  = 42
+	KitPostTopUp  = 43
+	KitPrecDirect = 45
+	KitPrecNested = 46
+	KitPrecRevert = 47
+	KitPrecTopUp  = 48
+)
+
+// GroundTruthSchema identifies the committed ground-truth document.
+const GroundTruthSchema = "metadata-kit-ground-truth-v1"
+
+func generateChain(dir, keysDir string, spec Spec) error {
+	c, err := Open(dir, keysDir)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("open %s: %w", dir, err)
+	}
+	if err := c.Generate(spec); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("generate %s: %w", dir, err)
+	}
+	if err := c.Finalize(); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("finalize %s: %w", dir, err)
+	}
+	if err := Canonicalize(dir); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("canonicalize %s: %w", dir, err)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// GenerateKit writes the full committed metadata fixture kit under outRoot
+// (which must be absolute — the strict opener refuses relative paths). The
+// output is byte-reproducible: two runs into different directories produce
+// byte-identical trees (the internal export report, which is run evidence,
+// is deliberately excluded). Both the `gen` command and the reproducibility
+// test call this so there is exactly one generation path.
+func GenerateKit(outRoot, keysDir string, logw io.Writer) error {
+	if !filepath.IsAbs(outRoot) {
+		return fmt.Errorf("fixture: GenerateKit requires an absolute outRoot, got %q", outRoot)
+	}
+	if err := os.RemoveAll(outRoot); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(outRoot, 0o755); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	// Dirty chain: pre-target create-validator (22) + delegate (26) +
+	// precompile-actor funding (28), target 30 (epoch 2), the 36/37 epoch
+	// transition and the post-target abandoned-branch staking schedule
+	// plus the 0xfc precompile delegation matrix.
+	dirty := filepath.Join(outRoot, "harmony_db_0")
+	if err := generateChain(dirty, keysDir, Spec{
+		Blocks:                KitBlocks,
+		CreateValidatorAt:     KitCreateVal,
+		DelegateAt:            KitDelegate,
+		FundPrecompileAt:      KitFundPrec,
+		PostCreateValidatorAt: KitPostCreate,
+		PostDelegateAt:        KitPostDeleg,
+		PostTopUpAt:           KitPostTopUp,
+		PrecompileDirectAt:    KitPrecDirect,
+		PrecompileNestedAt:    KitPrecNested,
+		PrecompileRevertAt:    KitPrecRevert,
+		PrecompileTopUpAt:     KitPrecTopUp,
+	}); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	// Clean twin: the same deterministic chain ended at the target.
+	clean := filepath.Join(outRoot, "clean", "harmony_db_0")
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(clean), 0o755); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := generateChain(clean, keysDir, Spec{
+		Blocks:            KitTarget,
+		CreateValidatorAt: KitCreateVal,
+		DelegateAt:        KitDelegate,
+		FundPrecompileAt:  KitFundPrec,
+	}); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	// Anchor config (no exploit block planted; empty known-bad list).
+	anchorPath := filepath.Join(outRoot, "recovery-anchor.localnet.json")
+	if err := WriteAnchorConfig(dirty, KitTarget, KitBlocks, nil, anchorPath); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("anchor: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	// Golden export artifacts over the dirty DB. Export publishes into
+	// <out>/release/ (one atomic rename); the committed kit keeps the flat
+	// reference/ layout, so lift the release files up and drop the export
+	// run directory.
+	refDir := filepath.Join(outRoot, "reference")
+	exportDir := filepath.Join(outRoot, ".export-run")
+	if code := refexport.Run(context.Background(), refexport.Options{
+		DBPath: dirty, AnchorPath: anchorPath, OutDir: exportDir,
+	}, logw); code != 0 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("export: exit %d", code)
+	}
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(refDir, 0o755); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	for _, name := range []string{
+		fmt.Sprintf("metadata-%d.hmr", KitTarget),
+		fmt.Sprintf("metadata-%d.reference.json", KitTarget),
+		"run-checksums.sha256",
+	} {
+		if err := os.Rename(
+			filepath.Join(exportDir, "release", name),
+			filepath.Join(refDir, name),
+		); err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("lift release artifact %s: %w", name, err)
+		}
+	}
+	// The internal export report is RUN EVIDENCE (absolute paths, inode,
+	// timestamps — machine-specific by design, §4.5) and stays out of the
+	// committed kit; only the byte-reproducible release artifacts are kept.
+	if err := os.RemoveAll(exportDir); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("drop export run dir: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	// Ground truth: the target tuple + artifact digests in one document.
+	db, err := rawdb.NewLevelDBDatabase(dirty, 16, 64, "", true)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("open for ground truth: %w", err)
+	}
+	targetHash := rawdb.ReadCanonicalHash(db, KitTarget)
+	childHash := rawdb.ReadCanonicalHash(db, KitTarget+1)
+	headHash := rawdb.ReadCanonicalHash(db, KitBlocks)
+	db.Close()
+	hmrBytes, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(refDir, fmt.Sprintf("metadata-%d.hmr", KitTarget)))
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("read golden hmr: %w", err)
+	}
+	refBytes, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(refDir, fmt.Sprintf("metadata-%d.reference.json", KitTarget)))
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("read golden reference: %w", err)
+	}
+	truth := map[string]interface{}{
+		"schema":               GroundTruthSchema,
+		"network":              "localnet",
+		"blocks":               uint64(KitBlocks),
+		"target_height":        uint64(KitTarget),
+		"target_hash":          targetHash.Hex(),
+		"abandoned_child_hash": childHash.Hex(),
+		"head_hash":            headHash.Hex(),
+		"staking_schedule": map[string]uint64{
+			"create_validator": KitCreateVal, "delegate": KitDelegate,
+			"fund_precompile":       KitFundPrec,
+			"post_create_validator": KitPostCreate, "post_delegate": KitPostDeleg,
+			"post_top_up":       KitPostTopUp,
+			"precompile_direct": KitPrecDirect, "precompile_nested": KitPrecNested,
+			"precompile_reverted": KitPrecRevert, "precompile_top_up": KitPrecTopUp,
+		},
+		"hmr_sha256":       report.SHA256Hex(hmrBytes),
+		"reference_sha256": report.SHA256Hex(refBytes),
+	}
+	if err := report.WriteJSONAtomic(filepath.Join(outRoot, "ground-truth.json"), truth); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("ground truth: %w", err)
+	}
+	fmt.Fprintf(logw, "metadata fixture kit written to %s (head %d, target %d, reference digest %s)\n",
+		outRoot, KitBlocks, KitTarget, truth["reference_sha256"])
+	return nil
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/metadata/hmr/hmr.go b/internal/recovery/metadata/hmr/hmr.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f7d48a0dd0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/metadata/hmr/hmr.go
@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+// Package hmr implements the byte-exact HMR1 container (plan §4.5), the
+// pre-registered digest definitions, and the timestamp-free canonical
+// reference manifest whose SHA-256 is THE reference digest B4/D consumers
+// bind.
+//
+// HMR1 container:
+//
+//	magic 4B ASCII "HMR1" · format-version u32BE = 1 · anchor-digest 32B =
+//	SHA-256 of the anchor config file bytes · record-count u64BE · then
+//	records in strictly increasing raw-key order (bytewise), each:
+//	key-length u32BE ‖ raw-key ‖ value-length u64BE ‖ raw-value
+//
+// The decoder rejects duplicate keys, non-monotone order, trailing bytes,
+// truncation, and count/header disagreement — each with a distinct error
+// class. Encoding a NormalizedSet is byte-reproducible: B4 apply re-derives
+// locally, serializes canonically in memory and compares digests; it never
+// installs .hmr records.
+package hmr
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/norm"
+)
+
+// Magic is the 4-byte container magic.
+var Magic = [4]byte{'H', 'M', 'R', '1'}
+
+// FormatVersion is the only supported version.
+const FormatVersion uint32 = 1
+
+// Distinct decoder error classes (plan WS3).
+var (
+	ErrBadMagic      = errors.New("hmr: bad magic")
+	ErrBadVersion    = errors.New("hmr: unsupported format version")
+	ErrTruncated     = errors.New("hmr: truncated container")
+	ErrTrailingBytes = errors.New("hmr: trailing bytes after last record")
+	ErrOutOfOrder    = errors.New("hmr: record keys not strictly increasing")
+	ErrDuplicateKey  = errors.New("hmr: duplicate record key")
+	ErrCountMismatch = errors.New("hmr: record count disagrees with header")
+	ErrOversized     = errors.New("hmr: implausible record length")
+)
+
+// maxComponent guards decode allocations (1 GiB per component).
+const maxComponent = 1 << 30
+
+// Records flattens a NormalizedSet into the container's flat ordered
+// record set (sections are assigned by key shape; the container stays a
+// flat set). Records with nil values (placeholders from refused runs) are
+// rejected.
+func Records(set *norm.NormalizedSet) ([]norm.Record, error) {
+	out := make([]norm.Record, 0, 3+len(set.DVL)+len(set.Snapshots))
+	out = append(out, set.ValidatorList)
+	out = append(out, set.DVL...)
+	out = append(out, set.Snapshots...)
+	out = append(out, set.ShardState)
+	out = append(out, set.RewardAccumulator)
+	for _, r := range out {
+		if len(r.Key) == 0 || r.Value == nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("hmr: refusing to encode incomplete normalized set (key %x has nil value)", r.Key)
+		}
+	}
+	sortByKey(out)
+	for i := 1; i < len(out); i++ {
+		if bytes.Equal(out[i-1].Key, out[i].Key) {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %x", ErrDuplicateKey, out[i].Key)
+		}
+	}
+	return out, nil
+}
+
+func sortByKey(rs []norm.Record) {
+	for i := 1; i < len(rs); i++ {
+		for j := i; j > 0 && bytes.Compare(rs[j].Key, rs[j-1].Key) < 0; j-- {
+			rs[j], rs[j-1] = rs[j-1], rs[j]
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// Encode serializes the normalized set with the anchor-config digest bound
+// into the header. Deterministic and byte-reproducible.
+func Encode(set *norm.NormalizedSet, anchorSHA [32]byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	records, err := Records(set)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	var buf bytes.Buffer
+	buf.Write(Magic[:])
+	var v4 [4]byte
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(v4[:], FormatVersion)
+	buf.Write(v4[:])
+	buf.Write(anchorSHA[:])
+	var c8 [8]byte
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(c8[:], uint64(len(records)))
+	buf.Write(c8[:])
+	for _, r := range records {
+		buf.Write(norm.FrameRecord(r.Key, r.Value))
+	}
+	return buf.Bytes(), nil
+}
+
+// Decoded is the parsed container.
+type Decoded struct {
+	AnchorSHA [32]byte
+	Records   []norm.Record
+}
+
+// Decode strictly parses container bytes.
+func Decode(data []byte) (*Decoded, error) {
+	r := bytes.NewReader(data)
+	var magic [4]byte
+	if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, magic[:]); err != nil {
+		return nil, ErrTruncated
+	}
+	if magic != Magic {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %x", ErrBadMagic, magic)
+	}
+	var v4 [4]byte
+	if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, v4[:]); err != nil {
+		return nil, ErrTruncated
+	}
+	if version := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(v4[:]); version != FormatVersion {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %d", ErrBadVersion, version)
+	}
+	out := &Decoded{}
+	if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, out.AnchorSHA[:]); err != nil {
+		return nil, ErrTruncated
+	}
+	var c8 [8]byte
+	if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, c8[:]); err != nil {
+		return nil, ErrTruncated
+	}
+	count := binary.BigEndian.Uint64(c8[:])
+
+	var prev []byte
+	for i := uint64(0); i < count; i++ {
+		var k4 [4]byte
+		if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, k4[:]); err != nil {
+			if err == io.EOF {
+				// Clean EOF at a record boundary: the header promised more
+				// records than the body holds.
+				return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: header %d, body %d", ErrCountMismatch, count, i)
+			}
+			return nil, ErrTruncated
+		}
+		klen := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(k4[:])
+		if klen == 0 || klen > maxComponent {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: key length %d", ErrOversized, klen)
+		}
+		key := make([]byte, klen)
+		if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, key); err != nil {
+			return nil, ErrTruncated
+		}
+		var v8 [8]byte
+		if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, v8[:]); err != nil {
+			return nil, ErrTruncated
+		}
+		vlen := binary.BigEndian.Uint64(v8[:])
+		if vlen > maxComponent {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: value length %d", ErrOversized, vlen)
+		}
+		value := make([]byte, vlen)
+		if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, value); err != nil {
+			return nil, ErrTruncated
+		}
+		if prev != nil {
+			switch c := bytes.Compare(prev, key); {
+			case c == 0:
+				return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %x", ErrDuplicateKey, key)
+			case c > 0:
+				return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %x after %x", ErrOutOfOrder, key, prev)
+			}
+		}
+		prev = key
+		out.Records = append(out.Records, norm.Record{Key: key, Value: value})
+	}
+	// Anything left after the promised record count is malformed: either
+	// trailing garbage or more records than the header claims.
+	if r.Len() != 0 {
+		return nil, ErrTrailingBytes
+	}
+	return out, nil
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/metadata/hmr/hmr_test.go b/internal/recovery/metadata/hmr/hmr_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..98494f3d81
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/metadata/hmr/hmr_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+package hmr
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"errors"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/norm"
+)
+
+// buildSet assembles a minimal valid NormalizedSet with three records.
+func buildSet() *norm.NormalizedSet {
+	return &norm.NormalizedSet{
+		ValidatorList:     norm.Record{Key: []byte("validator-list"), Value: []byte{0xc0}},
+		ShardState:        norm.Record{Key: []byte("ss\x0b\xba"), Value: []byte("shardbytes")},
+		RewardAccumulator: norm.Record{Key: append([]byte("blk-rwd-"), 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7), Value: []byte{0x2a}},
+	}
+}
+
+func TestEncodeGoldenVector(t *testing.T) {
+	set := buildSet()
+	var anchorSHA [32]byte
+	for i := range anchorSHA {
+		anchorSHA[i] = byte(i)
+	}
+	got, err := Encode(set, anchorSHA)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	// Hand-compute the expected container. Records sort bytewise by key:
+	// "blk-rwd-\x00...\x07" < "ss\x0b\xba" < "validator-list".
+	var want bytes.Buffer
+	want.Write([]byte("HMR1"))
+	want.Write([]byte{0, 0, 0, 1})
+	want.Write(anchorSHA[:])
+	want.Write([]byte{0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3})
+	frame := func(k, v []byte) {
+		var k4 [4]byte
+		binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(k4[:], uint32(len(k)))
+		want.Write(k4[:])
+		want.Write(k)
+		var v8 [8]byte
+		binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(v8[:], uint64(len(v)))
+		want.Write(v8[:])
+		want.Write(v)
+	}
+	frame(append([]byte("blk-rwd-"), 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7), []byte{0x2a})
+	frame([]byte("ss\x0b\xba"), []byte("shardbytes"))
+	frame([]byte("validator-list"), []byte{0xc0})
+	if !bytes.Equal(got, want.Bytes()) {
+		t.Fatalf("encoder drifted from golden:\n got %x\nwant %x", got, want.Bytes())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestEncodeDecodeRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
+	set := buildSet()
+	set.DVL = []norm.Record{{Key: append([]byte("dvl"), bytes.Repeat([]byte{1}, 20)...), Value: []byte{0xc1, 0x02}}}
+	var anchorSHA [32]byte
+	enc, err := Encode(set, anchorSHA)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	dec, err := Decode(enc)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(dec.Records) != 4 {
+		t.Fatalf("decoded %d records, want 4", len(dec.Records))
+	}
+	// encode(decode(x)) == x is guaranteed by monotone key order.
+	for i := 1; i < len(dec.Records); i++ {
+		if bytes.Compare(dec.Records[i-1].Key, dec.Records[i].Key) >= 0 {
+			t.Fatalf("decoded records not strictly increasing at %d", i)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPackageDigestChangesOnFlip(t *testing.T) {
+	set := buildSet()
+	var sha [32]byte
+	a, _ := Encode(set, sha)
+	set.ShardState.Value = []byte("shardbyteS") // flip one byte
+	b, _ := Encode(set, sha)
+	if bytes.Equal(a, b) {
+		t.Fatal("flipping a value byte must change the package bytes")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDecoderRejections(t *testing.T) {
+	set := buildSet()
+	var sha [32]byte
+	good, _ := Encode(set, sha)
+
+	t.Run("bad-magic", func(t *testing.T) {
+		bad := append([]byte(nil), good...)
+		bad[0] = 'X'
+		if _, err := Decode(bad); !errors.Is(err, ErrBadMagic) {
+			t.Fatalf("want ErrBadMagic, got %v", err)
+		}
+	})
+	t.Run("bad-version", func(t *testing.T) {
+		bad := append([]byte(nil), good...)
+		bad[7] = 2
+		if _, err := Decode(bad); !errors.Is(err, ErrBadVersion) {
+			t.Fatalf("want ErrBadVersion, got %v", err)
+		}
+	})
+	t.Run("trailing-byte", func(t *testing.T) {
+		bad := append(append([]byte(nil), good...), 0xff)
+		if _, err := Decode(bad); !errors.Is(err, ErrTrailingBytes) {
+			t.Fatalf("want ErrTrailingBytes, got %v", err)
+		}
+	})
+	t.Run("truncated-value", func(t *testing.T) {
+		bad := good[:len(good)-1]
+		if _, err := Decode(bad); !errors.Is(err, ErrTruncated) {
+			t.Fatalf("want ErrTruncated, got %v", err)
+		}
+	})
+	t.Run("count-too-high", func(t *testing.T) {
+		bad := append([]byte(nil), good...)
+		binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(bad[40:48], 99)
+		if _, err := Decode(bad); !errors.Is(err, ErrCountMismatch) {
+			t.Fatalf("want ErrCountMismatch, got %v", err)
+		}
+	})
+	t.Run("duplicate-key", func(t *testing.T) {
+		dup := buildDuplicate(sha)
+		if _, err := Decode(dup); !errors.Is(err, ErrDuplicateKey) {
+			t.Fatalf("want ErrDuplicateKey, got %v", err)
+		}
+	})
+	t.Run("out-of-order", func(t *testing.T) {
+		ooo := buildOutOfOrder(sha)
+		if _, err := Decode(ooo); !errors.Is(err, ErrOutOfOrder) {
+			t.Fatalf("want ErrOutOfOrder, got %v", err)
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+func buildRaw(sha [32]byte, count uint64, frames ...[]byte) []byte {
+	var b bytes.Buffer
+	b.Write([]byte("HMR1"))
+	b.Write([]byte{0, 0, 0, 1})
+	b.Write(sha[:])
+	var c8 [8]byte
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(c8[:], count)
+	b.Write(c8[:])
+	for _, f := range frames {
+		b.Write(f)
+	}
+	return b.Bytes()
+}
+
+func frame(k, v []byte) []byte {
+	var out bytes.Buffer
+	var k4 [4]byte
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(k4[:], uint32(len(k)))
+	out.Write(k4[:])
+	out.Write(k)
+	var v8 [8]byte
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(v8[:], uint64(len(v)))
+	out.Write(v8[:])
+	out.Write(v)
+	return out.Bytes()
+}
+
+func buildDuplicate(sha [32]byte) []byte {
+	return buildRaw(sha, 2, frame([]byte("k"), []byte("a")), frame([]byte("k"), []byte("b")))
+}
+
+func buildOutOfOrder(sha [32]byte) []byte {
+	return buildRaw(sha, 2, frame([]byte("kb"), []byte("a")), frame([]byte("ka"), []byte("b")))
+}
+
+// FuzzDecode ensures the decoder never panics on arbitrary input.
+func FuzzDecode(f *testing.F) {
+	set := buildSet()
+	var sha [32]byte
+	good, _ := Encode(set, sha)
+	f.Add(good)
+	f.Add([]byte("HMR1"))
+	f.Add([]byte{})
+	f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, data []byte) {
+		_, _ = Decode(data)
+	})
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/metadata/hmr/manifest.go b/internal/recovery/metadata/hmr/manifest.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5883ebd738
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/metadata/hmr/manifest.go
@@ -0,0 +1,229 @@
+package hmr
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/norm"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/report"
+)
+
+// ManifestSchema identifies the reference-manifest document.
+const ManifestSchema = "hmr-reference-v1"
+
+// AnchorTuple is the chain-invariant anchor embedded in the manifest.
+type AnchorTuple struct {
+	TargetHeight       uint64 `json:"target_height"`
+	TargetHash         string `json:"target_hash"`
+	TargetRoot         string `json:"target_root"`
+	Epoch              uint64 `json:"epoch"`
+	EpochFirstBlock    uint64 `json:"epoch_first_block"`
+	EpochLastBlock     uint64 `json:"epoch_last_block"`
+	SnapshotBaseHeight uint64 `json:"snapshot_base_height"`
+	AbandonedChildHash string `json:"abandoned_child_hash"`
+}
+
+// ManifestAssertion is the reference form of an absence assertion: only
+// namespace + predicate + expected_remaining (planned-deletion counts are
+// source-specific run evidence and are excluded, plan §4.5).
+type ManifestAssertion struct {
+	Namespace         string `json:"namespace"`
+	Predicate         string `json:"predicate"`
+	ExpectedRemaining uint64 `json:"expected_remaining"`
+}
+
+// ManifestSection mirrors a section digest.
+type ManifestSection struct {
+	Name        string `json:"name"`
+	RecordCount uint64 `json:"record_count"`
+	SHA256      string `json:"sha256"`
+}
+
+// Manifest is the canonical reference manifest
+// (metadata-<target>.reference.json): strictly canonical JSON, only
+// chain-invariant, timestamp-free material. Its SHA-256 is the reference
+// digest the release notes publish and B4's pre-mutation check, the
+// COMPLETE marker, and the D1 startup gate bind.
+type Manifest struct {
+	Schema           string              `json:"schema"`
+	Network          string              `json:"network"`
+	Shard            uint32              `json:"shard"`
+	Anchor           AnchorTuple         `json:"anchor"`
+	AnchorConfigSHA  string              `json:"anchor_config_sha256"`
+	RulesetVersion   string              `json:"ruleset_version"`
+	PackageSHA256    string              `json:"package_sha256"` // SHA-256 of the .hmr file bytes
+	RecordCount      uint64              `json:"record_count"`
+	Sections         []ManifestSection   `json:"sections"`
+	WrapperSetSHA256 string              `json:"wrapper_set_sha256"`
+	DiagnosticsSHA   string              `json:"diagnostics_sha256"`
+	Assertions       []ManifestAssertion `json:"absence_assertions"`
+}
+
+// BuildManifest assembles the manifest from a normalization result and the
+// encoded package bytes.
+func BuildManifest(a norm.Anchor, res *norm.Result, packageBytes []byte) *Manifest {
+	sections := make([]ManifestSection, 0, len(res.Digests.Sections))
+	var recordCount uint64
+	for _, s := range res.Digests.Sections {
+		sections = append(sections, ManifestSection{Name: s.Name, RecordCount: s.RecordCount, SHA256: s.SHA256})
+		recordCount += s.RecordCount
+	}
+	assertions := make([]ManifestAssertion, 0, len(res.Assertions))
+	for _, as := range res.Assertions {
+		assertions = append(assertions, ManifestAssertion{
+			Namespace: as.Namespace, Predicate: as.Predicate, ExpectedRemaining: as.ExpectedRemaining,
+		})
+	}
+	// Assertions stay order-stable (assembly order is fixed in norm).
+	return &Manifest{
+		Schema:  ManifestSchema,
+		Network: a.Network,
+		Shard:   a.Shard,
+		Anchor: AnchorTuple{
+			TargetHeight:       a.TargetHeight,
+			TargetHash:         a.TargetHash.Hex(),
+			TargetRoot:         a.TargetRoot.Hex(),
+			Epoch:              a.Epoch,
+			EpochFirstBlock:    a.EpochFirst,
+			EpochLastBlock:     a.EpochLast,
+			SnapshotBaseHeight: a.SnapshotBase,
+			AbandonedChildHash: a.AbandonedChildHash.Hex(),
+		},
+		AnchorConfigSHA:  a.ConfigSHA256Hex,
+		RulesetVersion:   norm.RulesetVersion,
+		PackageSHA256:    report.SHA256Hex(packageBytes),
+		RecordCount:      recordCount,
+		Sections:         sections,
+		WrapperSetSHA256: res.Digests.WrapperSet,
+		DiagnosticsSHA:   res.Digests.Diagnostics,
+		Assertions:       assertions,
+	}
+}
+
+// EncodeManifest renders the strictly canonical JSON bytes whose SHA-256 is
+// the reference digest.
+func EncodeManifest(m *Manifest) ([]byte, error) {
+	return report.CanonicalJSON(m)
+}
+
+// DecodeManifest strictly parses manifest bytes: unknown fields rejected,
+// every required field validated (Validate), and the bytes must be the
+// exact canonical re-encoding (which also rejects duplicate keys,
+// reordered keys and whitespace variants — the manifest's SHA-256 is the
+// reference digest, so only the one canonical byte form is a manifest).
+func DecodeManifest(data []byte) (*Manifest, error) {
+	dec := json.NewDecoder(bytes.NewReader(data))
+	dec.DisallowUnknownFields()
+	var m Manifest
+	if err := dec.Decode(&m); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("hmr: strict manifest parse: %w", err)
+	}
+	if dec.More() {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("hmr: trailing data after manifest document")
+	}
+	if err := m.Validate(); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	reenc, err := EncodeManifest(&m)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("hmr: manifest re-encode: %w", err)
+	}
+	if !bytes.Equal(reenc, data) {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("hmr: manifest bytes are not the canonical encoding (duplicate keys, ordering or formatting differ)")
+	}
+	return &m, nil
+}
+
+// Validate checks the complete manifest contract: schema, required
+// fields, digest shapes, the exact canonical section list for the target
+// epoch (names, order, count), the record-count sum, and assertions.
+func (m *Manifest) Validate() error {
+	if m.Schema != ManifestSchema {
+		return fmt.Errorf("hmr: manifest schema %q, want %q", m.Schema, ManifestSchema)
+	}
+	if m.Network == "" {
+		return fmt.Errorf("hmr: manifest network is empty")
+	}
+	if m.RulesetVersion != norm.RulesetVersion {
+		return fmt.Errorf("hmr: manifest ruleset %q, want %q", m.RulesetVersion, norm.RulesetVersion)
+	}
+	for name, v := range map[string]string{
+		"anchor_config_sha256": m.AnchorConfigSHA,
+		"package_sha256":       m.PackageSHA256,
+		"wrapper_set_sha256":   m.WrapperSetSHA256,
+		"diagnostics_sha256":   m.DiagnosticsSHA,
+	} {
+		if !isHexDigest(v, 64) {
+			return fmt.Errorf("hmr: manifest %s %q is not a 64-char lowercase hex SHA-256", name, v)
+		}
+	}
+	for name, v := range map[string]string{
+		"target_hash":          m.Anchor.TargetHash,
+		"target_root":          m.Anchor.TargetRoot,
+		"abandoned_child_hash": m.Anchor.AbandonedChildHash,
+	} {
+		if len(v) != 66 || v[:2] != "0x" || !isHexDigest(v[2:], 64) {
+			return fmt.Errorf("hmr: manifest anchor %s %q is not a 0x-prefixed 32-byte hash", name, v)
+		}
+	}
+	want := norm.SectionNames(m.Anchor.Epoch)
+	if len(m.Sections) != len(want) {
+		return fmt.Errorf("hmr: manifest has %d sections, want exactly %d", len(m.Sections), len(want))
+	}
+	// Fixed section cardinalities (plan §4.5): validator-list, shard-state
+	// and reward-accumulator are exactly one record each; the snapshot
+	// section must carry at least the target-epoch snapshot; dvl is the
+	// only variable-and-possibly-empty section. SectionNames order is
+	// [validator-list, dvl, <snapshots>, <shard-state>, reward-accumulator].
+	exactlyOne := map[int]bool{0: true, 3: true, 4: true}
+	var sum uint64
+	for i, s := range m.Sections {
+		if s.Name != want[i] {
+			return fmt.Errorf("hmr: manifest section %d is %q, want %q (canonical order)", i, s.Name, want[i])
+		}
+		if !isHexDigest(s.SHA256, 64) {
+			return fmt.Errorf("hmr: manifest section %q sha256 %q is not a 64-char lowercase hex SHA-256", s.Name, s.SHA256)
+		}
+		if exactlyOne[i] && s.RecordCount != 1 {
+			return fmt.Errorf("hmr: manifest section %q record_count %d, want exactly 1", s.Name, s.RecordCount)
+		}
+		if i == 2 && s.RecordCount == 0 {
+			return fmt.Errorf("hmr: manifest snapshot section %q has zero records (the target-epoch snapshot is mandatory)", s.Name)
+		}
+		sum += s.RecordCount
+	}
+	if m.RecordCount != sum {
+		return fmt.Errorf("hmr: manifest record_count %d != section sum %d", m.RecordCount, sum)
+	}
+	// Absence assertions must be exactly the canonical ordered set for the
+	// anchor's (epoch, target height), each with expected_remaining == 0.
+	// This rejects reordering, duplicates, extra/missing assertions and any
+	// nonzero end-state count.
+	specs := norm.CanonicalAssertionSpecs(m.Anchor.Epoch, m.Anchor.TargetHeight)
+	if len(m.Assertions) != len(specs) {
+		return fmt.Errorf("hmr: manifest has %d absence assertions, want exactly %d (canonical set)", len(m.Assertions), len(specs))
+	}
+	for i, a := range m.Assertions {
+		if a.Namespace != specs[i].Namespace || a.Predicate != specs[i].Predicate {
+			return fmt.Errorf("hmr: manifest assertion %d is {%q,%q}, want {%q,%q} (canonical set/order)",
+				i, a.Namespace, a.Predicate, specs[i].Namespace, specs[i].Predicate)
+		}
+		if a.ExpectedRemaining != 0 {
+			return fmt.Errorf("hmr: manifest assertion %d (%s) expected_remaining=%d, must be 0 (post-apply end state)", i, a.Namespace, a.ExpectedRemaining)
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func isHexDigest(s string, n int) bool {
+	if len(s) != n {
+		return false
+	}
+	for _, c := range s {
+		if (c < '0' || c > '9') && (c < 'a' || c > 'f') {
+			return false
+		}
+	}
+	return true
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/metadata/hmr/manifest_test.go b/internal/recovery/metadata/hmr/manifest_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9b4d49453f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/metadata/hmr/manifest_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,220 @@
+package hmr
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/norm"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/report"
+)
+
+// fakeSHA is a syntactically valid 64-hex digest generator for the sample
+// (Validate enforces digest shapes; the values are otherwise arbitrary).
+func fakeSHA(seed byte) string {
+	return report.SHA256Hex([]byte{seed})
+}
+
+func sampleResult() (norm.Anchor, *norm.Result, []byte) {
+	a := norm.Anchor{
+		Network: "mainnet", Shard: 0, TargetHeight: 92730034,
+		TargetHash:      common.HexToHash("0x30c35d2f2291e4b27debe7862956cf7a0cc7abefc044273d6823567335086d8d"),
+		TargetRoot:      common.HexToHash("0xdeadbeef"),
+		Epoch:           3002,
+		EpochFirst:      92700672,
+		EpochLast:       92733439,
+		SnapshotBase:    92700670,
+		ConfigSHA256Hex: fakeSHA(0xA0),
+	}
+	// The complete canonical section list for epoch 3002 (Validate
+	// enforces the exact names, order and cardinalities: validator-list,
+	// shard-state and reward-accumulator are exactly one record; the
+	// snapshot section is nonzero; dvl is variable).
+	names := norm.SectionNames(a.Epoch)
+	counts := []uint64{1, 7, 3, 1, 1} // [validator-list, dvl, snapshots, shard-state, reward-accumulator]
+	sections := make([]norm.SectionDigest, 0, len(names))
+	for i, name := range names {
+		sections = append(sections, norm.SectionDigest{
+			Name: name, RecordCount: counts[i], SHA256: fakeSHA(byte(i)),
+		})
+	}
+	// The full canonical absence-assertion set for (epoch, target), each
+	// with expected_remaining 0 and an arbitrary per-run planned count.
+	specs := norm.CanonicalAssertionSpecs(a.Epoch, a.TargetHeight)
+	assertions := make([]norm.AbsenceAssertion, 0, len(specs))
+	for i, s := range specs {
+		assertions = append(assertions, norm.AbsenceAssertion{
+			Namespace: s.Namespace, Predicate: s.Predicate,
+			PlannedDeletions: uint64(i * 3), ExpectedRemaining: 0,
+		})
+	}
+	res := &norm.Result{
+		Digests: norm.DigestSet{
+			Sections:    sections,
+			WrapperSet:  fakeSHA(0xB0),
+			Diagnostics: fakeSHA(0xC0),
+		},
+		Assertions: assertions,
+	}
+	pkg := []byte("fake-hmr-bytes")
+	return a, res, pkg
+}
+
+func TestManifestRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
+	a, res, pkg := sampleResult()
+	m := BuildManifest(a, res, pkg)
+	enc, err := EncodeManifest(m)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	dec, err := DecodeManifest(enc)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	// Re-encode must be byte-identical (canonical).
+	enc2, _ := EncodeManifest(dec)
+	if !bytes.Equal(enc, enc2) {
+		t.Fatal("manifest re-encode not byte-stable")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestManifestExcludesPlannedDeletionsAndTimestamps(t *testing.T) {
+	a, res, pkg := sampleResult()
+	m := BuildManifest(a, res, pkg)
+	enc, err := EncodeManifest(m)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	s := string(enc)
+	if strings.Contains(s, "planned_deletions") {
+		t.Fatal("reference manifest must not carry planned_deletions (source-specific run evidence)")
+	}
+	for _, ts := range []string{"created_at", "timestamp", "started_at", "duration"} {
+		if strings.Contains(s, ts) {
+			t.Fatalf("reference manifest must be timestamp-free, found %q", ts)
+		}
+	}
+	// It must carry the required end-state predicate + expected_remaining.
+	if !strings.Contains(s, "expected_remaining") || !strings.Contains(s, "epoch>3002") {
+		t.Fatal("reference manifest missing absence-assertion predicate/end-state")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestReferenceDigestBindings(t *testing.T) {
+	a, res, pkg := sampleResult()
+	base := func() string {
+		m := BuildManifest(a, res, pkg)
+		enc, _ := EncodeManifest(m)
+		return report.SHA256Hex(enc)
+	}
+	baseline := base()
+
+	// Flipping a payload byte changes the package digest -> reference
+	// digest.
+	pkg2 := append([]byte(nil), pkg...)
+	pkg2[0] ^= 0xff
+	m2 := BuildManifest(a, res, pkg2)
+	e2, _ := EncodeManifest(m2)
+	if report.SHA256Hex(e2) == baseline {
+		t.Fatal("changing the package bytes must change the reference digest")
+	}
+
+	// Flipping a section digest changes the reference digest.
+	res3 := *res
+	res3.Digests.Sections = append([]norm.SectionDigest(nil), res.Digests.Sections...)
+	res3.Digests.Sections[0].SHA256 = "ffff"
+	m3 := BuildManifest(a, &res3, pkg)
+	e3, _ := EncodeManifest(m3)
+	if report.SHA256Hex(e3) == baseline {
+		t.Fatal("changing a section digest must change the reference digest")
+	}
+
+	// Varying only per-run planned-deletion counts does NOT change the
+	// reference digest (junk-insensitivity at the manifest level).
+	res4 := *res
+	res4.Assertions = append([]norm.AbsenceAssertion(nil), res.Assertions...)
+	for i := range res4.Assertions {
+		res4.Assertions[i].PlannedDeletions += 777 // different junk
+	}
+	m4 := BuildManifest(a, &res4, pkg)
+	e4, _ := EncodeManifest(m4)
+	if report.SHA256Hex(e4) != baseline {
+		t.Fatal("per-run planned-deletion counts must NOT affect the reference digest")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestManifestRejectsUnknownFields(t *testing.T) {
+	bad := []byte(`{"schema":"hmr-reference-v1","surprise":1}`)
+	if _, err := DecodeManifest(bad); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("unknown fields must be rejected")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestManifestValidationRejectsIncomplete pins the strict-consumer
+// contract: schema-only documents, wrong digest shapes, section
+// order/count violations, record-count mismatches, missing assertions and
+// non-canonical encodings are all rejected.
+func TestManifestValidationRejectsIncomplete(t *testing.T) {
+	// Schema alone is NOT a manifest.
+	if _, err := DecodeManifest([]byte(`{"schema":"hmr-reference-v1"}`)); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("a schema-only document must be rejected")
+	}
+
+	a, res, pkg := sampleResult()
+	valid := BuildManifest(a, res, pkg)
+	enc, err := EncodeManifest(valid)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := DecodeManifest(enc); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("the canonical sample must decode: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	mutate := func(name string, f func(m *Manifest)) {
+		t.Helper()
+		m := BuildManifest(a, res, pkg)
+		f(m)
+		bad, err := EncodeManifest(m)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("%s: encode: %v", name, err)
+		}
+		if _, err := DecodeManifest(bad); err == nil {
+			t.Fatalf("%s: must be rejected", name)
+		}
+	}
+	mutate("short package digest", func(m *Manifest) { m.PackageSHA256 = "abcd" })
+	mutate("uppercase digest", func(m *Manifest) { m.WrapperSetSHA256 = strings.ToUpper(m.WrapperSetSHA256) })
+	mutate("section order swapped", func(m *Manifest) {
+		m.Sections[0], m.Sections[1] = m.Sections[1], m.Sections[0]
+	})
+	mutate("section dropped", func(m *Manifest) { m.Sections = m.Sections[:len(m.Sections)-1] })
+	mutate("record-count mismatch", func(m *Manifest) { m.RecordCount++ })
+	mutate("assertions dropped", func(m *Manifest) { m.Assertions = nil })
+	mutate("ruleset drift", func(m *Manifest) { m.RulesetVersion = "hmr-norm-v0" })
+	mutate("bad anchor hash", func(m *Manifest) { m.Anchor.TargetHash = "0x1234" })
+	// Section cardinality: validator-list / shard-state / reward-accumulator
+	// must be exactly one record; the snapshot section must be nonzero.
+	mutate("validator-list count != 1", func(m *Manifest) { m.Sections[0].RecordCount = 2; m.RecordCount++ })
+	mutate("shard-state count != 1", func(m *Manifest) { m.Sections[3].RecordCount = 0; m.RecordCount-- })
+	mutate("reward-accumulator count != 1", func(m *Manifest) { m.Sections[4].RecordCount = 3; m.RecordCount += 2 })
+	mutate("snapshot count zero", func(m *Manifest) { m.RecordCount -= m.Sections[2].RecordCount; m.Sections[2].RecordCount = 0 })
+	// Absence assertions: exact canonical set, order and zero end-state.
+	mutate("assertion reordered", func(m *Manifest) {
+		m.Assertions[0], m.Assertions[1] = m.Assertions[1], m.Assertions[0]
+	})
+	mutate("assertion extra", func(m *Manifest) {
+		m.Assertions = append(m.Assertions, ManifestAssertion{Namespace: "x", Predicate: "present"})
+	})
+	mutate("assertion nonzero expected_remaining", func(m *Manifest) { m.Assertions[0].ExpectedRemaining = 1 })
+	mutate("assertion wrong predicate", func(m *Manifest) { m.Assertions[0].Predicate = "epoch>1" })
+
+	// Non-canonical byte forms of a valid manifest are rejected (the
+	// reference digest binds exactly one byte form).
+	withSpace := append([]byte(nil), enc...)
+	withSpace = bytes.Replace(withSpace, []byte(`{"absence_assertions"`), []byte(`{ "absence_assertions"`), 1)
+	if _, err := DecodeManifest(withSpace); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("whitespace variant must be rejected (non-canonical)")
+	}
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/metadata/norm/ctxkv.go b/internal/recovery/metadata/norm/ctxkv.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7524eb9c10
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/metadata/norm/ctxkv.go
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+package norm
+
+import (
+	"context"
+
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/ethdb"
+)
+
+// ctxKV wraps a RawKV so every iterator observes context cancellation
+// (checked every ctxCheckStride steps — cheap even on the ~92.7M-key
+// mainnet blk-rwd walk). Cancellation latches as the iterator error, which
+// strictdb.ForEach fail-closed checking surfaces to the caller.
+type ctxKV struct {
+	RawKV
+	ctx context.Context
+}
+
+const ctxCheckStride = 1024
+
+func withCtx(kv RawKV, ctx context.Context) RawKV {
+	if ctx == nil {
+		return kv
+	}
+	return &ctxKV{RawKV: kv, ctx: ctx}
+}
+
+func (c *ctxKV) NewIterator(prefix []byte, start []byte) ethdb.Iterator {
+	return &ctxIter{Iterator: c.RawKV.NewIterator(prefix, start), ctx: c.ctx}
+}
+
+type ctxIter struct {
+	ethdb.Iterator
+	ctx   context.Context
+	steps int
+	err   error
+}
+
+func (i *ctxIter) Next() bool {
+	if i.err != nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	i.steps++
+	if i.steps%ctxCheckStride == 0 {
+		if err := i.ctx.Err(); err != nil {
+			i.err = err
+			return false
+		}
+	}
+	return i.Iterator.Next()
+}
+
+func (i *ctxIter) Error() error {
+	if i.err != nil {
+		return i.err
+	}
+	return i.Iterator.Error()
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/metadata/norm/digests.go b/internal/recovery/metadata/norm/digests.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c65de5701b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/metadata/norm/digests.go
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+package norm
+
+import (
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"fmt"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/report"
+)
+
+// FrameRecord returns the pre-registered record frame (plan §4.5):
+// u32be(len(key)) ‖ key ‖ u64be(len(value)) ‖ value.
+func FrameRecord(key, value []byte) []byte {
+	out := make([]byte, 0, 4+len(key)+8+len(value))
+	var k4 [4]byte
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(k4[:], uint32(len(key)))
+	out = append(out, k4[:]...)
+	out = append(out, key...)
+	var v8 [8]byte
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(v8[:], uint64(len(value)))
+	out = append(out, v8[:]...)
+	return append(out, value...)
+}
+
+// SectionSHA256 computes SHA-256("hmr1/section/" ‖ name ‖ 0x00 ‖
+// concat(record frames in key order)).
+func SectionSHA256(name string, records []Record) string {
+	h := sha256.New()
+	h.Write([]byte("hmr1/section/"))
+	h.Write([]byte(name))
+	h.Write([]byte{0})
+	for _, r := range records {
+		h.Write(FrameRecord(r.Key, r.Value))
+	}
+	return fmt.Sprintf("%x", h.Sum(nil))
+}
+
+// wrapperSetSHA256 computes SHA-256("hmr1/wrappers" ‖ 0x00 ‖ concat(addr(20)
+// ‖ u64be(len(code)) ‖ code)) in normalized list order; code is the raw
+// stored wrapper bytes at the target root, hashed unre-encoded.
+func wrapperSetSHA256(ordered []wrapperEntry) string {
+	h := sha256.New()
+	h.Write([]byte("hmr1/wrappers"))
+	h.Write([]byte{0})
+	for _, w := range ordered {
+		h.Write(w.addr.Bytes())
+		var v8 [8]byte
+		binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(v8[:], uint64(len(w.code)))
+		h.Write(v8[:])
+		h.Write(w.code)
+	}
+	return fmt.Sprintf("%x", h.Sum(nil))
+}
+
+// diagnosticsSHA256 hashes the canonical JSON of the chain-deterministic
+// findings, sorted by (code, key) — plan §4.5.
+func diagnosticsSHA256(findings []report.Finding) (string, error) {
+	var chainDet []report.Finding
+	for _, f := range findings {
+		if f.ChainDeterministic {
+			chainDet = append(chainDet, f)
+		}
+	}
+	report.SortFindings(chainDet)
+	if chainDet == nil {
+		chainDet = []report.Finding{}
+	}
+	return report.DigestCanonicalJSON(chainDet)
+}
+
+// digestSet assembles the DigestSet from the normalized sections.
+func digestSet(a Anchor, set *NormalizedSet, wrappers []wrapperEntry, findings []report.Finding) (DigestSet, error) {
+	sections := []SectionDigest{
+		{Name: "validator-list", RecordCount: 1,
+			SHA256: SectionSHA256("validator-list", []Record{set.ValidatorList})},
+		{Name: "dvl", RecordCount: uint64(len(set.DVL)),
+			SHA256: SectionSHA256("dvl", set.DVL)},
+		{Name: sectionSnapshots(a.Epoch), RecordCount: uint64(len(set.Snapshots)),
+			SHA256: SectionSHA256(sectionSnapshots(a.Epoch), set.Snapshots)},
+		{Name: sectionShardState(a.Epoch), RecordCount: 1,
+			SHA256: SectionSHA256(sectionShardState(a.Epoch), []Record{set.ShardState})},
+		{Name: "reward-accumulator", RecordCount: 1,
+			SHA256: SectionSHA256("reward-accumulator", []Record{set.RewardAccumulator})},
+	}
+	diag, err := diagnosticsSHA256(findings)
+	if err != nil {
+		return DigestSet{}, err
+	}
+	return DigestSet{
+		Sections:    sections,
+		WrapperSet:  wrapperSetSHA256(wrappers),
+		Diagnostics: diag,
+	}, nil
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/metadata/norm/dvl.go b/internal/recovery/metadata/norm/dvl.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..92a7320d22
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/metadata/norm/dvl.go
@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
+package norm
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"fmt"
+
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common"
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/rlp"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/report"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/strictdb"
+	staking "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/staking/types"
+)
+
+// dvl implements the §4.4 delegator-reverse-index rules: strict decode,
+// stable filter BlockNum <= target (order preserved — exact per the
+// append-only dvl semantics, §2.1), retained-pointer validation, and the
+// in-memory reverse map for the completeness pass.
+func (n *normalizer) dvl() error {
+	return strictdb.ForEach(n.s.Raw, prefixDVL, func(key, value []byte) error {
+		if len(key) != len(prefixDVL)+20 {
+			n.counts.DVL.Invalid++
+			n.fatal(report.ClassInvalidRetained, "dvl-malformed-key", key,
+				fmt.Sprintf("dvl key length %d, want %d", len(key), len(prefixDVL)+20))
+			return nil
+		}
+		delegator := common.BytesToAddress(key[len(prefixDVL):])
+
+		var indexes staking.DelegationIndexes
+		if err := rlp.DecodeBytes(value, &indexes); err != nil {
+			n.counts.DVL.Invalid++
+			n.fatal(report.ClassInvalidRetained, "dvl-undecodable", key,
+				fmt.Sprintf("dvl record for %s does not strict-decode: %v", delegator.Hex(), err))
+			return nil
+		}
+
+		var kept staking.DelegationIndexes
+		seenValidator := map[common.Address]bool{}
+		for _, idx := range indexes {
+			if idx.BlockNum == nil || !idx.BlockNum.IsUint64() {
+				n.counts.DVL.Invalid++
+				n.fatal(report.ClassInvalidRetained, "dvl-malformed-blocknum", key,
+					fmt.Sprintf("delegation index for %s -> %s has malformed BlockNum %v",
+						delegator.Hex(), idx.ValidatorAddress.Hex(), idx.BlockNum))
+				continue
+			}
+			if idx.BlockNum.Uint64() > n.a.TargetHeight {
+				// Stable filter: post-target appends drop, order preserved.
+				n.dvlEntriesRemoved++
+				n.removedDVL = append(n.removedDVL, RemovedDVLEntry{
+					Delegator: delegator,
+					Validator: idx.ValidatorAddress,
+					Index:     idx.Index,
+					BlockNum:  idx.BlockNum.Uint64(),
+				})
+				continue
+			}
+			if seenValidator[idx.ValidatorAddress] {
+				// Impossible per addDelegationIndex (§2.1); implies corruption.
+				n.counts.DVL.Duplicate++
+				n.fatal(report.ClassInvalidRetained, "dvl-duplicate-validator-entry", key,
+					fmt.Sprintf("delegator %s holds two retained entries for validator %s",
+						delegator.Hex(), idx.ValidatorAddress.Hex()))
+				continue
+			}
+			seenValidator[idx.ValidatorAddress] = true
+			n.validateRetainedIndex(key, delegator, idx)
+			kept = append(kept, idx)
+			vm, ok := n.retained[delegator]
+			if !ok {
+				vm = map[common.Address]uint64{}
+				n.retained[delegator] = vm
+			}
+			vm[idx.ValidatorAddress] = idx.Index
+			// Rough footprint: two addresses + index + map overhead.
+			n.inventory.DVLReverseMapBytes += 20 + 20 + 8 + 48
+		}
+
+		if len(kept) == 0 {
+			// Empty post-filter list: logical delete of the key.
+			n.counts.DVL.Removed++
+			n.dvlDeletions = append(n.dvlDeletions, PlannedDeletion{
+				Key: hexKey(key), Reason: "post-target-only",
+			})
+			return nil
+		}
+		newValue := mustRLP(kept)
+		n.counts.DVL.Retained++
+		n.set.DVL = append(n.set.DVL, Record{
+			Key: append([]byte(nil), key...), Value: newValue,
+		})
+		if !bytes.Equal(newValue, value) {
+			n.dvlRewrites = append(n.dvlRewrites, PlannedRewrite{
+				Key:            hexKey(key),
+				NewValueSHA256: report.SHA256Hex(newValue),
+				Reason:         "post-target-entries-filtered",
+			})
+		}
+		return nil
+	})
+}
+
+// validateRetainedIndex checks one retained pointer against the target
+// wrappers (§4.4): validator listed, wrapper exists, Index in range, and
+// the pointed-at Delegation belongs to the key's delegator.
+func (n *normalizer) validateRetainedIndex(key []byte, delegator common.Address, idx staking.DelegationIndex) {
+	wIdx, listed := n.wrapperByAddr[idx.ValidatorAddress]
+	if !listed {
+		n.counts.DVL.Invalid++
+		n.fatal(report.ClassInvalidRetained, "dvl-validator-not-listed", key,
+			fmt.Sprintf("retained index %s -> %s references a validator outside the normalized list",
+				delegator.Hex(), idx.ValidatorAddress.Hex()))
+		return
+	}
+	w := n.wrappers[wIdx].wrapper
+	if w == nil {
+		n.counts.DVL.Invalid++
+		n.fatal(report.ClassInvalidRetained, "dvl-validator-wrapper-unavailable", key,
+			fmt.Sprintf("retained index %s -> %s has no decodable target wrapper",
+				delegator.Hex(), idx.ValidatorAddress.Hex()))
+		return
+	}
+	if idx.Index >= uint64(len(w.Delegations)) {
+		n.counts.DVL.Invalid++
+		n.fatal(report.ClassInvalidRetained, "dvl-index-out-of-range", key,
+			fmt.Sprintf("retained index %s -> %s slot %d, wrapper holds %d delegations",
+				delegator.Hex(), idx.ValidatorAddress.Hex(), idx.Index, len(w.Delegations)))
+		return
+	}
+	if w.Delegations[idx.Index].DelegatorAddress != delegator {
+		n.counts.DVL.Invalid++
+		n.fatal(report.ClassInvalidRetained, "dvl-pointer-mismatch", key,
+			fmt.Sprintf("retained index %s -> %s slot %d points at delegator %s",
+				delegator.Hex(), idx.ValidatorAddress.Hex(), idx.Index,
+				w.Delegations[idx.Index].DelegatorAddress.Hex()))
+	}
+}
+
+// dvlReverseCompleteness runs the §4.4 reverse pass (sound per §2.1: no
+// pruning exists at this base; Undelegate/CollectRewards never remove
+// Delegation entries): for every listed wrapper and every Delegations[i], a
+// retained dvl entry {delegator -> (validator, i, BlockNum <= target)} must
+// exist.
+func (n *normalizer) dvlReverseCompleteness() {
+	for i := range n.wrappers {
+		entry := &n.wrappers[i]
+		if entry.wrapper == nil {
+			continue // already Fatal via the list rules
+		}
+		for di := range entry.wrapper.Delegations {
+			delegator := entry.wrapper.Delegations[di].DelegatorAddress
+			vm := n.retained[delegator]
+			idx, ok := uint64(0), false
+			if vm != nil {
+				idx, ok = vm[entry.addr]
+			}
+			if !ok {
+				n.counts.DVL.Missing++
+				n.fatal(report.ClassMissingRequired, "dvl-missing-required-index", dvlKey(delegator),
+					fmt.Sprintf("delegation %s -> %s (slot %d) has no retained dvl entry (clean-DB fallback signal)",
+						delegator.Hex(), entry.addr.Hex(), di))
+				continue
+			}
+			if idx != uint64(di) {
+				n.counts.DVL.Invalid++
+				n.fatal(report.ClassInvalidRetained, "dvl-index-slot-mismatch", dvlKey(delegator),
+					fmt.Sprintf("delegation %s -> %s: wrapper slot %d, retained dvl entry says %d",
+						delegator.Hex(), entry.addr.Hex(), di, idx))
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	sortRecords(n.set.DVL)
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/metadata/norm/epochs.go b/internal/recovery/metadata/norm/epochs.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a01b8dc142
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/metadata/norm/epochs.go
@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
+package norm
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"fmt"
+	"math/big"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/report"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/strictdb"
+)
+
+// shardStates implements the ss rules (§4.4): ss<epoch> must exist and
+// byte-equal the boundary header's ShardState field (§2.1: the epoch-last
+// block of the prior epoch carries it; production writes the raw header
+// field bytes unchanged). Future epochs are deleted (the audit
+// byte-verifies its reproduced next-epoch record against the deleted one);
+// prior epochs are preserved.
+func (n *normalizer) shardStates() error {
+	targetKey := shardStateKey(epochBig(n.a.Epoch))
+	var targetSeen bool
+
+	err := strictdb.ForEach(n.s.Raw, prefixShardState, func(key, value []byte) error {
+		suffix := key[len(prefixShardState):]
+		epoch, canonical, cerr := n.checkCanonicalEpochSuffix(key, suffix, func(e *big.Int) []byte {
+			return shardStateKey(e)
+		}, &n.counts.ShardState.Duplicate)
+		if cerr != nil {
+			return cerr
+		}
+		if !canonical {
+			n.counts.ShardState.Invalid++
+			return nil
+		}
+		switch {
+		case !epoch.IsUint64() || epoch.Uint64() > n.a.Epoch:
+			n.counts.ShardState.Removed++
+			n.epochDeletions = append(n.epochDeletions, PlannedDeletion{
+				Key: hexKey(key), Reason: "future-epoch",
+			})
+		case epoch.Uint64() == n.a.Epoch:
+			targetSeen = true
+			expected, err := n.boundaryShardState()
+			if err != nil {
+				n.fatal(report.ClassMissingRequired, "boundary-header-missing", key,
+					fmt.Sprintf("cannot read boundary header %d to verify ss<%d>: %v (conservatively a fallback signal)",
+						n.a.BoundaryHeight, n.a.Epoch, err))
+				return nil
+			}
+			if !bytes.Equal(value, expected) {
+				n.counts.ShardState.Invalid++
+				n.fatal(report.ClassInvalidRetained, "shard-state-mismatch", key,
+					fmt.Sprintf("ss<%d> differs from header(%d).ShardState()", n.a.Epoch, n.a.BoundaryHeight))
+				return nil
+			}
+			n.counts.ShardState.Retained++
+			n.set.ShardState = Record{Key: append([]byte(nil), key...), Value: nonNil(value)}
+		default: // prior epochs preserved untouched
+			n.counts.ShardState.Retained++
+			n.inventory.ShardStatesPrior.Count++
+		}
+		return nil
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if !targetSeen {
+		n.counts.ShardState.Missing++
+		n.fatal(report.ClassMissingRequired, "shard-state-missing", targetKey,
+			fmt.Sprintf("ss<%d> absent (clean-DB fallback signal)", n.a.Epoch))
+		n.set.ShardState = Record{Key: targetKey, Value: nil}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// boundaryShardState reads header(BoundaryHeight).ShardState() once.
+func (n *normalizer) boundaryShardState() ([]byte, error) {
+	hdr, err := n.s.Headers.HeaderByNumber(n.a.BoundaryHeight)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if hdr == nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("boundary header %d not found", n.a.BoundaryHeight)
+	}
+	return hdr.ShardState(), nil
+}
+
+// epochAux applies the dead-writer epoch-suffixed rules (§2.1): epochs
+// above the target are deleted defensively; any observed hit is itemized
+// (expected zero for epochs > target on mainnet).
+func (n *normalizer) epochAux() error {
+	type ns struct {
+		prefix []byte
+		label  string
+	}
+	for _, name := range []ns{
+		{prefixEpochNumber, "harmony-epoch-block-number"},
+		{prefixEpochVRF, "epoch-vrf-block-numbers"},
+		{prefixEpochVDF, "epoch-vdf-block-number"},
+	} {
+		name := name
+		err := strictdb.ForEach(n.s.Raw, name.prefix, func(key, value []byte) error {
+			suffix := key[len(name.prefix):]
+			epoch, canonical, cerr := n.checkCanonicalEpochSuffix(key, suffix, func(e *big.Int) []byte {
+				return append(append([]byte(nil), name.prefix...), e.Bytes()...)
+			}, &n.counts.EpochAux.Duplicate)
+			if cerr != nil {
+				return cerr
+			}
+			if !canonical {
+				n.counts.EpochAux.Invalid++
+				return nil
+			}
+			if !epoch.IsUint64() || epoch.Uint64() > n.a.Epoch {
+				n.counts.EpochAux.Removed++
+				n.epochDeletions = append(n.epochDeletions, PlannedDeletion{
+					Key: hexKey(key), Reason: "future-epoch-dead-writer",
+				})
+				n.addFinding(report.SeverityInfo, report.ClassDiagnostic, "dead-writer-key-observed", key,
+					fmt.Sprintf("%s record for epoch %s above target (dead writer namespace; expected zero)", name.label, epoch), false)
+				return nil
+			}
+			n.counts.EpochAux.Retained++
+			return nil
+		})
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// rewardAccumulator applies the blk-rwd rules (§4.4): the target record is
+// mandatory and included in the .hmr (§8 Q5); records above the target are
+// deleted (exact-key arithmetic, ~20,982 keys on mainnet); records below
+// are preserved.
+func (n *normalizer) rewardAccumulator() error {
+	targetKey := blkRwdKey(n.a.TargetHeight)
+	var targetSeen bool
+	err := strictdb.ForEach(n.s.Raw, prefixBlkRwd, func(key, value []byte) error {
+		rest := key[len(prefixBlkRwd):]
+		if len(rest) != 8 {
+			n.counts.RewardAccum.Invalid++
+			n.fatal(report.ClassInvalidRetained, "blk-rwd-malformed-key", key,
+				fmt.Sprintf("blk-rwd key length %d, want %d", len(key), len(prefixBlkRwd)+8))
+			return nil
+		}
+		var number uint64
+		for _, b := range rest {
+			number = number<<8 | uint64(b)
+		}
+		switch {
+		case number == n.a.TargetHeight:
+			targetSeen = true
+			n.counts.RewardAccum.Retained++
+			// A zero accumulator stores an empty value; keep it present
+			// (non-nil) so the .hmr section frames it as a real record.
+			n.set.RewardAccumulator = Record{Key: append([]byte(nil), key...), Value: nonNil(value)}
+		case number > n.a.TargetHeight:
+			n.counts.RewardAccum.Removed++
+			n.epochDeletions = append(n.epochDeletions, PlannedDeletion{
+				Key: hexKey(key), Reason: "post-target",
+			})
+		default:
+			n.counts.RewardAccum.Retained++
+			n.inventory.RewardAccumPrior.Count++
+		}
+		return nil
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if !targetSeen {
+		n.counts.RewardAccum.Missing++
+		n.fatal(report.ClassMissingRequired, "blk-rwd-target-missing", targetKey,
+			fmt.Sprintf("blk-rwd-%d absent (clean-DB fallback signal)", n.a.TargetHeight))
+		n.set.RewardAccumulator = Record{Key: targetKey, Value: nil}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// pendingAndLegacy plans the unconditional deletions: pendingCL/pendingSC
+// (handoff §2.2, node-local queues) and the dead legacy LastCommits key
+// (§8 Q6; §2.2 safety — B4 writes the exact block-sig-<target> so nothing
+// ever falls back).
+func (n *normalizer) pendingAndLegacy() error {
+	for _, p := range [][]byte{prefixPendingCL, prefixPendingSC} {
+		p := p
+		err := strictdb.ForEach(n.s.Raw, p, func(key, value []byte) error {
+			n.counts.Pending.Removed++
+			n.epochDeletions = append(n.epochDeletions, PlannedDeletion{
+				Key: hexKey(key), Reason: "node-local-queue",
+			})
+			return nil
+		})
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+	has, err := n.s.Raw.Has(keyLastCommits)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("norm: probe LastCommits: %w", err)
+	}
+	if has {
+		n.counts.Pending.Removed++
+		n.epochDeletions = append(n.epochDeletions, PlannedDeletion{
+			Key: hexKey(keyLastCommits), Reason: "legacy-dead-key",
+		})
+	}
+	return nil
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/metadata/norm/harness_test.go b/internal/recovery/metadata/norm/harness_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..550b9f1306
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/metadata/norm/harness_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+package norm
+
+import (
+	"math/big"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common"
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/ethdb"
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/rlp"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/block"
+	blockfactory "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/block/factory"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/rawdb"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/state"
+	bls_cosi "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/crypto/bls"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/params"
+	staking "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/staking/types"
+	staketest "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/staking/types/test"
+)
+
+// slotKeyFor derives a deterministic non-zero serialized BLS public key
+// from a byte seed (SanityCheck requires >= 1 slot key; the bytes need not
+// be a valid curve point for RLP/round-trip vectors).
+func slotKeyFor(seed byte) bls_cosi.SerializedPublicKey {
+	var pk bls_cosi.SerializedPublicKey
+	pk[0] = seed
+	pk[1] = 0x01
+	return pk
+}
+
+// Test anchor geometry (mirrors mainnet shape at small numbers).
+const (
+	tTarget       = uint64(44)
+	tEpoch        = uint64(3)
+	tEpochFirst   = uint64(33)
+	tEpochLast    = uint64(48)
+	tSnapshotBase = uint64(31) // EpochLastBlock(2)-1
+	tBoundary     = uint64(32) // carries ss<3>
+)
+
+func testAnchor() Anchor {
+	return Anchor{
+		Network: "localnet", Shard: 0,
+		TargetHeight: tTarget, Epoch: tEpoch,
+		EpochFirst: tEpochFirst, EpochLast: tEpochLast,
+		SnapshotBase: tSnapshotBase, BoundaryHeight: tBoundary,
+		ConfigSHA256Hex: "00",
+	}
+}
+
+func addr(n byte) common.Address {
+	var a common.Address
+	a[19] = n
+	return a
+}
+
+// builder assembles a synthetic source in an in-memory DB.
+type builder struct {
+	t         *testing.T
+	mem       ethdb.Database
+	sdb       state.Database
+	st        *state.DB
+	root      common.Hash
+	ssBytes   []byte
+	listAddrs []common.Address
+	creation  map[common.Address]uint64
+}
+
+func newBuilder(t *testing.T) *builder {
+	mem := rawdb.NewMemoryDatabase()
+	sdb := state.NewDatabase(mem)
+	st, err := state.New(common.Hash{}, sdb, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return &builder{t: t, mem: mem, sdb: sdb, st: st, ssBytes: []byte("shard-state-epoch-3"), creation: map[common.Address]uint64{}}
+}
+
+// wrapper writes a validator wrapper into the target state with the given
+// creation height and delegators (index 0 is always the validator itself).
+func (b *builder) wrapper(a common.Address, creation uint64, delegators ...common.Address) *staking.ValidatorWrapper {
+	w := staketest.GetDefaultValidatorWrapperWithAddr(a, []bls_cosi.SerializedPublicKey{slotKeyFor(a[19])})
+	w.Validator.CreationHeight = new(big.Int).SetUint64(creation)
+	// index 0 self-delegation already present; append others.
+	for _, d := range delegators {
+		w.Delegations = append(w.Delegations, staking.NewDelegation(d, big.NewInt(1000)))
+	}
+	if err := b.st.UpdateValidatorWrapper(a, &w); err != nil {
+		b.t.Fatalf("update wrapper %s: %v", a.Hex(), err)
+	}
+	b.st.SetValidatorFlag(a)
+	b.st.SetBalance(a, big.NewInt(1_000_000))
+	b.creation[a] = creation
+	return &w
+}
+
+// commit finalizes the state trie and records the root.
+func (b *builder) commit() {
+	root, err := b.st.Commit(false)
+	if err != nil {
+		b.t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := b.sdb.TrieDB().Commit(root, false); err != nil {
+		b.t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	b.root = root
+}
+
+func (b *builder) put(key, value []byte) { _ = b.mem.Put(key, value) }
+
+func (b *builder) writeList(addrs []common.Address) {
+	b.listAddrs = addrs
+	raw, err := rlp.EncodeToBytes(addrs)
+	if err != nil {
+		b.t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	b.put([]byte("validator-list"), raw)
+}
+
+func (b *builder) writeRawList(raw []byte) { b.put([]byte("validator-list"), raw) }
+
+func (b *builder) writeDVL(delegator common.Address, idxs staking.DelegationIndexes) {
+	raw, err := rlp.EncodeToBytes(idxs)
+	if err != nil {
+		b.t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	b.put(dvlKey(delegator), raw)
+}
+
+func (b *builder) writeSnapshotOf(a common.Address, epoch uint64, w *staking.ValidatorWrapper) {
+	raw, err := rlp.EncodeToBytes(w)
+	if err != nil {
+		b.t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	b.put(snapshotKey(a, new(big.Int).SetUint64(epoch)), raw)
+}
+
+func (b *builder) writeSnapshotRaw(key, value []byte) { b.put(key, value) }
+
+func (b *builder) writeSS(epoch uint64, value []byte) {
+	b.put(shardStateKey(new(big.Int).SetUint64(epoch)), value)
+}
+
+func (b *builder) writeBlkRwd(number uint64, value []byte) {
+	b.put(blkRwdKey(number), value)
+}
+
+// sources builds norm.Sources over the committed state (structural-only:
+// Hist=nil). The boundary header carries b.ssBytes.
+func (b *builder) sources() Sources {
+	target, err := state.New(b.root, b.sdb, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		b.t.Fatalf("open target state: %v", err)
+	}
+	return Sources{
+		Raw:     b.mem,
+		Target:  target,
+		Hist:    nil,
+		Headers: &stubHeaders{ss: b.ssBytes},
+	}
+}
+
+// idx builds a DelegationIndex.
+func idx(validator common.Address, i, blockNum uint64) staking.DelegationIndex {
+	return staking.DelegationIndex{ValidatorAddress: validator, Index: i, BlockNum: new(big.Int).SetUint64(blockNum)}
+}
+
+// staketestWrapperValue returns a default wrapper bound to a with a
+// self-delegation at index 0 (for raw snapshot bytes in vectors).
+func staketestWrapperValue(a common.Address) staking.ValidatorWrapper {
+	w := staketest.GetDefaultValidatorWrapperWithAddr(a, []bls_cosi.SerializedPublicKey{slotKeyFor(a[19])})
+	w.Validator.CreationHeight = new(big.Int).SetUint64(tSnapshotBase)
+	return w
+}
+
+type stubHeaders struct{ ss []byte }
+
+func (s *stubHeaders) HeaderByNumber(height uint64) (*block.Header, error) {
+	h := blockfactory.NewFactory(params.LocalnetChainConfig).NewHeader(big.NewInt(int64(tEpoch)))
+	h.SetShardState(s.ss)
+	return h, nil
+}
+
+// findFinding returns the first finding with the given code.
+func findFinding(res *Result, code string) *reportFindingView {
+	for i := range res.Findings {
+		if res.Findings[i].Code == code {
+			return &reportFindingView{res.Findings[i].Severity == "fatal", string(res.Findings[i].Class)}
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+type reportFindingView struct {
+	fatal bool
+	class string
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/metadata/norm/inventory.go b/internal/recovery/metadata/norm/inventory.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7369a54f5f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/metadata/norm/inventory.go
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+package norm
+
+import (
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"fmt"
+	"hash"
+	"sort"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/report"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/strictdb"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/types"
+)
+
+// surveyInventory collects the informational, non-normative survey:
+// validator-stats (kept untouched, §8 Q4 — never in the deletion plan, the
+// .hmr, or the absence assertions), sync-era/legacy keys with value digests
+// for B4's cleanup, and the per-shard crosslink/spent freeze inputs whose
+// post-target subsets come from the audit (§4.4).
+func (n *normalizer) surveyInventory() error {
+	// validator-stats: count + informational digest.
+	statsHash := sha256.New()
+	err := strictdb.ForEach(n.s.Raw, prefixStats, func(key, value []byte) error {
+		n.inventory.Stats.Count++
+		statsHash.Write(FrameRecord(key, value))
+		return nil
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if n.inventory.Stats.Count > 0 {
+		n.inventory.Stats.FrameSHA = fmt.Sprintf("%x", statsHash.Sum(nil))
+	}
+
+	// Sync-era and legacy keys (reported only; not metadata sections).
+	syncKeys := []string{
+		"LastPivot", "TrieSync", "SnapshotDisabled", "SnapshotRoot", "SnapshotJournal",
+		"SnapshotGenerator", "SnapshotRecovery", "SnapshotSyncStatus", "SkeletonSyncStatus",
+		"SnapdbInfo", "unclean-shutdown", "InvalidBlock",
+	}
+	for _, k := range syncKeys {
+		kb := []byte(k)
+		has, err := n.s.Raw.Has(kb)
+		if err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("norm: probe %s: %w", k, err)
+		}
+		if !has {
+			continue
+		}
+		v, err := n.s.Raw.Get(kb)
+		if err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("norm: read %s: %w", k, err)
+		}
+		n.inventory.SyncEra = append(n.inventory.SyncEra, SyncEraKey{
+			Key: k, ValueSHA: report.SHA256Hex(v),
+		})
+	}
+	if has, err := n.s.Raw.Has([]byte("continuous")); err != nil {
+		return err
+	} else if has {
+		v, err := n.s.Raw.Get([]byte("continuous"))
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		n.inventory.LeaderContinuous = &SyncEraKey{Key: "continuous", ValueSHA: report.SHA256Hex(v)}
+	}
+
+	// Per-shard crosslink records + pointer + spent markers.
+	type shardAcc struct {
+		links   KeyDigestInventory
+		linkH   hash.Hash
+		pointer []byte
+		spent   KeyDigestInventory
+		spentH  hash.Hash
+	}
+	shardIDs := []uint32{}
+	accs := map[uint32]*shardAcc{}
+	acc := func(sid uint32) *shardAcc {
+		a, ok := accs[sid]
+		if !ok {
+			a = &shardAcc{linkH: sha256.New(), spentH: sha256.New()}
+			accs[sid] = a
+			shardIDs = append(shardIDs, sid)
+		}
+		return a
+	}
+
+	err = strictdb.ForEach(n.s.Raw, prefixCrossLink, func(key, value []byte) error {
+		ns, meta := strictdb.Classify(key)
+		switch ns {
+		case strictdb.NsCrossLinkPointer:
+			a := acc(meta.ShardID)
+			a.pointer = append([]byte(nil), value...)
+		case strictdb.NsCrossLink:
+			a := acc(meta.ShardID)
+			if a.links.Count == 0 || meta.Number < a.links.MinNumber {
+				a.links.MinNumber = meta.Number
+			}
+			if meta.Number > a.links.MaxNumber {
+				a.links.MaxNumber = meta.Number
+			}
+			a.links.Count++
+			a.linkH.Write(FrameRecord(key, value))
+		default:
+			// "cl"-prefixed junk of unexpected shape: report, never plan.
+			n.addFinding(report.SeverityInfo, report.ClassDiagnostic, "crosslink-unexpected-key-shape", key,
+				"key under the cl prefix has neither pointer nor record shape", false)
+		}
+		return nil
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	err = strictdb.ForEach(n.s.Raw, prefixCXSpent, func(key, value []byte) error {
+		ns, meta := strictdb.Classify(key)
+		if ns != strictdb.NsCXReceiptSpent {
+			n.addFinding(report.SeverityInfo, report.ClassDiagnostic, "cxspent-unexpected-key-shape", key,
+				"key under the cxReceiptSpent prefix has an unexpected shape", false)
+			return nil
+		}
+		a := acc(meta.ShardID)
+		if a.spent.Count == 0 || meta.Number < a.spent.MinNumber {
+			a.spent.MinNumber = meta.Number
+		}
+		if meta.Number > a.spent.MaxNumber {
+			a.spent.MaxNumber = meta.Number
+		}
+		a.spent.Count++
+		a.spentH.Write(FrameRecord(key, value))
+		return nil
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	sort.Slice(shardIDs, func(i, j int) bool { return shardIDs[i] < shardIDs[j] })
+	for _, sid := range shardIDs {
+		a := accs[sid]
+		inv := ShardInventory{ShardID: sid, CrossLinks: a.links, CXReceiptsSpent: a.spent}
+		if a.links.Count > 0 {
+			inv.CrossLinks.FrameSHA = fmt.Sprintf("%x", a.linkH.Sum(nil))
+		}
+		if a.spent.Count > 0 {
+			inv.CXReceiptsSpent.FrameSHA = fmt.Sprintf("%x", a.spentH.Sum(nil))
+		}
+		if a.pointer != nil {
+			inv.PointerPresent = true
+			inv.PointerValueSHA = report.SHA256Hex(a.pointer)
+			if cl, err := types.DeserializeCrossLink(a.pointer); err == nil {
+				inv.PointerBlockNum = cl.BlockNum()
+			}
+		}
+		n.inventory.Shards = append(n.inventory.Shards, inv)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/metadata/norm/keys.go b/internal/recovery/metadata/norm/keys.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..20e0ead7cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/metadata/norm/keys.go
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+package norm
+
+import (
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"fmt"
+	"math/big"
+
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common"
+)
+
+// Raw key builders mirroring core/rawdb/schema.go (whose builders are
+// package-private). Byte-for-byte identical shapes; pinned by unit vectors
+// against rawdb-written fixtures.
+
+var (
+	prefixValidatorList = []byte("validator-list")
+	prefixDVL           = []byte("dvl")
+	prefixSnapshot      = []byte("validator-snapshot")
+	prefixStats         = []byte("validator-stats")
+	prefixShardState    = []byte("ss")
+	prefixEpochNumber   = []byte("harmony-epoch-block-number")
+	prefixEpochVRF      = []byte("epoch-vrf-block-numbers")
+	prefixEpochVDF      = []byte("epoch-vdf-block-number")
+	prefixBlkRwd        = []byte("blk-rwd-")
+	prefixBlockSig      = []byte("block-sig-")
+	keyLastCommits      = []byte("LastCommits")
+	prefixPendingCL     = []byte("pendingCL")
+	prefixPendingSC     = []byte("pendingSC")
+	prefixCrossLink     = []byte("cl")
+	prefixCXSpent       = []byte("cxReceiptSpent")
+)
+
+func u64be(n uint64) []byte {
+	b := make([]byte, 8)
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(b, n)
+	return b
+}
+
+func u32be(n uint32) []byte {
+	b := make([]byte, 4)
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(b, n)
+	return b
+}
+
+func dvlKey(delegator common.Address) []byte {
+	return append(append([]byte(nil), prefixDVL...), delegator.Bytes()...)
+}
+
+func snapshotKey(addr common.Address, epoch *big.Int) []byte {
+	k := append(append([]byte(nil), prefixSnapshot...), addr.Bytes()...)
+	return append(k, epoch.Bytes()...)
+}
+
+func shardStateKey(epoch *big.Int) []byte {
+	return append(append([]byte(nil), prefixShardState...), epoch.Bytes()...)
+}
+
+func blkRwdKey(number uint64) []byte {
+	return append(append([]byte(nil), prefixBlkRwd...), u64be(number)...)
+}
+
+func hexKey(k []byte) string { return fmt.Sprintf("%x", k) }
+
+func sectionSnapshots(epoch uint64) string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("validator-snapshot-%d", epoch)
+}
+
+func sectionShardState(epoch uint64) string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("shard-state-%d", epoch)
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/metadata/norm/normalize.go b/internal/recovery/metadata/norm/normalize.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2776882023
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/metadata/norm/normalize.go
@@ -0,0 +1,379 @@
+package norm
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"fmt"
+	"sort"
+
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common"
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/rlp"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/report"
+	staking "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/staking/types"
+)
+
+// wrapperEntry caches one listed validator's target-root wrapper.
+type wrapperEntry struct {
+	addr    common.Address
+	code    []byte // raw stored bytes at the target root (never re-encoded)
+	wrapper *staking.ValidatorWrapper
+}
+
+// normalizer carries the working state of one Normalize run.
+type normalizer struct {
+	a Anchor
+	s Sources
+
+	findings []report.Finding
+
+	// validator list
+	normalizedList []common.Address
+	removedList    []common.Address
+	wrappers       []wrapperEntry         // normalized list order
+	wrapperByAddr  map[common.Address]int // index into wrappers
+
+	// deletion plan accumulation (ordered)
+	dvlDeletions   []PlannedDeletion
+	dvlRewrites    []PlannedRewrite
+	snapDeletions  []PlannedDeletion
+	epochDeletions []PlannedDeletion
+
+	// normalized set accumulation
+	set NormalizedSet
+
+	counts    Counts
+	coverage  SnapshotCoverage
+	inventory Inventory
+
+	// retained dvl reverse map: delegator -> validator -> index (for the
+	// reverse-completeness pass); memory bounded by total delegations.
+	retained map[common.Address]map[common.Address]uint64
+
+	// per-assertion planned-deletion counters
+	dvlEntriesRemoved uint64
+	removedDVL        []RemovedDVLEntry
+}
+
+func (n *normalizer) addFinding(sev report.Severity, class report.Class, code string, key []byte, det string, chainDet bool) {
+	f := report.Finding{
+		Severity: sev, Class: class, Code: code, Detail: det,
+		ChainDeterministic: chainDet,
+	}
+	if key != nil {
+		f.Key = hexKey(key)
+	}
+	n.findings = append(n.findings, f)
+}
+
+func (n *normalizer) fatal(class report.Class, code string, key []byte, det string) {
+	n.addFinding(report.SeverityFatal, class, code, key, det, false)
+}
+
+// Normalize runs the full §4.4 ruleset. Infrastructure failures (I/O)
+// return an error (exit 14 at the CLI); semantic outcomes are Findings.
+// When Sources.Ctx is set, cancellation interrupts the raw iterations and
+// returns an error wrapping context.Canceled (exit 130/16 at the CLI).
+func Normalize(a Anchor, s Sources) (*Result, error) {
+	s.Raw = withCtx(s.Raw, s.Ctx)
+	n := &normalizer{
+		a: a, s: s,
+		wrapperByAddr: map[common.Address]int{},
+		retained:      map[common.Address]map[common.Address]uint64{},
+	}
+	if err := n.validatorList(); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if err := n.snapshots(); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if err := n.dvl(); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	n.dvlReverseCompleteness()
+	if err := n.shardStates(); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if err := n.epochAux(); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if err := n.rewardAccumulator(); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if err := n.pendingAndLegacy(); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if err := n.surveyInventory(); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	// A latched target-state read error means the target trie is not fully
+	// available: everything derived from it is unreliable (exit 22).
+	if err := s.Target.Error(); err != nil {
+		n.fatal(report.ClassTargetStateUnavailable, "target-state-read-error", nil, err.Error())
+	}
+
+	plan := n.assemblePlan()
+	assertions := n.assembleAssertions(plan)
+	report.SortFindings(n.findings)
+	digests, err := digestSet(a, &n.set, n.wrappers, n.findings)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return &Result{
+		Normalized:           &n.set,
+		Deletions:            plan,
+		Findings:             n.findings,
+		Digests:              digests,
+		Assertions:           assertions,
+		Coverage:             n.coverage,
+		Counts:               n.counts,
+		Inventory:            n.inventory,
+		NormalizedListLength: len(n.normalizedList),
+		RemovedValidators:    n.removedList,
+		RemovedDVLEntries:    n.removedDVL,
+	}, nil
+}
+
+// validatorList implements the §4.4 validator-list rules over the raw key
+// (never the fail-open rawdb.ReadValidatorList).
+func (n *normalizer) validatorList() error {
+	has, err := n.s.Raw.Has(prefixValidatorList)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("norm: probe validator-list: %w", err)
+	}
+	if !has {
+		n.counts.ValidatorList.Missing++
+		n.fatal(report.ClassMissingRequired, "validator-list-missing", prefixValidatorList,
+			"validator-list key absent (clean-DB fallback signal, handoff §2.4)")
+		// Continue with an empty list: downstream sections still report.
+		n.set.ValidatorList = Record{Key: append([]byte(nil), prefixValidatorList...), Value: mustRLP([]common.Address{})}
+		return nil
+	}
+	raw, err := n.s.Raw.Get(prefixValidatorList)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("norm: read validator-list: %w", err)
+	}
+	var list []common.Address
+	if err := rlp.DecodeBytes(raw, &list); err != nil {
+		n.counts.ValidatorList.Invalid++
+		n.fatal(report.ClassInvalidRetained, "validator-list-undecodable", prefixValidatorList,
+			fmt.Sprintf("strict RLP decode failed: %v", err))
+		n.set.ValidatorList = Record{Key: append([]byte(nil), prefixValidatorList...), Value: mustRLP([]common.Address{})}
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	seen := map[common.Address]bool{}
+	for _, addr := range list {
+		if seen[addr] {
+			// The writer cannot produce duplicates (§2.1): keep first
+			// occurrence, ReviewItem (chain-deterministic: retained content).
+			n.counts.ValidatorList.Duplicate++
+			n.addFinding(report.SeverityReviewItem, report.ClassDiagnostic,
+				"validator-list-duplicate", prefixValidatorList,
+				fmt.Sprintf("duplicate address %s keeps first occurrence", addr.Hex()), true)
+			continue
+		}
+		seen[addr] = true
+
+		flag := n.s.Target.IsValidator(addr)
+		code := n.s.Target.GetCode(addr)
+		if !flag && len(code) == 0 {
+			// Absent from target state entirely: validators are never
+			// deleted from state, so absence proves post-target origin.
+			// The audit reconciles each removal with an observed
+			// post-target CreateValidator.
+			n.counts.ValidatorList.Removed++
+			n.removedList = append(n.removedList, addr)
+			n.addFinding(report.SeverityInfo, report.ClassDiagnostic,
+				"validator-post-target-creation", nil,
+				fmt.Sprintf("listed validator %s absent from target state (no flag, no code): removed", addr.Hex()), false)
+			continue
+		}
+		// Present in state: every wrapper check must hold.
+		entry := wrapperEntry{addr: addr, code: append([]byte(nil), code...)}
+		invalid := false
+		if !flag {
+			n.fatal(report.ClassInvalidRetained, "validator-flag-missing", nil,
+				fmt.Sprintf("listed validator %s has wrapper code but no IsValidator flag at the target root", addr.Hex()))
+			invalid = true
+		}
+		if len(code) == 0 {
+			n.fatal(report.ClassInvalidRetained, "validator-wrapper-missing", nil,
+				fmt.Sprintf("listed validator %s is flagged but has no wrapper code at the target root", addr.Hex()))
+			invalid = true
+		} else {
+			var w staking.ValidatorWrapper
+			if err := rlp.DecodeBytes(code, &w); err != nil {
+				n.fatal(report.ClassInvalidRetained, "validator-wrapper-undecodable", nil,
+					fmt.Sprintf("listed validator %s wrapper bytes do not decode: %v", addr.Hex(), err))
+				invalid = true
+			} else {
+				if w.Address != addr {
+					n.fatal(report.ClassInvalidRetained, "validator-wrapper-unbound", nil,
+						fmt.Sprintf("listed validator %s wrapper embeds address %s", addr.Hex(), w.Address.Hex()))
+					invalid = true
+				}
+				if w.CreationHeight == nil || !w.CreationHeight.IsUint64() || w.CreationHeight.Uint64() > n.a.TargetHeight {
+					n.fatal(report.ClassInvalidRetained, "validator-creation-above-target", nil,
+						fmt.Sprintf("listed validator %s CreationHeight %v exceeds target %d", addr.Hex(), w.CreationHeight, n.a.TargetHeight))
+					invalid = true
+				}
+				// SanityCheck is diagnostic only: never a removal (§4.4).
+				if err := w.SanityCheck(); err != nil {
+					n.addFinding(report.SeverityReviewItem, report.ClassDiagnostic,
+						"validator-sanity-check", nil,
+						fmt.Sprintf("wrapper %s fails SanityCheck: %v", addr.Hex(), err), true)
+				}
+				entry.wrapper = &w
+			}
+		}
+		if invalid {
+			n.counts.ValidatorList.Invalid++
+			// Fatal invalid entries stay in the normalized list output so
+			// digests reflect the (refused) content deterministically.
+		}
+		n.counts.ValidatorList.Retained++
+		n.normalizedList = append(n.normalizedList, addr)
+		n.wrappers = append(n.wrappers, entry)
+		n.wrapperByAddr[addr] = len(n.wrappers) - 1
+	}
+
+	if len(n.normalizedList) == 0 {
+		n.fatal(report.ClassMissingRequired, "validator-list-empty", prefixValidatorList,
+			"normalized validator list is empty (clean-DB fallback signal)")
+	}
+
+	normalized := mustRLP(n.normalizedList)
+	n.set.ValidatorList = Record{Key: append([]byte(nil), prefixValidatorList...), Value: normalized}
+	if !bytes.Equal(normalized, raw) {
+		n.dvlRewrites = append(n.dvlRewrites, PlannedRewrite{
+			Key:            hexKey(prefixValidatorList),
+			NewValueSHA256: report.SHA256Hex(normalized),
+			Reason:         "post-target-validators-removed",
+		})
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// nonNil returns a non-nil copy of b (an empty but present value must not
+// collapse to a nil "absent" marker in the normalized set).
+func nonNil(b []byte) []byte {
+	out := make([]byte, len(b))
+	copy(out, b)
+	return out
+}
+
+func mustRLP(v interface{}) []byte {
+	b, err := rlp.EncodeToBytes(v)
+	if err != nil {
+		panic(fmt.Sprintf("norm: rlp encode: %v", err))
+	}
+	return b
+}
+
+// assemblePlan builds the four-phase deletion plan in deterministic order.
+func (n *normalizer) assemblePlan() *DeletionPlan {
+	return &DeletionPlan{Phases: []Phase{
+		{Name: PhaseDVL, Deletions: n.dvlDeletions, Rewrites: n.dvlRewrites},
+		{Name: PhaseSnap, Deletions: n.snapDeletions},
+		{Name: PhaseEpoch, Deletions: n.epochDeletions},
+		{Name: PhaseCleanup, Placeholders: []Placeholder{
+			{Name: "shard1-crosslink-subset", Detail: "audit-input-required: post-target crosslink keys per non-beacon shard come from abandoned-branch-audit.json"},
+			{Name: "shard1-spent-subset", Detail: "audit-input-required: post-target cxReceiptSpent keys per non-beacon shard come from abandoned-branch-audit.json"},
+			{Name: "shard1-last-pointer", Detail: "audit-input-required: target-time last-crosslink pointer per non-beacon shard (invariant solver, plan §4.4)"},
+			{Name: "canonical-lookup-cleanup", Detail: "B4-owned: canonical/lookup/head cleanup above the target is computed by prepare --apply, never here"},
+		}},
+	}}
+}
+
+// AssertionSpec is the chain-invariant identity of an absence assertion
+// (namespace + predicate). The canonical ordered set is a pure function of
+// the target epoch and height, so a verifier can reconstruct exactly which
+// assertions a genuine reference manifest must carry.
+type AssertionSpec struct {
+	Namespace string
+	Predicate string
+}
+
+// CanonicalAssertionSpecs returns the fixed, ordered absence-assertion set
+// for the given target epoch and height (mirrors assembleAssertions; every
+// assertion's expected_remaining is 0 by contract, plan §4.5).
+func CanonicalAssertionSpecs(epoch, targetHeight uint64) []AssertionSpec {
+	epochPred := fmt.Sprintf("epoch>%d", epoch)
+	heightPred := fmt.Sprintf("number>%d", targetHeight)
+	return []AssertionSpec{
+		{"validator-snapshot", epochPred},
+		{"ss", epochPred},
+		{"harmony-epoch-block-number", epochPred},
+		{"epoch-vrf-block-numbers", epochPred},
+		{"epoch-vdf-block-number", epochPred},
+		{"blk-rwd", heightPred},
+		{"dvl", fmt.Sprintf("entry.BlockNum>%d", targetHeight)},
+		{"pendingCL", "present"},
+		{"pendingSC", "present"},
+		{"LastCommits", "present"},
+	}
+}
+
+// assembleAssertions builds the §4.5 absence assertions with report-only
+// planned-deletion counts.
+func (n *normalizer) assembleAssertions(plan *DeletionPlan) []AbsenceAssertion {
+	epochPred := fmt.Sprintf("epoch>%d", n.a.Epoch)
+	heightPred := fmt.Sprintf("number>%d", n.a.TargetHeight)
+	count := func(ns string, reason string) uint64 {
+		var c uint64
+		for _, ph := range plan.Phases {
+			for _, d := range ph.Deletions {
+				if d.Reason == reason && classifyAssertNS(d.Key) == ns {
+					c++
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		return c
+	}
+	return []AbsenceAssertion{
+		{Namespace: "validator-snapshot", Predicate: epochPred, PlannedDeletions: count("validator-snapshot", "future-epoch"), ExpectedRemaining: 0},
+		{Namespace: "ss", Predicate: epochPred, PlannedDeletions: count("ss", "future-epoch"), ExpectedRemaining: 0},
+		{Namespace: "harmony-epoch-block-number", Predicate: epochPred, PlannedDeletions: count("harmony-epoch-block-number", "future-epoch-dead-writer"), ExpectedRemaining: 0},
+		{Namespace: "epoch-vrf-block-numbers", Predicate: epochPred, PlannedDeletions: count("epoch-vrf-block-numbers", "future-epoch-dead-writer"), ExpectedRemaining: 0},
+		{Namespace: "epoch-vdf-block-number", Predicate: epochPred, PlannedDeletions: count("epoch-vdf-block-number", "future-epoch-dead-writer"), ExpectedRemaining: 0},
+		{Namespace: "blk-rwd", Predicate: heightPred, PlannedDeletions: count("blk-rwd", "post-target"), ExpectedRemaining: 0},
+		{Namespace: "dvl", Predicate: fmt.Sprintf("entry.BlockNum>%d", n.a.TargetHeight), PlannedDeletions: n.dvlEntriesRemoved, ExpectedRemaining: 0},
+		{Namespace: "pendingCL", Predicate: "present", PlannedDeletions: count("pendingCL", "node-local-queue"), ExpectedRemaining: 0},
+		{Namespace: "pendingSC", Predicate: "present", PlannedDeletions: count("pendingSC", "node-local-queue"), ExpectedRemaining: 0},
+		{Namespace: "LastCommits", Predicate: "present", PlannedDeletions: count("LastCommits", "legacy-dead-key"), ExpectedRemaining: 0},
+	}
+}
+
+// classifyAssertNS maps a hex key to its assertion namespace label.
+func classifyAssertNS(hexk string) string {
+	k := common.FromHex(hexk)
+	switch {
+	case bytes.HasPrefix(k, prefixSnapshot):
+		return "validator-snapshot"
+	case bytes.HasPrefix(k, prefixEpochNumber):
+		return "harmony-epoch-block-number"
+	case bytes.HasPrefix(k, prefixEpochVRF):
+		return "epoch-vrf-block-numbers"
+	case bytes.HasPrefix(k, prefixEpochVDF):
+		return "epoch-vdf-block-number"
+	case bytes.HasPrefix(k, prefixBlkRwd):
+		return "blk-rwd"
+	case bytes.Equal(k, keyLastCommits):
+		return "LastCommits"
+	case bytes.HasPrefix(k, prefixPendingCL):
+		return "pendingCL"
+	case bytes.HasPrefix(k, prefixPendingSC):
+		return "pendingSC"
+	case bytes.HasPrefix(k, prefixShardState):
+		return "ss"
+	case bytes.HasPrefix(k, prefixDVL):
+		return "dvl"
+	default:
+		return "other"
+	}
+}
+
+// sortRecords orders records by raw key (bytewise ascending).
+func sortRecords(rs []Record) {
+	sort.Slice(rs, func(i, j int) bool { return bytes.Compare(rs[i].Key, rs[j].Key) < 0 })
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/metadata/norm/normalize_test.go b/internal/recovery/metadata/norm/normalize_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a57c2cb89f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/metadata/norm/normalize_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,361 @@
+package norm
+
+import (
+	"math/big"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common"
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/rlp"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/report"
+	staking "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/staking/types"
+)
+
+// cleanBuilder assembles a passing two-validator fixture at the target.
+// v1 = addr(1) created at the snapshot base; v2 = addr(2) created at the
+// boundary (dual-snapshot edge). Both self-delegate; an external delegator
+// addr(9) delegates to v1.
+func cleanBuilder(t *testing.T) *builder {
+	b := newBuilder(t)
+	v1, v2, ext := addr(1), addr(2), addr(9)
+	w1 := b.wrapper(v1, tSnapshotBase, ext)
+	w2 := b.wrapper(v2, tBoundary)
+	b.commit()
+
+	b.writeList([]common.Address{v1, v2})
+	// dvl: v1 self (idx 0), ext -> v1 (idx 1), v2 self (idx 0).
+	b.writeDVL(v1, staking.DelegationIndexes{idx(v1, 0, tSnapshotBase)})
+	b.writeDVL(ext, staking.DelegationIndexes{idx(v1, 1, tTarget-1)})
+	b.writeDVL(v2, staking.DelegationIndexes{idx(v2, 0, tBoundary)})
+	// target-epoch snapshots.
+	b.writeSnapshotOf(v1, tEpoch, w1)
+	b.writeSnapshotOf(v2, tEpoch, w2)
+	// v2 dual-snapshot edge: also a prior-epoch (2) record, preserved.
+	b.writeSnapshotOf(v2, tEpoch-1, w2)
+	// ss<target-epoch> byte-equals the boundary header ShardState.
+	b.writeSS(tEpoch, b.ssBytes)
+	// reward accumulator at the target.
+	b.writeBlkRwd(tTarget, big.NewInt(12345).Bytes())
+	return b
+}
+
+func TestCleanFixturePasses(t *testing.T) {
+	b := cleanBuilder(t)
+	res, err := Normalize(testAnchor(), b.sources())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if res.ExitCode() != report.ExitOK {
+		t.Fatalf("clean fixture exit %d, findings: %+v", res.ExitCode(), res.Findings)
+	}
+	if res.NormalizedListLength != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("normalized list length %d, want 2", res.NormalizedListLength)
+	}
+	if len(res.Normalized.Snapshots) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("retained %d target snapshots, want 2", len(res.Normalized.Snapshots))
+	}
+	if res.Normalized.RewardAccumulator.Value == nil {
+		t.Fatal("reward accumulator must be included (§8 Q5)")
+	}
+	// Stats never appear in the plan or the normalized set.
+	for _, d := range res.Deletions.Deletions() {
+		if classifyAssertNS(d.Key) == "validator-stats" {
+			t.Fatal("stats key must never be in the deletion plan")
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDeterminismByteIdentical(t *testing.T) {
+	b := cleanBuilder(t)
+	r1, err := Normalize(testAnchor(), b.sources())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	r2, err := Normalize(testAnchor(), b.sources())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	d1, _ := report.CanonicalJSON(r1.Digests)
+	d2, _ := report.CanonicalJSON(r2.Digests)
+	if string(d1) != string(d2) {
+		t.Fatalf("digests differ across runs:\n%s\n%s", d1, d2)
+	}
+	p1, _ := report.CanonicalJSON(r1.Deletions)
+	p2, _ := report.CanonicalJSON(r2.Deletions)
+	if string(p1) != string(p2) {
+		t.Fatal("deletion plans differ across runs")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPostTargetSnapshotRemoved(t *testing.T) {
+	b := cleanBuilder(t)
+	// A future-epoch snapshot for v1 and a post-target-created validator's
+	// target-epoch snapshot (addr 7, absent from the list).
+	w1 := staking.ValidatorWrapper{}
+	_ = w1
+	b.writeSnapshotRaw(snapshotKey(addr(1), big.NewInt(int64(tEpoch+1))), mustEnc(t, staketestWrapper(addr(1))))
+	b.writeSnapshotRaw(snapshotKey(addr(7), big.NewInt(int64(tEpoch))), mustEnc(t, staketestWrapper(addr(7))))
+	res, err := Normalize(testAnchor(), b.sources())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	var future, postTarget int
+	for _, d := range res.Deletions.Deletions() {
+		if classifyAssertNS(d.Key) == "validator-snapshot" {
+			switch d.Reason {
+			case "future-epoch":
+				future++
+			case "post-target-created":
+				postTarget++
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if future != 1 || postTarget != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("snapshot deletions: future=%d post-target=%d (want 1,1)", future, postTarget)
+	}
+	// Still a clean exit — removals are not fatal.
+	if res.ExitCode() != report.ExitOK {
+		t.Fatalf("exit %d, findings %+v", res.ExitCode(), res.Findings)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDVLFilterBoundary(t *testing.T) {
+	// BlockNum == target retained; target+1 removed. Add an external
+	// delegator whose two indexes straddle the boundary — but only the
+	// retained one may point at a real wrapper slot.
+	b := newBuilder(t)
+	v1, ext := addr(1), addr(9)
+	w1 := b.wrapper(v1, tSnapshotBase, ext)
+	b.commit()
+	b.writeList([]common.Address{v1})
+	b.writeDVL(v1, staking.DelegationIndexes{idx(v1, 0, tSnapshotBase)})
+	// ext: retained index at target (valid slot 1), plus a post-target
+	// index at target+1 that must be filtered.
+	b.writeDVL(ext, staking.DelegationIndexes{
+		idx(v1, 1, tTarget),
+		idx(addr(50), 0, tTarget+1), // post-target -> filtered before validation
+	})
+	b.writeSnapshotOf(v1, tEpoch, w1)
+	b.writeSS(tEpoch, b.ssBytes)
+	b.writeBlkRwd(tTarget, big.NewInt(1).Bytes())
+
+	res, err := Normalize(testAnchor(), b.sources())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if res.ExitCode() != report.ExitOK {
+		t.Fatalf("exit %d findings %+v", res.ExitCode(), res.Findings)
+	}
+	if len(res.RemovedDVLEntries) != 1 || res.RemovedDVLEntries[0].BlockNum != tTarget+1 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected exactly one removed dvl entry at target+1, got %+v", res.RemovedDVLEntries)
+	}
+	// The retained ext record keeps only the target-block index.
+	var extRecord []byte
+	for _, r := range res.Normalized.DVL {
+		if len(r.Key) == len(dvlKey(ext)) && string(r.Key) == string(dvlKey(ext)) {
+			extRecord = r.Value
+		}
+	}
+	if extRecord == nil {
+		t.Fatal("ext dvl record missing from normalized set")
+	}
+	var kept staking.DelegationIndexes
+	if err := rlp.DecodeBytes(extRecord, &kept); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(kept) != 1 || kept[0].BlockNum.Uint64() != tTarget {
+		t.Fatalf("kept indexes = %+v, want single target-block index", kept)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestNoncanonicalSnapshotKeyFatal(t *testing.T) {
+	b := cleanBuilder(t)
+	// Leading-zero alias suffix for epoch 3 (0x03 -> 0x0003).
+	alias := append(append([]byte("validator-snapshot"), addr(1).Bytes()...), 0x00, 0x03)
+	b.writeSnapshotRaw(alias, mustEnc(t, staketestWrapper(addr(1))))
+	res, err := Normalize(testAnchor(), b.sources())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	f := findFinding(res, "noncanonical-epoch-suffix")
+	if f == nil || !f.fatal || f.class != string(report.ClassNoncanonicalKey) {
+		t.Fatalf("expected fatal NoncanonicalKey finding, got %+v", f)
+	}
+	// Canonical + alias for one logical record => also a duplicate fatal.
+	if findFinding(res, "duplicate-logical-record") == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected duplicate-logical-record finding for canonical+alias pair")
+	}
+	if res.ExitCode() != report.ExitInvalidRetained {
+		t.Fatalf("exit %d, want 21", res.ExitCode())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestMissingTargetSnapshotFallback(t *testing.T) {
+	// Rebuild without v1's target-epoch snapshot.
+	b2 := newBuilder(t)
+	v1 := addr(1)
+	w1 := b2.wrapper(v1, tSnapshotBase)
+	b2.commit()
+	b2.writeList([]common.Address{v1})
+	b2.writeDVL(v1, staking.DelegationIndexes{idx(v1, 0, tSnapshotBase)})
+	// No snapshot for v1.
+	b2.writeSS(tEpoch, b2.ssBytes)
+	b2.writeBlkRwd(tTarget, big.NewInt(1).Bytes())
+	_ = w1
+	res, err := Normalize(testAnchor(), b2.sources())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if findFinding(res, "snapshot-missing-for-listed") == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected snapshot-missing-for-listed fallback finding")
+	}
+	if res.ExitCode() != report.ExitMissingRequired {
+		t.Fatalf("exit %d, want 20", res.ExitCode())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestMissingSSFallback(t *testing.T) {
+	b := newBuilder(t)
+	v1 := addr(1)
+	w1 := b.wrapper(v1, tSnapshotBase)
+	b.commit()
+	b.writeList([]common.Address{v1})
+	b.writeDVL(v1, staking.DelegationIndexes{idx(v1, 0, tSnapshotBase)})
+	b.writeSnapshotOf(v1, tEpoch, w1)
+	// No ss<target-epoch>.
+	b.writeBlkRwd(tTarget, big.NewInt(1).Bytes())
+	res, err := Normalize(testAnchor(), b.sources())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if findFinding(res, "shard-state-missing") == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected shard-state-missing fallback")
+	}
+	if res.ExitCode() != report.ExitMissingRequired {
+		t.Fatalf("exit %d, want 20", res.ExitCode())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestMissingBlkRwdFallback(t *testing.T) {
+	b := newBuilder(t)
+	v1 := addr(1)
+	w1 := b.wrapper(v1, tSnapshotBase)
+	b.commit()
+	b.writeList([]common.Address{v1})
+	b.writeDVL(v1, staking.DelegationIndexes{idx(v1, 0, tSnapshotBase)})
+	b.writeSnapshotOf(v1, tEpoch, w1)
+	b.writeSS(tEpoch, b.ssBytes)
+	// No blk-rwd-target.
+	res, err := Normalize(testAnchor(), b.sources())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if findFinding(res, "blk-rwd-target-missing") == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected blk-rwd-target-missing fallback")
+	}
+	if res.ExitCode() != report.ExitMissingRequired {
+		t.Fatalf("exit %d, want 20", res.ExitCode())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestMissingDVLIndexFallback(t *testing.T) {
+	b := newBuilder(t)
+	v1, ext := addr(1), addr(9)
+	w1 := b.wrapper(v1, tSnapshotBase, ext) // wrapper has ext delegation...
+	b.commit()
+	b.writeList([]common.Address{v1})
+	b.writeDVL(v1, staking.DelegationIndexes{idx(v1, 0, tSnapshotBase)})
+	// ...but no reverse dvl entry for ext -> v1.
+	b.writeSnapshotOf(v1, tEpoch, w1)
+	b.writeSS(tEpoch, b.ssBytes)
+	b.writeBlkRwd(tTarget, big.NewInt(1).Bytes())
+	res, err := Normalize(testAnchor(), b.sources())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if findFinding(res, "dvl-missing-required-index") == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected dvl-missing-required-index fallback")
+	}
+	if res.ExitCode() != report.ExitMissingRequired {
+		t.Fatalf("exit %d, want 20", res.ExitCode())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestInvalidListDecodeFatal(t *testing.T) {
+	b := newBuilder(t)
+	b.commit()
+	b.writeRawList([]byte{0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef})
+	b.writeSS(tEpoch, b.ssBytes)
+	b.writeBlkRwd(tTarget, big.NewInt(1).Bytes())
+	res, err := Normalize(testAnchor(), b.sources())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if findFinding(res, "validator-list-undecodable") == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected validator-list-undecodable fatal")
+	}
+	if res.ExitCode() != report.ExitInvalidRetained {
+		t.Fatalf("exit %d, want 21", res.ExitCode())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDVLPointerMismatchFatal(t *testing.T) {
+	b := newBuilder(t)
+	v1, ext := addr(1), addr(9)
+	w1 := b.wrapper(v1, tSnapshotBase, ext)
+	b.commit()
+	b.writeList([]common.Address{v1})
+	b.writeDVL(v1, staking.DelegationIndexes{idx(v1, 0, tSnapshotBase)})
+	// ext points at slot 0, which belongs to v1 (self), not ext.
+	b.writeDVL(ext, staking.DelegationIndexes{idx(v1, 0, tTarget-1)})
+	b.writeSnapshotOf(v1, tEpoch, w1)
+	b.writeSS(tEpoch, b.ssBytes)
+	b.writeBlkRwd(tTarget, big.NewInt(1).Bytes())
+	res, err := Normalize(testAnchor(), b.sources())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if findFinding(res, "dvl-pointer-mismatch") == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected dvl-pointer-mismatch fatal")
+	}
+	if res.ExitCode() != report.ExitInvalidRetained {
+		t.Fatalf("exit %d, want 21", res.ExitCode())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestMixedExitPrecedence(t *testing.T) {
+	// MISSING_REQUIRED + INVALID_RETAINED -> 21 (corruption outranks the
+	// fallback signal).
+	b := newBuilder(t)
+	v1 := addr(1)
+	w1 := b.wrapper(v1, tSnapshotBase)
+	b.commit()
+	b.writeList([]common.Address{v1})
+	b.writeDVL(v1, staking.DelegationIndexes{idx(v1, 0, tSnapshotBase)})
+	b.writeSnapshotOf(v1, tEpoch, w1)
+	// Corrupt: noncanonical ss alias (INVALID) AND missing blk-rwd
+	// (MISSING).
+	b.writeSS(tEpoch, b.ssBytes)
+	b.writeSnapshotRaw([]byte("ss\x00\x03"), b.ssBytes) // noncanonical ss<3> alias
+	res, err := Normalize(testAnchor(), b.sources())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if res.ExitCode() != report.ExitInvalidRetained {
+		t.Fatalf("mixed exit %d, want 21", res.ExitCode())
+	}
+}
+
+func mustEnc(t *testing.T, v interface{}) []byte {
+	t.Helper()
+	b, err := rlp.EncodeToBytes(v)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return b
+}
+
+func staketestWrapper(a common.Address) *staking.ValidatorWrapper {
+	w := staketestWrapperValue(a)
+	return &w
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/metadata/norm/snapshots.go b/internal/recovery/metadata/norm/snapshots.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..87608cd1cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/metadata/norm/snapshots.go
@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
+package norm
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"fmt"
+	"math/big"
+
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common"
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/rlp"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/report"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/strictdb"
+	staking "github.com/harmony-one/harmony/staking/types"
+)
+
+// checkCanonicalEpochSuffix enforces the canonical-suffix rule shared by
+// every epoch-suffixed namespace (§4.4): the raw suffix must byte-equal
+// epoch.Bytes(). It returns the parsed epoch; a noncanonical alias emits a
+// Fatal NoncanonicalKey and, if the canonical twin also exists, a Fatal
+// duplicate. A failed canonical-twin probe is a genuine I/O error and
+// propagates (exit 14 at the CLI) — it is never converted into "no twin".
+func (n *normalizer) checkCanonicalEpochSuffix(key, suffix []byte, canonicalKey func(*big.Int) []byte, dupCount *uint64) (*big.Int, bool, error) {
+	epoch := new(big.Int).SetBytes(suffix)
+	if bytes.Equal(suffix, epoch.Bytes()) {
+		return epoch, true, nil
+	}
+	n.fatal(report.ClassNoncanonicalKey, "noncanonical-epoch-suffix", key,
+		fmt.Sprintf("epoch suffix %x is not the canonical big.Int encoding of %s (production only emits canonical keys)", suffix, epoch))
+	canon := canonicalKey(epoch)
+	has, err := n.s.Raw.Has(canon)
+	if err != nil {
+		return epoch, false, fmt.Errorf("norm: probe canonical twin %x: %w", canon, err)
+	}
+	if has {
+		if dupCount != nil {
+			*dupCount++
+		}
+		n.fatal(report.ClassInvalidRetained, "duplicate-logical-record", key,
+			fmt.Sprintf("alias key and canonical key %x both present for epoch %s", canon, epoch))
+	}
+	return epoch, false, nil
+}
+
+// snapshots implements the §4.4 validator-snapshot rules.
+func (n *normalizer) snapshots() error {
+	targetEpoch := epochBig(n.a.Epoch)
+	seenTarget := map[common.Address]bool{}
+
+	err := strictdb.ForEach(n.s.Raw, prefixSnapshot, func(key, value []byte) error {
+		rest := key[len(prefixSnapshot):]
+		if len(rest) < 20 {
+			n.counts.Snapshots.Invalid++
+			n.fatal(report.ClassInvalidRetained, "snapshot-malformed-key", key,
+				fmt.Sprintf("key too short for address component (len %d)", len(key)))
+			return nil
+		}
+		addr := common.BytesToAddress(rest[:20])
+		suffix := rest[20:]
+		epoch, canonical, err := n.checkCanonicalEpochSuffix(key, suffix, func(e *big.Int) []byte {
+			return snapshotKey(addr, e)
+		}, &n.counts.Snapshots.Duplicate)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if !canonical {
+			n.counts.Snapshots.Invalid++
+			return nil
+		}
+
+		switch {
+		case epoch.Uint64() > n.a.Epoch || !epoch.IsUint64():
+			// Includes the abandoned next-epoch batch.
+			n.counts.Snapshots.Removed++
+			n.snapDeletions = append(n.snapDeletions, PlannedDeletion{
+				Key: hexKey(key), Reason: "future-epoch",
+			})
+		case epoch.Uint64() == n.a.Epoch:
+			idx, listed := n.wrapperByAddr[addr]
+			if !listed {
+				// Not in the normalized list: post-target-created
+				// (audit-reconciled) — covers both removed list entries and
+				// unknown addresses.
+				n.counts.Snapshots.Removed++
+				n.snapDeletions = append(n.snapDeletions, PlannedDeletion{
+					Key: hexKey(key), Reason: "post-target-created",
+				})
+				return nil
+			}
+			if seenTarget[addr] {
+				// Raw-key uniqueness makes this unreachable for canonical
+				// keys; defensive.
+				n.counts.Snapshots.Duplicate++
+				n.fatal(report.ClassInvalidRetained, "snapshot-duplicate", key,
+					fmt.Sprintf("second target-epoch snapshot for %s", addr.Hex()))
+				return nil
+			}
+			seenTarget[addr] = true
+			if !n.validateRetainedSnapshot(key, value, addr, &n.wrappers[idx]) {
+				n.counts.Snapshots.Invalid++
+				return nil
+			}
+			n.counts.Snapshots.Retained++
+			n.set.Snapshots = append(n.set.Snapshots, Record{
+				Key: append([]byte(nil), key...), Value: append([]byte(nil), value...),
+			})
+		default: // epoch < target: preserved untouched; diagnostics only.
+			n.inventory.SnapshotsPriorEpoch.Count++
+			var w staking.ValidatorWrapper
+			if err := rlp.DecodeBytes(value, &w); err != nil {
+				n.addFinding(report.SeverityReviewItem, report.ClassDiagnostic,
+					"prior-epoch-snapshot-undecodable", key,
+					fmt.Sprintf("epoch %s snapshot does not decode: %v (preserved untouched)", epoch, err), true)
+			}
+		}
+		return nil
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	// Every listed validator must have exactly one target-epoch snapshot;
+	// canonical-suffix enforcement + raw-key uniqueness give "at most one",
+	// §2.1 write points give "at least one".
+	for _, addr := range n.normalizedList {
+		if !seenTarget[addr] {
+			n.counts.Snapshots.Missing++
+			n.fatal(report.ClassMissingRequired, "snapshot-missing-for-listed", snapshotKey(addr, targetEpoch),
+				fmt.Sprintf("listed validator %s has no epoch-%d snapshot (clean-DB fallback signal)", addr.Hex(), n.a.Epoch))
+		}
+	}
+	sortRecords(n.set.Snapshots)
+	return nil
+}
+
+// validateRetainedSnapshot runs the strict decode + embedded-address check
+// and the best-effort content verification (§4.4, one behavior — §8 Q9).
+func (n *normalizer) validateRetainedSnapshot(key, value []byte, addr common.Address, entry *wrapperEntry) bool {
+	var w staking.ValidatorWrapper
+	if err := rlp.DecodeBytes(value, &w); err != nil {
+		n.fatal(report.ClassInvalidRetained, "snapshot-undecodable", key,
+			fmt.Sprintf("retained snapshot for %s does not strict-decode: %v", addr.Hex(), err))
+		return false
+	}
+	if w.Address != addr {
+		n.fatal(report.ClassInvalidRetained, "snapshot-address-mismatch", key,
+			fmt.Sprintf("retained snapshot embeds address %s, key says %s", w.Address.Hex(), addr.Hex()))
+		return false
+	}
+
+	// Best-effort reconstruction: H = max(snapshotBase, CreationHeight)
+	// (§2.1 write points). Where the root does not resolve, structural
+	// checks stand alone (structural-only cannot detect corruption that
+	// stays well-formed RLP with the right embedded address).
+	if n.s.Hist == nil || entry.wrapper == nil || entry.wrapper.CreationHeight == nil || !entry.wrapper.CreationHeight.IsUint64() {
+		n.coverage.StructuralOnly++
+		return true
+	}
+	h := n.a.SnapshotBase
+	if ch := entry.wrapper.CreationHeight.Uint64(); ch > h {
+		h = ch
+	}
+	hist, err := n.s.Hist.StateAt(h)
+	if err != nil || hist == nil {
+		n.coverage.StructuralOnly++
+		return true
+	}
+	expected := hist.GetCode(addr)
+	if herr := hist.Error(); herr != nil {
+		// Partial historical trie: unresolvable, not a mismatch.
+		n.coverage.StructuralOnly++
+		return true
+	}
+	if len(expected) == 0 {
+		n.fatal(report.ClassInvalidRetained, "snapshot-account-absent-at-write-height", key,
+			fmt.Sprintf("historical state at %d resolves but holds no wrapper for %s", h, addr.Hex()))
+		return false
+	}
+	if !bytes.Equal(expected, value) {
+		n.fatal(report.ClassInvalidRetained, "snapshot-content-mismatch", key,
+			fmt.Sprintf("retained snapshot bytes differ from the wrapper at height %d (creation %s)", h, entry.wrapper.CreationHeight))
+		return false
+	}
+	n.coverage.ReconstructedVerified++
+	return true
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/metadata/norm/types.go b/internal/recovery/metadata/norm/types.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..75bf598e5f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/metadata/norm/types.go
@@ -0,0 +1,313 @@
+// Package norm is THE shared, deterministic validator-metadata
+// normalization library (plan §4.3/§4.4): one implementation consumed by
+// `metadata scan`, `metadata export-reference`, `metadata audit-branch`
+// (mask construction) and — as the documented interface — B4 apply and
+// verify. Divergent implementations are the failure mode handoff §6 bans.
+//
+// Behavior is fixed by the anchor plus RulesetVersion (no policy knobs, §8
+// Q4/Q5: validator-stats kept untouched, the target reward accumulator
+// included). Determinism rules: iteration strictly in ascending raw-key
+// order, no Go map iteration reaches any output, no wall-clock content in
+// digested material, and Normalize performs zero writes (it only receives
+// read interfaces; tests additionally run it over a write-refusing
+// wrapper).
+package norm
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"math/big"
+
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common"
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/ethdb"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/block"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/state"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/report"
+)
+
+// RulesetVersion is embedded in the reference manifest so B4 can refuse on
+// rule drift (plan §4.3).
+const RulesetVersion = "hmr-norm-v1"
+
+// Anchor is the resolved, cross-checked anchor tuple the rules run under.
+type Anchor struct {
+	Network            string
+	Shard              uint32
+	TargetHeight       uint64
+	TargetHash         common.Hash
+	TargetRoot         common.Hash
+	Epoch              uint64 // 3002 on mainnet
+	EpochFirst         uint64
+	EpochLast          uint64
+	SnapshotBase       uint64 // EpochLastBlock(epoch-1) - 1 = 92,700,670
+	BoundaryHeight     uint64 // EpochLastBlock(epoch-1)     = 92,700,671 (carries ss<epoch>)
+	AbandonedChildHash common.Hash
+	AuditEndHeight     uint64
+	ConfigSHA256Hex    string
+}
+
+// RawKV is the strict read-only surface Normalize consumes: exact-key gets
+// plus ordered iteration. It is intentionally write-free.
+type RawKV interface {
+	ethdb.KeyValueReader
+	ethdb.Iteratee
+}
+
+// HistoricalStateOpener resolves best-effort historical state at a
+// pre-target height for snapshot content reconstruction (plan §4.4). A nil
+// state with a nil error means "root unavailable" (structural-only).
+type HistoricalStateOpener interface {
+	StateAt(height uint64) (*state.DB, error)
+}
+
+// HeaderReader reads a canonical pre-target header (the boundary header
+// whose ShardState field the ss<epoch> record must byte-equal).
+type HeaderReader interface {
+	HeaderByNumber(height uint64) (*block.Header, error)
+}
+
+// Sources bundles the inputs (plan §4.3).
+type Sources struct {
+	Raw     RawKV
+	Target  *state.DB
+	Hist    HistoricalStateOpener // may be nil: pure structural-only mode
+	Headers HeaderReader
+
+	// Ctx, when non-nil, makes every long raw iteration observe
+	// cancellation (the mainnet blk-rwd walk alone visits ~92.7M keys —
+	// SIGINT must not be ignored for hours). Cancellation surfaces as an
+	// error wrapping context.Canceled; callers map it to exit 130/16.
+	Ctx context.Context
+}
+
+// Record is one raw key/value pair of the normalized set.
+type Record struct {
+	Key   []byte
+	Value []byte
+}
+
+// NormalizedSet is the logical .hmr content (plan §4.5 sections). Stats
+// are never included; target wrapper/state blobs are never included.
+type NormalizedSet struct {
+	ValidatorList     Record   // 1 record: RLP of the normalized ordered list
+	DVL               []Record // every corrected non-empty record, key order
+	Snapshots         []Record // retained target-epoch snapshots, original validated bytes, key order
+	ShardState        Record   // ss<epoch>, exact bytes
+	RewardAccumulator Record   // blk-rwd-<target> (§8 Q5)
+}
+
+// SectionNames returns the .hmr section names in canonical order for the
+// given target epoch (on mainnet: validator-snapshot-3002 etc., plan §4.5).
+func SectionNames(epoch uint64) []string {
+	return []string{
+		"validator-list",
+		"dvl",
+		sectionSnapshots(epoch),
+		sectionShardState(epoch),
+		"reward-accumulator",
+	}
+}
+
+// DeletionPlan phase names — exactly B4's journal phases (handoff B4; no
+// stats phase, §8 Q4).
+const (
+	PhaseDVL     = "DVL_SANITIZING"
+	PhaseSnap    = "SNAPSHOT_SANITIZING"
+	PhaseEpoch   = "EPOCH_SANITIZING"
+	PhaseCleanup = "LOOKUP_AND_CANONICAL_CLEANUP"
+)
+
+// PlannedDeletion is one raw key to delete with its reason code.
+type PlannedDeletion struct {
+	Key    string `json:"key"` // hex
+	Reason string `json:"reason"`
+}
+
+// PlannedRewrite is one raw key whose value is replaced; only the hash of
+// the new value is carried (apply re-derives, the plan authenticates).
+type PlannedRewrite struct {
+	Key            string `json:"key"` // hex
+	NewValueSHA256 string `json:"new_value_sha256"`
+	Reason         string `json:"reason"`
+}
+
+// Placeholder marks audit-input-required cleanup (shard-1 subsets and the
+// derived pointer) and B4-owned canonical cleanup — never computed here.
+type Placeholder struct {
+	Name   string `json:"name"`
+	Detail string `json:"detail"`
+}
+
+// Phase groups the plan by B4 journal phase.
+type Phase struct {
+	Name         string            `json:"name"`
+	Deletions    []PlannedDeletion `json:"deletions,omitempty"`
+	Rewrites     []PlannedRewrite  `json:"rewrites,omitempty"`
+	Placeholders []Placeholder     `json:"placeholders,omitempty"`
+}
+
+// DeletionPlan is the per-phase raw-key mutation plan. The validator-list
+// rewrite is carried in DVL_SANITIZING (the validator/delegator metadata
+// correction family); B4 physically applies the corrected list in its
+// final synchronous batch per handoff B4 — the plan is the logical
+// artifact, the journal owns physical sequencing.
+type DeletionPlan struct {
+	Phases []Phase `json:"phases"`
+}
+
+// Deletions flattens all planned deletions in phase order.
+func (p *DeletionPlan) Deletions() []PlannedDeletion {
+	var out []PlannedDeletion
+	for _, ph := range p.Phases {
+		out = append(out, ph.Deletions...)
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
+// Rewrites flattens all planned rewrites in phase order.
+func (p *DeletionPlan) Rewrites() []PlannedRewrite {
+	var out []PlannedRewrite
+	for _, ph := range p.Phases {
+		out = append(out, ph.Rewrites...)
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
+// AbsenceAssertion is the post-apply end-state contract (plan §4.5):
+// PlannedDeletions is report-only evidence (source-specific); the
+// reference manifest embeds only namespace + predicate +
+// expected_remaining.
+type AbsenceAssertion struct {
+	Namespace         string `json:"namespace"`
+	Predicate         string `json:"predicate"`
+	PlannedDeletions  uint64 `json:"planned_deletions"` // stripped from the reference
+	ExpectedRemaining uint64 `json:"expected_remaining"`
+}
+
+// SectionCounts are per-section record counters.
+type SectionCounts struct {
+	Retained  uint64 `json:"retained"`
+	Removed   uint64 `json:"removed"`
+	Invalid   uint64 `json:"invalid"`
+	Missing   uint64 `json:"missing"`
+	Duplicate uint64 `json:"duplicate"`
+}
+
+// Counts is the fixed-shape per-section counter block (no map iteration).
+type Counts struct {
+	ValidatorList SectionCounts `json:"validator_list"`
+	DVL           SectionCounts `json:"dvl"`
+	Snapshots     SectionCounts `json:"validator_snapshot_target_epoch"`
+	ShardState    SectionCounts `json:"shard_state"`
+	EpochAux      SectionCounts `json:"epoch_aux"`
+	RewardAccum   SectionCounts `json:"reward_accumulator"`
+	Pending       SectionCounts `json:"pending_queues"`
+}
+
+// SnapshotCoverage reports reconstructed-vs-structural verification (plan
+// §4.4): structural-only cannot detect corruption that stays well-formed
+// RLP with the right embedded address.
+type SnapshotCoverage struct {
+	ReconstructedVerified uint64 `json:"reconstructed_verified"`
+	StructuralOnly        uint64 `json:"structural_only"`
+}
+
+// DigestSet holds the pre-registered digests (plan §4.5). Package digest
+// is added at export time (it hashes the .hmr file bytes).
+type DigestSet struct {
+	Sections    []SectionDigest `json:"sections"` // canonical section order
+	WrapperSet  string          `json:"wrapper_set"`
+	Diagnostics string          `json:"diagnostics"`
+}
+
+// SectionDigest is one named section digest with its record count.
+type SectionDigest struct {
+	Name        string `json:"name"`
+	RecordCount uint64 `json:"record_count"`
+	SHA256      string `json:"sha256"`
+}
+
+// KeyDigestInventory is a bounded inventory row: count + digest over the
+// record frames of a namespace subset.
+type KeyDigestInventory struct {
+	Count     uint64 `json:"count"`
+	FrameSHA  string `json:"frame_sha256,omitempty"`
+	MinNumber uint64 `json:"min_number,omitempty"`
+	MaxNumber uint64 `json:"max_number,omitempty"`
+}
+
+// ShardInventory is the per-shard crosslink/spent freeze input (plan §4.4:
+// the post-target subsets to delete come from the audit).
+type ShardInventory struct {
+	ShardID          uint32             `json:"shard_id"`
+	CrossLinks       KeyDigestInventory `json:"crosslinks"`
+	PointerPresent   bool               `json:"pointer_present"`
+	PointerValueSHA  string             `json:"pointer_value_sha256,omitempty"`
+	PointerBlockNum  uint64             `json:"pointer_block_num,omitempty"`
+	CXReceiptsSpent  KeyDigestInventory `json:"cx_receipts_spent"`
+}
+
+// SyncEraKey is one observed sync-era/legacy key with its value digest
+// (reported for B4's cleanup; never in the .hmr or the deletion plan).
+type SyncEraKey struct {
+	Key      string `json:"key"`
+	ValueSHA string `json:"value_sha256"`
+}
+
+// Inventory is the informational (non-normative) survey.
+type Inventory struct {
+	Stats               KeyDigestInventory `json:"validator_stats"` // kept untouched (§8 Q4)
+	SnapshotsPriorEpoch KeyDigestInventory `json:"snapshots_prior_epochs"`
+	ShardStatesPrior    KeyDigestInventory `json:"shard_states_prior_epochs"`
+	RewardAccumPrior    KeyDigestInventory `json:"reward_accum_prior"`
+	SyncEra             []SyncEraKey       `json:"sync_era_keys"`
+	LeaderContinuous    *SyncEraKey        `json:"leader_continuous,omitempty"`
+	Shards              []ShardInventory   `json:"shards"`
+	DVLReverseMapBytes  uint64             `json:"dvl_reverse_map_bytes"` // memory-footprint report (plan §4.4)
+}
+
+// RemovedDVLEntry is one filtered-out (post-target) delegation index tuple;
+// the audit binds these bidirectionally to metadata-producing delegations
+// (plan §4.6 output 5).
+type RemovedDVLEntry struct {
+	Delegator common.Address `json:"delegator"`
+	Validator common.Address `json:"validator"`
+	Index     uint64         `json:"index"`
+	BlockNum  uint64         `json:"block_num"`
+}
+
+// Result is the full normalization output (plan §4.3).
+type Result struct {
+	Normalized *NormalizedSet
+	Deletions  *DeletionPlan
+	Findings   []report.Finding
+	Digests    DigestSet
+	Assertions []AbsenceAssertion
+	Coverage   SnapshotCoverage
+	Counts     Counts
+	Inventory  Inventory
+	// NormalizedListLength is printed prominently by scan for the manual,
+	// informational preflight comparison (§8 Q2 — no receipt coupling).
+	NormalizedListLength int
+
+	// Audit inputs (plan §4.6 output 5): the removed entities the branch
+	// re-execution must account for bidirectionally.
+	RemovedValidators []common.Address
+	RemovedDVLEntries []RemovedDVLEntry
+}
+
+// ExitCode resolves the §4.5 exit implied by the findings.
+func (r *Result) ExitCode() int { return report.ExitForFindings(r.Findings) }
+
+// HasFatalOrMissing reports whether export must refuse (plan WS5: any
+// Fatal or MissingRequired finding refuses export; ReviewItems allowed).
+func (r *Result) HasFatalOrMissing() bool {
+	for _, f := range r.Findings {
+		if f.Severity == report.SeverityFatal {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+func epochBig(e uint64) *big.Int { return new(big.Int).SetUint64(e) }
diff --git a/internal/recovery/metadata/refexport/export.go b/internal/recovery/metadata/refexport/export.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..48f14fba87
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/metadata/refexport/export.go
@@ -0,0 +1,580 @@
+// Package refexport implements `harmony-recovery metadata export-reference`
+// (plan WS5): the run-once reference producer. Any Fatal (incl.
+// MissingRequired) finding refuses export; the built-in double-run
+// determinism self-check (§4.5, replacing two-donor convergence per §8 Q1)
+// derives everything twice over fresh handles and byte-compares both .hmr
+// serializations and both reference manifests before writing anything. On
+// mismatch: exit 23, no release artifacts, only determinism-diff dumps and
+// the export report.
+package refexport
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/anchor"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/dbopen"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/integrity"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/hmr"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/norm"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/scan"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/source"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/report"
+)
+
+// Schema identifies the export report document.
+const Schema = "metadata-export-report-v1"
+
+// Tool is the report tool identifier.
+const Tool = "harmony-recovery metadata export-reference"
+
+// Options configures an export run.
+type Options struct {
+	DBPath     string
+	AnchorPath string
+	OutDir     string
+	Handles    int
+	CacheMB    int
+
+	// SkipSelfCheckForTest disables the double-run self-check. It exists
+	// only so tests can time nondeterminism faults; the CLI never sets it
+	// (the self-check cannot be skipped in a release build, plan WS5).
+	SkipSelfCheckForTest bool
+}
+
+// Report is the internal export report (run evidence: coverage, per-phase
+// deletion counts, timings, created_at — never digested into the
+// reference). On a fully clean run the finalized success report is
+// published atomically INSIDE release/ together with the artifacts; on a
+// failed or refused attempt a failure report is written to the out-dir
+// root instead.
+type Report struct {
+	Tool   string `json:"tool"`
+	Schema string `json:"schema"`
+
+	Network string `json:"network"`
+	Shard   uint32 `json:"shard"`
+	DBPath  string `json:"db_path"`
+
+	AnchorConfigSHA string          `json:"anchor_config_sha256"`
+	Anchor          hmr.AnchorTuple `json:"anchor"`
+
+	NormalizedValidatorListLength int `json:"normalized_validator_list_length"`
+
+	Counts     norm.Counts             `json:"counts"`
+	Coverage   norm.SnapshotCoverage   `json:"snapshot_coverage"`
+	Findings   scan.FindingsSection    `json:"findings"`
+	Plan       scan.PlanSection        `json:"deletion_plan"`
+	Digests    norm.DigestSet          `json:"digests"`
+	Assertions []norm.AbsenceAssertion `json:"absence_assertions"` // carry planned_deletions (run evidence)
+
+	Refused      bool   `json:"refused"`
+	RefuseReason string `json:"refuse_reason,omitempty"`
+
+	Determinism struct {
+		Ran            bool   `json:"ran"`
+		Passed         bool   `json:"passed"`
+		FirstDiff      string `json:"first_diff,omitempty"`
+		DiffDumpPrefix string `json:"diff_dump_prefix,omitempty"`
+	} `json:"determinism_self_check"`
+
+	Artifacts struct {
+		// ReleaseDir is the directory (relative to --out-dir) the release
+		// set was atomically published into; set only on a fully clean run.
+		ReleaseDir    string `json:"release_dir,omitempty"`
+		HMRFile       string `json:"hmr_file,omitempty"`
+		HMRSHA256     string `json:"hmr_sha256,omitempty"`
+		ManifestFile  string `json:"manifest_file,omitempty"`
+		ManifestSHA   string `json:"manifest_sha256,omitempty"` // THE reference digest
+		ChecksumsFile string `json:"checksums_file,omitempty"`
+	} `json:"artifacts"`
+
+	FingerprintBefore *dbopen.Fingerprint `json:"db_fingerprint_before"`
+	FingerprintAfter  *dbopen.Fingerprint `json:"db_fingerprint_after"`
+	ZeroWriteProof    bool                `json:"zero_write_proof"`
+	WriteAttempts     int                 `json:"write_attempts"`
+
+	CreatedAt string  `json:"created_at"`
+	DurationS float64 `json:"duration_s"`
+
+	Verdict  string `json:"verdict"`
+	ExitCode int    `json:"exit_code"`
+}
+
+type derivation struct {
+	res      *norm.Result
+	hmrBytes []byte
+	manifest []byte
+}
+
+// TestMutatePassB is a test-only hook that perturbs the second derivation's
+// serialized bytes so tests can exercise the determinism self-check. It is
+// nil in every non-test build; the self-check itself cannot be skipped in a
+// release build (there is no CLI flag for it).
+var TestMutatePassB func(hmrBytes, manifest []byte) ([]byte, []byte)
+
+// TestVerifyFault, when non-nil, is consulted for each staged artifact
+// during pre-publication verification; a non-nil return simulates a
+// verification failure so tests can prove a set that cannot be verified is
+// never published under the release name. Never set in a release build.
+var TestVerifyFault func(name string) error
+
+// TestPromoteFault, when non-nil, is consulted before the single atomic
+// directory rename that publishes the release; a non-nil return simulates
+// the rename failing so tests can prove nothing ever appears under the
+// release name. Never set in a release build.
+var TestPromoteFault func(releaseDir string) error
+
+// TestCleanupFault, when non-nil, is consulted before the best-effort
+// removal of the staging directory; a non-nil return simulates that removal
+// failing so tests can prove a failed cleanup changes neither the exit code
+// nor what is visible under the release name (staging is not
+// consumer-facing). Never set in a release build.
+var TestCleanupFault func(staging string) error
+
+// TestReportFault, when non-nil, is consulted before writing a report
+// document at path (both the staged success report and the root failure
+// report); a non-nil return simulates the write failing so tests can prove
+// a report failure never publishes a release and never leaves a
+// success-shaped report visible. Never set in a release build.
+var TestReportFault func(path string) error
+
+// Run executes export-reference. Artifact names follow the release list:
+// metadata-<target>.hmr, metadata-<target>.reference.json.
+func Run(ctx context.Context, opts Options, stderr io.Writer) int {
+	started := time.Now()
+	usage := func(format string, args ...interface{}) int {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "invalid invocation: "+format+"\n", args...)
+		return report.ExitBadInvocation
+	}
+	if opts.DBPath == "" || opts.AnchorPath == "" || opts.OutDir == "" {
+		return usage("--db, --anchor and --out-dir are required")
+	}
+	res, err := anchor.Resolve(opts.AnchorPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		return usage("%v", err)
+	}
+	if err := dbopen.ValidateOutputPath(opts.OutDir, opts.DBPath); err != nil {
+		return usage("%v", err)
+	}
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(opts.OutDir, 0o755); err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "error: create out dir: %v\n", err)
+		return report.ExitIO
+	}
+	// Run-once producer: refuse an out-dir already holding a release
+	// directory (a previous run's output must never be mistaken for this
+	// run's; the operator picks a fresh directory). Anything already
+	// sitting at the release path — including a stat error that is not
+	// IsNotExist — refuses the run: publication is a single rename onto
+	// this name and must never race a pre-existing entry.
+	if _, serr := os.Lstat(filepath.Join(opts.OutDir, releaseDirName)); serr == nil {
+		return usage("out-dir already contains %s/ from a previous run; export-reference is a run-once producer — use a fresh --out-dir", releaseDirName)
+	} else if !os.IsNotExist(serr) {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "error: probe %s: %v\n", filepath.Join(opts.OutDir, releaseDirName), serr)
+		return report.ExitIO
+	}
+
+	fpBefore, err := dbopen.FingerprintDir(opts.DBPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "error: fingerprint source: %v\n", err)
+		return report.ExitIO
+	}
+
+	open, err := source.OpenSource(opts.DBPath, res, dbopen.Options{Handles: opts.Handles, BlockCacheMB: opts.CacheMB})
+	if err != nil {
+		code := dbopen.ClassifyExit(err)
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "error: open source: %v\n", err)
+		return code
+	}
+	defer open.Close()
+
+	rep := &Report{
+		Tool:            Tool,
+		Schema:          Schema,
+		Network:         res.Config.Network,
+		Shard:           res.Config.Shard,
+		DBPath:          open.DB.Path(),
+		AnchorConfigSHA: res.ConfigSHAHex(),
+		CreatedAt:       started.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
+	}
+	rep.Anchor = hmr.AnchorTuple{
+		TargetHeight:       open.NormA.TargetHeight,
+		TargetHash:         open.NormA.TargetHash.Hex(),
+		TargetRoot:         open.NormA.TargetRoot.Hex(),
+		Epoch:              open.NormA.Epoch,
+		EpochFirstBlock:    open.NormA.EpochFirst,
+		EpochLastBlock:     open.NormA.EpochLast,
+		SnapshotBaseHeight: open.NormA.SnapshotBase,
+		AbandonedChildHash: open.NormA.AbandonedChildHash.Hex(),
+	}
+
+	staging := filepath.Join(opts.OutDir, stagingDirName)
+	code := runExport(ctx, opts, res, open, rep, staging, stderr)
+
+	// Source-immutability gate (fingerprint compared before/after,
+	// device/inode included): any read failure or mismatch is exit 14 and
+	// refuses the staged artifacts.
+	rep.FingerprintBefore = fpBefore
+	if fpAfter, ferr := dbopen.FingerprintDir(opts.DBPath); ferr != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "error: fingerprint source after run: %v\n", ferr)
+		code = report.ResolveExit(code, report.ExitIO)
+	} else {
+		rep.FingerprintAfter = fpAfter
+		rep.ZeroWriteProof = fpBefore.Equal(fpAfter) && open.DB.WriteAttempts() == 0
+	}
+	rep.WriteAttempts = open.DB.WriteAttempts()
+	if rep.WriteAttempts > 0 {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "internal invariant violated: %d write attempts were made (and refused)\n", rep.WriteAttempts)
+		code = report.ResolveExit(code, report.ExitIO)
+	}
+	if rep.FingerprintAfter != nil && !rep.ZeroWriteProof {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "error: source fingerprint changed during the export (zero-write proof failed); artifacts refused\n")
+		code = report.ResolveExit(code, report.ExitIO)
+	}
+	if ctx.Err() != nil {
+		code = report.ResolveExit(code, report.InterruptExit(ctx))
+	}
+
+	// Publication protocol (one atomic unit): on a fully clean run the
+	// finalized SUCCESS report is staged NEXT TO the release artifacts and
+	// the whole set — artifacts, checksums AND report — becomes visible
+	// through the single atomic directory rename to release/. There is no
+	// window in which release/ exists without its success report, or in
+	// which a success-shaped report is consumer-visible without release/:
+	// before the rename nothing consumer-visible exists (a crash there
+	// strands only the non-consumer .staging directory); after it the
+	// complete unit exists. On ANY failed or refused attempt — including a
+	// failed publication — a separate FAILURE report is written to the
+	// out-dir root instead; a success-shaped report only ever exists
+	// inside release/.
+	publishable := code == report.ExitOK && rep.Artifacts.HMRFile != ""
+	finalize := func() {
+		rep.DurationS = time.Since(started).Seconds()
+		rep.ExitCode = code
+		rep.Verdict = scan.Verdict(code)
+	}
+	if publishable {
+		rep.Artifacts.ChecksumsFile = checksumsName
+		rep.Artifacts.ReleaseDir = releaseDirName
+		finalize()
+		if err := writeReport(filepath.Join(staging, reportName), rep); err != nil {
+			fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "error: stage export report: %v; nothing was published under %s/\n",
+				err, filepath.Join(opts.OutDir, releaseDirName))
+			code = report.ResolveExit(code, report.ExitIO)
+		} else {
+			names := []string{rep.Artifacts.HMRFile, rep.Artifacts.ManifestFile, checksumsName, reportName}
+			if pcode := publishRelease(staging, opts.OutDir, names, stderr); pcode != report.ExitOK {
+				code = report.ResolveExit(code, pcode)
+			} else {
+				releaseDir := filepath.Join(opts.OutDir, releaseDirName)
+				fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "wrote %s (package sha %s)\n", filepath.Join(releaseDir, rep.Artifacts.HMRFile), rep.Artifacts.HMRSHA256)
+				fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "wrote %s (reference digest %s)\n", filepath.Join(releaseDir, rep.Artifacts.ManifestFile), rep.Artifacts.ManifestSHA)
+				fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "export report published to %s\n", filepath.Join(releaseDir, reportName))
+				// The staging directory was renamed away; nothing to clean.
+				return code
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	// Failed or refused attempt: nothing was published (release/ is
+	// absent). Record the failure report at the out-dir root.
+	rep.Artifacts.HMRFile, rep.Artifacts.ManifestFile, rep.Artifacts.ChecksumsFile = "", "", ""
+	rep.Artifacts.HMRSHA256, rep.Artifacts.ManifestSHA = "", ""
+	rep.Artifacts.ReleaseDir = ""
+	finalize()
+	reportPath := filepath.Join(opts.OutDir, reportName)
+	if err := writeReport(reportPath, rep); err != nil {
+		// Even the failure report could not be recorded: the process exit
+		// code still carries the failure, and no success-shaped report
+		// exists anywhere consumer-visible (it only ever lives inside
+		// release/, which was never created).
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "error: write export report: %v\n", err)
+		code = report.ResolveExit(code, report.ExitIO)
+	} else {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "export report written to %s\n", reportPath)
+	}
+	// Remove staging leftovers. Staging is not a consumer-facing name, so
+	// a failed removal here is a warning: it can never expose anything
+	// under the release name.
+	if err := removeStaging(staging); err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "warning: remove staging dir %s: %v\n", staging, err)
+	}
+	return code
+}
+
+// writeReport writes one report document (with the test-only report fault
+// applied first).
+func writeReport(path string, rep *Report) error {
+	if TestReportFault != nil {
+		if err := TestReportFault(path); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+	return report.WriteJSONAtomic(path, rep)
+}
+
+// publishRelease publishes the staged release set into outDir/release with
+// ONE atomic rename. The protocol makes an incomplete set under the release
+// name structurally impossible, on every failure path:
+//
+//  1. VERIFY the staged set BEFORE anything is visible: the staging
+//     directory must contain exactly the expected artifact names — nothing
+//     missing, nothing extra, nothing empty. Every error counts as a
+//     verification failure (not just IsNotExist). A set that cannot be
+//     verified is simply not published; the release name never appears.
+//  2. Publish with a single os.Rename(staging → outDir/release). rename(2)
+//     is atomic on POSIX (staging lives inside outDir, so no cross-device
+//     fallback exists): the release directory either appears fully
+//     populated with the verified set, or — on any failure — does not
+//     appear at all. There is no partially-promoted state to clean up, so
+//     no cleanup step whose own failure could strand a partial set; a
+//     leftover staging directory is not a consumer-facing name.
+//
+// Returns report.ExitOK only when the verified set is published.
+func publishRelease(staging, outDir string, names []string, stderr io.Writer) int {
+	fail := func(err error) int {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "error: %v; nothing was published under %s/ (the release name appears only with the complete verified set)\n",
+			err, filepath.Join(outDir, releaseDirName))
+		return report.ExitIO
+	}
+	// Step 1: verify the staged set is exactly the expected release set.
+	entries, err := os.ReadDir(staging)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fail(fmt.Errorf("verify staged release set: %w", err))
+	}
+	expected := map[string]bool{}
+	for _, name := range names {
+		expected[name] = true
+	}
+	for _, e := range entries {
+		if !expected[e.Name()] {
+			return fail(fmt.Errorf("verify staged release set: unexpected stray file %q in staging", e.Name()))
+		}
+	}
+	for _, name := range names {
+		var err error
+		if TestVerifyFault != nil {
+			err = TestVerifyFault(name)
+		}
+		if err == nil {
+			var fi os.FileInfo
+			if fi, err = os.Stat(filepath.Join(staging, name)); err == nil && fi.Size() == 0 {
+				err = errors.New("zero-length artifact")
+			}
+		}
+		if err != nil {
+			return fail(fmt.Errorf("verify staged release set: %s: %w", name, err))
+		}
+	}
+	// Step 2: one atomic rename.
+	dst := filepath.Join(outDir, releaseDirName)
+	if TestPromoteFault != nil {
+		if ferr := TestPromoteFault(dst); ferr != nil {
+			return fail(fmt.Errorf("publish release directory: %w", ferr))
+		}
+	}
+	if err := os.Rename(staging, dst); err != nil {
+		return fail(fmt.Errorf("publish release directory: %w", err))
+	}
+	return report.ExitOK
+}
+
+// removeStaging best-effort-removes the staging directory (with the
+// test-only cleanup fault applied first).
+func removeStaging(staging string) error {
+	if TestCleanupFault != nil {
+		if err := TestCleanupFault(staging); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+	return os.RemoveAll(staging)
+}
+
+// stagingDirName is the private staging area inside --out-dir; the whole
+// directory is renamed to releaseDirName in one atomic step on a fully
+// clean run.
+const stagingDirName = ".staging"
+
+// releaseDirName is the consumer-facing release directory inside --out-dir.
+// It exists if and only if a run completed fully clean, and then holds the
+// complete verified release set.
+const releaseDirName = "release"
+
+// checksumsName is the internal run checksum file (§4.7 tier (a)).
+const checksumsName = "run-checksums.sha256"
+
+// reportName is the export report document. On a fully clean run it is
+// staged with the release artifacts and published atomically inside
+// release/; on a failed or refused attempt a failure report is written to
+// the out-dir root instead.
+const reportName = "export-report.json"
+
+// derive runs one full derivation over fresh iterators/state handles.
+func derive(ctx context.Context, open *source.Open, res *anchor.Resolved) (*derivation, error) {
+	srcs, err := open.BuildSources()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	srcs.Ctx = ctx // long raw iterations observe cancellation (SIGINT)
+	nres, err := norm.Normalize(open.NormA, srcs)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	d := &derivation{res: nres}
+	if nres.HasFatalOrMissing() {
+		return d, nil // refusal handled by the caller; no encode possible
+	}
+	if d.hmrBytes, err = hmr.Encode(nres.Normalized, res.ConfigSHA); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	manifest := hmr.BuildManifest(open.NormA, nres, d.hmrBytes)
+	if d.manifest, err = hmr.EncodeManifest(manifest); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return d, nil
+}
+
+func runExport(ctx context.Context, opts Options, res *anchor.Resolved, open *source.Open, rep *Report, staging string, stderr io.Writer) int {
+	fillSections := func(r *norm.Result) int {
+		rep.NormalizedValidatorListLength = r.NormalizedListLength
+		rep.Counts = r.Counts
+		rep.Coverage = r.Coverage
+		rep.Digests = r.Digests
+		rep.Assertions = r.Assertions
+		var err error
+		if rep.Findings, err = scan.BuildFindingsSection(r.Findings); err != nil {
+			fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "error: findings section: %v\n", err)
+			return report.ExitIO
+		}
+		if rep.Plan, err = scan.BuildPlanSection(r.Deletions); err != nil {
+			fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "error: plan section: %v\n", err)
+			return report.ExitIO
+		}
+		return 0
+	}
+
+	passA, err := derive(ctx, open, res)
+	if err != nil {
+		return classifyDeriveError(ctx, err, stderr)
+	}
+	if c := fillSections(passA.res); c != 0 {
+		return c
+	}
+	if passA.res.HasFatalOrMissing() {
+		// Fatal or MissingRequired refuses export (ReviewItems allowed,
+		// recorded in the diagnostics digest).
+		rep.Refused = true
+		rep.RefuseReason = "normalization produced fatal findings; export refused (see findings)"
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "export refused: fatal findings present\n")
+		return passA.res.ExitCode()
+	}
+	if ctx.Err() != nil {
+		return report.InterruptExit(ctx)
+	}
+
+	// Determinism self-check: full second derivation over fresh handles.
+	if !opts.SkipSelfCheckForTest {
+		rep.Determinism.Ran = true
+		passB, err := derive(ctx, open, res)
+		if err != nil {
+			return classifyDeriveError(ctx, err, stderr)
+		}
+		if TestMutatePassB != nil {
+			// Test-only fault injection: perturb the second derivation's
+			// serialization to prove the self-check catches nondeterminism.
+			// Never set in a release build.
+			passB.hmrBytes, passB.manifest = TestMutatePassB(passB.hmrBytes, passB.manifest)
+		}
+		if diff := firstDifference(passA, passB); diff != "" {
+			rep.Determinism.Passed = false
+			rep.Determinism.FirstDiff = diff
+			prefix := filepath.Join(opts.OutDir, "determinism-diff")
+			rep.Determinism.DiffDumpPrefix = prefix
+			if err := os.MkdirAll(prefix, 0o755); err == nil {
+				_ = report.WriteFileAtomic(filepath.Join(prefix, "pass-a.hmr"), passA.hmrBytes)
+				_ = report.WriteFileAtomic(filepath.Join(prefix, "pass-b.hmr"), passB.hmrBytes)
+				_ = report.WriteFileAtomic(filepath.Join(prefix, "pass-a.reference.json"), passA.manifest)
+				_ = report.WriteFileAtomic(filepath.Join(prefix, "pass-b.reference.json"), passB.manifest)
+			}
+			fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "DETERMINISM_MISMATCH: %s — no release artifacts emitted; dumps under %s\n", diff, prefix)
+			return report.ExitDeterminismMismatch
+		}
+		rep.Determinism.Passed = true
+	}
+
+	// Stage artifacts privately (only after the self-check passed); the
+	// caller promotes them together after the source-immutability gate.
+	hmrName := fmt.Sprintf("metadata-%d.hmr", open.NormA.TargetHeight)
+	refName := fmt.Sprintf("metadata-%d.reference.json", open.NormA.TargetHeight)
+	if err := os.RemoveAll(staging); err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "error: reset staging dir: %v\n", err)
+		return report.ExitIO
+	}
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(staging, 0o755); err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "error: create staging dir: %v\n", err)
+		return report.ExitIO
+	}
+	if err := report.WriteFileAtomic(filepath.Join(staging, hmrName), passA.hmrBytes); err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "error: stage %s: %v\n", hmrName, err)
+		return report.ExitIO
+	}
+	if err := report.WriteFileAtomic(filepath.Join(staging, refName), passA.manifest); err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "error: stage %s: %v\n", refName, err)
+		return report.ExitIO
+	}
+	// Internal run checksums (§4.7 tier (a)), staged alongside.
+	if err := integrity.WriteSums(filepath.Join(staging, checksumsName), []string{hmrName, refName}); err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "error: stage run checksums: %v\n", err)
+		return report.ExitIO
+	}
+	rep.Artifacts.HMRFile = hmrName
+	rep.Artifacts.HMRSHA256 = report.SHA256Hex(passA.hmrBytes)
+	rep.Artifacts.ManifestFile = refName
+	rep.Artifacts.ManifestSHA = report.SHA256Hex(passA.manifest)
+	return report.ExitOK
+}
+
+func classifyDeriveError(ctx context.Context, err error, stderr io.Writer) int {
+	var tse *source.TargetStateError
+	if errors.As(err, &tse) {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "error: %v\n", err)
+		return report.ExitTargetStateUnavailable
+	}
+	fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "error: %v\n", err)
+	if errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) || errors.Is(err, context.DeadlineExceeded) {
+		return report.InterruptExit(ctx)
+	}
+	return report.ExitIO
+}
+
+// firstDifference byte-compares both serializations and reports the first
+// differing artifact and offset ("" when identical).
+func firstDifference(a, b *derivation) string {
+	if !bytes.Equal(a.hmrBytes, b.hmrBytes) {
+		return fmt.Sprintf("hmr bytes differ at offset %d (lens %d vs %d)",
+			firstDiffOffset(a.hmrBytes, b.hmrBytes), len(a.hmrBytes), len(b.hmrBytes))
+	}
+	if !bytes.Equal(a.manifest, b.manifest) {
+		return fmt.Sprintf("reference manifests differ at offset %d (lens %d vs %d)",
+			firstDiffOffset(a.manifest, b.manifest), len(a.manifest), len(b.manifest))
+	}
+	return ""
+}
+
+func firstDiffOffset(a, b []byte) int {
+	n := len(a)
+	if len(b) < n {
+		n = len(b)
+	}
+	for i := 0; i < n; i++ {
+		if a[i] != b[i] {
+			return i
+		}
+	}
+	return n
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/metadata/scan/scan.go b/internal/recovery/metadata/scan/scan.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cf53c824df
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/metadata/scan/scan.go
@@ -0,0 +1,367 @@
+// Package scan implements `harmony-recovery metadata scan` (plan WS4): the
+// internal diagnosis/dry-run — strict open, anchor cross-verification,
+// target resolution, one Normalize pass, and the full report with bounded
+// itemization and overflow digests. It never writes to the source
+// (zero-write proof: source fingerprints compared before/after, and the
+// handle is the write-refusing wrapper).
+package scan
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/anchor"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/dbopen"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/hmr"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/norm"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/source"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/report"
+)
+
+// Schema identifies the scan report document.
+const Schema = "metadata-scan-report-v1"
+
+// Tool is the report tool identifier.
+const Tool = "harmony-recovery metadata scan"
+
+// ItemLimit bounds report itemization; the full lists are digested.
+const ItemLimit = 200
+
+// PreflightNote records the §8 Q2 decision in every report.
+const PreflightNote = "validator-list completeness (the combined-omission case) rests on the separately-run preflight state traversal; " +
+	"the normalized list length above is printed for a manual, informational comparison — no receipt input, no gating"
+
+// Options configures a scan run.
+type Options struct {
+	DBPath     string
+	AnchorPath string
+	ReportPath string
+	Handles    int
+	CacheMB    int
+}
+
+// FindingsSection is the bounded findings report.
+type FindingsSection struct {
+	Total       int              `json:"total"`
+	Fatal       int              `json:"fatal"`
+	ReviewItems int              `json:"review_items"`
+	Info        int              `json:"info"`
+	Items       []report.Finding `json:"items"`
+	Omitted     int              `json:"omitted"`
+	FullListSHA string           `json:"full_list_sha256"`
+}
+
+// BuildFindingsSection bounds and digests a finding list.
+func BuildFindingsSection(fs []report.Finding) (FindingsSection, error) {
+	sec := FindingsSection{Total: len(fs)}
+	for _, f := range fs {
+		switch f.Severity {
+		case report.SeverityFatal:
+			sec.Fatal++
+		case report.SeverityReviewItem:
+			sec.ReviewItems++
+		default:
+			sec.Info++
+		}
+	}
+	full, err := report.DigestCanonicalJSON(fs)
+	if err != nil {
+		return sec, err
+	}
+	sec.FullListSHA = full
+	if len(fs) > ItemLimit {
+		sec.Items = fs[:ItemLimit]
+		sec.Omitted = len(fs) - ItemLimit
+	} else {
+		sec.Items = fs
+	}
+	return sec, nil
+}
+
+// PhaseSummary is one deletion-plan phase with bounded itemization.
+type PhaseSummary struct {
+	Name             string                 `json:"name"`
+	DeletionCount    int                    `json:"deletion_count"`
+	RewriteCount     int                    `json:"rewrite_count"`
+	PlaceholderCount int                    `json:"placeholder_count"`
+	Deletions        []norm.PlannedDeletion `json:"deletions,omitempty"`
+	DeletionsOmitted int                    `json:"deletions_omitted"`
+	Rewrites         []norm.PlannedRewrite  `json:"rewrites,omitempty"`
+	RewritesOmitted  int                    `json:"rewrites_omitted"`
+	Placeholders     []norm.Placeholder     `json:"placeholders,omitempty"`
+}
+
+// PlanSection summarizes the deletion plan; apply re-derives, the digest
+// authenticates.
+type PlanSection struct {
+	Phases  []PhaseSummary `json:"phases"`
+	PlanSHA string         `json:"plan_sha256"`
+}
+
+// BuildPlanSection bounds and digests a deletion plan.
+func BuildPlanSection(p *norm.DeletionPlan) (PlanSection, error) {
+	sha, err := report.DigestCanonicalJSON(p)
+	if err != nil {
+		return PlanSection{}, err
+	}
+	sec := PlanSection{PlanSHA: sha}
+	for _, ph := range p.Phases {
+		s := PhaseSummary{
+			Name:             ph.Name,
+			DeletionCount:    len(ph.Deletions),
+			RewriteCount:     len(ph.Rewrites),
+			PlaceholderCount: len(ph.Placeholders),
+			Placeholders:     ph.Placeholders,
+		}
+		if len(ph.Deletions) > ItemLimit {
+			s.Deletions = ph.Deletions[:ItemLimit]
+			s.DeletionsOmitted = len(ph.Deletions) - ItemLimit
+		} else {
+			s.Deletions = ph.Deletions
+		}
+		if len(ph.Rewrites) > ItemLimit {
+			s.Rewrites = ph.Rewrites[:ItemLimit]
+			s.RewritesOmitted = len(ph.Rewrites) - ItemLimit
+		} else {
+			s.Rewrites = ph.Rewrites
+		}
+		sec.Phases = append(sec.Phases, s)
+	}
+	return sec, nil
+}
+
+// Report is the scan report document.
+type Report struct {
+	Tool   string `json:"tool"`
+	Schema string `json:"schema"`
+
+	Network string `json:"network"`
+	Shard   uint32 `json:"shard"`
+	DBPath  string `json:"db_path"`
+
+	AnchorConfigSHA string          `json:"anchor_config_sha256"`
+	Anchor          hmr.AnchorTuple `json:"anchor"`
+
+	// NormalizedValidatorListLength is printed prominently for the manual
+	// preflight comparison (§8 Q2).
+	NormalizedValidatorListLength int    `json:"normalized_validator_list_length"`
+	PreflightNote                 string `json:"preflight_note"`
+
+	Counts     norm.Counts             `json:"counts"`
+	Coverage   norm.SnapshotCoverage   `json:"snapshot_coverage"`
+	Findings   FindingsSection         `json:"findings"`
+	Plan       PlanSection             `json:"deletion_plan"`
+	Digests    norm.DigestSet          `json:"digests"`
+	Assertions []norm.AbsenceAssertion `json:"absence_assertions"`
+	Inventory  norm.Inventory          `json:"inventory"`
+
+	FingerprintBefore *dbopen.Fingerprint `json:"db_fingerprint_before"`
+	FingerprintAfter  *dbopen.Fingerprint `json:"db_fingerprint_after"`
+	ZeroWriteProof    bool                `json:"zero_write_proof"`
+	WriteAttempts     int                 `json:"write_attempts"`
+
+	StartedAt string  `json:"started_at"` // run evidence, not digested
+	DurationS float64 `json:"duration_s"`
+
+	Verdict  string `json:"verdict"`
+	ExitCode int    `json:"exit_code"`
+}
+
+// Run executes the scan pipeline and writes the report. The returned exit
+// code follows the §4.5 precedence table.
+func Run(ctx context.Context, opts Options, stderr io.Writer) int {
+	started := time.Now()
+	usage := func(format string, args ...interface{}) int {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "invalid invocation: "+format+"\n", args...)
+		return report.ExitBadInvocation
+	}
+	if opts.DBPath == "" || opts.AnchorPath == "" || opts.ReportPath == "" {
+		return usage("--db, --anchor and --report are required")
+	}
+	res, err := anchor.Resolve(opts.AnchorPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		return usage("%v", err)
+	}
+	if err := dbopen.ValidateOutputPath(opts.ReportPath, opts.DBPath); err != nil {
+		return usage("%v", err)
+	}
+
+	fpBefore, err := dbopen.FingerprintDir(opts.DBPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "error: fingerprint source: %v\n", err)
+		return report.ExitIO
+	}
+
+	open, err := source.OpenSource(opts.DBPath, res, dbopen.Options{Handles: opts.Handles, BlockCacheMB: opts.CacheMB})
+	if err != nil {
+		code := dbopen.ClassifyExit(err)
+		// Path/layout mistakes are invocation errors, not I/O.
+		if code == report.ExitIO && isLayoutError(err) {
+			code = report.ExitBadInvocation
+		}
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "error: open source: %v\n", err)
+		return code
+	}
+	defer open.Close()
+
+	rep := &Report{
+		Tool:            Tool,
+		Schema:          Schema,
+		Network:         res.Config.Network,
+		Shard:           res.Config.Shard,
+		DBPath:          open.DB.Path(),
+		AnchorConfigSHA: res.ConfigSHAHex(),
+		PreflightNote:   PreflightNote,
+		StartedAt:       started.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
+	}
+
+	code, err := runNormalize(ctx, open, rep)
+	if err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "error: %v\n", err)
+		if code == 0 {
+			code = report.ExitIO
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Source-immutability gate (fingerprints include device/inode): a
+	// failed re-fingerprint or any mismatch is exit 14, never ignored.
+	rep.FingerprintBefore = fpBefore
+	if fpAfter, ferr := dbopen.FingerprintDir(opts.DBPath); ferr != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "error: fingerprint source after run: %v\n", ferr)
+		code = report.ResolveExit(code, report.ExitIO)
+	} else {
+		rep.FingerprintAfter = fpAfter
+		rep.ZeroWriteProof = fpBefore.Equal(fpAfter) && open.DB.WriteAttempts() == 0
+	}
+	rep.WriteAttempts = open.DB.WriteAttempts()
+	if rep.WriteAttempts > 0 {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "internal invariant violated: %d write attempts were made (and refused)\n", rep.WriteAttempts)
+		code = report.ResolveExit(code, report.ExitIO)
+	}
+	if rep.FingerprintAfter != nil && !rep.ZeroWriteProof {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "error: source fingerprint changed during the scan (zero-write proof failed)\n")
+		code = report.ResolveExit(code, report.ExitIO)
+	}
+
+	if ctx.Err() != nil {
+		code = report.ResolveExit(code, interruptExit(ctx))
+	}
+
+	rep.DurationS = time.Since(started).Seconds()
+	rep.ExitCode = code
+	rep.Verdict = verdictFor(code)
+	if err := report.WriteJSONAtomic(opts.ReportPath, rep); err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "error: write report %s: %v\n", opts.ReportPath, err)
+		return report.ResolveExit(code, report.ExitIO)
+	}
+	fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "report written to %s\n", opts.ReportPath)
+	fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "normalized validator list length: %d (%s)\n",
+		rep.NormalizedValidatorListLength, "compare manually against the preflight receipt, §8 Q2")
+	return code
+}
+
+func runNormalize(ctx context.Context, open *source.Open, rep *Report) (int, error) {
+	srcs, err := open.BuildSources()
+	if err != nil {
+		var tse *source.TargetStateError
+		if errors.As(err, &tse) {
+			rep.Verdict = "TARGET_STATE_UNAVAILABLE"
+			return report.ExitTargetStateUnavailable, err
+		}
+		return report.ExitIO, err
+	}
+	if ctx.Err() != nil {
+		return interruptExit(ctx), ctx.Err()
+	}
+	srcs.Ctx = ctx // long raw iterations observe cancellation (SIGINT)
+	res, err := norm.Normalize(open.NormA, srcs)
+	if err != nil {
+		if errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) || errors.Is(err, context.DeadlineExceeded) {
+			return interruptExit(ctx), err
+		}
+		return report.ExitIO, err
+	}
+	rep.Anchor = hmr.AnchorTuple{
+		TargetHeight:       open.NormA.TargetHeight,
+		TargetHash:         open.NormA.TargetHash.Hex(),
+		TargetRoot:         open.NormA.TargetRoot.Hex(),
+		Epoch:              open.NormA.Epoch,
+		EpochFirstBlock:    open.NormA.EpochFirst,
+		EpochLastBlock:     open.NormA.EpochLast,
+		SnapshotBaseHeight: open.NormA.SnapshotBase,
+		AbandonedChildHash: open.NormA.AbandonedChildHash.Hex(),
+	}
+	rep.NormalizedValidatorListLength = res.NormalizedListLength
+	rep.Counts = res.Counts
+	rep.Coverage = res.Coverage
+	rep.Digests = res.Digests
+	rep.Assertions = res.Assertions
+	rep.Inventory = res.Inventory
+	if rep.Findings, err = BuildFindingsSection(res.Findings); err != nil {
+		return report.ExitIO, err
+	}
+	if rep.Plan, err = BuildPlanSection(res.Deletions); err != nil {
+		return report.ExitIO, err
+	}
+	return res.ExitCode(), nil
+}
+
+func verdictFor(code int) string {
+	switch code {
+	case report.ExitOK:
+		return "OK"
+	case report.ExitMissingRequired:
+		return "MISSING_REQUIRED_METADATA"
+	case report.ExitInvalidRetained:
+		return "INVALID_RETAINED_METADATA"
+	case report.ExitTargetStateUnavailable:
+		return "TARGET_STATE_UNAVAILABLE"
+	case report.ExitDeterminismMismatch:
+		return "DETERMINISM_MISMATCH"
+	case report.ExitAuditAnomaly:
+		return "AUDIT_ANOMALY"
+	case report.ExitUnsafeOpen:
+		return "UNSAFE_OPEN"
+	case report.ExitIO:
+		return "IO_ERROR"
+	case report.ExitBadInvocation:
+		return "INVALID_INVOCATION"
+	case report.ExitInterrupted, report.ExitSIGINT:
+		return "INTERRUPTED"
+	default:
+		return fmt.Sprintf("EXIT_%d", code)
+	}
+}
+
+// Verdict exposes verdictFor for sibling commands.
+func Verdict(code int) string { return verdictFor(code) }
+
+// isLayoutError distinguishes layout/path invocation mistakes (exit 15)
+// from real I/O failures (exit 14). dbopen layout errors are produced
+// before any LevelDB open.
+func isLayoutError(err error) bool {
+	s := err.Error()
+	for _, sub := range []string{
+		"must be an absolute path",
+		"does not match the expected",
+		"sharded (harmony_sharddb_*) layout",
+		"is a symlink",
+		"is not a directory",
+		"does not look like a LevelDB",
+		"resolves inside the source DB",
+		"anchor:",
+		"source: canonical hash",
+		"source: header-number reverse mapping",
+	} {
+		if strings.Contains(s, sub) {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+func interruptExit(ctx context.Context) int { return report.InterruptExit(ctx) }
diff --git a/internal/recovery/metadata/source/source.go b/internal/recovery/metadata/source/source.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..64cf2e5aad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/metadata/source/source.go
@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+// Package source opens the strict read-only source DB and assembles the
+// norm.Sources every metadata subcommand consumes: anchor resolution +
+// schedule install, DB cross-checks, target-state opening (snaps=nil), the
+// best-effort historical state opener, and the canonical header reader.
+// It is shared plumbing under the scan / export-reference / audit-branch
+// commands (plan §4.1 pipeline).
+package source
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common"
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/ethdb"
+
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/block"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/rawdb"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/core/state"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/anchor"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/dbopen"
+	"github.com/harmony-one/harmony/internal/recovery/metadata/norm"
+)
+
+// Open is the assembled source.
+type Open struct {
+	Anchor   *anchor.Resolved
+	NormA    norm.Anchor
+	DB       *dbopen.DB
+	KV       ethdb.KeyValueStore // write-refusing
+	ChainDB  ethdb.Database      // rawdb wrapper over KV (no freezer)
+	Header   *block.Header       // verified target header
+	Sources  norm.Sources
+	stateDBs []state.Database
+}
+
+// OpenSource runs the shared pipeline: layout gate, strict open, anchor DB
+// cross-verification, target resolution (canonical mapping == anchor hash,
+// H+hash reverse mapping, header hash recomputation, state.New(root) with
+// snaps=nil).
+func OpenSource(dbPath string, res *anchor.Resolved, opts dbopen.Options) (*Open, error) {
+	if err := dbopen.CheckLayout(dbPath, res.Config.Shard); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	db, err := dbopen.OpenStrictReadOnly(dbPath, opts)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	o := &Open{Anchor: res, DB: db, KV: db.KV()}
+	o.ChainDB = rawdb.NewDatabase(o.KV)
+
+	if _, err := anchor.VerifyDB(o.KV, res); err != nil {
+		db.Close()
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	// Reverse mapping H+hash -> number must agree.
+	if num := rawdb.ReadHeaderNumber(o.ChainDB, res.TargetHash); num == nil || *num != res.Config.TargetHeight {
+		db.Close()
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("source: header-number reverse mapping for %s is %v, want %d",
+			res.Config.TargetHash, num, res.Config.TargetHeight)
+	}
+	hdr := rawdb.ReadHeader(o.ChainDB, res.TargetHash, res.Config.TargetHeight)
+	if hdr == nil {
+		db.Close()
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("source: target header %d %s not decodable", res.Config.TargetHeight, res.Config.TargetHash)
+	}
+	if got := hdr.Hash(); got != res.TargetHash {
+		db.Close()
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("source: target header recomputes to %s, anchor says %s", got.Hex(), res.Config.TargetHash)
+	}
+	o.Header = hdr
+
+	o.NormA = norm.Anchor{
+		Network:            res.Config.Network,
+		Shard:              res.Config.Shard,
+		TargetHeight:       res.Config.TargetHeight,
+		TargetHash:         res.TargetHash,
+		TargetRoot:         hdr.Root(),
+		Epoch:              res.Config.Epoch,
+		EpochFirst:         res.Config.EpochFirstBlock,
+		EpochLast:          res.Config.EpochLastBlock,
+		SnapshotBase:       res.Config.SnapshotBaseHeight,
+		BoundaryHeight:     res.Inplace.BoundaryHeight,
+		AbandonedChildHash: res.ChildHash,
+		AuditEndHeight:     res.Config.AuditEndHeight,
+		ConfigSHA256Hex:    res.ConfigSHAHex(),
+	}
+	return o, nil
+}
+
+// BuildSources opens fresh state handles (fresh iterators/state caches per
+// derivation pass — the determinism self-check runs two independent
+// passes).
+func (o *Open) BuildSources() (norm.Sources, error) {
+	sdb := state.NewDatabase(o.ChainDB)
+	o.stateDBs = append(o.stateDBs, sdb)
+	target, err := state.New(o.Header.Root(), sdb, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return norm.Sources{}, &TargetStateError{Err: err}
+	}
+	return norm.Sources{
+		Raw:     o.KV,
+		Target:  target,
+		Hist:    &histOpener{o: o, sdb: sdb},
+		Headers: &headerReader{o: o},
+	}, nil
+}
+
+// TargetStateError marks state.New(targetRoot) failure (exit 22).
+type TargetStateError struct{ Err error }
+
+func (e *TargetStateError) Error() string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("target state unavailable: %v", e.Err)
+}
+func (e *TargetStateError) Unwrap() error { return e.Err }
+
+// Close releases the DB handle.
+func (o *Open) Close() error { return o.DB.Close() }
+
+type histOpener struct {
+	o   *Open
+	sdb state.Database
+}
+
+// StateAt resolves canonical(height).Root and opens it; unavailability is
+// (nil, nil) — structural-only, never an error (plan §4.4 best-effort).
+func (h *histOpener) StateAt(height uint64) (*state.DB, error) {
+	hash := rawdb.ReadCanonicalHash(h.o.ChainDB, height)
+	if hash == (common.Hash{}) {
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+	hdr := rawdb.ReadHeader(h.o.ChainDB, hash, height)
+	if hdr == nil {
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+	st, err := state.New(hdr.Root(), h.sdb, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+	return st, nil
+}
+
+type headerReader struct{ o *Open }
+
+func (h *headerReader) HeaderByNumber(height uint64) (*block.Header, error) {
+	hash := rawdb.ReadCanonicalHash(h.o.ChainDB, height)
+	if hash == (common.Hash{}) {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("no canonical hash at height %d", height)
+	}
+	hdr := rawdb.ReadHeader(h.o.ChainDB, hash, height)
+	if hdr == nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("header %d %s not found", height, hash.Hex())
+	}
+	return hdr, nil
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/report/report.go b/internal/recovery/report/report.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..61410ba957
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/report/report.go
@@ -0,0 +1,313 @@
+// Package report holds the metadata command family's shared output
+// contract: the orthogonal finding severity/class model, the exit-code
+// table with its deterministic precedence, canonical-JSON encoding (the
+// byte-stable form every digested document uses), digest primitives, and
+// atomic report writing.
+//
+// The preflight subcommand has its own, separate report package
+// (internal/recovery/inplace/report) with exits 0/1/2/3; the two tables
+// overlap only at 0 = success (plan §4.5).
+package report
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"sort"
+)
+
+// Exit codes for the metadata command family (plan §4.5). Metadata
+// subcommands never emit 1/2/3 themselves; cobra flag-parse and unknown
+// command errors exit 2 at the shared root.
+const (
+	ExitOK                     = 0
+	ExitUnsafeOpen             = 13 // unsafe DB open / concurrent writer / missing LOCK
+	ExitIO                     = 14 // I/O or corruption
+	ExitBadInvocation          = 15 // invalid config / path overlap (inside RunE)
+	ExitInterrupted            = 16 // interrupted (non-signal)
+	ExitMissingRequired        = 20 // MISSING_REQUIRED_METADATA (clean-DB fallback signal)
+	ExitInvalidRetained        = 21 // INVALID_RETAINED_METADATA (incl. NoncanonicalKey)
+	ExitTargetStateUnavailable = 22 // TARGET_STATE_UNAVAILABLE
+	ExitDeterminismMismatch    = 23 // DETERMINISM_MISMATCH (export self-check)
+	ExitAuditAnomaly           = 24 // AUDIT_ANOMALY (incl. POINTER_AMBIGUOUS)
+	ExitSIGINT                 = 130
+)
+
+// precedence orders mixed outcomes: highest applicable wins (plan §4.5).
+// Corruption (21) deliberately outranks the fallback signal (20): a corrupt
+// DB must be investigated, not routed to the clean-DB path.
+var precedence = []int{
+	ExitSIGINT,
+	ExitInterrupted,
+	ExitBadInvocation,
+	ExitUnsafeOpen,
+	ExitIO,
+	ExitTargetStateUnavailable,
+	ExitInvalidRetained,
+	ExitMissingRequired,
+	ExitAuditAnomaly,
+	ExitDeterminismMismatch,
+	ExitOK,
+}
+
+// precedenceRank maps exit code -> position (lower = wins).
+var precedenceRank = func() map[int]int {
+	m := make(map[int]int, len(precedence))
+	for i, c := range precedence {
+		m[c] = i
+	}
+	return m
+}()
+
+// ErrSIGINT is the cancellation cause the CLI's signal handler records
+// when SIGINT is delivered, so exits distinguish 130 (SIGINT) from 16
+// (ordinary interruption).
+var ErrSIGINT = errors.New("interrupted by SIGINT")
+
+// InterruptExit maps a canceled context to the §4.5 interruption codes:
+// 130 when the cancellation cause is SIGINT delivery, 16 otherwise.
+func InterruptExit(ctx context.Context) int {
+	if errors.Is(context.Cause(ctx), ErrSIGINT) {
+		return ExitSIGINT
+	}
+	return ExitInterrupted
+}
+
+// ResolveExit returns the highest-precedence code among candidates.
+// Unknown codes are rejected loudly (programming error).
+func ResolveExit(codes ...int) int {
+	best := ExitOK
+	bestRank := precedenceRank[ExitOK]
+	for _, c := range codes {
+		r, ok := precedenceRank[c]
+		if !ok {
+			panic(fmt.Sprintf("report: unknown exit code %d", c))
+		}
+		if r < bestRank {
+			best, bestRank = c, r
+		}
+	}
+	return best
+}
+
+// Severity of a finding. Severity and Class are orthogonal (plan §4.3).
+type Severity string
+
+const (
+	SeverityInfo       Severity = "info"
+	SeverityReviewItem Severity = "review-item"
+	SeverityFatal      Severity = "fatal"
+)
+
+// Class of a finding; every Fatal carries a Class mapping to exactly one
+// exit code.
+type Class string
+
+const (
+	ClassMissingRequired        Class = "missing-required"
+	ClassInvalidRetained        Class = "invalid-retained"
+	ClassTargetStateUnavailable Class = "target-state-unavailable"
+	ClassNoncanonicalKey        Class = "noncanonical-key"
+	ClassPollutionSuspect       Class = "pollution-suspect"
+	ClassAuditAnomaly           Class = "audit-anomaly"
+	ClassDeterminismMismatch    Class = "determinism-mismatch"
+	ClassDiagnostic             Class = "diagnostic"
+)
+
+// ExitForClass maps a Fatal finding class to its exit code.
+func ExitForClass(c Class) int {
+	switch c {
+	case ClassMissingRequired:
+		return ExitMissingRequired
+	case ClassInvalidRetained, ClassNoncanonicalKey:
+		return ExitInvalidRetained
+	case ClassTargetStateUnavailable:
+		return ExitTargetStateUnavailable
+	case ClassAuditAnomaly, ClassPollutionSuspect:
+		return ExitAuditAnomaly
+	case ClassDeterminismMismatch:
+		return ExitDeterminismMismatch
+	default:
+		return ExitOK
+	}
+}
+
+// Finding is one classified observation. Key is the hex of the raw LevelDB
+// key it concerns (empty when not key-scoped).
+type Finding struct {
+	Severity Severity `json:"severity"`
+	Class    Class    `json:"class"`
+	Code     string   `json:"code"`
+	Key      string   `json:"key,omitempty"`
+	Detail   string   `json:"detail,omitempty"`
+	// ChainDeterministic marks findings that are a pure function of the
+	// retained chain-invariant content (and therefore belong in the
+	// diagnostics digest); junk-, machine- or branch-dependent findings
+	// are run evidence only (plan §4.5).
+	ChainDeterministic bool `json:"chain_deterministic,omitempty"`
+}
+
+// SortFindings orders findings by (code, key, detail) — the canonical order
+// used for the diagnostics digest and report sections.
+func SortFindings(fs []Finding) {
+	sort.SliceStable(fs, func(i, j int) bool {
+		if fs[i].Code != fs[j].Code {
+			return fs[i].Code < fs[j].Code
+		}
+		if fs[i].Key != fs[j].Key {
+			return fs[i].Key < fs[j].Key
+		}
+		return fs[i].Detail < fs[j].Detail
+	})
+}
+
+// ExitForFindings resolves the exit code implied by a finding set: the
+// highest-precedence exit among all Fatal findings' classes (0 if none).
+func ExitForFindings(fs []Finding) int {
+	codes := []int{ExitOK}
+	for _, f := range fs {
+		if f.Severity == SeverityFatal {
+			codes = append(codes, ExitForClass(f.Class))
+		}
+	}
+	return ResolveExit(codes...)
+}
+
+// CanonicalJSON encodes v as strictly canonical JSON: object keys sorted,
+// no insignificant whitespace, numbers passed through verbatim
+// (json.Number), and a guaranteed byte-stable output for equal inputs. It
+// round-trips v through encoding/json, so struct field names follow their
+// json tags.
+func CanonicalJSON(v interface{}) ([]byte, error) {
+	raw, err := json.Marshal(v)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	dec := json.NewDecoder(bytes.NewReader(raw))
+	dec.UseNumber()
+	var tree interface{}
+	if err := dec.Decode(&tree); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	var buf bytes.Buffer
+	if err := writeCanonical(&buf, tree); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return buf.Bytes(), nil
+}
+
+func writeCanonical(buf *bytes.Buffer, v interface{}) error {
+	switch t := v.(type) {
+	case map[string]interface{}:
+		buf.WriteByte('{')
+		keys := make([]string, 0, len(t))
+		for k := range t {
+			keys = append(keys, k)
+		}
+		sort.Strings(keys)
+		for i, k := range keys {
+			if i > 0 {
+				buf.WriteByte(',')
+			}
+			if err := marshalScalar(buf, k); err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+			buf.WriteByte(':')
+			if err := writeCanonical(buf, t[k]); err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+		}
+		buf.WriteByte('}')
+		return nil
+	case []interface{}:
+		buf.WriteByte('[')
+		for i, e := range t {
+			if i > 0 {
+				buf.WriteByte(',')
+			}
+			if err := writeCanonical(buf, e); err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+		}
+		buf.WriteByte(']')
+		return nil
+	case json.Number:
+		buf.WriteString(t.String())
+		return nil
+	default:
+		return marshalScalar(buf, t)
+	}
+}
+
+// marshalScalar encodes a scalar (or map key) without HTML escaping, so
+// predicate strings like "epoch>3002" stay literal. json.Encoder appends a
+// trailing newline that we trim; the output stays deterministic.
+func marshalScalar(buf *bytes.Buffer, v interface{}) error {
+	var tmp bytes.Buffer
+	enc := json.NewEncoder(&tmp)
+	enc.SetEscapeHTML(false)
+	if err := enc.Encode(v); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	b := tmp.Bytes()
+	if n := len(b); n > 0 && b[n-1] == '\n' {
+		b = b[:n-1]
+	}
+	buf.Write(b)
+	return nil
+}
+
+// SHA256Hex returns the lowercase hex SHA-256 of data.
+func SHA256Hex(data []byte) string {
+	sum := sha256.Sum256(data)
+	return fmt.Sprintf("%x", sum[:])
+}
+
+// DigestCanonicalJSON is SHA256Hex(CanonicalJSON(v)).
+func DigestCanonicalJSON(v interface{}) (string, error) {
+	b, err := CanonicalJSON(v)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	return SHA256Hex(b), nil
+}
+
+// WriteFileAtomic writes data to path via temp file + rename in the target
+// directory.
+func WriteFileAtomic(path string, data []byte) error {
+	dir := filepath.Dir(path)
+	tmp, err := os.CreateTemp(dir, "."+filepath.Base(path)+".tmp-*")
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	tmpName := tmp.Name()
+	if _, err := tmp.Write(data); err != nil {
+		tmp.Close()
+		os.Remove(tmpName)
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := tmp.Close(); err != nil {
+		os.Remove(tmpName)
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := os.Rename(tmpName, path); err != nil {
+		os.Remove(tmpName)
+		return err
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// WriteJSONAtomic writes indented (human-readable) JSON atomically. Reports
+// use this form; digested documents use CanonicalJSON.
+func WriteJSONAtomic(path string, v interface{}) error {
+	data, err := json.MarshalIndent(v, "", "  ")
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return WriteFileAtomic(path, append(data, '\n'))
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/report/report_test.go b/internal/recovery/report/report_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3bf6645782
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/report/report_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+package report
+
+import (
+	"encoding/json"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestResolveExitPrecedence(t *testing.T) {
+	// Highest-precedence wins: 130 > 16 > 15 > 13 > 14 > 22 > 21 > 20 > 24 > 23 > 0.
+	cases := []struct {
+		in   []int
+		want int
+	}{
+		{[]int{ExitOK}, ExitOK},
+		{[]int{ExitMissingRequired, ExitInvalidRetained}, ExitInvalidRetained}, // 21 outranks 20
+		{[]int{ExitAuditAnomaly, ExitDeterminismMismatch}, ExitAuditAnomaly},
+		{[]int{ExitOK, ExitMissingRequired, ExitAuditAnomaly}, ExitMissingRequired},
+		{[]int{ExitIO, ExitTargetStateUnavailable}, ExitIO},
+		{[]int{ExitSIGINT, ExitInvalidRetained, ExitUnsafeOpen}, ExitSIGINT},
+		{[]int{ExitBadInvocation, ExitUnsafeOpen}, ExitBadInvocation},
+	}
+	for _, c := range cases {
+		if got := ResolveExit(c.in...); got != c.want {
+			t.Errorf("ResolveExit(%v) = %d, want %d", c.in, got, c.want)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestExitForFindings(t *testing.T) {
+	// A mixed MissingRequired + InvalidRetained set exits 21.
+	fs := []Finding{
+		{Severity: SeverityFatal, Class: ClassMissingRequired},
+		{Severity: SeverityFatal, Class: ClassInvalidRetained},
+		{Severity: SeverityReviewItem, Class: ClassDiagnostic},
+	}
+	if got := ExitForFindings(fs); got != ExitInvalidRetained {
+		t.Fatalf("mixed fatal set exits %d, want %d", got, ExitInvalidRetained)
+	}
+	// NoncanonicalKey maps to 21.
+	if got := ExitForFindings([]Finding{{Severity: SeverityFatal, Class: ClassNoncanonicalKey}}); got != ExitInvalidRetained {
+		t.Fatalf("noncanonical exits %d, want %d", got, ExitInvalidRetained)
+	}
+	// No fatals -> 0 (review items never gate).
+	if got := ExitForFindings([]Finding{{Severity: SeverityReviewItem, Class: ClassDiagnostic}}); got != ExitOK {
+		t.Fatalf("review-item-only exits %d, want 0", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCanonicalJSONStableAndSorted(t *testing.T) {
+	a := map[string]interface{}{"b": 1, "a": 2, "nested": map[string]interface{}{"z": 1, "y": 2}}
+	b := map[string]interface{}{"nested": map[string]interface{}{"y": 2, "z": 1}, "a": 2, "b": 1}
+	ca, err := CanonicalJSON(a)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	cb, err := CanonicalJSON(b)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if string(ca) != string(cb) {
+		t.Fatalf("canonical JSON not order-independent:\n%s\n%s", ca, cb)
+	}
+	want := `{"a":2,"b":1,"nested":{"y":2,"z":1}}`
+	if string(ca) != want {
+		t.Fatalf("canonical JSON = %s, want %s", ca, want)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCanonicalJSONNumbersVerbatim(t *testing.T) {
+	// Large uint64 must survive without float rounding.
+	type doc struct {
+		N uint64 `json:"n"`
+	}
+	raw, err := CanonicalJSON(doc{N: 92730034})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if string(raw) != `{"n":92730034}` {
+		t.Fatalf("got %s", raw)
+	}
+	var back doc
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &back); err != nil || back.N != 92730034 {
+		t.Fatalf("round-trip lost precision: %v %d", err, back.N)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSortFindingsDeterministic(t *testing.T) {
+	fs := []Finding{
+		{Code: "b", Key: "02"},
+		{Code: "a", Key: "02"},
+		{Code: "a", Key: "01"},
+		{Code: "a", Key: "01", Detail: "x"},
+	}
+	SortFindings(fs)
+	if fs[0].Code != "a" || fs[0].Key != "01" || fs[0].Detail != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("first = %+v", fs[0])
+	}
+	if fs[3].Code != "b" {
+		t.Fatalf("last = %+v", fs[3])
+	}
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/strictdb/strictdb.go b/internal/recovery/strictdb/strictdb.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fa0417979e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/strictdb/strictdb.go
@@ -0,0 +1,270 @@
+// Package strictdb provides the metadata pipeline's strict database
+// access discipline (plan WS1): error-latching ordered iteration (stock
+// off-chain iterators never check Iterator.Error(); here exhaustion
+// without a checked error is indistinguishable from truncation and
+// therefore always checked), per-namespace raw key-shape validation, and
+// the shared namespace classifier used by the scan inventory and the
+// audit's write-log reconciliation.
+package strictdb
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"fmt"
+	"math/big"
+
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/ethdb"
+)
+
+// ForEach iterates kv over prefix in ascending raw-key order, calling fn
+// with copies of key and value, and checks Iterator.Error() on exhaustion
+// (fail-closed: an unread error would silently truncate the scan).
+func ForEach(kv ethdb.Iteratee, prefix []byte, fn func(key, value []byte) error) error {
+	it := kv.NewIterator(prefix, nil)
+	defer it.Release()
+	for it.Next() {
+		k := append([]byte(nil), it.Key()...)
+		v := append([]byte(nil), it.Value()...)
+		if err := fn(k, v); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+	if err := it.Error(); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("strictdb: iterator over prefix %q failed: %w", prefix, err)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// Namespace identifies a raw-key family.
+type Namespace string
+
+const (
+	NsValidatorList     Namespace = "validator-list"
+	NsDVL               Namespace = "dvl"
+	NsValidatorSnapshot Namespace = "validator-snapshot"
+	NsValidatorStats    Namespace = "validator-stats"
+	NsShardState        Namespace = "shard-state" // "ss" + epoch.Bytes()
+	NsEpochBlockNumber  Namespace = "harmony-epoch-block-number"
+	NsEpochVRF          Namespace = "epoch-vrf-block-numbers"
+	NsEpochVDF          Namespace = "epoch-vdf-block-number"
+	NsBlockRewardAccum  Namespace = "blk-rwd"
+	NsBlockCommitSig    Namespace = "block-sig"
+	NsLastCommits       Namespace = "LastCommits"
+	NsPendingCrossLink  Namespace = "pendingCL"
+	NsPendingSlashing   Namespace = "pendingSC"
+	NsCrossLink         Namespace = "crosslink"         // "cl" + shard(4) + num(8)
+	NsCrossLinkPointer  Namespace = "crosslink-pointer" // "cl" + shard(4) — shorter key, same namespace
+	NsCXReceipt         Namespace = "cxReceipt"
+	NsCXReceiptSpent    Namespace = "cxReceiptSpent"
+	NsCXLookup          Namespace = "cx-lookup"
+	NsHeader            Namespace = "header"
+	NsHeaderTD          Namespace = "header-td"
+	NsCanonicalHash     Namespace = "canonical-hash"
+	NsHeaderNumber      Namespace = "header-number"
+	NsBody              Namespace = "body"
+	NsReceipts          Namespace = "receipts"
+	NsTxLookup          Namespace = "tx-lookup"
+	NsCode              Namespace = "code"           // "c" + hash
+	NsValidatorCode     Namespace = "validator-code" // "vc" + hash
+	NsStateNode         Namespace = "state-node"     // bare 32-byte key: trie node or legacy code
+	NsPreimage          Namespace = "preimage"
+	NsHead              Namespace = "head-pointer"
+	NsSyncEra           Namespace = "sync-era"
+	NsLeaderContinuous  Namespace = "continuous"
+	NsConfig            Namespace = "config"
+	NsBloom             Namespace = "bloom"
+	NsSkeleton          Namespace = "skeleton"
+	NsOther             Namespace = "other"
+)
+
+// Meta carries the parsed key components a rule needs.
+type Meta struct {
+	Address []byte   // 20-byte address where applicable
+	Epoch   *big.Int // parsed epoch suffix where applicable
+	Number  uint64   // block number where applicable
+	ShardID uint32   // shard id where applicable
+	// CanonicalEpochSuffix reports whether the raw epoch suffix byte-equals
+	// epoch.Bytes() (big.Int canonical form, no leading zeros; empty for 0).
+	CanonicalEpochSuffix bool
+}
+
+var (
+	pValidatorList = []byte("validator-list")
+	pDVL           = []byte("dvl")
+	pSnapshot      = []byte("validator-snapshot")
+	pStats         = []byte("validator-stats")
+	pSS            = []byte("ss")
+	pEpochNum      = []byte("harmony-epoch-block-number")
+	pEpochVRF      = []byte("epoch-vrf-block-numbers")
+	pEpochVDF      = []byte("epoch-vdf-block-number")
+	pBlkRwd        = []byte("blk-rwd-")
+	pBlockSig      = []byte("block-sig-")
+	pLastCommits   = []byte("LastCommits")
+	pPendingCL     = []byte("pendingCL")
+	pPendingSC     = []byte("pendingSC")
+	pCL            = []byte("cl")
+	pCXSpent       = []byte("cxReceiptSpent")
+	pCXReceipt     = []byte("cxReceipt")
+	pCX            = []byte("cx")
+	pSecureKey     = []byte("secure-key-")
+	pConfig        = []byte("ethereum-config-")
+	pGenesis       = []byte("ethereum-genesis-")
+	pBloomIdx      = []byte("iB")
+
+	headKeys = [][]byte{
+		[]byte("LastHeader"), []byte("LastBlock"), []byte("LastFast"), []byte("LastFinalized"),
+	}
+	syncEraKeys = [][]byte{
+		[]byte("LastPivot"), []byte("TrieSync"), []byte("SnapshotDisabled"), []byte("SnapshotRoot"),
+		[]byte("SnapshotJournal"), []byte("SnapshotGenerator"), []byte("SnapshotRecovery"),
+		[]byte("SnapshotSyncStatus"), []byte("SkeletonSyncStatus"), []byte("SnapdbInfo"),
+		[]byte("unclean-shutdown"), []byte("InvalidBlock"), []byte("TransactionIndexTail"),
+		[]byte("FastTransactionLookupLimit"), []byte("eth2-transition"), []byte("DatabaseVersion"),
+		[]byte("preimage-import"), []byte("preimage-gen-start"), []byte("preimage-gen-end"),
+	}
+)
+
+func be8(b []byte) uint64 {
+	var n uint64
+	for _, x := range b {
+		n = n<<8 | uint64(x)
+	}
+	return n
+}
+
+func be4(b []byte) uint32 {
+	var n uint32
+	for _, x := range b {
+		n = n<<8 | uint32(x)
+	}
+	return n
+}
+
+// epochMeta parses a variable-length big-endian epoch suffix and records
+// whether it is canonical (byte-equal to epoch.Bytes(): no leading zeros,
+// empty for zero).
+func epochMeta(suffix []byte) (m Meta) {
+	e := new(big.Int).SetBytes(suffix)
+	m.Epoch = e
+	m.CanonicalEpochSuffix = bytes.Equal(suffix, e.Bytes())
+	return m
+}
+
+// Classify identifies the namespace of a raw LevelDB key and parses its
+// components. It is a total function: unknown shapes map to NsOther.
+func Classify(key []byte) (Namespace, Meta) {
+	switch {
+	case bytes.Equal(key, pValidatorList):
+		return NsValidatorList, Meta{}
+	case bytes.HasPrefix(key, pSnapshot): // check before shorter prefixes
+		rest := key[len(pSnapshot):]
+		if len(rest) < 20 {
+			return NsValidatorSnapshot, Meta{}
+		}
+		m := epochMeta(rest[20:])
+		m.Address = rest[:20]
+		return NsValidatorSnapshot, m
+	case bytes.HasPrefix(key, pStats):
+		m := Meta{}
+		if rest := key[len(pStats):]; len(rest) == 20 {
+			m.Address = rest
+		}
+		return NsValidatorStats, m
+	case bytes.HasPrefix(key, pDVL):
+		m := Meta{}
+		if rest := key[len(pDVL):]; len(rest) == 20 {
+			m.Address = rest
+		}
+		return NsDVL, m
+	case bytes.HasPrefix(key, pEpochNum):
+		return NsEpochBlockNumber, epochMeta(key[len(pEpochNum):])
+	case bytes.HasPrefix(key, pEpochVRF):
+		return NsEpochVRF, epochMeta(key[len(pEpochVRF):])
+	case bytes.HasPrefix(key, pEpochVDF):
+		return NsEpochVDF, epochMeta(key[len(pEpochVDF):])
+	case bytes.HasPrefix(key, pBlkRwd):
+		m := Meta{}
+		if rest := key[len(pBlkRwd):]; len(rest) == 8 {
+			m.Number = be8(rest)
+		}
+		return NsBlockRewardAccum, m
+	case bytes.HasPrefix(key, pBlockSig):
+		m := Meta{}
+		if rest := key[len(pBlockSig):]; len(rest) == 8 {
+			m.Number = be8(rest)
+		}
+		return NsBlockCommitSig, m
+	case bytes.Equal(key, pLastCommits):
+		return NsLastCommits, Meta{}
+	case bytes.HasPrefix(key, pPendingCL):
+		return NsPendingCrossLink, Meta{}
+	case bytes.HasPrefix(key, pPendingSC):
+		return NsPendingSlashing, Meta{}
+	case bytes.HasPrefix(key, pCXSpent): // longer than pCXReceipt/pCX; first
+		m := Meta{}
+		if rest := key[len(pCXSpent):]; len(rest) == 12 {
+			m.ShardID = be4(rest[:4])
+			m.Number = be8(rest[4:])
+		}
+		return NsCXReceiptSpent, m
+	case bytes.HasPrefix(key, pCXReceipt) && len(key) == len(pCXReceipt)+4+8+32:
+		m := Meta{ShardID: be4(key[len(pCXReceipt) : len(pCXReceipt)+4]), Number: be8(key[len(pCXReceipt)+4 : len(pCXReceipt)+12])}
+		return NsCXReceipt, m
+	case bytes.HasPrefix(key, pCX) && len(key) == 2+32:
+		return NsCXLookup, Meta{}
+	case bytes.HasPrefix(key, pCL) && len(key) == 2+4:
+		return NsCrossLinkPointer, Meta{ShardID: be4(key[2:])}
+	case bytes.HasPrefix(key, pCL) && len(key) == 2+4+8:
+		return NsCrossLink, Meta{ShardID: be4(key[2:6]), Number: be8(key[6:])}
+	case bytes.HasPrefix(key, pSS):
+		return NsShardState, epochMeta(key[len(pSS):])
+	case bytes.HasPrefix(key, pSecureKey):
+		return NsPreimage, Meta{}
+	case bytes.HasPrefix(key, pConfig), bytes.HasPrefix(key, pGenesis):
+		return NsConfig, Meta{}
+	case bytes.HasPrefix(key, pBloomIdx):
+		return NsBloom, Meta{}
+	case len(key) == 32:
+		return NsStateNode, Meta{}
+	case len(key) == 1+8+32 && key[0] == 'h':
+		return NsHeader, Meta{Number: be8(key[1:9])}
+	case len(key) == 1+8+32+1 && key[0] == 'h' && key[41] == 't':
+		return NsHeaderTD, Meta{Number: be8(key[1:9])}
+	case len(key) == 1+8+1 && key[0] == 'h' && key[9] == 'n':
+		return NsCanonicalHash, Meta{Number: be8(key[1:9])}
+	case len(key) == 1+32 && key[0] == 'H':
+		return NsHeaderNumber, Meta{}
+	case len(key) == 1+8+32 && key[0] == 'b':
+		return NsBody, Meta{Number: be8(key[1:9])}
+	case len(key) == 1+8+32 && key[0] == 'r':
+		return NsReceipts, Meta{Number: be8(key[1:9])}
+	case len(key) == 1+32 && key[0] == 'l':
+		return NsTxLookup, Meta{}
+	case len(key) == 1+32 && key[0] == 'c':
+		return NsCode, Meta{}
+	case len(key) == 2+32 && key[0] == 'v' && key[1] == 'c':
+		return NsValidatorCode, Meta{}
+	case len(key) == 1+8 && key[0] == 'S':
+		return NsSkeleton, Meta{Number: be8(key[1:])}
+	case len(key) == 1+2+8+32 && key[0] == 'B':
+		return NsBloom, Meta{}
+	case bytes.Equal(key, []byte("continuous")):
+		return NsLeaderContinuous, Meta{}
+	}
+	for _, hk := range headKeys {
+		if bytes.Equal(key, hk) {
+			return NsHead, Meta{}
+		}
+	}
+	for _, sk := range syncEraKeys {
+		if bytes.Equal(key, sk) {
+			return NsSyncEra, Meta{}
+		}
+	}
+	return NsOther, Meta{}
+}
+
+// KeyShapeError reports a key inside a namespace prefix whose shape is
+// invalid (wrong component lengths), with the offending key hex.
+func KeyShapeError(ns Namespace, key []byte) error {
+	return fmt.Errorf("strictdb: malformed %s key %x (len %d)", ns, key, len(key))
+}
diff --git a/internal/recovery/strictdb/strictdb_test.go b/internal/recovery/strictdb/strictdb_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1d455b5a64
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/recovery/strictdb/strictdb_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+package strictdb
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"errors"
+	"math/big"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common"
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/ethdb"
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/ethdb/memorydb"
+)
+
+func snapKey(addr common.Address, epoch *big.Int) []byte {
+	k := append([]byte("validator-snapshot"), addr.Bytes()...)
+	return append(k, epoch.Bytes()...)
+}
+
+func TestClassifyNamespaces(t *testing.T) {
+	addr := common.HexToAddress("0x00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff00112233")
+	u64 := func(n uint64) []byte { b := make([]byte, 8); binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(b, n); return b }
+	u32 := func(n uint32) []byte { b := make([]byte, 4); binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(b, n); return b }
+	cl := func(shard uint32, num uint64) []byte { return append(append([]byte("cl"), u32(shard)...), u64(num)...) }
+
+	cases := []struct {
+		name   string
+		key    []byte
+		wantNS Namespace
+		check  func(Meta) bool
+	}{
+		{"validator-list", []byte("validator-list"), NsValidatorList, nil},
+		{"dvl", append([]byte("dvl"), addr.Bytes()...), NsDVL, func(m Meta) bool { return bytes.Equal(m.Address, addr.Bytes()) }},
+		{"snapshot-2byte-epoch", snapKey(addr, big.NewInt(3002)), NsValidatorSnapshot, func(m Meta) bool {
+			return m.Epoch.Uint64() == 3002 && m.CanonicalEpochSuffix
+		}},
+		{"snapshot-epoch-0", snapKey(addr, big.NewInt(0)), NsValidatorSnapshot, func(m Meta) bool {
+			return m.Epoch.Sign() == 0 && m.CanonicalEpochSuffix
+		}},
+		{"ss", append([]byte("ss"), big.NewInt(3002).Bytes()...), NsShardState, func(m Meta) bool { return m.Epoch.Uint64() == 3002 }},
+		{"stats", append([]byte("validator-stats"), addr.Bytes()...), NsValidatorStats, nil},
+		{"blk-rwd", append([]byte("blk-rwd-"), u64(92730034)...), NsBlockRewardAccum, func(m Meta) bool { return m.Number == 92730034 }},
+		{"block-sig", append([]byte("block-sig-"), u64(5)...), NsBlockCommitSig, func(m Meta) bool { return m.Number == 5 }},
+		{"LastCommits", []byte("LastCommits"), NsLastCommits, nil},
+		{"pendingCL", []byte("pendingCL"), NsPendingCrossLink, nil},
+		{"crosslink-record", cl(1, 42), NsCrossLink, func(m Meta) bool { return m.ShardID == 1 && m.Number == 42 }},
+		{"crosslink-pointer", append([]byte("cl"), u32(1)...), NsCrossLinkPointer, func(m Meta) bool { return m.ShardID == 1 }},
+		{"cxReceiptSpent", append(append([]byte("cxReceiptSpent"), u32(1)...), u64(7)...), NsCXReceiptSpent, func(m Meta) bool { return m.ShardID == 1 && m.Number == 7 }},
+		{"LastHeader", []byte("LastHeader"), NsHead, nil},
+		{"LastPivot", []byte("LastPivot"), NsSyncEra, nil},
+		{"continuous", []byte("continuous"), NsLeaderContinuous, nil},
+		{"epoch-vrf", append([]byte("epoch-vrf-block-numbers"), big.NewInt(3003).Bytes()...), NsEpochVRF, func(m Meta) bool { return m.Epoch.Uint64() == 3003 }},
+	}
+	for _, c := range cases {
+		t.Run(c.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			ns, meta := Classify(c.key)
+			if ns != c.wantNS {
+				t.Fatalf("Classify(%x) ns = %s, want %s", c.key, ns, c.wantNS)
+			}
+			if c.check != nil && !c.check(meta) {
+				t.Fatalf("Classify(%x) meta check failed: %+v", c.key, meta)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestClassifyNoncanonicalEpochSuffix(t *testing.T) {
+	// Leading-zero alias for epoch 3002 (0x0BBA) => 0x000BBA.
+	alias := append([]byte("ss"), 0x00, 0x0b, 0xba)
+	ns, meta := Classify(alias)
+	if ns != NsShardState {
+		t.Fatalf("ns = %s", ns)
+	}
+	if meta.CanonicalEpochSuffix {
+		t.Fatal("leading-zero suffix must be flagged noncanonical")
+	}
+	if meta.Epoch.Uint64() != 3002 {
+		t.Fatalf("parsed epoch %s, want 3002", meta.Epoch)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestForEachChecksIteratorError(t *testing.T) {
+	mem := memorydb.New()
+	_ = mem.Put([]byte("dvl\x01"), []byte("v1"))
+	_ = mem.Put([]byte("dvl\x02"), []byte("v2"))
+	// Wrap in an iteratee that injects an error on exhaustion.
+	it := &erroringIteratee{inner: mem, failAfter: 1}
+	var seen int
+	err := ForEach(it, []byte("dvl"), func(k, v []byte) error { seen++; return nil })
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("ForEach must surface a latched iterator error")
+	}
+}
+
+// erroringIteratee returns an iterator that reports an error after
+// failAfter keys.
+type erroringIteratee struct {
+	inner     ethdb.KeyValueStore
+	failAfter int
+}
+
+func (e *erroringIteratee) NewIterator(prefix, start []byte) ethdb.Iterator {
+	return &erroringIter{inner: e.inner.NewIterator(prefix, start), failAfter: e.failAfter}
+}
+
+type erroringIter struct {
+	inner   ethdb.Iterator
+	failAfter int
+	seen    int
+}
+
+func (i *erroringIter) Next() bool {
+	if i.seen >= i.failAfter {
+		return false
+	}
+	i.seen++
+	return i.inner.Next()
+}
+func (i *erroringIter) Key() []byte   { return i.inner.Key() }
+func (i *erroringIter) Value() []byte { return i.inner.Value() }
+func (i *erroringIter) Release()      { i.inner.Release() }
+func (i *erroringIter) Error() error  { return errors.New("injected iterator error") }
diff --git a/scripts/recovery/gen-metadata-fixtures.sh b/scripts/recovery/gen-metadata-fixtures.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000000..fa0908e68c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/recovery/gen-metadata-fixtures.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Regenerates the metadata acceptance fixture chain under
+# testdata/recovery/metadata/kit (a localnet twin chain with real BLS
+# certificates from the public .hmy dev keys, deterministic block times, and
+# fixture-only BLS validator secrets — byte-reproducible, safe to commit,
+# never used outside tests). Requires the BLS build environment
+# (scripts/setup_bls_build_flags.sh).
+#
+# The acceptance suite (internal/recovery/metadata/acceptance) regenerates
+# fixtures in-process, so this script is for the devops pilot and manual
+# inspection. See docs/recovery/metadata.md for the run-once runbook.
+set -euo pipefail
+
+cd "$(dirname "${0}")/../.."
+# setup_bls_build_flags.sh reads $1 unguarded (its -v flag); relax nounset
+# around the source so running this script without arguments works.
+set +u
+. scripts/setup_bls_build_flags.sh
+set -u
+
+OUT="${1:-testdata/recovery/metadata/kit}"
+
+case "$(uname -s)" in
+Darwin)
+   # Homebrew gmp is not on the default linker path (bls links -lgmp).
+   GMP_DIR="${GMP_DIR:-$(brew --prefix gmp 2>/dev/null || echo /opt/homebrew/opt/gmp)}"
+   export CGO_LDFLAGS="${CGO_LDFLAGS} -L${GMP_DIR}/lib"
+   # SIP strips DYLD_* from the environment across protected binaries
+   # (bash/go), so `go run` aborts loading libbls384_256.dylib. Build the
+   # generator, then launch it via /usr/bin/env with the variable set
+   # explicitly for the (unprotected) generator binary itself — the same
+   # mechanism the test suite uses (go test -exec "/usr/bin/env DYLD_...").
+   BIN="$(mktemp -d)/metadata-fixture-gen"
+   trap 'rm -rf "$(dirname "${BIN}")"' EXIT
+   go build -o "${BIN}" ./internal/recovery/metadata/fixture/gen
+   /usr/bin/env DYLD_FALLBACK_LIBRARY_PATH="${DYLD_FALLBACK_LIBRARY_PATH}" "${BIN}" "${OUT}"
+   ;;
+*)
+   go run ./internal/recovery/metadata/fixture/gen "${OUT}"
+   ;;
+esac
+echo "metadata fixture kit written to ${OUT}"
diff --git a/scripts/recovery/gen-preflight-fixtures.sh b/scripts/recovery/gen-preflight-fixtures.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000000..c0ea6b5517
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/recovery/gen-preflight-fixtures.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Regenerates the deterministic preflight fixtures under
+# testdata/recovery/preflight/. The fixtures embed fixture-only BLS secrets
+# (small fixed scalars) and are safe to commit; they must never be used
+# outside tests. Requires the BLS build environment
+# (scripts/setup_bls_build_flags.sh).
+set -euo pipefail
+
+cd "$(dirname "${0}")/../.."
+. scripts/setup_bls_build_flags.sh
+
+go run ./internal/recovery/inplace/fixture/gen "${1:-testdata/recovery/preflight}"
+echo "fixtures written to ${1:-testdata/recovery/preflight}"
diff --git a/testdata/recovery/metadata/README.md b/testdata/recovery/metadata/README.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..27270567b0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testdata/recovery/metadata/README.md
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+# testdata/recovery/metadata
+
+Committed goldens for the `harmony-recovery metadata` command family.
+
+- `golden/root-help.txt`, `golden/metadata-help.txt`, `golden/preflight-help.txt`
+  — CLI help goldens pinned by `cmd/harmony-recovery.TestGoldenHelpFiles`
+  (regenerate with `UPDATE_GOLDEN=1 go test ./cmd/harmony-recovery/`). The
+  preflight golden pins that registration of the metadata group left the
+  preflight help byte-identical.
+- `kit/` — the committed localnet fixture kit, regenerated byte-identically
+  by `scripts/recovery/gen-metadata-fixtures.sh` (canonicalized LevelDB
+  directories, deterministic block times, fixture-only BLS secrets derived
+  from fixed scalars, dev committee keys from the public `.hmy` keys):
+  - `kit/harmony_db_0/` — the dirty chain: head 48, target 30 (epoch 2),
+    pre-target create-validator (22) / delegate (26) / precompile-actor
+    funding (28), the 36/37 epoch transition, and the post-target
+    abandoned-branch staking schedule — create (40), delegate (42), top-up
+    (43), plus the `0xfc` precompile delegation matrix: direct (45), nested
+    contract→`0xfc` (46), reverted (47), top-up (48).
+  - `kit/clean/harmony_db_0/` — the clean twin: the same deterministic
+    chain ended at the target (blocks 1..30 byte-identical to the dirty
+    chain's).
+  - `kit/fixture-keys/` — fixture-only BLS secrets (public test keys, never
+    used outside tests).
+  - `kit/recovery-anchor.localnet.json` — the kit's anchor config.
+  - `kit/reference/` — golden export artifacts over the dirty DB
+    (`metadata-30.hmr`, `metadata-30.reference.json`,
+    `run-checksums.sha256`). The internal export report (run evidence:
+    absolute paths, inode, timestamps) is deliberately excluded — it is
+    machine-specific by design.
+  - `kit/ground-truth.json` — target tuple, staking schedule and artifact
+    digests.
+
+  `acceptance.TestCommittedKitGolden` pins a fresh in-process export over
+  the committed dirty DB against these goldens byte-for-byte. The
+  acceptance suite otherwise generates fixtures in-process; the committed
+  kit is the pinned golden, the devops-pilot input (§5.7) and the
+  manual-inspection artifact. Two script runs produce byte-identical trees
+  (`diff -r` clean).
+
+The shipped mainnet anchor config lives at
+`docs/recovery/recovery-anchor.mainnet.json` (pinned against the compiled
+constants by `cmd/harmony-recovery.TestAnchorDriftPin`).
diff --git a/testdata/recovery/metadata/golden/metadata-help.txt b/testdata/recovery/metadata/golden/metadata-help.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8865e7a91f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testdata/recovery/metadata/golden/metadata-help.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+The metadata command family derives the recovery target's validator
+metadata from a STOPPED node's shard-0 LevelDB: scan (diagnosis/dry-run),
+export-reference (the run-once canonical .hmr + reference JSON producer)
+and audit-branch (masked re-execution of the abandoned branch).
+
+Exit codes: 0 OK; 13 unsafe open/concurrent writer; 14 I/O or corruption;
+15 invalid config/paths; 16 interrupted; 20 MISSING_REQUIRED_METADATA;
+21 INVALID_RETAINED_METADATA; 22 TARGET_STATE_UNAVAILABLE;
+23 DETERMINISM_MISMATCH; 24 AUDIT_ANOMALY; 130 SIGINT.
+
+Usage:
+  harmony-recovery metadata [flags]
+  harmony-recovery metadata [command]
+
+Available Commands:
+  audit-branch     Re-execute the abandoned branch over a masked overlay and reconcile every planned deletion
+  export-reference Produce the canonical .hmr reference package and reference manifest (run-once producer)
+  scan             Diagnose and dry-run the metadata normalization (read-only; run before export and audit)
+
+Flags:
+  -h, --help   help for metadata
+
+Use "harmony-recovery metadata [command] --help" for more information about a command.
diff --git a/testdata/recovery/metadata/golden/preflight-help.txt b/testdata/recovery/metadata/golden/preflight-help.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a0181500b0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testdata/recovery/metadata/golden/preflight-help.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+preflight verifies - against a live or stopped shard-0 LevelDB - that the
+compiled-in recovery target block's header, certificate, ancestry and
+complete state are present and cryptographically consistent. It never
+writes to the database. The final stdout line is exactly "PASS" or
+"FAIL: <reason>"; a small JSON receipt is written for reporting.
+
+Exit codes: 0 PASS, 1 FAIL, 2 unusable (flags/layout), 3 persistent read error.
+
+Usage:
+  harmony-recovery preflight --db /path/to/harmony_db_0 [--name "my-validator"] [flags]
+
+Flags:
+      --db string             path to the node's harmony_db_0 directory (required)
+      --db-cache-mb int       LevelDB block cache size in MiB (default 256)
+      --handles int           open-file cache capacity for the LevelDB reader (default 512)
+  -h, --help                  help for preflight
+      --name string           optional validator name for the receipt (coordinators use it to attribute results)
+      --network string        network schedule to verify against (default "mainnet")
+      --report string         receipt output path (never inside --db) (default "preflight-result.json")
+      --shard uint32          shard id (the compiled anchor is shard 0)
+      --storage-workers int   storage/code verification workers (0 = min(8, NumCPU))
+      --trie-cache-mb int     trie clean-cache size in MiB (default 256)
diff --git a/testdata/recovery/metadata/golden/root-help.txt b/testdata/recovery/metadata/golden/root-help.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b43fee6069
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testdata/recovery/metadata/golden/root-help.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+harmony-recovery hosts the emergency shard-0 in-place recovery tooling.
+The preflight subcommand samples a validator database for recovery
+eligibility without stopping the node and never writes to the database.
+The metadata command group (scan, export-reference, audit-branch) derives
+and audits the recovery target's validator metadata on a stopped node.
+
+Usage:
+  harmony-recovery [flags]
+  harmony-recovery [command]
+
+Available Commands:
+  completion  Generate the autocompletion script for the specified shell
+  help        Help about any command
+  metadata    Offline validator-metadata maintenance (scan, export-reference, audit-branch; stopped node required)
+  preflight   Sample a shard-0 database for recovery target availability (never writes; node may keep running)
+
+Flags:
+  -h, --help      help for harmony-recovery
+  -v, --version   version for harmony-recovery
+
+Use "harmony-recovery [command] --help" for more information about a command.
diff --git a/testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/clean/fixture-keys/9e00cb2fd4086271c15800ac202b64fce280ae6822c9136a3d867fa760f52472f824d92f9ed0b9dfabfd440aa26da996.hex b/testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/clean/fixture-keys/9e00cb2fd4086271c15800ac202b64fce280ae6822c9136a3d867fa760f52472f824d92f9ed0b9dfabfd440aa26da996.hex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..80c7a93330
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/clean/fixture-keys/9e00cb2fd4086271c15800ac202b64fce280ae6822c9136a3d867fa760f52472f824d92f9ed0b9dfabfd440aa26da996.hex
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+b4a31518ddde38e110ab2c143d7fb236b17bde1785c4de17eaf1817b4843de00
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/clean/harmony_db_0/000002.log b/testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/clean/harmony_db_0/000002.log
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e69de29bb2
diff --git a/testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/clean/harmony_db_0/000004.ldb b/testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/clean/harmony_db_0/000004.ldb
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a81708edd6
Binary files /dev/null and b/testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/clean/harmony_db_0/000004.ldb differ
diff --git a/testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/clean/harmony_db_0/CURRENT b/testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/clean/harmony_db_0/CURRENT
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..feda7d6b24
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/clean/harmony_db_0/CURRENT
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+MANIFEST-000000
diff --git a/testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/clean/harmony_db_0/LOCK b/testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/clean/harmony_db_0/LOCK
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e69de29bb2
diff --git a/testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/clean/harmony_db_0/MANIFEST-000000 b/testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/clean/harmony_db_0/MANIFEST-000000
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..137b0ac46e
Binary files /dev/null and b/testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/clean/harmony_db_0/MANIFEST-000000 differ
diff --git a/testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/fixture-keys/4775152cc020879dcebbd77c332e69c98621528ddd4b470fdf96c0689a6610c67dac430eb4b27d5ece696c2c4e022600.hex b/testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/fixture-keys/4775152cc020879dcebbd77c332e69c98621528ddd4b470fdf96c0689a6610c67dac430eb4b27d5ece696c2c4e022600.hex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7af0b66d39
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/fixture-keys/4775152cc020879dcebbd77c332e69c98621528ddd4b470fdf96c0689a6610c67dac430eb4b27d5ece696c2c4e022600.hex
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+22551392d897b16c9a41dd0a636e7170e80db9a95645b71af4dc42cd20554600
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/fixture-keys/9e00cb2fd4086271c15800ac202b64fce280ae6822c9136a3d867fa760f52472f824d92f9ed0b9dfabfd440aa26da996.hex b/testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/fixture-keys/9e00cb2fd4086271c15800ac202b64fce280ae6822c9136a3d867fa760f52472f824d92f9ed0b9dfabfd440aa26da996.hex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..80c7a93330
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/fixture-keys/9e00cb2fd4086271c15800ac202b64fce280ae6822c9136a3d867fa760f52472f824d92f9ed0b9dfabfd440aa26da996.hex
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+b4a31518ddde38e110ab2c143d7fb236b17bde1785c4de17eaf1817b4843de00
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/ground-truth.json b/testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/ground-truth.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d4b5f5cb41
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/ground-truth.json
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+{
+  "abandoned_child_hash": "0x797a8bb62da1e2a810994979554c1e87dac5dc37883e029a101b2844012a3a67",
+  "blocks": 48,
+  "head_hash": "0x8db488df141e6952aff2291301e0403f2104ce05a10e701e5a9c80e802d6b7a5",
+  "hmr_sha256": "78d66d4a4b4d003ffd005be682126e03cc1c7d32cfcced10ae0ce28a69e52f52",
+  "network": "localnet",
+  "reference_sha256": "e8e507c88f9a0528257bfaf431f5f8adcf94d86899457d087f8f048fb67e66a9",
+  "schema": "metadata-kit-ground-truth-v1",
+  "staking_schedule": {
+    "create_validator": 22,
+    "delegate": 26,
+    "fund_precompile": 28,
+    "post_create_validator": 40,
+    "post_delegate": 42,
+    "post_top_up": 43,
+    "precompile_direct": 45,
+    "precompile_nested": 46,
+    "precompile_reverted": 47,
+    "precompile_top_up": 48
+  },
+  "target_hash": "0x0429eb8e1d6f837e16f1c2e94e1bd13b78b1882029ec9ca1f03ed17152b2f79a",
+  "target_height": 30
+}
diff --git a/testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/harmony_db_0/000002.log b/testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/harmony_db_0/000002.log
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e69de29bb2
diff --git a/testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/harmony_db_0/000004.ldb b/testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/harmony_db_0/000004.ldb
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2fc626e473
Binary files /dev/null and b/testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/harmony_db_0/000004.ldb differ
diff --git a/testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/harmony_db_0/CURRENT b/testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/harmony_db_0/CURRENT
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..feda7d6b24
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/harmony_db_0/CURRENT
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+MANIFEST-000000
diff --git a/testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/harmony_db_0/LOCK b/testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/harmony_db_0/LOCK
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e69de29bb2
diff --git a/testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/harmony_db_0/MANIFEST-000000 b/testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/harmony_db_0/MANIFEST-000000
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5c057674b1
Binary files /dev/null and b/testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/harmony_db_0/MANIFEST-000000 differ
diff --git a/testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/recovery-anchor.localnet.json b/testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/recovery-anchor.localnet.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..155c443fe1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/recovery-anchor.localnet.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"schema":"recovery-anchor-v1","network":"localnet","shard":0,"target_height":30,"target_hash":"0x0429eb8e1d6f837e16f1c2e94e1bd13b78b1882029ec9ca1f03ed17152b2f79a","abandoned_child_hash":"0x797a8bb62da1e2a810994979554c1e87dac5dc37883e029a101b2844012a3a67","epoch":2,"epoch_first_block":21,"epoch_last_block":36,"snapshot_base_height":19,"audit_end_height":48,"known_bad_blocks":null}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/reference/metadata-30.hmr b/testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/reference/metadata-30.hmr
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..301c7d1e01
Binary files /dev/null and b/testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/reference/metadata-30.hmr differ
diff --git a/testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/reference/metadata-30.reference.json b/testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/reference/metadata-30.reference.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..96c5f43fbb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/reference/metadata-30.reference.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"absence_assertions":[{"expected_remaining":0,"namespace":"validator-snapshot","predicate":"epoch>2"},{"expected_remaining":0,"namespace":"ss","predicate":"epoch>2"},{"expected_remaining":0,"namespace":"harmony-epoch-block-number","predicate":"epoch>2"},{"expected_remaining":0,"namespace":"epoch-vrf-block-numbers","predicate":"epoch>2"},{"expected_remaining":0,"namespace":"epoch-vdf-block-number","predicate":"epoch>2"},{"expected_remaining":0,"namespace":"blk-rwd","predicate":"number>30"},{"expected_remaining":0,"namespace":"dvl","predicate":"entry.BlockNum>30"},{"expected_remaining":0,"namespace":"pendingCL","predicate":"present"},{"expected_remaining":0,"namespace":"pendingSC","predicate":"present"},{"expected_remaining":0,"namespace":"LastCommits","predicate":"present"}],"anchor":{"abandoned_child_hash":"0x797a8bb62da1e2a810994979554c1e87dac5dc37883e029a101b2844012a3a67","epoch":2,"epoch_first_block":21,"epoch_last_block":36,"snapshot_base_height":19,"target_hash":"0x0429eb8e1d6f837e16f1c2e94e1bd13b78b1882029ec9ca1f03ed17152b2f79a","target_height":30,"target_root":"0x0d1364376e0bdca3bc667fa664b24f21215cd0e3fe8ffb2f210b92c541abeb09"},"anchor_config_sha256":"8070dca42bd7990ed1ea2f18386108f270e9c4d98f631a419aa01ac6a350d98a","diagnostics_sha256":"4f53cda18c2baa0c0354bb5f9a3ecbe5ed12ab4d8e11ba873c2f11161202b945","network":"localnet","package_sha256":"78d66d4a4b4d003ffd005be682126e03cc1c7d32cfcced10ae0ce28a69e52f52","record_count":6,"ruleset_version":"hmr-norm-v1","schema":"hmr-reference-v1","sections":[{"name":"validator-list","record_count":1,"sha256":"34847f1d769dcd16db49c73a2541f252ea6a5ca6275152041f089e7aba9cbfc2"},{"name":"dvl","record_count":2,"sha256":"a840eef82ea0c114d9d30683934e275604c28120df060382d42e289dbeedeec9"},{"name":"validator-snapshot-2","record_count":1,"sha256":"5c1cc2813e7f4272e68b6272d18009578d581ae2dfb89c7970b1b5f6c725dee0"},{"name":"shard-state-2","record_count":1,"sha256":"10be04df8c9dfa1580ffd34581ada6ba8071f9206051de4852d624ca1acd98f5"},{"name":"reward-accumulator","record_count":1,"sha256":"f1e1dfc4a6548b990c3b19a620c1b4afd58d72367af0bd45a9aed4a19766f265"}],"shard":0,"wrapper_set_sha256":"805522fe9e96a59dc797712096fccd3fb668cd0ef4e9d636be570fa302aa473f"}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/reference/run-checksums.sha256 b/testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/reference/run-checksums.sha256
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dfb1b9a804
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testdata/recovery/metadata/kit/reference/run-checksums.sha256
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+78d66d4a4b4d003ffd005be682126e03cc1c7d32cfcced10ae0ce28a69e52f52  metadata-30.hmr
+e8e507c88f9a0528257bfaf431f5f8adcf94d86899457d087f8f048fb67e66a9  metadata-30.reference.json
diff --git a/testdata/recovery/preflight/README.md b/testdata/recovery/preflight/README.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6058d7562e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testdata/recovery/preflight/README.md
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+# Preflight test fixtures
+
+Deterministic fixtures for `harmony-recovery preflight`
+(`cmd/harmony-recovery`, `internal/recovery/inplace/*`). Each variant
+directory holds a small shard-0 LevelDB (`harmony_db_0`) with a BLS-signed
+localnet header chain (boundary 36 → target 44 → child 45, epoch 3), the
+boundary `ss` record, exact `block-sig` record, and a state trie with EOA /
+contract / validator / legacy-code / crafted flag-edge accounts.
+`fixtures.json` lists each variant's target hash and state root; `golden/`
+holds the pinned receipts and the toy-state digest vector.
+
+Regenerate with:
+
+```bash
+scripts/recovery/gen-preflight-fixtures.sh
+```
+
+Generation is **byte-reproducible**: after building, the generator rewrites
+each database into a canonical form (every key-value re-inserted in sorted
+order, so LevelDB's internal sequence numbers are a pure function of the
+content, then fully compacted; the timestamped `LOG` file is dropped).
+`TestBuildByteReproducible` pins two generations byte-identical, and
+`TestCommittedFixtureAgreement` fails if the committed trees drift from a
+fresh generation.
+
+Tests build identical fixtures hermetically in temp dirs via
+`internal/recovery/inplace/fixture`; the one exception is
+`TestCommittedFixtureAgreement`, which runs the CLI against the committed
+`base/harmony_db_0` copy and fails if it is missing or drifts from the
+golden receipt — pinning the committed fixtures, the in-test generator and
+the goldens together. The materialized copies also serve manual inspection
+and ad-hoc runs:
+
+```bash
+./bin/harmony-recovery preflight \
+    --db testdata/recovery/preflight/base/harmony_db_0 \
+    --network localnet \
+    --target-height 44 \
+    --target-hash $(jq -r .base.target_hash testdata/recovery/preflight/fixtures.json)
+```
+
+## SECURITY NOTE — fixture-only BLS secrets
+
+The committee secret keys in these fixtures are **fixed small scalars**
+(secret *i* = 32-byte little-endian of *i+1*; the pinned
+`SecretKey.SetLittleEndian` performs no modular reduction). They exist so
+the fixtures are byte-reproducible. They are trivially recoverable by
+anyone and must NEVER be used outside tests.
diff --git a/testdata/recovery/preflight/bad-account-leaf/harmony_db_0/000004.ldb b/testdata/recovery/preflight/bad-account-leaf/harmony_db_0/000004.ldb
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7543a1e420
Binary files /dev/null and b/testdata/recovery/preflight/bad-account-leaf/harmony_db_0/000004.ldb differ
diff --git a/testdata/recovery/preflight/bad-account-leaf/harmony_db_0/CURRENT b/testdata/recovery/preflight/bad-account-leaf/harmony_db_0/CURRENT
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..feda7d6b24
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testdata/recovery/preflight/bad-account-leaf/harmony_db_0/CURRENT
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+MANIFEST-000000
diff --git a/testdata/recovery/preflight/bad-account-leaf/harmony_db_0/LOCK b/testdata/recovery/preflight/bad-account-leaf/harmony_db_0/LOCK
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e69de29bb2
diff --git a/testdata/recovery/preflight/bad-account-leaf/harmony_db_0/MANIFEST-000000 b/testdata/recovery/preflight/bad-account-leaf/harmony_db_0/MANIFEST-000000
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..259584f51c
Binary files /dev/null and b/testdata/recovery/preflight/bad-account-leaf/harmony_db_0/MANIFEST-000000 differ
diff --git a/testdata/recovery/preflight/bad-storage-leaf/harmony_db_0/000004.ldb b/testdata/recovery/preflight/bad-storage-leaf/harmony_db_0/000004.ldb
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c0d4c2164d
Binary files /dev/null and b/testdata/recovery/preflight/bad-storage-leaf/harmony_db_0/000004.ldb differ
diff --git a/testdata/recovery/preflight/bad-storage-leaf/harmony_db_0/CURRENT b/testdata/recovery/preflight/bad-storage-leaf/harmony_db_0/CURRENT
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..feda7d6b24
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testdata/recovery/preflight/bad-storage-leaf/harmony_db_0/CURRENT
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+MANIFEST-000000
diff --git a/testdata/recovery/preflight/bad-storage-leaf/harmony_db_0/LOCK b/testdata/recovery/preflight/bad-storage-leaf/harmony_db_0/LOCK
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e69de29bb2
diff --git a/testdata/recovery/preflight/bad-storage-leaf/harmony_db_0/MANIFEST-000000 b/testdata/recovery/preflight/bad-storage-leaf/harmony_db_0/MANIFEST-000000
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9ccc04a456
Binary files /dev/null and b/testdata/recovery/preflight/bad-storage-leaf/harmony_db_0/MANIFEST-000000 differ
diff --git a/testdata/recovery/preflight/base/harmony_db_0/000004.ldb b/testdata/recovery/preflight/base/harmony_db_0/000004.ldb
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..188aeac17d
Binary files /dev/null and b/testdata/recovery/preflight/base/harmony_db_0/000004.ldb differ
diff --git a/testdata/recovery/preflight/base/harmony_db_0/CURRENT b/testdata/recovery/preflight/base/harmony_db_0/CURRENT
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..feda7d6b24
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testdata/recovery/preflight/base/harmony_db_0/CURRENT
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+MANIFEST-000000
diff --git a/testdata/recovery/preflight/base/harmony_db_0/LOCK b/testdata/recovery/preflight/base/harmony_db_0/LOCK
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e69de29bb2
diff --git a/testdata/recovery/preflight/base/harmony_db_0/MANIFEST-000000 b/testdata/recovery/preflight/base/harmony_db_0/MANIFEST-000000
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..203b9454d6
Binary files /dev/null and b/testdata/recovery/preflight/base/harmony_db_0/MANIFEST-000000 differ
diff --git a/testdata/recovery/preflight/fixtures.json b/testdata/recovery/preflight/fixtures.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..630347a12f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testdata/recovery/preflight/fixtures.json
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+{
+  "bad-account-leaf": {
+    "state_root": "0x787a54bc01ed044689ced5e1de5e945572300f60ceeeeb3ee877d433887a2a09",
+    "target_hash": "0xefce7e84539bf07cc4b47e1f5a4978a93e56c47f30815823f889e30878cd346b",
+    "child_hash": "0x55daeda0db851c85153a76c15e7713427824d0f0e0fdcf0440f9aeea367d8dfa",
+    "target_height": 44,
+    "network": "localnet"
+  },
+  "bad-storage-leaf": {
+    "state_root": "0x755c11e90abd83cfd01af3a5090d4e436c31aa18652e34da2e67de0d09ba1e30",
+    "target_hash": "0xa9788a811d95b8e0b191c94961d8b42e02ca95994ffeedf7dcb334e7ba4af643",
+    "child_hash": "0xed19139f62fa1db350c21b9ef8d5275b952b4eb4dc69ce5b896e456d3cad5246",
+    "target_height": 44,
+    "network": "localnet"
+  },
+  "base": {
+    "state_root": "0xbb76bf6baabeb17cabe998226b71c2fa63493bdeb950869ccc96c5fdc05a248b",
+    "target_hash": "0x3572752c3747bf7d1879da8415a3c701940ad7216291863b5776535634fb5f3a",
+    "child_hash": "0x340d92a335f998aefb6f6e4737d3bbbee82f95f64c82267b260e943dbd031f64",
+    "target_height": 44,
+    "network": "localnet"
+  },
+  "flagged-empty-code": {
+    "state_root": "0x01ca67db75e8aad48b2e515ed615f9cd31746a951ff9d8fa21797321f5626cb7",
+    "target_hash": "0x134dffb5cc4a2536ca58d0d929aa766229e32a2efa9968cd385bd9d566c32fb3",
+    "child_hash": "0xe6d8d4f5b84fbe5349ca901bff2f3e0999336d0ad22cb32fda0142a881d5f612",
+    "target_height": 44,
+    "network": "localnet"
+  },
+  "many-anomalies": {
+    "state_root": "0x6dc03adbce3e0f851fcd266765e241c5410987905fbe4d8985ae3494dd4870af",
+    "target_hash": "0xf229d4058eacbd5d9f7a95ff73876fd210f1461e1942dfc5cf5dc06c70a2f230",
+    "child_hash": "0x57541ffcd077089de6c003f1c2e0cfc5dddfbee2b1397f76eff3d89db1cea978",
+    "target_height": 44,
+    "network": "localnet"
+  },
+  "wrapper-unbound": {
+    "state_root": "0x0af51babe6e05ea87e52c6eb58dbabc20aac37b0dc4171ab38b3467980c792e5",
+    "target_hash": "0x654ba743ab6e29d58daa7cccf7b2bcc4236f6854b4fbb72587710d6945e6c435",
+    "child_hash": "0x1dac60d8ad0240f4ab154ea8faf4f1957a5587eca6abf0a34ffbca1d3d94f931",
+    "target_height": 44,
+    "network": "localnet"
+  }
+}
diff --git a/testdata/recovery/preflight/flagged-empty-code/harmony_db_0/000004.ldb b/testdata/recovery/preflight/flagged-empty-code/harmony_db_0/000004.ldb
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..092738ac44
Binary files /dev/null and b/testdata/recovery/preflight/flagged-empty-code/harmony_db_0/000004.ldb differ
diff --git a/testdata/recovery/preflight/flagged-empty-code/harmony_db_0/CURRENT b/testdata/recovery/preflight/flagged-empty-code/harmony_db_0/CURRENT
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..feda7d6b24
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testdata/recovery/preflight/flagged-empty-code/harmony_db_0/CURRENT
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+MANIFEST-000000
diff --git a/testdata/recovery/preflight/flagged-empty-code/harmony_db_0/LOCK b/testdata/recovery/preflight/flagged-empty-code/harmony_db_0/LOCK
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e69de29bb2
diff --git a/testdata/recovery/preflight/flagged-empty-code/harmony_db_0/MANIFEST-000000 b/testdata/recovery/preflight/flagged-empty-code/harmony_db_0/MANIFEST-000000
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..90878b7891
Binary files /dev/null and b/testdata/recovery/preflight/flagged-empty-code/harmony_db_0/MANIFEST-000000 differ
diff --git a/testdata/recovery/preflight/golden/receipt-fail-state-walk.json b/testdata/recovery/preflight/golden/receipt-fail-state-walk.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e323a668c0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testdata/recovery/preflight/golden/receipt-fail-state-walk.json
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+{
+  "tool": "harmony-recovery preflight",
+  "schema": "preflight-result-v2",
+  "build": {},
+  "name": "golden-validator",
+  "hostname": "\u003chost\u003e",
+  "network": "localnet",
+  "shard": 0,
+  "db_path": "\u003cdb\u003e",
+  "node_probably_running": false,
+  "sample_note": "result reflects the database at scan time; if the node was running, this is a point-in-time sample - authoritative verification happens at apply time on a stopped node",
+  "started_at": "\u003ctime\u003e",
+  "duration_s": 0,
+  "retries": {
+    "reopen_count": 0
+  },
+  "target": {
+    "height": 44,
+    "hash": "0x3572752c3747bf7d1879da8415a3c701940ad7216291863b5776535634fb5f3a",
+    "state_root": "0xbb76bf6baabeb17cabe998226b71c2fa63493bdeb950869ccc96c5fdc05a248b",
+    "epoch": 3,
+    "view_id": 44
+  },
+  "checks": {
+    "ancestry_to_boundary": "ok",
+    "body": "ok",
+    "certificate": "ok",
+    "shard_state": "ok",
+    "state_walk": "fail: account trie root (root 0xbb76bf6baabeb17cabe998226b71c2fa63493bdeb950869ccc96c5fdc05a248b): missing trie node 0xbb76bf6baabeb17cabe998226b71c2fa63493bdeb950869ccc96c5fdc05a248b at path ",
+    "target_header": "ok"
+  },
+  "head_sample": {
+    "last_header": "0x340d92a335f998aefb6f6e4737d3bbbee82f95f64c82267b260e943dbd031f64",
+    "last_block": "0x340d92a335f998aefb6f6e4737d3bbbee82f95f64c82267b260e943dbd031f64",
+    "walk_to_target": "reached-target",
+    "child_at_target_plus_1": "0x340d92a335f998aefb6f6e4737d3bbbee82f95f64c82267b260e943dbd031f64"
+  },
+  "certificate_sources": {
+    "exact_key_present": true,
+    "child_header_present": true,
+    "satisfied_by": "exact-key+child-header"
+  },
+  "state": {
+    "counts": {
+      "accounts": 0,
+      "account_trie_nodes": 0,
+      "storage_tries": 0,
+      "storage_trie_nodes": 0,
+      "storage_leaves": 0,
+      "code_refs_contract": 0,
+      "code_refs_validator": 0,
+      "unique_code_contract": 0,
+      "unique_code_validator": 0,
+      "unique_code_bytes": 0
+    },
+    "anomalies": {
+      "total": 0,
+      "omitted": 0
+    }
+  },
+  "result": "FAIL",
+  "fail_reason": "state_walk: account trie root (root 0xbb76bf6baabeb17cabe998226b71c2fa63493bdeb950869ccc96c5fdc05a248b): missing trie node 0xbb76bf6baabeb17cabe998226b71c2fa63493bdeb950869ccc96c5fdc05a248b at path ",
+  "exit_code": 1
+}
diff --git a/testdata/recovery/preflight/golden/receipt-pass.json b/testdata/recovery/preflight/golden/receipt-pass.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4e7e8d4fd8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testdata/recovery/preflight/golden/receipt-pass.json
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+{
+  "tool": "harmony-recovery preflight",
+  "schema": "preflight-result-v2",
+  "build": {},
+  "name": "golden-validator",
+  "hostname": "\u003chost\u003e",
+  "network": "localnet",
+  "shard": 0,
+  "db_path": "\u003cdb\u003e",
+  "node_probably_running": false,
+  "sample_note": "result reflects the database at scan time; if the node was running, this is a point-in-time sample - authoritative verification happens at apply time on a stopped node",
+  "started_at": "\u003ctime\u003e",
+  "duration_s": 0,
+  "retries": {
+    "reopen_count": 0
+  },
+  "target": {
+    "height": 44,
+    "hash": "0x3572752c3747bf7d1879da8415a3c701940ad7216291863b5776535634fb5f3a",
+    "state_root": "0xbb76bf6baabeb17cabe998226b71c2fa63493bdeb950869ccc96c5fdc05a248b",
+    "epoch": 3,
+    "view_id": 44
+  },
+  "checks": {
+    "ancestry_to_boundary": "ok",
+    "body": "ok",
+    "certificate": "ok",
+    "shard_state": "ok",
+    "state_walk": "ok",
+    "target_header": "ok"
+  },
+  "head_sample": {
+    "last_header": "0x340d92a335f998aefb6f6e4737d3bbbee82f95f64c82267b260e943dbd031f64",
+    "last_block": "0x340d92a335f998aefb6f6e4737d3bbbee82f95f64c82267b260e943dbd031f64",
+    "walk_to_target": "reached-target",
+    "child_at_target_plus_1": "0x340d92a335f998aefb6f6e4737d3bbbee82f95f64c82267b260e943dbd031f64"
+  },
+  "certificate_sources": {
+    "exact_key_present": true,
+    "child_header_present": true,
+    "satisfied_by": "exact-key+child-header"
+  },
+  "state": {
+    "digest": "34fe1ee840cc02ebe4899a7a4d68f166e243d3079c5efad64dcc6761b96fecea",
+    "digest_algorithm": "preflight_state_digest_v1",
+    "counts": {
+      "accounts": 1008,
+      "account_trie_nodes": 1359,
+      "storage_tries": 7,
+      "storage_trie_nodes": 138,
+      "storage_leaves": 103,
+      "code_refs_contract": 4,
+      "code_refs_validator": 3,
+      "unique_code_contract": 4,
+      "unique_code_validator": 3,
+      "unique_code_bytes": 3742
+    },
+    "anomalies": {
+      "total": 4,
+      "by_kind": {
+        "code-dual-class": 1,
+        "flag-decoded-zero": 1,
+        "flag-noncanonical-value": 1,
+        "wrapper-shaped-contract-code": 1
+      },
+      "examples": [
+        {
+          "kind": "flag-noncanonical-value",
+          "detail": "account 0x07d2236a00cf6561c5a98863aef977e5292e4fbabe01c1851cb04f67afe23262 IsValidator flag value 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 differs from canonical"
+        },
+        {
+          "kind": "flag-decoded-zero",
+          "detail": "account 0x295d5d5c2b48a6a8e54752c31abe0bca000407a0926bb649b8253fe7e2f484be has an IsValidator flag leaf decoding to zero"
+        },
+        {
+          "kind": "wrapper-shaped-contract-code",
+          "detail": "unflagged account 0x5b1b69802f05faa3d0edfe2552ed49074d05a8c234209f41ce4f138cf5136aa6 carries wrapper-shaped code 0xbc21520a961771b96eefe386e5e8b4988abf75b17f6e90fe4c7325319b854694 (stays contract)"
+        },
+        {
+          "kind": "code-dual-class",
+          "detail": "code hash 0xbc21520a961771b96eefe386e5e8b4988abf75b17f6e90fe4c7325319b854694 referenced as both contract and validator code"
+        }
+      ],
+      "omitted": 0
+    }
+  },
+  "result": "PASS",
+  "exit_code": 0
+}
diff --git a/testdata/recovery/preflight/golden/receipt-read-error.json b/testdata/recovery/preflight/golden/receipt-read-error.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d63d0f1f0a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testdata/recovery/preflight/golden/receipt-read-error.json
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+{
+  "tool": "harmony-recovery preflight",
+  "schema": "preflight-result-v2",
+  "build": {},
+  "name": "golden-validator",
+  "hostname": "\u003chost\u003e",
+  "network": "localnet",
+  "shard": 0,
+  "db_path": "\u003cdb\u003e",
+  "node_probably_running": false,
+  "sample_note": "result reflects the database at scan time; if the node was running, this is a point-in-time sample - authoritative verification happens at apply time on a stopped node",
+  "started_at": "\u003ctime\u003e",
+  "duration_s": 0,
+  "retries": {
+    "reopen_count": 0
+  },
+  "target": {
+    "height": 44,
+    "hash": "0x3572752c3747bf7d1879da8415a3c701940ad7216291863b5776535634fb5f3a"
+  },
+  "checks": {
+    "ancestry_to_boundary": "skipped",
+    "body": "skipped",
+    "certificate": "skipped",
+    "shard_state": "skipped",
+    "state_walk": "skipped",
+    "target_header": "skipped"
+  },
+  "head_sample": {},
+  "certificate_sources": {
+    "exact_key_present": false,
+    "child_header_present": false
+  },
+  "state": {
+    "counts": {
+      "accounts": 0,
+      "account_trie_nodes": 0,
+      "storage_tries": 0,
+      "storage_trie_nodes": 0,
+      "storage_leaves": 0,
+      "code_refs_contract": 0,
+      "code_refs_validator": 0,
+      "unique_code_contract": 0,
+      "unique_code_validator": 0,
+      "unique_code_bytes": 0
+    },
+    "anomalies": {
+      "total": 0,
+      "omitted": 0
+    }
+  },
+  "result": "FAIL",
+  "fail_reason": "\u003cread-error\u003e",
+  "exit_code": 3
+}
diff --git a/testdata/recovery/preflight/golden/toy_state_digest.txt b/testdata/recovery/preflight/golden/toy_state_digest.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..470d01131c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testdata/recovery/preflight/golden/toy_state_digest.txt
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+d51f1046734cf9fc6437ca2ed685bbbf3dba41980e1382c2e36d2b93dab080a2
diff --git a/testdata/recovery/preflight/many-anomalies/harmony_db_0/000004.ldb b/testdata/recovery/preflight/many-anomalies/harmony_db_0/000004.ldb
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ca702dac62
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diff --git a/testdata/recovery/preflight/many-anomalies/harmony_db_0/CURRENT b/testdata/recovery/preflight/many-anomalies/harmony_db_0/CURRENT
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..feda7d6b24
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testdata/recovery/preflight/many-anomalies/harmony_db_0/CURRENT
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+MANIFEST-000000
diff --git a/testdata/recovery/preflight/many-anomalies/harmony_db_0/LOCK b/testdata/recovery/preflight/many-anomalies/harmony_db_0/LOCK
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e69de29bb2
diff --git a/testdata/recovery/preflight/many-anomalies/harmony_db_0/MANIFEST-000000 b/testdata/recovery/preflight/many-anomalies/harmony_db_0/MANIFEST-000000
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..227164e610
Binary files /dev/null and b/testdata/recovery/preflight/many-anomalies/harmony_db_0/MANIFEST-000000 differ
diff --git a/testdata/recovery/preflight/wrapper-unbound/harmony_db_0/000004.ldb b/testdata/recovery/preflight/wrapper-unbound/harmony_db_0/000004.ldb
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..06fa27c810
Binary files /dev/null and b/testdata/recovery/preflight/wrapper-unbound/harmony_db_0/000004.ldb differ
diff --git a/testdata/recovery/preflight/wrapper-unbound/harmony_db_0/CURRENT b/testdata/recovery/preflight/wrapper-unbound/harmony_db_0/CURRENT
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..feda7d6b24
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testdata/recovery/preflight/wrapper-unbound/harmony_db_0/CURRENT
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+MANIFEST-000000
diff --git a/testdata/recovery/preflight/wrapper-unbound/harmony_db_0/LOCK b/testdata/recovery/preflight/wrapper-unbound/harmony_db_0/LOCK
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e69de29bb2
diff --git a/testdata/recovery/preflight/wrapper-unbound/harmony_db_0/MANIFEST-000000 b/testdata/recovery/preflight/wrapper-unbound/harmony_db_0/MANIFEST-000000
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8e344cb85c
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